Mr. LEVIN. That is the historical

Mr. FELANDO. I would say yes.

Mr. LEVIN. This gets back to our earlier question concerning added canneries, added competition. Do you feel then that that might make a change in the price bid for fish?

Mr. FELANDO. I would like to go into that and say my answer is again yes. The other thing that I feel is that there is a definite area here that requires further inquiry by some governmental agency, and that is with respect to the pricing policies adopted by the canners and the pricing practices in the past directed toward a resolution of the issue as to whether, as a result of such pricing policies and the pattern of price development, there hasn't been a restraint of trade. Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator BARTLETT. Who is the skipper of the Saratoga?

Mr. FELANDO. Mr. Joe Madruga.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Felando.

I would like to ask Mr. Madruga a question.

Senator BARTLETT. This has nothing to do with prices. How long was the Saratoga out?

Mr. MADRUGA. She was out 23 days.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you.

Mr. CALISE. Senator, I forgot to put something else in evidence here. Senator BARTLETT. Come forward or sit where you are and put it in. Mr. CALISE. August Felando just reminded me of something. I have a letter here addressed to the boatowners. It is addressed to the Cooperative Association in San Pedro, and it says there that StarKist, as of the 16th of May 1963, says:

You are aware of the inventory price problem presently facing the tuna industry. We do not think this problem will remain, but, until a solution is worked out, it is our recommendation that no vessel normally delivered to us sail with the expectation that we will be able to accept their fish.

While we cannot control the sailing of vessels, we feel you are entitled to know our thinking on our ability to take fish from their vessels.

Unless the vessels are able to market their catches elsewhere, or are prepared to run the risk of holding their fish for a long period of time, we urge that you do not sail.

This is by Star-Kist Foods.

Senator BARTLETT. What date?

Mr. CALISE. May the 16th. The point I want to make is that we have no control of the sale of fish, the prices, or what place the boatowner wants to take his fish. The boatowner is now going out subject to this letter, like the Saratoga. Now, Augie said it is timewise he wants to get unloaded, so he can get out; and he has no market for his fish when he comes back.

Senator BARTLETT. Are the boats going out anyway?

Mr. CALISE. They are going out anyway. French Sardine boats are going out anyway, which are totally owned by the Star-Kist Foods. So, although Star-Kist has been released from all obligations to that boat which is contracted to them, these boats are going out; and then, when they come back, we are subject to the prices. Our wages are based on the prices that they want to accept at that time when they come in again, and I think that shows where the boatowner himself is

the sole judge of where and what he wants to do, and then one of our guys get a job on the boat and we don't know if we are going to sell the fish. That is all.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Calise, thank you. There being no further witnesses, the committee will be in recess, subject to the call of the chairman. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., May 25, 1963, the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)

FISHERMEN'S MARKETING ACT

THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 1963

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10: 15 a.m., room 1202, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., the Honorable Senator E. L. Bartlett presiding.

Senator BARTLETT. The committee will be in order.

The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee has a varied menu today. We will open with a fisheries marketing bill, S. 1135, and follow with two Coast Guard bills-one, S. 1460, dealing with officers promotions and retirement; the other, S. 1459, in the interest of preventing collisions on the high seas.

We will take up S. 1135 first. It would make clear that fishermen's organizations, regardless of their technical legal status, have a voice in the ex-vessel sale of the fish or other aquatic products on which the livelihood of their members depends.

The first witness, Mr. Daniel P. Moynihan, Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, Department of Labor. We welcome you, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK V. CANTWELL, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON OFFICER; AND R. OTTO MELETZKE, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Senator Bartlett.

I am honored to be here today, and I have with me, in addition to Mr. Frank Cantwell, legislative liaison officer of the Department of Labor, Mr. Otto Meletzke of the Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor, who is the attorney in the Department who has concerned himself most particularly with this important subject.

Senator, as I said, I am honored to appear before this subcommittee today to present the views of the Department of Labor on S. 1135, introduced by Chairman Magnuson for himself and on behalf of the senior Senator from Alaska.

A great deal of information relating to the history of industrial relations in the fishing industry, the Fishermen's Marketing Act of 1934 which S. 1135 would amend-and the operation of the antitrust laws as regard the industry, has already been placed in the record.

It is commendable that your subcommittee has been able to spend considerable time in developing a rather full record on this subject, and I would not propose to belabor either the factual or legal circumstances which have prompted this legislation. I do wish to record, however, the Department of Labor's strong overall interest in the industrial relations problem to which S. 1135 is addressed, and, in this regard, hope that my presentation may in some way assist your subcommittee in arriving at a judgment with respect to the proposal. As I am certain the subcommittee realizes, S. 1135 does pose the very difficult question of whether it is desirable or necessary to legislate a complete exemption from the antitrust laws in order to secure a more realistic right of collective bargaining for fishermen. This is a complex problem involving economic and antitrust policy. The Department of Labor does not have the detailed or specialized economic data, or a knowledge of the intricate organization, operation, and relationships in this industry, to offer a solution. The Department of the Interior, in carrying out its responsibilities, and the Department of Justice and the FTC, as the agencies administering our antitrust laws, may be able to speak more directly to this question. While we realize that many economic problems face the fishing industry, we do believe that a sufficiently real collective bargaining problem does exist in the industry-stemming from the method by which the wages of fishermen are set-to justify a serious effort to find a solution.

The commercial fisherman enjoys a unique status in the context of labor-management relations. He is dependent upon a wide variety of physical and other circumstances beyond his control. As has been developed during this subcommittee's hearings, his "share" or "lay" system of remuneration is not truly comparable to wage systems in most other gainful occupations. "Shares," of course, are, in effect, directly dependent upon fish prices paid by canners or processors. When, as in the case of many fishermen in the industry, "wages" may decline if the sale price of fish is low, it is natural for this group to seek some measure of wage stability. The heart of the problem stems from the system of remuneration which historically has prevailed since fishermen went to sea.

Because of this unique system, employment relationships in the fishing industry do not fit into the general pattern of labor relations law. This presents something of a paradox. Fishermen whose livelihood depends upon selling arrangements between boatowners or skippers and ultimate purchasers, are not employees of such purchasers, usually canners or processors, and therefore cannot bargain directly with them. In most cases they are considered employees of the boatowners or skippers. This being the case, they must depend solely upon the boatowner's or skipper's success in obtaining a good price for the catch, instead of being able to present an effective bargaining position to support or advance their own earnings. In addition, because of the varied antitrust and labor law problems which have surrounded the bargaining situation in the industry, there is understandable reluctance and restraint by all parties concerned on the issue of collective bargaining. Whatever equities may prevail, in the final analysis, this is not a healthy situation consistent with sound labor-management relations.

In recent years labor organizations representing fishermen have generally been limited to negotiating terms and conditions of employment with the skippers or boatowners based on the fish-price agreed to by the boatowner and the canner or processor. This limitation really denies the fisherman the right to improve his earning capacity, in contrast to other workers, who may bargain for better wages. It seems unfair therefore to constrict the fisherman's bargaining power merely because of the interrelationship between the fish-price paid for the catch and the "share" or "wage" of the fisherman. The fact remains that fishermen, to the same extent as other workers, have a vital interest in advancing their economic status.

I would stress the importance of treating collective bargaining in the fishing industry from an overall economic standpoint, balancing the interests at stake for all concerned, including not only members of the industry but also the ultimate consumer and the public interest. In this context, a meaningful right to bargain collectively for better wages should extend to fishermen just as it does to workers in other industries.

We in the Department of Labor are not in a position to make a definitive judgment as to whether S. 1135 either meets the particular economic needs of the industry as a whole, or even of the fishermenemployees who feel they should have a voice in bargaining on fish prices, or whether the antitrust implications of such bargaining outweigh the employees' needs. We do believe, however, that bargaining for fish prices, in itself, is an understandable objective of fishermen in the industry.

Our understanding is that what is sought here is a legislative affirmation of what now may be legally done in the industry, as well as an extension of bargaining to some areas now prohibited. For example, fish-price bargaining between labor unions and canners or processors is and can be legally carried on in a number of circum

stances.

First, where fishermen operate on company boats as employees of the canneries, as in the Bristol Bay, Alaska, situation; and

Second, in the case of fishermen on independent boats, where fishermen's cooperatives have been set up pursuant to the Fishermen's Marketing Act consisting only of boatowners and skippers, not crews, and where unions have petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for an election treating the cooperative as employer in a multiemployer unit. In such a situation, the union negotiates with the cooperative for the minimum price on which the crew's "share" would be based, and the cooperative bargains separately with a single canner or buyer.

According to our information, this method of bargaining is susceptible to efficient operation only in limited situations, such as in the case of certain trawlers in the Puget Sound area. In addition, we understand that the unions, the boatowner's groups involved, and the canners or processors recognize that this scheme presents difficult practical problems as we would clearly suppose it would from the general outlines.

Some means for providing an opportunity for fishermen to bargain collectively for fish prices which are, in essence, their wages should be encouraged, particularly if your committee finds that the eco