as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 23 Stat. 385. This section now appears as § 548 in Title 18 of the United States Code, and the state Supreme Court has ruled that it gives Nebraska authority to try the petitioner. This construction of the section is not in accord with that heretofore given it by the Courts of Nebraska and other courts. In argument before us, Nebraska does not rely on the state Supreme Court's construction of 18 U.S. C. 548. Instead it argues that petitioner's allegation that the crime was committed on an Indian Reservation is false, and that the state Supreme Court was required to take judicial knowledge of its falsity. It admits, however, that Thurston County, where the burglary was allegedly committed, is included within the original statutory boundaries of a federally created Indian Reservation, 14 Stat. 667, 14 Stat. 671, and that the village of Winnebago, where the alleged offense was committed, is located within the boundaries of the Winnebago Reservation. The village of Winnebago, it insists, has ceased to be a part of the Reservation because all the Indians have been given the full benefits of citizenship by Nebraska and because Winnebago is incorporated under the laws of Nebraska and is located entirely upon land which has been patented in fee. The facts upon which this contention rests are said to be those of which Nebraska courts can take judicial knowledge. With these facts thus established, it is said that jurisdiction of Nebraska over this offense is conferred by § 6 of the General Allotment Act passed in 1887, 24 Stat. 390, as amended, 34 Stat. 182. Assuming that all the facts urged by the State are correct, and that these Indian

4 Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417, 30 N. W. 428, cf. Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 152 N. W. 380; State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N. W. 553; People v. Daly, 212 N. Y. 183, 105 N. E. 1048; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375.

786

Opinion of the Court.

lands have been disposed of under this latter statute, the State finds support for its contention in this Court's interpretation of that Act in Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488. But later cases have cast considerable doubt on what was said in the Heff decision. United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 290-291; Hallowell v. United States, 221 U. S. 317, 323; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286, 314; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 269-272; United States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357; United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539.

All of these questions concerning the power of the state courts to try this Indian petitioner for burglary indicate the complexities of the problem he would have found had he attempted to defend himself on this ground. And a decision by the state court that it had jurisdiction might or might not have finally determined the issue. Cf. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542, 549, and Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19.

We conclude that the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on his allegations that he did not, in the burglary proceedings, waive his constitutional right to have the benefit of counsel.

It has been suggested that even if the court below erred in holding that a plea of guilty is a conclusive waiver of the right to counsel, its judgment might be sustained on the ground that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy, or because the allegations of the petition lack sufficient definiteness. The very fact that the court considered the petition on its merits gives rise to a strong, if not conclusive, inference that the petition satisfied the state's procedural requirements in all respects. By treating this clumsily drawn petition with liberality, instead of dismissing it because of a failure to comply with the precise niceties of technical procedure, the state Supreme Court acted in accordance with its traditional solicitude for the

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting.

324 U.S.

writ. And this treatment is in line with federal practice. "A petition for habeas corpus ought not to be scrutinized with technical nicety. Even if it is insufficient in substance it may be amended in the interest of justice." Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U. S. 342, 350, 351.o

Since the state court placed its judgment precisely on the absence of merit in the petition, we could not, except by speculation, conclude that the petition failed to measure up to its procedural requirements. For the reasons given, we hold that the allegations of the petition showed a prima facie violation of the petitioner's right to counsel.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

In view of the circumstances revealed by the record in this case and in the light of Nebraska's experience with

5 "It must be conceded that the petition is not a skillfully drawn pleading, but as it was not attacked in the district court it must receive a liberal construction here . . . Crocker made no appearance in the case, and the warrant was not set out in any of the pleadings. When attacked after judgment, the petition, though informal, must be held sufficient." Urban v. Brailey, 85 Neb. 796, 798-99, 124 N. W. 467. "It has been held that the proper method of attacking the petition is by motion to quash the writ, and that insufficiency in the petition is waived unless that remedy be resorted to. (McGlennan v. Margowski, 90 Ind. 150.)" Nebraska Children's Home Society v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 769, 78 N. W. 267. See also Chase v. State, 93 Fla. 963, 113 So. 103; State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S. W. 2d 111; Stuart v. State, 36 Ariz. 28, 282 P. 276; State ex rel. Davis v. Hardie, 108 Fla. 133, 146 So. 97; Ex parte Tipton, 83 Cal. App. 742, 257 P. 445; Deaver v. State, 24 Ala. App. 377, 135 So. 604; McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga. 670, 144 S. E. 206; Ex parte Tollison, 73 Okl. Cr. 38, 117 P. 2d 549; People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N. E. 875; Willis v. Bayles, 105 Ind. 363, 5 N. E. 8.

• See also Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19.

7 See Smith v. O'Grady, supra; cf. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 261.

petitions for habeas corpus, as laid before this Court by the Attorney General of Nebraska, the meager allegations of this petition for habeas corpus should preclude our attributing to the Supreme Court of Nebraska a disregard, in affirming a denial of the petition, of rights under the Constitution of the United States rather than a denial on allowable state grounds. Accordingly, I believe the judgment should be affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON join in this view.

REPUBLIC AVIATION CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

NO. 226. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.*

Argued January 10, 1945.-Decided April 23, 1945.

1. The National Labor Relations Board was warranted in these cases in finding unfair labor practices, violative of §8 of the National Labor Relations Act, in the employer's (1) enforcement of a "nosolicitation" rule against the solicitation of union membership by employees on company property during lunch hour; (2) discharge of employees for wearing union "shop steward" buttons in the plant though at a time when a majority of the employees had not designated any collective bargaining representative; and (3) enforcement of a general "no-distribution" rule against distribution of union literature or circulars by employees on their own time though on parking lots owned by the company and adjacent to the plant. Pp. 795, 803.

2. As an administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred, the Labor Board, within the limits of its inquiry, may infer from proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based on the facts proven. P. 800.

*Together with No. 452, National Labor Relations Board v. Le Tourneau Company of Georgia, on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Opinion of the Court.

324 U.S.

3. It was reasonable for the Labor Board to adopt a presumption of invalidity of a company rule forbidding union solicitation by employees on company property outside of working hours, in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline. P. 803. 4. The discharge of an employee for violation of a company rule against solicitation, which rule was invalid as applied to the union solicitation in which the employee engaged on his own time, was discriminatory within the meaning of § 8 (3) of the Act in that it discouraged membership in a labor union, notwithstanding that the rule was enforced impartially against all solicitors. P. 805.

142 F.2d 193, affirmed.

143 F. 2d 67, reversed.

CERTIORARI, 323 U. S. 688, 698, to review, in No. 226, a decree granting enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board; and, in No. 452, a judgment setting aside an order of the Board.

Mr. J. Edward Lumbard, Jr., with whom Messrs. John J. Ryan, Frederick M. Davenport, Jr., Ralstone R. Irvine and Theodore S. Hope were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 226.

Miss Ruth Weyand, with whom Solicitor General Fahy, Messrs. Alvin J. Rockwell and Mozart G. Ratner were on the briefs, for the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. Robert L. Stern also was on the brief for the Board in No. 226.

Mr. A. C. Wheeler, with whom Mr. Clifton W. Brannon was on the brief, for respondent in No. 452.

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the Republic Aviation Corporation case, the employer, a large and rapidly growing military aircraft manufacturer, adopted, well before any union activity at the plant, a general rule against soliciting which read as follows: