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324 U.S.

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January at its true and actual value; 10, § 1 of the Constitution of West Virginia provides: "... taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value." This section of the constitution also provides for the division of all taxable property into four classes, with a prescribed limitation on the amount of tax which may be levied upon each class. Class I consists of "personal property employed exclusively in agriculture, products of agriculture including livestock, while owned by the producer" and includes "money, notes, bonds, bills and accounts receivable, stocks and other similar intangible personal property," which is the class of property for which appellants are taxed.

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Notwithstanding these provisions of the constitution and statutes of the state, it appears from the evidence, and the state Court of Appeals found, that in 1941, and since, the assessor of Kanawha County, following the instructions of the state tax commissioner, employed a different method in the valuation and assessment of the property of building and loan associations and federal savings and loan associations, including appellants, from that employed in assessing Class I property of other taxpayers. It is this difference in the mode of assessing the property of different taxpayers which petitioners contend has resulted in taxing the property of appellants at its full value and like property of other taxpayers at less than its full valuation, in violation of the equal protection clause.

It appears from the record that the assessor in 1941 for the first time followed the uniform practice of assessing the capital of building and loan associations and federal

182

Opinion of the Court.

loan associations as evidenced by their investment shares and investment accounts, constituting their Class I intangibles, at their full value. But it also appears that in assessing other taxpayers on their Class I property, the assessor varied his method of assessment as to different types of property included in the class. As to them he valued money at 100%, bonds, notes and accounts receivable, except installment accounts, at about 70% of their face value and installment accounts at 65% of their face value. Livestock and agricultural products were valued at approximately 50% of their "purchase value." The accounts receivable and notes of small loan companies were assessed at about 85% of their face value. It does not appear how commercial banks and trust companies were assessed, but for purposes of decision the state court assumed that their Class I intangibles were assessed at their full face value.

The Court of Appeals found that small loan companies and other taxpayers whose Class I intangibles were taxed at less than their face value are engaged in a business different from and involving a greater risk than that in which building and loan associations and federal savings and loan associations are engaged. It found that there was a basis for the discount from face value employed in assessing notes and accounts of small loan associations, which was lacking in the assessment of the higher grade securities, held by building and loan associations and federal savings and loan associations, whose investments are generally more carefully made and better secured than those of other classes of taxpayers.

The court concluded that the method of assessment and valuation employed was not adopted with the purpose of taxing some but not all Class I property at less than its true value, but as a means of arriving at its true value. It said: "We do not have a case where the true and actual value was ascertained and a discount allowed from that

where the discount was allowed, -- in an effort to reach the Ar thought that this method m instances be an erroneous the assessor, it held that a the mode of assessment establish an unlawful disan though imperfect, is adopted serure fair and equitable assessunformity in taxation."

ial to them of the equal problished by the proof of the ashis mode of assessment of the operty belonging to different taxscrimination is shown to be "in

" But this argument overlooks le that the constitutional prohibixation which in fact bears unequally ~~ 4 moverty of the same class and that mere ms of assessment do not deny equal proare shown to produce such inequality. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 236; . New York, 134 U. S. 594, 600; Adams 165 U. S. 194, 229; Michigan Central 201 U. S. 245, 298-300; cf. Hendrick U. S. 610; General American Tank Car TOU. S. 367; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Star R. Co., 273 U. S. 45, 51; Interstate Busses . Statt, 276 U. S. 245, 251. Nor does the equal e sus prohibit inequality in taxation which es, is en mere mistake or error in judgment of tax sburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 $1,455; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 196 A&D; Brooklyn City R. Co. v. New York, 199 32; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260

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U.S. 441, 447; Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 527; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137, 142; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S. 23, 25; Rowley v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 293 U. S. 102, 111; Great Northern R. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135, 139; or which is not shown to be the result of intentional or systematic undervaluation of some but not all of the taxed property in a single class. New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279, 284, 285; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 597; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, supra, 447; Southern R. Co. v. Watts, supra; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 9.

In all these respects appellants have the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the assessments which they assail, Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, supra, 353, and cases cited; Southern R. Co. v. Watts, supra, 526; Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 99; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U. S. 276, 284; Great Northern R. Co. v. Weeks, supra, 139; Snowden v. Hughes, supra, 9; and they have failed to sustain that burden.

It is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a state from placing notes and receivables in a different class from personal property used in agriculture and the products of agriculture, including livestock, and taxing the two classes differently, even though the state places them in a single class for other purposes of taxation. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, 237; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, supra, 606; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra, 608-9; Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19.

As we have said, the state court concluded that the discount from face value allowed in assessing Class I intangibles of various taxpayers, other than appellants, was for

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