the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and was entitled therefore to recover liquidated damages by reason of petitioner's default in making overtime payments as required by § 7 of the Act. This decision was affirmed by the New York Appellate Division," and by the New York Court of Appeals." Since the New York Court of Appeals decided a federal question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court, we granted certiorari' limited to the question of whether the respondent's release of all claims and damages under the Act, given at the time he received payment of the overtime compensation due under the Act, is a defense to an action subsequently brought solely to recover liquidated damages. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on § 237 (b) of the Judicial Code.

No. 554.

The petitioner in this second case operated a box factory in which he employed the respondent during the period from October, 1938, the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to November, 1942, when respondent was discharged. During this period the respondent worked hours in excess of the statutory maximums in effect during this period. Petitioner failed to pay respondent time and one-half for overtime as required by the Act. In September, 1942, the Wage and Hour Administration procured an injunction, by consent, prohibiting the petitioner from violating the Act. In November, 1942, the petitioner tendered the respondent $500 for wages due and owing under the Act, the latter accepting the money and signing a

O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 180 Misc. 542, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 25.

5 O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 631.

"Affirmed without opinion, 293 N. Y. 666, 56 N. E. 2d 259. 7323 U.S. 698.

Opinion of the Court.

324 U.S.

general release of all claims against petitioner under the Act. Both parties knew at this time that more than $500 was due to respondent for minimum wages and overtime pay under the Act. Shortly thereafter, the respondent engaged counsel to recover the balance due him under the Act. Petitioner, before suit was filed, tendered the balance of the statutory wages due, but respondent refused to accept it because it did not include an equal sum for liquidated damages. Thereupon the respondent brought suit for $276.05, the balance of the statutory wages due respondent, and $776.05, being liquidated damages equal to the whole amount ($500 plus $276.05) which had originally been unlawfully withheld. In his answer, the petitioner pleaded settlement of respondent's claim for $500, the release given by respondent pursuant to such settlement, and the petitioner's subsequent tender of a check for the deficiency in statutory minimum and overtime wages due. The District Court granted judgment for the respondent relying on Guess v. Montague, 140 F. 2d 500, which held invalid a settlement agreement on the part of employees to accept less than the statutory minimum wage. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed."

Because the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, we granted certiorari 10 limited to the question of whether there had been a compromise of respondent's claim. Jurisdiction of this Court rests on § 240 (a) of the Judicial Code.

The petition in No. 445 raises the question of whether an employee, accepting from his employer a delayed pay

8 Maddrix v. Dize, 7 Wage Hour Rep. 313 (Jan. 31, 1944, not officially reported).

Dize v. Maddrix, 144 F. 2d 584.

10 323 U. S. 702.

ment of the basic statutory wages due under the Act, can validly release and waive any further right to recover liquidated damages under the provisions of § 16 (b)." A preliminary question arises as to whether respondent's release was given in settlement of a bona fide dispute between the parties with respect to coverage or amount due under the Act or whether it constituted a mere waiver of his right to liquidated damages. The state courts made no findings of fact on this issue. Where a state court fails to pass on evidence or make findings of fact because under their respective views the facts referred to are immaterial, we are not relieved from the duty of examining the evidence for the purpose of determining what facts reasonably might be and presumably would be found therefrom by the state court. Merchants' National Bank v. Richmond, 256 U. S. 635, 638; Carlson v. Curtiss, 234 U. S. 103, 105. Cf. United Gas Co. v. Texas, 303 U. S. 123, 143; Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261. We think the record in this case shows that the release was not given in settlement of a bona fide dispute between employer and employee. Petitioner undertook to pay the respondent after our decision in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, which determined the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to building operators like the petitioner. Petitioner's answer in the Municipal Court merely relied upon payment of the statutory liability and the release of other claims. With the exception of the recital in the release, there is nothing in the record which shows that the respondent's release was obtained as the result of the settlement of a bona fide dispute between the parties with respect to coverage or amount.12 Moreover, the decision by the New York Appellate Division was based on Rigopoulos

11 See note 1 supra.

12 The respondent, employee, was informed by a third person some two years after he left the petitioner's employment that petitioner had some money for him. Respondent went to petitioner's offices. According to respondent's testimony, there was no discussion or dispute prior

v. Kervan, 140 F. 2d 506, which involved waiver of right to liquidated damages in the absence of a bona fide dispute and which expressly reserved decision on the question of validity of a settlement where there was such a dispute between the parties. The issue presented in No. 445 therefore is whether in the absence of a bona fide dispute between the parties as to liability, respondent's written waiver of his right to liquidated damages under § 16 (b) bars a subsequent action to recover liquidated damages. We are of the opinion that it does not bar such claim."

It has been held in this and other courts that a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy. Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 361; Phillips v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 236 U. S. 662, 667. Cf. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U. S. 204, 212. Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate. With respect to private rights to his acceptance of the check given him by the petitioner either as to the existence of liability under the Act or as to the amount of such liability. Viewed most favorably petitioner's witness' testimony was merely to the effect that the petitioner had subjective doubts as to the existence and amount of its liability.

13 For a general discussion of the problem raised by this case, see Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law and Contemp. Probs. 368; Tepper, Consent Judgments and Contempt Cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 22 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 390; Determination of Wages under Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 Col. L. Rev. 355; 57 Harv. L. Rev. 257. 14 See United States v. Morley Construction Co., 98 F. 2d 781, 788; Labor Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 113 F. 2d 232, 118 F. 2d 630; Labor Board v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F. 2d 188, 190; Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Labor Board, 119 F. 2d 760; Perry v.

created by a federal statute, such as § 16 (b), the question of whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute. As was stated in Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 320 U. S. 356, 360, whether the policy of . . . .. [the] legislation contemplates the one result or the other . . . is the controlling question."

66

15

Neither the statutory language, the legislative reports nor the debates16 indicates that the question at issue was

W. L. Huffman Automobile Co., 104 Neb. 211, 175 N. W. 1021, reversed on rehearing, 104 Neb. 214, 179 N. W. 501; Harrington v. Dept. of Labor & Industry, 252 Mich. 87, 233 N. W. 361.

15 The provisions of § 16 (b) appeared for the first time in the bill reported by a Conference Committee of both Houses. The Committee report simply stated, H. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 33:

"Section 16 of the conference agreement provides a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, for violations of the act. No person is to be imprisoned upon conviction for a first offense. This section also provides for civil reparations for violations of the wages and hours provisions. If an employee is employed for less than the legal minimum wage, or if he is employed in excess of the specified hours without receiving the prescribed payment for overtime, he may recover from his employer twice the amount by which the compensation he should have received exceeds that which he actually received."

There were three legislative reports on predecessor bills but these bills did not contain any provision analogous to § 16 (b). S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.

16 As indicated in note 15, supra, § 16 (b) was first incorporated into the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in the bill reported out of the Conference Committee of both Houses. The debates in both Houses prior to adoption of the Conference report were quite brief, 83 Cong. Rec. 9158-78, 9246-67. The only reference to § 16 (b) was by Representative Keller who stated, 83 Cong. Rec. p. 9264:

"Among the provisions for the enforcement of the act an old principle has been adopted and will be applied to new uses. If there shall