CONTRIBUTION.
GENERALLY.

1. Among tenants in common.-The widow's right to dower, not
assigned, is an incumbrance endangering the estate, and one tenant in
common can compel contribution from another for extinguishing it.
Chesnut, Jr., et al. v. Chesnut et al.,

442

2. Enforced against infant.—The right to compel contribution in
equity for protecting the common title may be enforced as well against
infants as adults, but the court will scrutinize the transaction closely to
see that the interests of the infant are jealously guarded and properly
protected. Chesnut, Jr., et al. v. Chesnut et al.,
442
CONVERSION.
GENERALLY.

1. Breach of contract.-That which begins in contract, a non-per-
formance of what the party so undertakes to do, or a bare non-delivery
of what he undertakes to deliver, is not to be considered as of itself
amounting to a tortious conversion. Race v. Chandler,
532

2. Delivery of notes to collect.-Where certain notes were delivered
by plaintiff to defendant for him to collect or negotiate for plaintiff, and
there was no restriction as to the mode in which it should be done.
Held, that defendant must be deemed to have had authority, by impli
cation, to make use of such instrumentalities and to adopt such mode as
in the ordinary course of business were usually employed for such pur-
pose, and the mere fact that the notes were left with defendant's
brother, in Aurora, can not be held to constitute a conversion, especially
in view of the fact that the notes were secured by deeds of trust, and
the evidence tends to show the brother was the trustee.

Chandler,

Race v.
532

3. Demand and refusal.—A demand and refusal do not of them-
selves constitute a conversion, but are only presumptive evidence of a
conversion, capable of being rebutted by proof of any facts which con-
stitute a legal justification or excuse for non-delivery. Race v. Chandler,

532

4. What the refusal must be--When inferred.--The refusal must
be absolute, amounting to a denial of the plaintiff's title to the posses-
sion, and not a mere excuse or apology for not delivering the goods; but
it need not be expressed-it may be inferred from non-compliance with
a proper demand. Race v. Chandler,
532

5. Same.-Where defendant, upon demand, agreed to return plaint-
iff's notes the next day, but was delayed by the serious illness of his
father for three days, and then not finding them at home was obliged
to go to Aurora to get them from his brother. Held, that any infer-
ence of a refusal to be derived from defendant's delay in compliance
with the demand is fully rebutted by the circumstances of the case. Race
v. Chandler,
532

6. What is a conversion.-A conversion is a positive torticus act.
Mere non-feasance, or neglect of some legal duty, will not suffice to
support trover, although it may constitute a sufficient ground to main-
tain an action on the case. Race v. Chandler,

532

CONVEYANCES.

GENERALLY.

1. Consideration of deed.—The consideration passing between the parties to a deed may be shown to be different from that expressed on the face of the deed. Neill et al. v. Chessen,

266

2. Deed poll-Acceptance by grantee.-Where a grantee accepts a deed poll, reserving certain duties expressly to be performed by such grantee, assumpsit will lie for the non-performance of them. Glade v. Schmidt, 51

3. Delivery of deed.--As to delivery of deed to grantee without the grantee performing the conditions upon which his right to receive it depended. Eichlor v. Holroyd,

657

4. Sale-Reservation of rent.—Where a party sells land that is held by another by virtue of a lease, the grantee in the deed is entitled to recover the rents accruing after the execution and delivery of the deed unless the rents are reserved by the grantor. But such reservation need not be expressed on the face of the deed. Neill et al. v. Chessen, 266 As to fraudulent conveyance of debtor-See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. As to delivery of deed-See DELIVERY.

CORONER'S INQUEST-See FEES AND SALARIES.

CORPORATIONS.

PRIVATE.

1. Assuming corporate name.-The mere assumption of a name appropriate for a corporation would be no violation of section 220 of the Criminal Code, nor would the putting forth of a sign or advertisement in which a corporate name is assumed, if not done for the purpose of soliciting business, constitute such violation. Edgerton et al, v. Preston et al., 23

2. Personal liability of stockholder.-In a suit brought to enforce the personal liability of a stockholder under the charter of the People's Bank of Belleville, where the stockholder set up as a defense that judg ments had been recovered against him in favor of creditors of the bank, to an amount equal to the amount of his liability as a stockholder, and the judgments had been discharged for a less sum than the amount due, the sum actually paid should be regarded. Kunkelman v. Rentchler, 271

MUNICIPAL.

3. Estoppel.-A municipal corporation may be estopped by the acts of its officers, and a settlement of an existing controversy, if made in good faith, binds the corporation. Brall v. Agnew et al., 122

4. Order for appeal.-Although a municipal corporation may prosecute an appeal without giving bond, yet there must be an order allowing an appeal in all cases. City of Chester v. Wilson,

COSTS.

GENERALLY.

2.9

1. In mechanic's lien.-The rule in regard to costs governing in chancery cases does not apply in proceedings under the statute to enforce a mechanic's lien. The matter of costs in such cases is controlled by statute. Kipp et al. v. Massin, 300

As to costs and expenses incurred in dissolution of injunction-See
INJUNCTION.

COUNTIES.

COUNTY BOARD.

1. County board engaging in business of abstract making.--Where
a county board bought a set of abstract books, and by request the re-
corder took charge of the same and made out and certified to abstracts
of title for persons at rates fixed by the board, and the recorder retain-
ing a portion of the receipts as compensation for his services, the board
thereupon brought suit. Held, that the board can not recover. If it
had authority to engage in the business, and employed the recorder, it
bad authority to pay him for his services, and the services being ren-
dered, a promise to pay would be implied. If the business was ultra
vires the corporate powers of the board, the county can maintain no
action to recover the avails of such enterprise. Brockway v. Cook
County,
560

COURTS-See JURISDICTION.

1. Justices courts.-The court of chancery possesses no legal su-
premacy over justices' courts, and can award no writs in the nature of
a writ of prohibition upon the actions of such courts. Eberhardt et al.
v. Penn. Co.,
541

As to jurisdiction of county, chancery and appellate courts-See Ju-

RISDICTION.

DAMAGES.

GENERALLY.

1. Damnum absque injuria.—Where the death of a party is the re-
sult of a purely accidental occurrence, without the fault of those causing
it, no action will lie, for though there is damage, the thing amiss, the
injuria, is wanting. Lincoln Coal Mining Co. v. McNally,
181

2. For constructing road.-As to damages for constructing track
across a street upon which another railroad has its track. C. & W. I.
R. R. Co. v. C., St. L. & P. R. R. Co.,
587

3. In case of breach of promise.-In a breach of promise case it is
proper to instruct the jury to take into consideration the character and
habits of the plaintiff in estimating the damages, and that no person
addicted to lewdness and unchaste conduct ought to recover as much as
a moral and virtuous person, and this is unaffected by the general
merits or demerits of the defendant. Doubet v. Kirkman,
622

As to damages for mental suffering in case of slander-See SLANDER.
As to damages on injunction bond-See INJUNCTION.

As to exemplary damages in actions under Dram Shop Act-See
DRAM SHOPS.

Damage for draining road-See DRAINAGE.

UPON DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTION.

4. Costs and expenses incurred, when allowable as part of the
damages. Costs and expenses, reasonable in amount, incurred for the
single object of obtaining a discharge of the injunction, are allowable as

DAMAGES.

UPON DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTION. Continued.

part of the damages sustained by reason of the injunction. But where counsel fees and expenses are incurred in defeating the action, and the dissolution of the injunction is only incidental to that result, such fees and expenses are not allowable. Gerard v. Gateau, 520

5. Damages to business.-Damages to the defendant's business, and a consequent loss of profits, if any such resulted from the injunction. are allowable as damages, "by reason of the injunction." Gerard v. Gatean, 520

6. What damages recoverable.-The damages recoverable upon a dissolution of an injunction are limited to such as may have then accrued. Such proceeding can not apply to damages resulting from a subsequent revival of the injunction pending an appeal. Gerard v. Gateau, 520

As to when the suggestion of damages must be filed-See INJUNC

TION.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE BY DEBTOR.

1. Fraudulent conveyance.-The court is of opinion that the circumstances in this case clearly show that the conveyance by the debtor was made with the intent and design to defraud his cred tors, and that the purchaser had notice of such fraud. Cowling v. Estes,

255

2. Notice, how established.-Notice to the purchaser may be established by proving direct and positive knowledge on his part, or the notice may be inferred from the existence of certain facts and circumstances that would place a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry with reference to the conduct of the vendor. Cowling v. Estes, 255

3. Purchaser with notice.-When a debtor has conveyed to a purchaser for value, with the intent and design to defraud his creditors, it is not necessary that the purchaser should have purchased with the intention of aiding the vendor in his fraudulent design, in order to enable the creditor of the vendor to have the conveyance set aside as fraudulent. If the purchaser accepts the conveyance with notice of the fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor, the property so purchased may be subjected to the payment of the debts of the fraudulent vendor. Cowling v. Estes,

255

4. Removing fraudulent conveyances.-The power of courts of equity to remove fraudulent conveyances of a judgment debtor out of the way of an execution in favor of a judgment creditor can not be questioned. But the jurisdiction in such cases rests solely upon grounds of fraud. 458 Fifield v. Gorton et al.,

5. Sale hindering and delaying creditors.-A sale of a debtor's property up on a long and unusual credit has a tendency to hinder and delay creditors by interposing a legal title between them and the debtor, and consequently is a badge of fraud. Cowling v. Estes, GENERALLY.

255

6. Lien of judgment creditor.--The lien in favor of a judgment creditor is given by statute, and can not be extended beyond its terms.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

GENERALLY. Continued.

It is confined to the real estate and does not extend to the rents and
profits. Fifield v. Gorton et al.,
458

7. Taking a note for pre-existing debt.--Taking a note or accept-
ance for a pre-existing debt extends the time of payment of such debt
until the maturity of the note or acceptance, and suspends the remedy
of the creditor until the maturity of the note or bill. Cox v. Keiser,
432

DECLARATIONS--See EVIDENCE.

DEDICATION-See USER.

DEEDS--See CONVEYANCES.

DELIVERY.

GENERALLY.

1. Delivery of deed without performance of condition.---The de-
livery to the grantee of a deed eft in the hands of a third party, with-
out the grantee performing the condition upon which his right to
receive it depended, vests no title in him, and the grantor may recover it
by action or have it removed as a cloud upon his title. Eichlor v.
Holroyd,
657

2. Delivery of note-Trust.-If a son gives a note to his father upon
certain conditions, and in accordance therewith the event happens en-
titling the son to have the note given up to him, and the father delivers
it to A to give to the former, and A puts it among his pap rs, and never
delivers it to the son, A should be treated as the trustee of the son and
bound by the terms of the trust, rather than agent of the father, and
liable to have his authority revoked by him at any time before delivery
of the note. Gibson v. Gibson, etc.,
328

3. Question of intent.-The question of delivery is always one of
intention of the parties. If the deed passes into the hands of the
grantee, without intention on the part of the grantor that it shall be-
come operative and be used for the purpose intended, it is not a
delivery. Brooks v. The People,
570

4. What constitutes sufficient delivery.-Delivery is essential to
make a deed effective, and this delivery must be in the lifetime of the
grantor. After the writing has been signed and sealed, any acts or
words which clearly manifest an ir cention to consummate and complete
it, and to part absolutely and unconditionally with it and all control
over it, are sufficient to give legal existence to it as a deed, and consti-
tute a sufficient delivery. Brooks v. The People,
570

As to delivery of guardian's bond-See BONDS.

DEMAND AND REFUSAL-See CONVERSION.

DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTION-See INJUNCTION.

DISTRESS.

GENERALLY.

1. Delivery of warrant-Liability of landlord for torticus taking.—