Under classic international law, no national ownership attached to the Continental Shelf and its contained resources beyond the 3-mile limit (with minor modifications). In order to deal with, and among, its own citizens in the development of the oil resources off its own coast, the United States required to obtain a modification of international law so that it would have jurisdiction over the offshore oil development. There was really nothing under law for the Federal and State Governments to divide up until this was accomplished. During the same period of years, the 1930's, the technology of fishing salmon on the high seas far distant from home port was in the process of being developed by the Japanese in the North Pacific, using mother ships, catcher boats with drift gill nets and so forth. For many years there had been developing among the Americans who were the only fishers in Bristol Bay an elaborate system of conservation regulations particularly fitted to the American economy and designed to keep those enormous runs of salmon productive in perpetuity. The suddenly acquired ability of the Japanese to come over on this side of the ocean startled all Americans connected with this problem. Suddenly the salmon runs, the conservation program, and this large industry and its revenues which were an integral part of the Alaskan economy were in jeopardy. The people interested in this problem simply wanted the Japanese to stay out of their fishery. This could not be accomplished by the United States by fiat under international law.

Both of these problems were relieved by the war but only lay fulminating. The people interested in both, as the war drew to a close, became again active in defending their respective interests. The result was a pair of proclamations issued by President Truman on September 28, 1945, one dealing with the Continental Shelf; the other dealing with the conservation of fisheries lying in the high seas.

The Continental Shelf proclamation sought to initiate a change in international law to the effect that the coastal nation would have unique jurisdiction over the resources in the Continental Shelf contiguous to its coast. Although this outright suggested change in international law sputtered along until 1958 before it was substantially adopted by the family of nations, there was never any particular international controversy over the general idea of this proclamation.

The Conservation of Fisheries Proclamation did not seek to change international law. As stated by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Department of State Bulletin 934, June 6, 1955, p. 936): "This [proclamation] declares the policy of the United States on the establishment of fishery conservation zones in the high seas contiguous to its coasts. Where such fishing activities are maintained by U.S, nationals alone it regards it as proper that regulation be exercised by the United States exclusively. But when the fishing activities have been legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals of the United States and nationals of other states, conservation zones may be established by agreement between the United States and such other states. This proclamation has been misunderstood by some as implying a claim to exclusive fishing rights for U.S. nationals off its coasts. The proclamation asserts no such claims, and such is not the position of the United States. ***"

This fisheries proclamation stirred up a veritable hornets nest in international relations all over the world which was extremely active for nearly 15 years. A year or two ago, it commenced to subside. Within the United States the fisheries proclamation did nothing to settle the Alaska-Japan salmon problem but almost at once it raised serious problems in another great U.S. fishery-that for tuna. Mexico reacted almost immediately. A Presidential declaration was issued on October 29, 1945-scarcely a month after the U.S. Presidential proclamation. The Mexican declaration claimed as a right of Mexico the ability to extend its jurisdiction as far to sea as it felt from time to time necessary in order to protect natural resources vital to its long-term welfare. On October 11, 1946, Argentina by Presidential Decree No. 14,708 stated: "It is hereby declared that Argentina's epicontinental sea and continental shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the nation." So far as is known, no controversy over fisheries was involved in this decree, as no foreign fishermen operated off the Argentine coast at the time. This decree on top of the Mexican proclamation, however, launched a spate of extraordinarily "broad" territorial waters claims in Latin America. Chile followed on June 25, 1947. Having a very narrow continental shelf, it departed from the Argentine formula to claim sovereignty over the ocean to a minimum distance from its coast. Peru followed with a decree on the Chile model on August 1, 1947.

Trouble for the tuna industry first arose with Mexico, the nearest and consequently the most important country off whose shores Californians fished. Although the Mexican proclamation was never enacted into effective Mexican law nor reflected in seizures and serious troubles on the high seas off the Pacific coast of Mexico, nevertheless there was a deterioration in the relations between the affected agencies of the Mexican Government and the California fishing industry, which had been steadily nurtured by both sides over the years and had been generally excellent. Increasingly, from 1945 to 1949, this deterioration resulted in minor harassments and much talk which was not conducive to good business and which caused the Californians increasing concern.

The California tuna people became about as worried over these potentially explosive developments adjacent to their fishing industry as were the Alaska salmon people. Although their views on the substantive issues involved were precisely opposite to those of the Alaskans, they joined forces with the latter to see that these fishery jurisdiction matters were given proper attention in the Department of State. As a consequence, there was created in the Department of State the Office of Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Unde” Secretary of State to have cognizance of such matters.

This was not accomplished any too early for the needs of the tuna peopl of southern California because of serious developments that were taking place both externally in relation to other governments and internally in the industry The steady and rapid growth which had taken place in the California tung fishery and its market during the 1920's and 1930's had been artifically restrained during the first half of the 1940's by the exigencies of war. The Navy took ove the long-range tuna clippers and wartime economic controls substantially froz the market. Immediately the Pacific war was concluded, this repressed growth burst its bounds both in the fishery and in the market and an abnormally rani | rate of growth took place in both, with resultant abnormal strains.

The suppressed market began to zoom with the removal of governments economic controls. The Japanese being still out of the supply end of the market and substantially no fishery for tuna existing in any of the Latin Ame ican countries, the pressure for increasing supplies of raw material to meet market demands fell entirely upon the southern California fleets. The Navy began releasing vessels taken over for war duties back to their owners, and made available to owners whose vessels had been lost to enemy action and to the sea other suitable surplus hulls. Other fishermen, under the spur of market demand, built more and ever larger tuna vessels. The effect of these forces upon the size of the fleet is given in the following figures on the number of bait boat vessels in the San Diego fleet (the largest component) and their combined carrying capacity in short tons during the period directly after the war:

The catch of yellowfin and skipjack tuna by all countries from the eastern Pacific expanded as the U.S. fleet expanded, but the expansion was mostly attributable to the expansion of the bait boat fleet working out of San Diego. The catch in millions of pounds for these years was as follows:

The internal problem that this rapid expansion created in external relations was competition between the two sorts of large tuna fishing vessels existing in southern California which had different external needs and internal connections. The purse seine fleet originated primarily from San Pedro, the average size of vessels in that fleet (and their working range) was smaller, and it needed no bait from foreign waters but ability to take shelter in local ports from heavy weather. The bait-boat fleet originated from San Diego, contained the largest and longest ranged units which were much more free from need for port privileges adjacent to the fishing grounds, but absolutely required live bait which was for the most part available only within 3 miles or less of the beach and this within the sovereign jurisdiction of the countries adjacent to the fishing grounds.

Vigorous competition between these two American forces at sea, and for variable sorts of port privileges to the south, resulted in friction between the two in ports, and with governments, from northern Mexico to southern Ecuador. This was exacerbated by the very rapid expansion of the total California fleet which led thinking in the affected coastal countries in two quite separate but correlated paths: (a) This was a rich fishery which should be captured to help the economy of the coastal country, and (b) this fishery was growing so rapidly that if not checked it would damage, or even destroy, the natural resources upon which it was based.

The argument most frequently raised publicly by the Mexicans was that the very rapid expansion in fishing effort in California was putting the tuna resources off the Mexican coast in jeopardy or in actual danger of extinction. At that stage of history the Californians themselves did not know what justification there might be to such accusations because of lack of research on tuna and the fishery. Having before them the successful examples of the international fisheries commissions in the Pacific Northwest applying to halibut and sockeye salmon, they unitedly (both sorts of boatowners, fishermen's unions, and canners) petitioned the Department of State to engage with Mexico in such an international fisheries commission to investigate impartially and jointly to determine what was the state of the resource, and what, on the basis of adequate scientific data, were the effects of the fishery.

Accordingly, the Department of State engaged in negotiations with the Government of Mexico in Mexico City from October 25 to November 4, 1948. Several representatives of the tuna fishing and processing interests were in Mexico City at the invitation of the Department of State during the negotiations, and were in daily consultation with the U.S. delegation. As a result of these negotiations a convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the establishment of an international commission for the scientific investigation of tuna was signed at Mexico City, January 25, 1949. It may be noted that advice and consent to the United States ratifying this convention was given by the U.S. Senate in 1949, with the testified approbation of all segments of the California industry.

The convention between the United States and Mexico never became effective for the reason that the Government of Mexico never appointed commissioners. The convention seemed, however, to have an ameliorating effect on relations between the two countries in that friction over the tuna fishery declined. The convention expired at the end of 5 years in accordance with its included terms. The lack of immediate working success of this convention did not make much difference at the time because almost simultaneously much more serious trouble erupted in Costa Rica, and the United States moved to counter it by the same means it had used with Mexico.

For about 20 years the bait-boat clippers from San Diego, Calif., had frequented the Gulf of Nicoya in Costa Rica for the purpose of catching anchovetta there as bait for their fishery. They paid liberal license fees to Costa Rica for this purpose and also by their expenditures for supplies, etc., in the coastal community, Puntarenas, contributed materially to the economy of that city as well as the country.

In 1946, the purse seiners from San Pedro began fishing off Costa Rica and also using the harbor of Puntarenas. Competitive arguments between these two sorts of California fishermen arose in Costa Rica and different individuals in that Government took different sides in these quarrels over what sort of gear was best for harvesting tuna in those latitudes.

In 1947, the Gulf of Nicoya experienced a widespread outbreak of "red tide," the poisonous one-celled animal which in dense congregations kills off fish. The entire anchovetta population of the Gulf of Nicoya soon disappeared. In 1948,

there also occurred a revolution on July 27. The revolutionary government published a proclamation based on that of Chile and Peru establishing the sovereignty of Costa Rica to the sea off its coast to a distance of 200 miles and establishing a territorial sea of the same distance around its off-lying island possessions and commenced enforcing this proclamation against the California fleet.

This was indeed serious to the California tuna people because Cocos Island, a Costa Rican possession, lies about 300 miles off the coast of that country. The newly pronounced territorial sea of Costa Rica, if validly established, would have put in being a band of territorial sea extending 500 miles to westward of Costa Rica, athwart the passage of the tuna boats to the south and in or through which Costa Rica could have controlled their passage or stopped it.

The U.S. Government made diplomatic representations to Costa Rica and that Government justified its action in the following terms: The anchovetta of the Gulf of Nicoya had died off. It was Costa Rica's opinion that the California bait boats had killed them off by overfishing. The number of California bait boats and purse seiners fishing off the coast was increasing rapidly. The Government believed this would lead to the tuna off this coast being killed off too if the fishing were left unregulated. Accordingly, it had taken what recourse was available to it, it had established a conservation zone off its coast (following, it said, the principles laid down by the U.S. fisheries proclamation of September 1945). Under this it proposed to regulate the tuna and bait fishing off the coast and prevent any overfishing.

The United States was fairly hoist with its own petard. In those days nobody knew very much about the population dynamics of tuna or the effect of the fishery upon such stocks of fish. Its own policies had been plainly stated by President Truman to the effect that U.S. nationals would not be permitted by the Government of the United States to overfish any stock of fish in the high seas. now a case of put up or shut up.

It was

Accordingly, the United States suggested to Costa Rica that the subject be scientifically investigated by an international commission to be established between the two nations in which each would have an equal voice. If such joint scientific investigations showed that tuna (or bait) was being overfished, then appropriate regulations to prevent this, based upon the scientific investigations of the Commission, would be put into effect in respect of the citizens of the two countries.

This was accepted by Costa Rica, negotiations on the subject were undertaken in Washington, D.C., in May 1949, and the Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica for the Establishment of an InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission was signed between the two countries on May 31, 1949. The convention came into force on March 3, 1950. The two countries promptly appointed Commissioners and the Commission held its inaugural meeting in San Diego, Calif., in July of that same year. A director of investigations, Dr. Milner B. Schaefer, was hired and the recruiting of scientific staff began.

The Government of Costa Rica was satisfied with this program and our problems with that nation seemed well on the way to alleviation. As a matter of fact, when constitutional government was subsequently reestablished, the Costa Rican Supreme Court declared null and void the 200 miles proclamation issued by the revolutionary government.

On September 7 of that same year (1950), the U.S. Congress adopted legislation enabling the United States to perform its obligations under this convention. It will be noted that this enabling legislation did not give the U.S. Government authority to regulate its tuna fishermen on the high seas for conservation purposes. At this stage, that was not an obligation of the United States under this convention. Accordingly, authority was given to enforce only regulations requisite to the gathering of scientific data by the Commission. Following the successful precedents of the International Pacific Halibut Convention, and the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Convention, the authority actually to regulate was withheld from the U.S. Government until such time as the Tuna Commission found conservation regulations to be necessary.

We have only reached this stage now-12 years later.

Thus, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission was formed especially to solve a problem in international relations, not particularly a problem in fisheries conservation; no fisheries conservation problem was known for sure to exist in the area of the tuna fishery in 1950 and one has only now developed— 12 years later.

The reason why no overfishing problem developed in this area for such a long period of time was economic and not political or diplomatic. In 1950, while the above-noted activities were going on, a flood of canned tuna imports from Japan hit the U.S. market. For the next 10 years the succeeding shocks in the U.S. market from the product of the rapidly expanding Japanese tuna fisheries and processing operations kept the California tuna industry, and especially the fleet, so upset that its fishing effort in this area declined steadily during that decade rather than expanding as had confidently been expected in early 1950.

But while Costa Rica was satisfied, the diplomatic problem which the Commission had been brought into being to solve between the United States and Costa Rica kept right on growing in other areas during the early years of the Commission's activity.

The 200-mile thesis in general developed into a flaming fire in Latin America, fed by a variety of fuels-nationalism, desire for economic gain, demagoguery, genuine fear for the welfare of resources, anti-Americanism, et cetera.

On September 14, 1950, El Salvador wrote a 200-mile limit for its territorial sea into a new constitution. The battle then moved into the international arenas, first in the Organization of American States and its related agencies. In July 1951, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, meeting in Rio de Janeiro, came out with recommendations favoring the adoption of a 200-mile territorial sea for all countries of Latin America. This had no legal effect of any sort, but in August 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, meeting in Santiago, Chile, signed an agreement establishing a breadth of territorial sea to a minimum distance of 200 miles for those three countries, thus beginning that accumulation of treaty law and practice which often leads to changes in international law.

At the second meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists in Buenos Aires in 1953, the above-noted recommendations of the Inter-American Juridical Committee came up for consideration and it was only with great difficulty that the United States and a few similar-thinking allies were able, not to defeat the concept, but to refer it back to the Inter-American Juridical Committee for study. At the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas in March 1954, a resolution proposing the adoption of the 200-mile limit as the rule of law in Latin America was brought forward. Had this been brought to a vote nobody there questioned that it would have been adopted by a majority of 18 to 2. The United States again was able to postpone the decision on the issue by getting adopted a resolution calling for the Organization of American States to convoke a specialized conference in 1955 to study as a whole the different aspects of the law of the sea.

What had been more or less a localized fishery argument over one fishery among a few nations had developed into a regional issue, the adoption of which could have had catastrophic consequences to general United States and the free world military, mercantile, and strategic interests on a worldwide basis. The United States could not tolerate losing on this issue and it could not win it in the Latin American arena. Accordingly, the United States, with allies, succeeded in transferring the action on this subject out of the Organization of American States into the United Nations. An International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea was called for Rome in April 1955, by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its meeting in December 1954.

While these moves were going on in the international field the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's scientific staff had organized and forged ahead on its scientific studies of the relationship of the tuna fishery to the stocks of tuna and bait fishes in the entire eastern tropical and subtropical Pacific.

Also the California tuna industry, under the crushing competition in its market from expanding Japanese tuna production had been extending its area to the southward in order that it could have a more complete year-round activity and thus improve its economic situation. The fishery off the Ecuadoran continental coast (as contrasted with that around the Galapagos Islands) had increased, regular fishing had been established along the northern Peruvian coast and, finally, the fishery had extended seasonally (the northern winter or southern summer) clear down the coast of Peru to northern Chile, thus encompassing in a regular manner the entire range of yellowfin and skipjack in the Eastern Pacific from southern California to northern Chile.

There had been a sharp clash, with seizures of vessels, with Panama in 1953 which had finally been settled amicably with Panama adhering to the convention establishing the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission on September 21, 1953.