not check U.S. exports during the same period. Furthermore, the Japanese figures on value represent the cost, insurance, and freight value at Japanese port of entry so include the freight rates from the United States.

TABLE I.—Japan's imports of automotive passenger cars, year 1961

There probably is a difference in what is included as automobiles in the two sets of figures. Passenger cars from the United States under 254 centimeters (10 feet) wheelbase and valued in Japan at $388 each makes one think they have included some small passenger vehicles not usually considered by us as automobiles.

In any event the table shows that the United States-Japan freight rates did not prevent U.S. automobile shipments to Japan from being competitive pricewise with imports from other countries at the Japanese port of entry. The United States-Japan ocean freight rates did not prevent the U.S. automobile imports amounting to 66 percent of the number and 73 percent of the value of total imported cars. Eliminating the smaller models (on which U.S. manufacturers have not concentrated) U.S. imports were 74 percent of the number and 79 percent of the value of imported cars. This certainly does not indicate ocean freight rates had any adverse effect on U.S. exports of automobiles to Japan.

Senator Bartlett is also interested in the effect of the westbound and eastbound transpacific rates on electric motors on U.S. exports to Japan. The eastbound rate is just 56 percent of the westbound rate.

The United States shipped to Japan in 1961, 65,698 electric motors valued at $1,049,446 at an average price of $15.97 each. But Japan shipped to the United States, 3,946,564 motors valued at only $739,046 or an average of $0.19 per motor. Clearly these are not "identical items."

Here are U.S. Department of Commerce figures as issued in their FT410 and FT110 for 1961. Values shown are at port of export of the country of manufacture and do not include ocean freight rates.

TABLE II.-Electric motors shipped between Japan and the United States, year 1961

It will be seen from these figures that a perfect comparison cannot be made in the smaller types of motors. But this much we know: 99 percent of the motors we import from Japan are less than one-tenth horsepower and are valued at port of export at $0.18 each. The United States shipped to Japan

65,496 motors less than 1 horsepower valued at $671,244 in 1961. This was an average price of $10.25 per motor. Japan shipped 3,946,468 motors to the United States under 1 horsepower valued at $731,194 at Japan port of export or an average of 182 cents per motor.

I would guess that the great majority of the Japanese motors are less than one-tenth horsepower and are the type that gladden the hearts of small boys in their model cars or boats, whereas the U.S. manufactured motors are probably closer to one-third horsepower. In any event we either are not talking of identical items or pricewise the U.S. product is far from competitive regardless of the freight rate. Neither is the U.S. manufacturer competitive pricewise in any of the categories.

Now let's look at Japanese import figures which will not check U.S. Department of Commerce figures for reasons stated above.

TABLE III. Japan's total imports electric motors-Year 1961

Here we see that of every 100 electric motors Japan imported in 1961, 99 came from the United States. Of each dollar they spent, 80 cents was spent for the motors in the United States and for the cost of moving them to Japan. We feel safe in saying that the United States-Japan freight rates on electric motors did not prevent the U.S. manufacturer from being competitive in Japan on the motors where his price would allow him to compete.

Senator Bartlett's statement is also specifically concerned with the freight rates on iron and steel scrap and how the outbound rate affects our exports to Japan.

In the first place, the $21.95 long ton or 40 cubic feet rate the Senator shows for the outbound would only apply on the 4 percent of the total iron and steel scrap for remanufacture; 96 percent of Japan's imports of scrap iron and steel from the United States in 1961 was for smelting. This type of scrap moved chiefly in tramps at a $7 per long ton rate and some in liners at from $8.50 to $10.50 per long ton.

It will be interesting to note the following figures from the U.S. Department of Commerce covering the movement of scrap iron and steel between the United States and Japan during 1961.

This tremendous movement from the United States to Japan took place not because the freight rates were lower but because the United States had the scrap, Japan had the need and the ability to pay for it. The rates from the United States did not keep U.S. scrap from being competitive in Japan as the following figures will show. All value figures here are at Japanese port of entry and include ocean freight.

Source: Trade of Japan, 1961. Japan Ministry of Finance. Value represents cost, insurance, and freight value.

Here again we see the U.S. scrap was so competitive that 75 percent of Japan's scrap imports came from the United States representing 75 cents of each dollar they paid for imported scrap.

Japan didn't export scrap iron and steel to the United States because they simply had none to export. Here are their figures which are negligible alongside their imports.

These figures are from Japanese Ministry of Finance and differ from U.S. figures as explained above.

We have taken this many words to comment on only 3 of the 21 commodities referred to by Senator Bartlett, but these are the items he mentioned as being of particular interest to him.

We could continue and discuss the other items in detail but it is probably enough at present to point out a few additional pertinent matters with reference to the other items.

No commodity is going to move at any considerable volume at the "cargo, n.o.s." or at a corresponding catchall rate such as "canned goods, n.o.s.," "sporting goods, n.o.s.," or "toys, n.o.s."

Referring always to year 1961:

Japan shipped over 750,000 binoculars to United States averaging about $8 per pair; United States shipped 15 to Japan averaging about $50 per pair.

Japan shipped to United States over 660 million square feet of plywood at 7 cents per square foot while United States returned only 2,560 square feet at 19 cents per square foot. It is obvious there was a heavy demand in the United States for Japanese plywood. Even after payment of the Japan/United States freight, this commodity was able to compete with our domestic product either because of price or quality or a combination of the two. Under the circumstances it is apparent that even if the U.S. plywood were transported to Japan free, it would not be competitive in the Japanese market.

Japan shipped over 11 million radio receiving sets to the United States, while only 112 were shipped in the opposite direction at an average value of 20 times that of the Japanese product.

Seventy-five percent of the generators Japan imported in 1961 came from the United States. The average value in Japan of the American generators was $361. Ninety-four percent of the generators Japan shipped to the United States were valued at less than $4 each. Japan spent 10 times as much on generators they bought from us as we spent on those we purchased from Japan.

Japan shipped to the United States 130 metric tons of dried, salted, or smoked fish. None moved in the opposite direction.

No oats or explosives moved between the United States and Japan in either direction.

Iron and steel girders, beams, and angles were not specified separately in available statistics.

Over 2,008 tons oil well casings were shipped Japan to United States while only 236 tons were shipped United States to Japan. Japan price is cheaper.

Eighty-two percent of the bulldozers imported by Japan came from the United States. United States imported none from Japan.

United States imported over $32 million worth of toys from Japan while we shipped them $1,355,000 worth. No prices available per comparable units.

United States imported over $13 million worth of sporting goods from Japan while exporting to Japan $2,668,000 worth.

United States exported to Japan 6,000 tons fresh fruits and vegetables while importing from Japan 24 tons.

United States exported to Japan 330 tons copper sulfate while none moved in the other direction.

The following corrections should be made in the freight rates shown in the table attached to Senator E. L. Bartlett's statement at San Francisco hearings on Pacific trade:

Senator ENGLE. Our next witness is Charles Paul, director, Department of Agriculture, State of California, 1220 N Street, Sacramento, Calif.

Mr. Paul has a long and intimate knowledge of the agriculture of this State. He is personally engaged in the agricultural business, and one of the toughest parts of it, too, the poultry industry. I know of the action taken by the Governor in appointing an export-import committee, on which he and other knowledgeable men participate for the purpose of doing what they can to prepare us to save our hides in these negotiations that will come up with the Common Market.

The Governor himself indicated in Los Angeles on Monday, and I myself so stated in speaking before the Propeller Club, that some of our crops have a very high vulnerability in these trading situations. We think that is true, because the specialty just don't have enough muscle sometimes to protect themselves as others do.

Mr. Paul, it is a very great pleasure to welcome you before this committee, and to have your statement. You may proceed to read it, if you wish.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES PAUL, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. PAUL. Senator Engle and Senator Bartlett, I appreciate very much the opportunity of appearing before this committee and presenting a statement concerning the activities in which the California Department of Agriculture is involved in relation to foreign trade.

Foreign trade, of course, is of tremendous significance to agriculture in this State and agriculture is, in turn, of tremendous sig nificance to the entire economy of the State. California ranks first in agricultural production amongst the various States. The farm value of our products during recent years has been in excess of $3 billion. In the export of agricultural products, California again ranks first, with shipments ranging from $475 to $500 million annually. Most of these products move from California ports.

In contrast to our exports of farm products, there are substantial imports of farm products into the United States which compete directly with specialty crops produced in California. The impact of this competition must be given consideration when one is dealing with the subject of foreign trade.

Industry groups in California agriculture have been greatly concerned with the entire subject during the past 2 years. As a result of the position of the industry groups, and with the recognition by governmental agencies of the significance of foreign trade to the total economy of this State, Governor Brown has established two advisory committees to represent agricultural interests in questions dealing with foreign trade. One advisory committee is composed of representatives of commodity groups whose principal interest is in export markets. The other advisory group is composed of representatives of commodities concerned primarily with importation of farm products into the United States. The purposes and objectives of these committees are

(1) To advise the Governor with respect to studies necessary to evaluate the economic effect or impact upon specific California products of various types and levels of both import and export agreements.

(2) To review means of making such information available to appropriate State and Federal agencies and industry groups. (3) To advise the Governor with respect to necessary studies of alternate methods of resolving foreign trade problems, such as a study of the possibilities of international commodity agreements.

(4) To seek information regarding foreign market potentials for California farm products, and potential competition from foreign supplies.

These two committees have recognized that important to the entire consideration of foreign trade will be the matter of the effect of actions taken with respect to tariffs and other trade arrangements upon both imports and exports. To be properly equipped to participate in bargaining for concessions to be received and concessions to be granted, it is necessary that the negotiator have an understanding of the effect of the proposed concessions upon the domestic industry. The committees, working in conjunction with the University of California, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and our own department, have ar