§ 12. Use of initials. A party being indicted by the name of D. K. Olney Winter moved that the indictment be quashed upon the ground that he was not described therein by any christian name. The motion was denied, on the ground that as a person may be known by any of the several names given him at baptism, and may, if he like, place initials before instead of behind such name, it was to be presumed that the name set out in the indictment was the only given name by which the defendant had chosen to be known, and that his manner of writing it was the same as that exhibited in the indictment. United States v. Winter, 13 Blatch., 276.

§ 13. Upon suit by "Terence Nugent, Jr.," to recover the value of cotton seized by the United States during the late rebellion, satisfactory evidence being produced by the claimant to establish his loyalty, held, that the appearance of the name of "T. Nugent, Jr.," in the poll list-of those who voted at a presidential election, under the Confederate government, was not sufficient to connect the claimant with that election. Nugent v. United States,* 6 Ct. Cl., 305. § 14. In proving a claim against the estate of a bankrupt, founded on a note of the bankrupt given in favor of A. G. Wallace, and signed W. H. Valentine, the full christian names, or at least the first christian name, of each party should appear, either in the documents offered in evidence or in the record of the proceedings; if the creditor's initials merely are stated it is not sufficient. In re Valentine, 4 Biss., 317.

§ 15. Presumption as to identity.- Where an alleged offender was described in the mandate, issued by the executive for his arrest, as "George Macdonell,” while in the warrant and complaint he was described as George Macdonell, otherwise Macdonnell," held, that the variance was not material, as identity of name raises the presumption of identity of person. In re Macdonnell, 11 Blatch., 79.

§ 16. Upon the question of the admissibility of an oath taken by the claimant under an amnesty proclamation, the name, place of residence, and occupation of the claimant being identical with the name, residence, and business of the person described in the amnesty oath, held, that the identification of the claimant as the one by whom the oath was taken was sufficient, and that the oath was admissible in evidence. Backer v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 551. § 17. Where one set of witnesses describe W. B. as being a respectable man, a deacon in the church, a surveyor, and capable of writing a good hand, and another set describe him as an ignorant, dissipated man, incapable of business, accustomed to hunting, and living the greater part of the time with the Indians, the court may assume that there are two persons of the name of W. B. Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet., 62.

§ 18. Libelant sued under the name of William Henry for a balance of wages due him as cook and steward. In the original articles produced before the commissioner William Henderson was entered as cook and steward. The name was sigued by a mark, and the handwrit ing of the witness to the articles was proved. Held, that as libelant sued in the capacity of cook and steward, he would be presumed, in the absence of proof, to be the person who signed the shipping articles. Henry v. Curry,* Abb. Adm., 433.

§ 19. Courts of admiralty are too familiar with the habit of sailors to assume a variety of names to lay special stress on an objection of misnomer unaccompanied with evidence that the party was not known by the name ascribed to him. Ibid. The administrator of Lebering permitted to draw the wages of a mariner who appeared to have been known on board as Lebrun or Lebring. Ketland v. Lebering,* 2 Wash., 201.

§ 20. Middle name. The law knows but one christian name, and the omission or insertion of the middle name or of the initial letter of that name is immaterial. Where a deed was offered in evidence in which the grantor described himself as "David Carrick Buchanan, formerly David Buchanan," and the person named in the patent was David Buchanan, held, that the deed was admissible as evidence, the jury being left to determine whether David Carrick Buchanan was the same person as David Buchanan named as grantee in the patent. Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet., 322; Dunn v. Games, 1 McL., 321.

§ 21. Where all the papers in the case and the notices published in the newspapers gave the bankrupt's name correctly, but the notices served on the creditors who appeared at the creditors' meeting gave the middle letter of the bankrupt's name as B., instead of D., held, that the variance was not material. In re Hill,* 6 Int. Rev. Rec., 51.

§ 22. Change of name. At common law a man may lawfully change his name, and may sue and be sued by his known and recognized name. Hence a plea alleging that the plaintiff's real name, at the commencement of the suit, was and is S. and not L.; that the real name of the husband of the plaintiff at the time of his marriage to her was S. and not L., must be overruled as bad. Linton v. First Nat. Bank of Kittanning, 10 Fed. R., 894; 13 Rep., 487; 28 Int. Rev. Rec., 104.

§ 23. Amendment.- Where the writ was against E. Briddle, and the declaration against E. Biddle, the defendant having given bail by the name of E. Briddle, and pleaded in bar of the action, held, that judgment could not be arrested on the ground of misnomer; that the

variance being merely matter of form might, by the provisions of the act of congress, be amended at any time. Scull v. Briddle, 2 Wash., 200.

§ 24. Misnomer in judgment.— A mere misnomer is not sufficient to exclude the record of a judgment from being given in evidence, if, in point of fact, the party appeared by a wrong name, and, instead of pleading the misnomer, went to issue on other points, and judgment was given against him; and an averment in an action on the judgment that he is the same person, if made out by proof, will fix the liability of the defendant for the judgment. Stevelie v. Read, 2 Wash., 274.

§ 25. After judgment rendered, misnomer of the plaintiff cannot be taken advantage of. Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413.

§ 26. In pleadings.— The full christian and surnames of all persons referred to in a bill must be inserted therein; but a bill defective in this respect may be amended. Barth v. Makeever, 4 Biss., 206.

27. Demurrer.- At common law a defendant in a criminal case cannot take advantage of a misnomer by demurrer. If he is not proceeded against by his true name, he must so allege in a plea in abatement, and state what his true name is. United States v. Howard, 1 Saw., 507.

NATIONAL BANKS.

See BANKS, NATIONAL.

NATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

See COURTS; STATES.

NATURALIZATION.

See CITIZENS AND ALIENS.

NAVIGABLE RIVERS.

See WATER-COURSES.

NAVIGATION LAWS.

See MARITIME LAW.

NAVY.

See WAR.

NEBRASKA.

See STATES.

NEGLIGENCE.

See CARRIERS; TORTS.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

See BILLS AND NOTES; BONDS.

NEGROES.

See CITIZENS; CONSTITUTION AND LAWS.

NEUTRALITY.

See WAR.

NEVADA.

See STATES.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

See STATES.

NEW JERSEY.

See STATES.

NEW MADRID CERTIFICATES.

See LAND.

NEW MEXICO.

See STATES.

NEW TRIAL.

See PRACTICE.

NEW YORK.

See STATES.

NOLLE PROSEQUI.

See CRIMES; PRACTICE.

NON-IMPORTATION LAWS.

See EMBARGO.

NON-INTERCOURSE LAWS.

See WAR.

NON-RESIDENTS.

See COURTS; PRACTICE.

NONSUIT.

See PRACTICE.

NORTH CAROLINA.

See STATES.

NORTHWEST TERRITORY.

See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS; STATES.

NOTARIAL ACT.

See CONVEYANCES; NOTARY PUBLIC.

NOTARY PUBLIC.

[See BILLS AND NOTES.]

§ 1. An infant may hold the office of notary public at common law. And a minor is not ineligible because the state statute requires county officers to be twenty-one years old, a notary not being a county officer. So where one was indicted for perjury, and he pleaded that the notary before whom he took the oath was an infant, a demurrer to the plea was sustained. United States v. Bixby,* 9 Fed. R., 78.

§ 2. Use of seal.— Where the copy of a record of the condemnation of property insured was offered in evidence without the seal of the notary who made the copy, there being merely flourishes of the pen on the margin of each page, held, no proof being given that the notary had or had not a seal, that the evidence must be rejected. Talcott v. Delaware Ins. Co., 2 Wash., 449.

§ 3. The notarial seal proves itself in all countries where the law merchant prevails, and it is only necessary that it should conform to the law of the place where the notary acts. An impression upon the paper is as good as upon wax, or any tenaceous substance. Orr v. Lacy, 4 McL., 243.

§ 4. Judicial notice is taken of the seal of a notary public from any part of the world, if impressed upon paper or wax. Such seal authenticates an act of protest, and entitles it to full faith and credit. So held where a certificate was offered in evidence, which had been

made in Norway, and which had impressed upon the paper a seal purporting to be that of a notary public in Norway. Pierce v. Indseth, 16 Otto, 546.

§ 5. A notarial seal proves itself. The requisites of such seal are determined by the law of the locality from which the official derives his authority, or if there be no law prescribing what the seal shall be, by the rules of the common law. In re Phillips,* 14 N. B. R., 219; 3 Month. West. Jur., 457.

§ 6. In the absence of statutory provision, an official seal is the impression on the paper directly, or on wax, or wafer, attached thereto, made by the official as and for his seal. Hence the seal impression placed upon a document by a notary public signifies authentication of his official character. It is the seal and not its composition or characters of words and devices which raises the presumption of official character, of which courts take judicial notice. Accordingly where a notarial seal affixed to a jurat contained the words 'Notarial Seai, Lucas Co., Ohio," the name of the notary being omitted, held, sufficient. Ibid.

§ 7. Indication of official character.- Under the act of congress of September 16, 1860, providing that certain oaths, affirmations or acknowledgments may be taken before any notary public, and that "when certified under the hand and official seal of such notary they shall have the same force and effect," etc., held, that the officer need not state in his certificate that he is a notary public and that such certificate is given under his hand and seal; that if the notary signs his name with the words "Notary Public" thereunder, and his seal contains his name and the words "Notary Public," it is a sufficient indication of his official character. Goodyear v. Hullihen, 2 Hughes, 492; 3 Fish. Pat. Cas., 251.

§ 8. Act of clerk or deputy.- A demand of payment of a foreign bill of exchange and protest for non-payment by the clerk of a notary is of no effect. The notary, who acts under oath, is certainly the only one who can make the protest. Sacrider v. Brown, 3 McL., 481.

§ 9. Taking acknowledgments of deeds. A notary public is not incompetent to acknowledge and certify a deed of trust, by reason of his interest as one of the beneficiaries in the trust, such acknowledgment being merely a ministerial duty. National Bank of Fredericksburg v. Conway, 1 Hughes, 37.

§ 10. Powers and liabilities as to commercial paper.-In Mississippi, a notary public is a public officer and becomes the agent of the holder of negotiable paper intrusted to him for demand and protest, and is alone liable to the holder for any failure or negligence in the discharge of his official duties, even though the paper is intrusted to him without the knowledge or authority of the holder by a bank to which it has been sent for the purpose of collection. Britton v. Niccolls, 14 Otto, 757. See BILLS AND NOTES.

§ 11. If a notary public, whose duty it is to demand payment of a bill of exchange from the acceptors, goes several times to their office for the purpose of making demand, but finding the doors closed, and no person there to answer his demand, makes out his notarial protest, certifying to these facts, without seeking out the residences of such acceptors, he has made a legal demand and protest, and is not liable to the holder on the ground of negligence by reason of his not having sought the acceptors at their residences. Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 How., 368. If a notary does not remember that he has made demand, he may refer to his book, and then testify that he made demand as therein stated. Thornton v. Caldwell, 1 Cr. C. C.. 524.

§ 12. Power to administer oaths. A notary public is authorized, under the act of congress of August 16, 1876, to administer the oath required by the laws of the United States to be taken by the directors of national banks. United States v. Neale, 14 Fed. R., 767.

§ 13. Under the act of 1790 a notary public is a proper officer before whom the oaths of persons claiming exemption from military duty under act of March 3, 1863, may be taken. United States v. Sonachall, 4 Biss., 425.

§ 14. Notaries public are proper officers before whom to take verifications to bills and answers, and affidavits in support of, or to oppose, motions for injunction, the notarial acts in such cases being "acts in relation to evidence," within the meaning of the act of congress of July 29, 1854. Blake Crusher Co. v. Ward,* 1 Am. L. T. Rep. (N. S.). 423.

§ 15. Although, under section 2 of chapter 159 of the laws of 1854, notaries public had power to administer oaths in the United States circuit courts, such power is now gone by virtue of section 5596 of the Revised Statutes of 1878. Buerk v. Imhaeuser,* 10 Off. Gaz. Pat., 907.

§ 16. Acts in evidence. By the laws of Louisiana copies of notarial acts are evidence, the original always remaining in the office of the notary. Thus, where a copy of a bill of sale, executed by a notary in New Orleans, and on record in his office, was offered in evidence in a federal court, held, that the court was bound to take judicial notice of the laws of Louisiana and admit the copy as evidence, it being evidence by the state laws. Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet., 607. § 17. An entry made by a notary is admissible as evidence after his death, to prove facts contained therein, it being shown that he kept a record of his notarial acts. Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat., 326.