§ 18. Upon trial for engaging in the slave trade, by carrying two blacks from a port in Africa to Brazil, the defendant alleged that the blacks whom he received on board had free papers, as if manumitted. It was adjudged to be evidence of the genuineness of the manumission papers that they were attested and sealed by persons purporting to be Portuguese notaries public on that coast, and who had acted as such in other business; that they were on the kind of paper and under the stamp used there in the public offices; were lodged with the proper authorities in Brazil, and the Portuguese consu! there certified to the notaries' being regular officers of his government, and that the American consul in Brazil obtained and sent to this country all these papers with translations. United States v. Libby, 1 Woodb. & M., 221.

§ 19. In bankruptcy.- Proof of debt taken before a notary public under the provisions of the act of June 22, 1874, amending the bankrupt act, is not admissible as proof of the debt unless it be authenticated by the notary's signature and seal, and the impression of the seal must show it to be that of the notary whose acts it purports to authenticate. In re Nebe,* 11 N. B. R., 289.

ors.

$20. Notaries public are competent to acknowledge letters of attorney to represent creditThe provision, in general order in bankruptcy No. 34, for their acknowledgment before a register or United States commissioner, is not in exclusion of other methods of proof. In re Butterfield,* 14 N. B. R., 195.

$21. Notaries public have authority to take the acknowledgments of creditors to powers of attorney in bankruptcy proceedings. In re McDuffee,* 14 N. B. R., 336.

§ 22. Under the statute of August 15, 1876 (19 Stats., 206, ch. 304), notaries public have authority to swear bankrupts as to their schedules. In re Bailey,* 15 N. B. R., 48.

§ 23. Notaries public have not, under the act of congress of September 16, 1850, or the act of July 29, 1854, the judicial power to take legal proof of a claim, by deposition or otherwise, against the estate of a bankrupt under the bankrupt act. In re Strauss,* 2 N. B. R., 18.

§ 24. A notary public is not authorized to take a creditor's acknowledgment to a power of attorney to vote for assignee, under general order No. 34 in bankruptcy. In re Higgins, 8 Ben., 100.

§ 25. A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was verified before a notary public, proceedings instituted and an adjudication of bankruptcy made by default. Upon petition by a creditor to vacate the adjudication because the petition was verified before a notary, held, that the verification before a notary public was irregular, but as the question of proper verification was one of practice, and not of jurisdiction, and the verification had been recognized as proper and an order of adjudication had been entered, it was too late for the debtor or any creditor to raise the question. In re Gitchell, 8 Ben., 256.

§ 26. The certificate of a notary public in Liverpool of the authority of English assignees in bankruptcy is sufficient to enable them to be admitted as defendants in a suit against the bankrupts in this country. Wilson v. Stewart, 1 Cr. C. C., 123.

NOTES.

See BILLS AND NOTES.

NOTICE.

[See APPEALS; BILLS AND NOTES; BONDS; CONTRACTS; EQUITY. By registration, see CONVEYANCES. Innocent Purchaser, see FRAUD; LAND; SALES. In Bankruptcy, see DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. In Practice, see PRACTICE; WRITS.]

§ 1. Constructive notice is notice imputed by the law to a person not having actual notice; and every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and who omits to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence, is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself. Gress v. Evans,* 1 Dak. T'y, 387.

§ 2. To affect a purchaser with constructive notice, it is not enough that he had the means of obtaining, and might by prudent caution have obtained, knowledge of the fact, but whether not obtaining it was an act of gross negligence. Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall., 83.

§ 3. A mortgage was given in reality to indemnify the mortgagee, but purporting to secure a sum of money payable in one year, and five years afterwards it was assigned, the whole

sum appearing from the instrument to be unpaid. Held, that the circumstances of the case should have put the assignee upon inquiry, from which he would have learned the true consideration of the mortgage, and that having thus had constructive notice, his rights with reference to the mortgage were no better than those of his assignor, the mortgagee. United States v. Sturges, 1 Paine, 525.

§ 4. Party put on inquiry.-Information which makes it the duty of a party to make inquiry, and shows where it may be effectually made, is notice of all facts to which such inquiry might have led. But a party thus put on inquiry is to be allowed a reasonable time to make it before he is affected with notice. Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt., 390.

§ 5. A party put upon inquiry by the known facts is affected with notice of interdependent facts. Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How., 333.

§ 6. To be published "once a week."- Where an act of congress required notice to be published once a week for three months, held, that a week, within the meaning of the statute, is a definite period of time beginning with Sunday and ending with Saturday, and that a notice published on one day during each week for that time is sufficient, even if more than seven days elapsed between two successive publications. Roukendorff v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349. § 7. Where a statute requires a notice to be published "once in each week for four weeks” there should be an interval of seven days between each of the four publications. In re King, 7 N. B. R., 279; 5 Ben., 453.

§ 8. Thus, where, under such a statute, notice was published on the 11th, 21st and 27th days of January, and on the 1st and 10th days of February, held insufficient. Ibid.

§ 9. In writing.—Under the act of congress providing that any person who "shall harbor or conceal" (a fugitive from labor), "after notice that he or she was a fugitive, shall forfeit," etc., held, that in order to render a party liable under the law, the notice need not be in writing, or come from the master of the fugitives, or his agent; but that full knowledge, derived from the negroes, or otherwise, that they were fugitives from labor, was sufficient notice to the one harboring them. Jones v. Vanzandt, 2 McL., 611.

§ 10. The act of Rhode Island (Digest of 1822, p. 246, sec. 3) provides "that no guardian shall be appointed or removed under this act, unless all persons interested shall have had reasonable notice in writing, signed by the clerk, and served by the town sergeant or constable, that he, she, or they may appear to object to the same." Held, that a notice by reading the order of the court is not a "notice in writing,” in the sense of the statute, and that the appointment of a guardian, with such notice only, was a nullity. Hart v. Gray, 3 Sumn., § 11. Service on Sunday.-A notice cannot lawfully be served on Sunday. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Bradley, 4 Cr. C. C., 193. Notice of rescission of a contract may be given on Sunday. Pence v. Langdon, 9 Otto, 578.

339.

§ 12. A printed tariff of charges at a dry dock, not brought to the notice of the master or owner of the vessel taken into such dock for repairs, is not binding upon such master or owner. Ives v. The Steamboat Buckeye State, 1 Newb., 69.

§ 13. Notice by mail.— Where a clause in an insurance policy required notice in writing to be given to the underwriters of any subsequent insurance on the property that the same might be indorsed on the policy, held, that evidence of writing and posting a letter notifying the company of subsequent insurance is not evidence of giving the notice required. To constitute such notice the letter must have been received. Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 4 How., 185.

§ 14. To be read.- A person chargeable with the duty of giving a notice does not perform that duty by handing the party entitled to notice a paper containing such notice, especially if the person to whom it is handed is directed to use it in a particular way and for a particular purpose, which does not require him to examine or read it. An agent presented, for his principal, United States bonds to the assistant treasurer for payment. The assistant treasurer gave him a receipt for the same and directed him to take the receipt to the cashier in another part of the building. The receipt, which was not examined by the agent, contained the following: "Payment made subject to examination and acceptance of bonds by the department at Washington." Upon examination at Washington, the bonds were found to be forged. Upon suit brought against the agent for the money received on the forged bonds, such money having in the meantime been paid over to his principal, held, that the above clause in the receipt was not notice to him of the conditional payment of the bonds. United States v. Pinover, 3 Fed. R., 305.

§ 15. Designation of newspaper.- Where a statute requires a notice to be published in a paper where "the place of its publication is nearest the land," the language must be taken as referring to the particular place where the paper is first issued, that is, given to the public for circulation, and not to the place where the papers may be sent for distribution. Leroy v. Jamison, 3 Saw., 369.

§ 16. Purchaser.- Where a plaintiff seeks to set up the equitable against the legal title in the defendant, he must aver that the latter purchased with notice, and at the trial conclusively prove such averment. McNeil v. Magee, 5 Mason, 244.

§ 17. Notoriety, at a subsequent time, of an adverse title cannot affect rights of a purchaser antecedently vested. Ibid.

§ 18. A purchaser who has notice of such facts as with ordinary diligence would lead him to a full knowledge of an outstanding equity is a purchaser with notice. Hinde v. Vattier, 1 McL., 110.

§ 19. Neither floating rumor nor a notice by one who has no interest in the property is sufficient to affect the conscience of a purchaser. Piatt v. Vattier, 1 McL., 146.

§ 20. Notice to a purchaser, who purchased from one who was a bona fide purchaser, without notice, cannot affect the title. Ibid.

§ 21. Notice ordinarily sufficient to put a party on inquiry is not necessarily notice of all that might be learned by inquiry where the purchaser had a right to rely upon positive representations of the vendor. Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet., 210.

§ 22. A full consideration paid in cash will not protect a purchaser who has notice, actual or constructive, that the vendor is selling to hinder and delay his creditors. A. bought of a merchant, B., at a late hour in the night, his stock of goods. A. knew B.'s general reputation for honesty was bad; that he was not punctual in the payment of his debts; that the value of all the property B. possessed before he purchased the goods did not exceed one-half of the goods purchased; that it was unusual for country merchants to buy exclusively for cash; that he was selling the stock for one-half of its cost, in the height of the business season, and at about the time debts contracted in its purchase would be maturing; that B. had not advertised in any mode his desire to sell the goods; and that he probably had not disclosed his purpose to do so to any other person. A. intended to make money out of the purchase by selling the goods where they were at public auction, and must have known that the same method of disposing of the goods was open to B., and that there was no reason why he should not resort to it if he owed no debts and was honest. Held, that A. had constructive notice of the fraudulent character of the sale and could not claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of the fraud. Singer v. Jacobs, 3 McC., 638.

§ 23. Where a patent to land is issued to William Park Lea instead of William P. Lea, a purchaser of the land from William Park Lea, without notice of the mistake, will be protected in equity; and the actual possession of such purchaser is notice of his title, although his deed be not recorded until long afterwards, so as to bar, under the statute of limitations, any relief sought. Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 21 How., 493.

§ 24. Where A. mortgaged to B. the whole of his stock in trade, and on the same day made oath to the petition for the benefit of the bankrupt act, and B. subsequently assigned all his right, title and interest in the said stock to a certain bank, held, that inasmuch as the bank had notice, at the time when the assignment was made, that A. had failed, and only took it as collateral security for old claims upon B., it was not a bona fide purchase for a valuable consideration without notice. Morse v. Godfrey, 3 Story, 364.

§ 25. The pendency of proceedings in bankruptcy is sufficient constructive notice to all grantees of property proceeding from the bankrupt. Ibid.

§ 26. A stranded vessel was sold by the master at an inadequate price, and immediately thereafter purchased by himself and the wreck commissioner at the price for which she had just been sold, they taking a special warranty of title. Subsequently A. purchased one-half of the vessel from the wreck commissioner, taking a special warranty relating back to the original sale of the vessel, and later the remaining half from the master, taking a general warranty. While in the hands of B., the new master and quarter owner by purchase from A., the vessel was seized and libeled by the former owners on the ground that the sale made on the beach was unnecessary, illegal and collusive. A. and B. claimed to be bona fide purchasers without notice. Held, that as A. and B. purchased with a full knowledge of the antecedent history of the vessel, taking special warranty instead of general warranty, contrary to general custom, and as their own title deeds showed who were the original owners, while other papers showed the manner and consideration of the wreck sale and the purchase of the wreck commissioner and the master for a proportionate sum of the original price, they must be considered as having had constructive notice of the fraud practiced upon the owners, and hence were not entitled to hold as bona fide purchasers. The Schooner Tilton, 5 Mason, 465.

§ 27. There is no such principle of law as that what is matter of record shall be constructive notice to a purchaser. The true doctrine is, that purchasers are affected with constructive notice of all that is apparent upon the face of the title deeds under which they claim, and of such other facts as those already known necessarily put them upon inquiry for; but of other

facts, extrinsic of the title and collateral to it, no constructive notice can be presumed. Dexter v. Harris, 2 Mason, 531.

§ 28. Notice of a lien or incumbrance on property binds the purchaser when received before the actual payment of the purchase money, and arrests all further steps towards the completion of the purchase; and a purchaser, to be protected, must deny notice before the actual payment of the purchase money, and this essential averment cannot be supplied by intendment. Merrill v. Dawson, Hemp., 563; Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How., 375.

§ 29. Notice reaches the conscience of the party, and though he be a purchaser for a valuable consideration, yet, in equity, his rights are the same as were those of the person from whom he purchased. Smith v. Shane, 1 McL., 22.

$30. No person is at liberty to remain intentionally ignorant of facts relating to his purchase within his reach, and then claim protection as an innocent purchaser. Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 181.

§31. A purchase of goods, before seizure, which have become forfeited to the United States, will not purge the forfeiture, when the purchase has been made under a full knowledge of the facts, or of such facts as were sufficient to put the party on inquiry. Where a ship immediately on its return from a voyage, which, under an act of congress, subjected it to forfeiture, was purchased by a party with full knowledge of the facts of the voyage, held, that such purchaser must have had notice of the legal consequences flowing from those acts, and hence was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of the defect of title. The Brig Ploughboy, 1 Gall., 41.

§ 32. Possession by a tenant of an estate at the time of its purchase is constructive notice to the purchaser of the tenant's title, though not of the title of the lessor, or of the party under whom the tenant claims. Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn., 486.

§ 33. Where purchasers of real estate, at the time of their purchase, have actual or constructive notice that it is partnership property, it will be chargeable in their hands with the payment of the partnership debts, even though they have no notice of the existence of partnership debts. If they have no notice that it is partnership property, they are exonerated to the extent of the purchase money already paid by them; but so far as the purchase money has not been paid, it is a substituted fund, chargeable in their hands with the same burdens as the real estate. Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn., 173.

§ 34. Confirmation of land titles.- A notice published by the surveyor-general, stating that he had examined and approved of a certain rancho, confirmed to designated parties, and that the plats would be retained in his office, subject to inspection, for four weeks from the date of publication, held, to be insufficient under the act of congress of June 14, 1860, requiring a published notice that a survey and plat of the claim confirmed had been made and approved by the surveyor-general. Leroy v. Jamison, 3 Saw., 369.

35. Title to personal property.-A., a resident of California, directed his agent, B., in New York, to contract for the building of a vessel there, all contracts in relation thereto to be made in the name of B., who was to act as the owner of the vessel and conceal the ownership of A. B. procured the usual builder's certificate in his own name, and had the ship enrolled also in his name. A. having died during the construction of the vessel, his representatives pursued substantially the same line of conduct with reference to the ownership of the ship, except that some of the materials were paid for through another agent. B., being to all appearances owner and possessed of all the indicia of property, sold the vessel. Held, that the purchasers, who were advised by B. that there were parties in California who had advanced money toward building the vessel; that she was originally intended for employment in the waters of that state; that this purpose had been changed; that they now wished the boat sold, and that he, B., was authorized to sell her, did not thereby receive constructive notice of the equitable interest in the heirs or personal representatives of A. Calais Steamboat Co. v. Scudder, 2 Black, 372.

§ 36. Purchase from one executor.- Where property is purchased from one of two joint executors, without the knowledge or consent of the other, and a deed taken from the one executor only, such purchaser takes the property subject to the infirmity of the executor's deed to him, on the principle of caveat emptor, and all subsequent purchasers of him are equally charged with notice. Lipse v. Spears, 4 Hughes, 535.

§ 37. Sale under trust deed.— As the law has prescribed no particular form for the notice of a sale under a trust deed, it is sufficient if, upon the whole matter, it appears calculated reasonably to apprise the public of the property intended to be sold. Where a notice described the property as "lot 99, in P., B., T. and D.'s addition to Georgetown, fronting sixty feet on F. street and one hundred and twenty feet on S. street," held, that the notice was sufficient, although the property was in T.'s addition instead of the one named in the notice. Newman v. Jackson, 12 Wheat., 570.

§ 38. Mortgage.—Where A. promises B. to buy machinery of C., and let B. have it to use at an agreed price per yard for cloth made by it at B.'s factory, A. to furnish the raw cotton and credit B. towards payment for the machinery with what the cloth sells for beyond that price and expenses; and a memorandum at the bottom of the contract calls the machinery collateral security for the money paid for it by A., the contract may be deemed a mortgage of the machinery to A. in equity, and any person buying such machinery of B. knowing the circumstances, or knowing enough to put him on inquiry, cannot hold the machinery without paying A. the balance due. Nor, to constitute notice, is a record of such mortgage necessary. Almy v. Wilber, 2 Woodb. & M., 371.

§ 39. Prior deed or mortgage.- Notice in fact of a prior deed or mortgage may be proved where such prior conveyances have not been recorded, or where by reason of defects in the papers, or the registration thereof, there was no constructive notice. Schultz v. Moore, 1 McL, 520. Actual notice of a deed is sufficient against an attaching creditor of the grantor although the deed was not recorded. Briggs v. French, 2 Sumn., 251.

§ 40. A person having notice of a prior mortgage on a canal boat is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of the act of the New York legislature of 1864. And a person who has discovered enough to put him on inquiry is bound to make further inquiry, and whether he does so or not will be charged with notice of everything to which such inquiry would have reasonably led. The Canal Boat Independence, 9 Ben., 395; Pickert v. Canal Boat Independence, 55 How. Pr., 205.

§ 41. Subsequent vendec.— A. conveyed, by unstamped and unrecorded deeds, a portion of his mining claim to certain parties, who in turn conveyed the same to B., by deeds duly stamped and recorded. Later A. conveyed all his interest in the same mining claims to B., by deeds duly stamped and recorded, and afterwards filed a bill to correct a mistake in the latter conveyance to B., but pendente lite conveyed to C., who had no notice of the prior conveyances by unstamped and unrecorded deeds, all his interest in the mine. Held, that whatever equities A. could have conveyed to any one, as against his prior vendees, had already been conveyed to B., of which conveyance C. had notice, and that therefore all that C. could possibly acquire was the equity, if such existed, on which a reformation of A.'s deed to B. might be obtained. Kinney v. Consolidated Virginia Mining Co., 4 Saw., 382. § 42. Lis pendens. The general principles by which a third person is charged with notice under the doctrine of lis pendens is that the notice attaches only to the thing which is the subject-matter of the suit. In re Great Western Telegraph Co.,* 5 Biss., 363.

§ 43. In regard to promissory notes, fair upon their face, an indorsee is not bound to inquire into the consideration of the note or the circumstances out of which it grew. So a bona *fide indorsee of a note is not charged with notice by a pending suit to declare void a contract made by the litigating parties. Ibid.

$ 44. A person purchasing municipal bonds with actual knowledge of a suit pending to avoid the bonds is not an innocent holder. His position is no better than that of his vendor or indorser, although the paper was purchased before maturity, Durant v. Iowa County, 1 Woolw., 69.

§ 45. To make the pendency of a suit notice, so as to affect the conscience of a purchaser, it is essential that the court have jurisdiction over the thing. Carrington v. Brents, 1 McL., 167.

§ 46. The pendency of a suit cannot operate as notice until after the service of process or publication. Dunn v. Games, 1 McL., 321. Held, that a purchase of real estate in Virginia pending a suit is void, though the notice of the suit is not filed and recorded pursuant to the provisions of the code. Rutherglen v. Woolf,* 1 Hughes, 78.

$47. Where a defendant in ejectment aliens the property in dispute while the proceedings are pending, and the plaintiff ultimately recovers, the vendee cannot set up the statute of limitations as against such plaintiff. although by reason of vexatious delays in the suit he and his vendor have been able to keep the plaintiff out for the period required by statute to give title by possession under color of title. Walden v. Bodley's Heirs, 9 How., 34.

§ 48. Where a vessel, having become subject to a lien for damage by a collision, afterwards comes within the proper jurisdiction in which to be subject to libel, such presence being known to the libelants and no action being taken, a libel, filed four years after the collision, will not affect the rights of bona fide purchasers without notice. And where, pending the collision cause, one of the original purchasers sells his part of the vessel to the other, such part will be subject to no greater liability than that which attached to it in the hands of the seller, as one who has bought in good faith, without notice of an equity, can convey a good title to a purchaser, whether he has or has not notice of the equity. The D. M. French, 1 Low., 43. § 49. Where bonds are secured by lien, and an equitable suit is brought to enforce the lien claimed upon property in the hands of the defendants, who are not charged on the bonds in any other sense than that there is a lien upon their property, such suit operates as a lis pen