652 Opinion of the Court. power of the national government to lay and collect customs duties upon such merchandise, is precisely the same as in the case of that of foreign origin. Hence it is plain that such importations, although not of foreign origin, are within the design and purpose of the constitutional prohibition against the local taxation of imports. We find it impossible to say that merely because merchandise, brought into the country from a place without, does not come from a foreign country, it is not an import envisaged by the words and purpose of the constitutional prohibition. The interpretation in Brown v. Maryland, supra, the occasional judicial decisions that foreign origin is not a necessary characteristic of imports so long as they are brought into the country from a place without it, and the purpose of the constitutional prohibition, are alike persuasive that there may be imports in the constitutional sense which do not have a foreign origin. The fact that the merchandise here in question did not come from a foreign country, if the contention be accepted that the Philippines are not to be regarded as such, is therefore without significance. It is material only whether it came from a place without the "country." Hence, in determining what are imports for constitutional purposes, we must ascertain the territorial limits of the "country" into which they are brought. Obviously, if the Philippines are to be regarded as a part of the United States in this sense, merchandise brought from the Philippines to the United States would not be brought into the United States from a place without, and would not be imports, more than articles transported from one state to another. The term "United States" may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States ex Opinion of the Court. 324 U.S. tends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution." When Brown v. Maryland, supra, was decided, the United States was without dependencies or territories outside its then territorial boundaries on the North American continent, and the Court had before it only the question whether foreign articles brought into the State of Maryland could be subjected to state taxation. It seems plain that Chief Justice Marshall, in his reference to imports as articles brought into the country, could have had reference only to articles brought into a state which is one of the states united by and under the Constitution, and in which alone the constitutional prohibition here involved is applicable. The relation of the Philippines to the United States, taken as the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution, is in many respects different from the status of those areas which, when the Constitution was adopted, were brought under the control of Congress and which were ultimately organized into states of the United States. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 304-305, and cases cited. Hence we do not stop to inquire whether articles brought into such territories or brought from such territories into a state, could have been regarded as imports, constitutionally immune from state taxation. We confine the present discussion to the question whether such articles, brought from the Philippines and introduced into the United States, are imports so immune. We have adverted to the fact that the reasons for protecting from interference, by state taxation, the consti * See Langdell, "The Status of our New Territories," 12 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 371; see also Thayer, "Our New Possessions," 12 Harv. L. Rev. 464; Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court," 15 Harv. L. Rev. 164; Littlefield, "The Insular Cases," 15 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 281. tutional power of the national government to collect customs duties, apply equally whether the merchandise brought into the country is of foreign origin or not. The Constitution has not made the foreign origin of articles imported the test of importation, but only their origin in a place over which the Constitution has not extended its commands with respect to imports and their taxation. Hence our question must be decided, not by determining whether the Philippines are a foreign country, as indeed they have been held not to be within the meaning of the general tariff laws of the United States, Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U. S. 176; cf. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, and within the scope of other general laws, Faber v. United States, 221 U. S. 649; cf. Huus v. New York & P. R. S. S. Co., 182 U. S. 392; Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1; West India Oil Co. v. Domenech, 311 U. S. 20, but by determining whether they have been united governmentally with the United States by and under the Constitution. That our dependencies, acquired by cession as the result of our war with Spain, are territories belonging to, but not a part of, the Union of states under the Constitution, was long since established by a series of decisions in this Court beginning with The Insular Tax Cases in 1901; De Lima v. Bidwell, supra; Dooley v. United States, supra, 182 U. S. 222; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151; and see also Public Utility Commissioners v. Ynchausti & Co., 251 U. S. 401, 406-407; Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra. This status has ever since been maintained in the practical construction of the Constitution by all the agencies of our government in dealing with our insular possessions. It is no longer doubted that the United States may acquire territory by conquest or by treaty, and may govern it through the exercise of the power of Congress conferred by § 3 of Article IV of the Constitution "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regu Opinion of the Court. 324 U.S. lations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Dooley v. United States, supra, 183 U. S. at 157; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 149; Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra, 305; Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 323. In exercising this power, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for the United States. See Downes v. Bidwell, supra; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197; Dorr v. United States, supra; Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325, 332; Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91, 98; Public Utility Commissioners v. Ynchausti & Co., supra, 406-407; Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra. And in general the guaranties of the Constitution, save as they are limitations upon the exercise of executive and legislative power when exerted for or over our insular possessions, extend to them only as Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power over territory belonging to the United States, has made those guaranties applicable. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra. The constitutional restrictions on the power of Congress to deal with articles brought into or sent out of the United States, do not apply to articles brought into or sent out of the Philippines. Despite the restrictions of §§ 8 and 9 of Article I of the Constitution, such articles may be taxed by Congress and without apportionment. Downes v. Bidwell, supra. It follows that articles brought from the Philippines into the United States are imports in the sense that they are brought from territory, which is not a part of the United States, into the territory of the United States, organized by and under the Constitution, where alone the import clause of the Constitution is applicable. The status of the Philippines as territory belonging to the United States, but not constitutionally united with it, has been maintained consistently in all the governmental relations between the Philippines and the United States. Following the conquest of the Philippines, they were governed for a period under the war power. After annexation by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, military government was succeeded by a form of executive government. By the Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of March 2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 910, it was provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion ." On July 1, 1902 Congress provided for a complete system of civil government by the original Philippine Organic Act, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691. Step by step Congress has conferred greater powers upon the territorial government, and those of the federal government have been diminished correspondingly, although Congress retains plenary power over the territorial government until such time as the Philippines are made independent. This process culminated in the Act of March 24, 1934, c. 84, 48 Stat. 456, providing for the independence of the islands. The adoption by the Philippines and approval by the United States of a constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, as provided by the Act, have prepared the way for their complete independence. ... The Act of 1934 made special provisions for the relations between the two governments pending the final withdrawal of sovereignty of the United States from the Philippines and in particular provided for a limit on the number and amount of articles produced or manufactured in the Philippine Islands that might be "exported" to the United States free of duty. § 6. It provided for the complete withdrawal and surrender of all right of posses |