LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act, to favor collective bargaining and the growth of free democratic unions. While the Congress has imposed curbs on union abuses through the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin law, Congress has been careful in doing so to reiterate and reconfirm its policy of favoring the organization of working men into unions and the free collective bargaining process. Indeed, we think it is a fair statement to say that the time, study, and care Congress has put in to enact legislation such as the Landrum-Griffin law and the Taft-Hartley Act to correct abuses was a strong reaffirmation by Congress of favoring the process of collective bargaining. If Congress had felt that policy should have been changed, it would simply have outlawed unions and collective bargaining rather than attempting to correct abuses so that the process would be further favored and protected. We therefore submit that the statement of Chairman Dixon that the fact that this law would encourage unionism in the industry is a point in its favor, not against it. We think that the questioning by the committee and counsel suffciently developed the point that the instant bill would not, as feared by the Commission and the Department of Justice, establish any dangerous precedent for other industries, because there is no other industry, as the witnesses conceded, similar to this one. Neither could cite any industry in which the negotiation of a price was an essential direct ingredient of wage negotiations. We think it might serve some purpose to reiterate what has heretofore been said that, far from establishing precedent, this legislation simply brings this group of workmen into line and equal legal status with other workmen throughout the United States who have the right to bargain under the protection of laws passed by Congress. One more comment may be in order. Senator Bartlett pressed the spokesman for the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission for examples of any harm which had resulted from free collective bargaining in the years before it was prohibited and in each instance the spokesmen were unable to provide any specific instance, but fell back on the general doctrine that any exemption under antitrust laws was bad. It should be pointed out that collective bargaining as to fish prices was conducted in Alaska under a letter of immunity from the Department of Justice from 1946 on until stopped by the Federal Trade Commission. In the letter of immunity, which unfortunately has not been put in evidence, the Department of Justice specifically reserved the right to bring a civil antitrust action to prevent further bargaining should such bargaining be found to result in any public harm. The Department then was on full notice of the bargaining which was in existence and never brought any such action, and it may therefore be assumed that the Department found no harm to the public welfare from the bargaining which existed. We request that this statement be made a part of the record on this bill. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, Of Vance, Davies, Roberts & Bettis, Its Attorneys. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1963. Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request of June 14, 1963, for a report on S. 1135, 88th Congress, 1st session, a bill to make clear that fishermen's organizations, regardless of their technical legal status, have a voice in the ex-vessel sale of fish or other aquatic products on which the livelihood of their members depends. This bill would amend the Fishermen's Cooperative Marketing Act (Public Law 73-464, 15 U.S.C. 521-522) by permitting unions or other organizations of 1 "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection" (29 USCA, sec. 101, Taft-Hartley Act). active fishermen whose income is dependent on the ex-vessel price of fish or other aquatic products, to bargain severally or jointly with one or more buyers of such products. The Fishermen's Cooperative Marketing Act authorizes persons engaged in the fishing industry as fishermen to act together in associations in collectively marketing in interstate and foreign commerce their aquatic products. There is no authorization granted for such associations to bargain with groups of competing buyers for the sale of the aquatic products of their members. In the Commission's case against the United Fishermen of Alaska, et al., docket 6368, 52 F.T.C. 1240 (1956), the Commission's order enjoined the cooperatives organized under the provisions of this act from bargaining with the canners acting jointly as to the prices at which the cooperatives would sell the king crab caught by its members. It is our view that the subject bill would permit the organizations formed under its provisions to engage in such bargaining. The arrangement authorized by the bill would permit the unions of fishermen to be used as a vehicle for bringing together at the bargaining table unions, employers, and buyers of the employers' products. The effect of such action would tend to eliminate competition between and among the canners in buying the aquatic products and the boatowners in selling them. The argument is made that since the amount of remuneration which the fishermen will receive is dependent upon the prices paid by the canners for the fish caught by the fishermen, they should have a voice in determining that price, but this argument is not limited to fishermen. In our economy the wages of all employees, in the last analysis, are affected by the prices at which the employers' products are sold. Of course, each individual seller in determining his own price, of necessity, must take into consideration the wages he must pay his employees, but that does not mean the employees should have a voice in determining their employers' prices. The Supreme Court has held in Columbia River Packers Association, Inc. v. Hinton et al., 315 U.S. 143 (1941) that unions may not act in this manner, because when the union bargains for the sale of the fish of its members, such action does not pertain to the wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of its members. As a result, by so acting, the union loses the statutory immunization granted unions and, therefore, violates the antitrust laws. Other decisions of courts along this same line are Hawaiian Tuna Packers v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, D.C. Hawaii, 72 F. Supp. 562 (1947); Local 36 of International Fishermen and Allied Workers of America v. United States, 9th Cir., 177 F. 2d 320 cert. denied 339 U.S. 947 (1949). In addition to the United Fishermen of Alaska case, to which we have referred, the Federal Trade Commission has had several other cases dealing with various fisehrmen's organizations. For example, the Commission has issued orders to cease and desist in the following cases: Alaska Salmon Industry et al., docket 6141, 50 F.T.C. 863 (1954); Cordova District Fisheries Union et al., docket 6261, 52 F.T.C. 66 (1955); Cordova District Fisheries Union et al., docket 6369, 52 F.T.C. 731 (1956); Puget Sound Salmon Canners et al., docket 6376, 52 F.T.C. 1251 (1956); California Fish Canners Association et al., docket 6623, 54 F.T.C. 120 (1957). In those cases, the Commission was confronted with situations wherein various cooperative groups combined with other respondents, including employee groups, such as fishermen unions, boatowners' associations, and canners, in price-fixing combinations in restraint of trade. Orders were issued requiring the parties to cease and desist from so combining or entering into any agreements between and among themselves or with others with the purpose or intent of fixing or maintaining prices at which fish or other aquatic products were to be purchased or sold and also from interfering with the fishing operations of others. Those orders, however, did assure bona fide fishermen's cooperative organizations that actions pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of the Fishermen's Cooperative Marketing Act were excepted therefrom. In addition, those orders specifically excepted activities by any of the respondents, including fishermen's cooperatives, in individually purchasing or selling or bargaining for the purchase or sale of any fish or aquatic product with any single buyer or seller. The subject bill would, in our opinion, negate the decision of the court in the Hinton case as well as the orders of the Commission in the various cases to which we have referred. In addition, the bill would permit the fishermen employees who joined the organizations authorized by the bill to retain their status as employees, thereby receiving the benefis granted to them by such acts as the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, the Clayton Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Further, under the terms of the bill the buyers may join together in associations or otherwise in determining the ex-vessel prices of fish or other aquatic products each will pay. Immunity from antitrust laws should be granted sparingly. In the absence of a clear showing of an overriding public interest, the Commission cannot favor enactment of such legislation. The Commission is sympathetic to the problems confronting fishermen; however, we do not believe that S. 1135 offers the proper answer to those problems. As we have pointed out, the proposed bill would negate existing law. Because of this and the other reasons we have stated, the Commission does not favor its enactment. Commissioner MacIntyre wishes to be noted as not concurring in the opposition of the Commission to S. 1135. By direction of the Commission: PAUL RAND DIXON, Chairman. N.B. Pursuant to regulations, this report was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on July 29, 1963, and on August 14, 1963, the Bureau of the Budget advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the administration's program. О JOSEPH N. KUZEW, Acting Secretary. |