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mark indicating the location of our vessel at the time of arrest, and my logbook were confiscated. They still possess these articles. I was requested to come to the captain of the port for an interview when so ordered. I agreed to do so, and on the following Monday, I gave them a statement. Robert Early was present at this interrogation.

While in port, we repaired our net. We were not restrained in any manner while in port. The Colombians were very courteous. Armed guards and a customs official were aboard ship on a 24-hour basis.

I visited with Robert Early every day during the period of retention. The delay in releasing the vessel was explained in part as follows: The commandant of the Arc Gorgona did not give his statement on the release until a week after the arrival of the DV San Joaquin in Buenaventura.

During our arrest, a crew member reported the loss of $20 and 10 pesos from his bunk. Machado Medina reported that his wallet was missing from his

room.

Immediately after our arrest at sea, I made radio contact with the DV Alphecca and the DV Sun Europa, and advised them of the situation. I requested them to contact the American Tunaboat Association.

At the time of the arrest, two other fishing vessels were drifting 2 to 3 miles ESE of our position. I believe they were the DV Marsha Ann and the DV Ronnie M. I also saw the following vessels seaward of our position: DV Alphecca, DV Crusader, and DV Western Sky.

GEORGE CABRAL, Master, DV "San Joaquin”.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1962. [SEAL]

AUGUST J. FELANDO,

Notary Public in and for the county of San Diego, State of California.

My commission expires April 16, 1965.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of San Diego, ss:

AFFIDAVIT

August Da Silva, being duly sworn says:

That I am the master of the MV Normandie, official no. 237,622.

That I have just recently completed a fishing trip off Central and Latin America

and the following incident occurred off Ecuador.

On March 21, 1962, we radioed for a license to Panama requesting an Ecuadoran fishing license. At the time I was located off Panama.

license on March 22.

We received the

On the 3d of April we arrived off of the shore of Ecuador. That's the day we were stopped by Ecuador's Coast Guard. It was 28 miles west of Cape Pasado, 80° 59′ W., 00°:08' S., that is the position that they stopped us the first time. The patrol vessel crossed our bow and we were instructed to stop. To avoid a collision, I slowed down our vessel. I stopped and he asked me to go aboard and take the logbook. I left the Normandie and went aboard the Ecuadoran patrol vessel. They made a few calls themselves. He used the radio to contact someone on shore and after an hour he told us that we could continue. The name of the patrol vessel was Esmalda.

Then on April 17, we were stopped again by a second Ecuadoran patrol vessel; there was no name on this vessel, but it did have a number. It looked like a destroyer, it was a very large size vessel.

At the time this patrol vessel came upon us we had our net in the water. Our position was 81° :08′ W., 2° 10' S., about 8 miles off West San Elena. He ordered me aboard the vessel but because we were working I could not leave my vessel. Four or five men then boarded our vessel. They looked around the vessel and inspected our logbook and the license number. These five Ecuadorans left our vessel and returned to their patrol vessel. Then via the use of a loudspeaker the Ecuadoran patrol vessel informed me that my license was out of order and that he would have to bring us into port. He told me within 4 hours I had to be in port. The patrol vessel after being advised by me that it would take from 3 to 5 hours for us to complete our work and get into port and he told me that they would be waiting for me. About 5 hours later we came into the port of Salinas. The patrol vessel was not there. I contacted the

captain of the port and paid him $60 for the clearance. I showed the captain of the port the license. The captain of the port told me that as far as he could see all the papers were in order and I paid the clearance fee of $60 and left port.

Out at sea I discussed what had happened to me with the other vessels. The captains told me they had run into the same problem. Most of these vessels were fishing the same general area. They were also stopped at least once and some twice.

Actually on a third occasion a patrol boat circled about us at night but we were not stopped, we were drifting at the time and I was not given orders to board the Ecuadoran vessel.

On a previous voyage, on the 29th of November 1961, our vessel was stopped by an Ecuadoran patrol vessel about 15 miles west of Cape Pasado. We were working on a school of fish at the time and the Ecuadoran patrol vessel made us stop working and as a result we lost our opportunity to set our net around the fish. The patrol vessel stopped us for the same reason, they wanted to look at our papers. When they looked at our papers we had a license aboard at that time, they let us alone but it was too late to work on the school of fish.

Also, during a voyage in May 1961, off Manta, Ecuador, approximately 11 miles from shore, our vessel was ordered to stop its fishing activities and have the master came aboard the Ecuadoran vessel for inspection of the ship's documents. On the patrol vessel, the ship's documents and an Ecuadoran fishing license were examined. After the examination, our vessel was permitted to fish.

AUGUST DA SILVA, Master-MV "Normandie."

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of August 1962, by August Da Silva, to me known.

[SEAL]

C. C. PAYNE,

Notary Public in and for the County of San Diego, State of California. My commission expires January 22, 1965.

Mr. FELANDO. These affidavits illustrate there is no one isolated situation off the Pacific. We see a marked movement in the increase of these actions as the fishing industries of these countries develop. And more problems are on the way. I have been reliably informed that we will have trouble off the coast of Peru within a short period of time.

Last night I received information that there is a Peruvian military plane and a military patrol vessel off the coast and that our vessels are approximately-eight vessels off the coast of Ecuador-these vessels have reason to believe that the Peruvian patrol vessel is out to locate American-flag vessels.

Two tuna vessels were chased off a fishing location 25 miles off the coast by a Peruvian gunboat a few months ago. Within the past few weeks, the Peruvian Navy was requested by Peruvian citizens to chase or seize American-flag tuna vessels off the Peruvian coast.

American citizens and others who are operating U.S.-flag vessels or foreign-flag vessels from ports in Peru have been ordered to report the presence of U.S.-based tuna clippers off the coast of Peru.

We are also informed that a strongly financed newspaper campaign will soon be inaugurated in Peru for the express purpose of putting pressure on the Peruvian Government. We have been advised that this program has been delayed because of recent political events in Peru. The trend of increased harassment of U.S.-based tuna vessels off Latin America is unmistakable and very apparent. And this trend will be accelerated when conservation controls go into effect upon American tuna fishermen.

It is clear to us that our Government's policy in merely denying recognition of various nation's claims beyond the 3-mile limit has not been effective in preserving the rights of tuna fishermen operating in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.

This policy is ineffective today, and we have no reason to believe that it will be effective tomorrow. To merely deny recognition is totally insufficient. To deny recognition and then attempt to negotiate problems has proven impractical. Our Government's policy to protect vessels of the United States on the high seas is sadly lacking in effective implementation. This appraisal is also applicable to the Fishermen's Protective Act (Public Law 680, 83d Cong.).

Under the Fishermen's Protective Act, a shipowner can recover the fine imposed by a foreign country in a case where the vessel is seized by a foreign country.

During my visit to Colombia this last April, I was informed by the Director of Fisheries that the money paid under the fines paid by the tuna vessels San Joaquin ($2,318.20) and the Princessa ($2,897.75) did not go into the Government treasury, but to his department. He requested the seizure, he controls the fishing license privilege, and he uses the income derived from the fines imposed upon our vessels. And, under the Fishermen's Protective Act, he has the U.S. Government as guarantor for payment of the fines.

But, under the Fishermen's Protective Act, there exists no remedy for the costs incurred for time spent under arrest in a foreign port. The Shamrock lost 5 days (March 21-25) and never did come in with a full load of fish. The San Joaquin lost 12 days (February 12-24) and this vessel also failed to come home with a load of fish. The Lou Jean lost 5 days (April 28-May 3). The White Star is going on its fourth week.

Based on the record of catch per day for the prior fishing year, the demurrage cost for tuna vessels runs approximately $500 to $1,000 or more per day.

Nor does the Fishermen's Protective Act provide remedies against a foreign country's actions that are designed to harass or otherwise interfere with the lawful activities of our fishing vessels.

Thus our Government's action to implement our 3-mile policy has been totally ineffective, and the statute now on the books, the Fishermen's Protective Act, is inadequate to handle the problems now faced by our high seas tuna fleet.

We are opposed to the contention that our Government should seek leverage with these countries as a method of implementing the nonrecognition policy by assisting the country's fishing industry. This plan has apparently already failed.

I refer you to exhibit 7, of Senator Gruening's speech on August 2, 1962, pages 14419-14440 of the Congressional Record. This exhibit indicates the billions of dollars of American economic and military aid granted to South America during the period 1946-61.

For instance, Ecuador has received $100.5 million in economic and military aid. I might add that our tuna fleet has helped out alsofrom January 1 to August 20, 1962, Ecuadoran consuls in California and Panama have received about $300,000 in fishing license income. In previous years, our vessels used to average about $500,000 each

year.

Peru has received over $376.1 million in economic and military aid. The money granted or loaned to other Latin American countries is in the record.

Now, it appears to us, that if this amount of aid through the years doesn't give our Government any so-called leverage in the negotiation of its nonrecognition policy with these countries, then surely any aid now directed to the fishing interests in these countries will also be inadequate.

Our Government representatives tell us that time will solve our problems. They argue that our troubles are only spasmodic in nature, and not very serious. In opposition to this type of thinking, we believe that the events we have described represent an unmistakable trend.

The best evidence of this trend is the decree placed into effect by Ecuador on May 31, 1962, prohibiting foreign tuna purse seiners from fishing within 40 miles of the Ecuadoran coast. This unilateral action by Ecuador was taken while the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission was meeting in Ecuador and expressing recognition by them, including Ecuador, that conservation of tuna required joint action by all nations fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. (See the informal translation of this Ecuadoran decree, by the U.S. Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, exhibit 4.)

It is obvious to us that as tuna production units are numerically increased, and as canning and cold storage facilities are expanded in Latin America, fishing interests in those countries will act to remove competition from U.S.-based tuna vessels as effectively and as quickly as possible. Time will not solve the problem.

We also think it obvious that as conservation controls are applied to American fishermen and to other foreign fishermen, the desire of Latin American fishing interests to keep out American competition intensifies, and the problem becomes even more aggravated.

At first we thought the remedy we now request, and the type of solutions suggested in Senator Bartlett's speech and mentioned in the Senate Commerce report, would confuse the need for an amendment of the Tuna Convention Act of 1950.

We were advised that such a remedy would prevent passage of the bill. So, we gave in when the bill was in the Senate. However, due to recent serious developments which I have mentioned, we have been forced to conclude that continued existence of an American tuna fleet depends to a large exent on effective protection of U.S.-flag tuna fishing vessels on the high seas.

The legislative history of the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950 will reveal the fact that the American Tunaboat Association strongly supported the creation of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. In fact, the author of the law, W. M. Chapman, former Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State in 1949, was employed by the association after he left Government service. Our organization has an extremely close and friendly relationship with the Commission. Then, why the strong objection to S. 2568, and why now?

As I have pointed out, seizure, harassment and discrimination by Latin American countries against American tuna fishermen has increased with the increased pressure of our Government for conservation of tuna resources. At the same time, the tuna fishing industry

in Latin America has substantially increased at the expense of the tuna industry in the United States. Our Government has greatly increased economic aid to Latin America but has failed to protect American tuna fishermen.

Although the tuna conventions have been in existence for the past 12 years without consequential foreign tuna fishing countries becoming members, in spite of inducements by our Government, it has been asserted that unilateral action by the United States to regulate its tuna fishermen will bring about multilateral conservation of tuna.

We doubt this, and if it does, we believe that it will be almost entirely at the expense and detriment of the U.S.-flag tuna fishing fleet. When we are told that in time S. 2568 will solve our problems, we agree if what our Government has in mind is elimination of the American tuna fishing fleet in favor of foreign tuna fishing fleets.

We strongly believe that if S. 2568 is not amended, as we request, then our fleet will be subject to fishing conditions in the eastern Pacific that will mean the extinction of the country's only high seas fishing fleet. It seems incredible to us that the United States would follow a policy of allowing other countries to develop high seas fishing fleets, and deny American fishermen such development.

A few weeks ago, in a meeting held in San Francisco, we were advised by Government representatives that under the provisions of S. 2568, American fishermen could be subjected to the following intolerable conditions:

1. The countries who fish within the regulated area would agree that on an agreed date each of the countries would place into effect laws upon their fishermen that would implement the recommendations of the Commission.

Thus, American fishermen would be under regulation on a certain date agreed upon with other countries.

2. The other countries could adopt laws identical to the Ecuadoran decree, and such a fact would not suspend the regulation of American fishermen or prevent agreement with our country.

We were advised that the United States could not compel agreement from the other countries, even as to those countries that are members of the Commission, as to the contents of the laws that they would apply. The net effect of this situation would best be illustrated by the conditions now in existence today.

Suppose, we are regulated as to yellowfin production, and free to fish skipjack tuna. Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are good areas for skipjack fishing. Effective enforcement of the Ecuadoran decree would mean disaster for our fleet.

Our idea is not based upon mere speculation. Look at what is happening to the White Star. Will a man risk his business, a vessel worth from $250,000 to $1,200,000, the lives of his crew, under these conditions?

It is both logical and imperative for us to charge that if the Government is to be given the power to control tuna production, then it should protect the tuna fishermen in gaining access and use of the source of such production.

Under the terms of S. 2568, the Government is given the power to prohibit fish from those countries who violate conservation policies of the Commission. In this instance, the embargo power is justified.

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