disclosures.

Suitability

Consistent with the Rules of Fair Practice, the OCC expects banks to determine whether a product being recommended is an appropriate investment for the customer. Banks should ensure that any salespeople involved in bank-related sales obtain sufficient information from customers to enable the salesperson to make a judgment about the suitability of recommendations for particular customers. At a minimum, suitability inquiries should be made consistent with the Rules of Fair Practice concerning the customer's financial and tax status, investment objectives, and other factors that may be relevant, prior to making recommendations to the customer. This information should be documented and updated periodically.

A well-documented suitability inquiry can protect a bank from dissatisfied customers who threaten litigation. Such litigation could introduce risk to the bank's capital. Accordingly, the OCC may view banks operating a retail securities business without appropriate suitability procedures to be engaging in an unsafe and unsound practice.

Many banks use software programs that document investor profiles to assist in making suitability judgments. Each profile is based on a customer's responses to inquiries as to his or her financial and relevant personal history. The software program subsequently matches the customer's investment needs and objectives to the bank's available products. This type of software is a tool, not a substitute for professional judgement; it should not weight bank proprietary products too heavily or bank deposits too lightly.

One example of a critical suitability determination involves sales to elderly bank customers. Many of these customers rely upon investments or savings for retirement income and may consequently demand high yields. They may not, however, have the

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Examiners should investigate potential suitability problems in mutual fund sales when reviewing "breakpoints" and "letters of intent." Breakpoints are discounts that are available to investors who purchase a large amount of mutual fund shares in a lump sum or as part of a cumulative investment program (e.g. under a "letter of intent"). The potential for abuse usually occurs when the sale of several different mutual fund shares takes place in quantities just below the level at which the purchaser would qualify for reduced sales charges on any one of the funds.

Examiners should determine whether a bank officer has been assigned responsibility for implementing and/or monitoring the suitability system. The examination approach should focus on the system the bank has in place to make suitability inquiries, suitability judgements, and periodic account reviews. Examiners generally should review sales patterns rather than individual sales for suitability issues. To determine the types of sales to test for suitability, examiners should investigate marketing programs that target a class of customers, customer complaints, sales to first-time and risk-averse investors, sales made by high- or low-volume salespersons, volatile and new products, and the existence of mutual fund redemptions after relatively short holding periods.

Qualifications and Training

Banks should implement detailed training programs to ensure that sales personnel have thorough product knowledge (as opposed to simple sales training for a product) and understand customer protection requirements. Examiners should assess the process the bank uses to ensure that sales personnel are properly qualified

and adequately trained to sell all bankrelated nondeposit investment products. If bank personnel sell or recommend securities, the training should be substantively equivalent to that required for personnel qualified to sell securities as registered representatives. Securities industry training is available in most metropolitan areas.

Examiners also should determine that the bank's audit and compliance personnel and persons with supervisory responsibilities are properly trained and knowledgeable.

A bank's hiring practices and training plan should be designed around the complexity and risks of the particular investment products being offered. While it may be appropriate to have a banking generalist with no securities industry background sell money market mutual funds, it could be inappropriate to allow this individual to sell fixedrate annuities without extensive training.

If individuals with securities industry experience are hired to sell investment products for banks, they should have an understanding of securities industry customer protection and control systems and have an adequate knowledge of the products being offered. Since they may not be familiar with general banking regulations and may not understand the needs of bank customers, banks should also ensure that these individuals are instructed as to the specialized obligations of selling investment products in a retail banking environment. Examiners should expect management to check with securities regulators to determine if potential bank sales employees with previous securities industry experience have a disciplinary history.

Banks engaging in lower volume mutual fund and annuity sales frequently train existing bank employees to sell investment products. Examiners should determine that bank management is satisfied that these individuals have acquired "product knowledge," and thoroughly understand the need to safeguard the customers' interests. More specialized "product knowledge" training is generally provided by the mar

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keting division of a mutual fund sponsor or another third party vendor. Bank staff should also receive customer protection and compliance training.

Examiners should determine whether a bank officer has been assigned responsibility for ensuring that adequate training is provided to bank staff, and for reviewing the hiring and training practices of a third party vendor.

Compensation

Incentive compensation systems, which are standard in the securities and insurance businesses, are becoming increasingly common in commercial banking. Personnel who are authorized to sell nondeposit investment products may receive incentive compensation, such as commissions, for transactions entered into by customers. However, incentive compensation programs must not be structured in such a way as to result in unsuitable recommendations or sales being made to customers. An improperly designed compensation system can provide a bank employee with the incentive to place his or her own compensation interests above the interests of bank customers. Examiners should assess the steps management has taken to ensure that compensation programs do not operate as an incentive for salespeople to make unsuitable recommendations or sales to customers.

One way to avoid having the compensation system drive the recommendation toward mutual funds and away from certificate of deposit renewals would be to separate the nondeposit investment product sales and CD renewal functions. Alternatively, if employees are permitted to offer both deposits and nondeposit investment products, a bank could reduce the temptation by compensating the employee for renewing maturing deposits as well as for selling nondeposit investment products. Examiners should discuss with bank management where appropriate the methods used to avoid possible conflicts of interest poten

tially arising from the bank's compensation plan.

To investigate whether incentive compensation schemes could induce salespersons to recommend products with higher commissions over a more suitable option, examiners should look to customer complaints and to sales patterns rather than to individual sales. For example, an examiner can look for instances in which sales for particular product increased after changes to an incentive compensation system.

Examiners also should expect a bank to increase its supervision of sales programs as it increases its incentive compensation. Examiners should be critical of supervision that does not take into account the possibility that recommendations for purchases of nondeposit investment products could be influenced by the incentive compensation scheme.

If the overall setting and circumstances of a bank's investment sales program appears to be only marginally satisfactory, examiners should regard higher incentive compensation on certain investment products and lower compensation on deposits and other investment products as having the potential for causing serious problems. In this case the compensation system itself should justify an increase in the level of bank management supervision. If supervision is not adequate, the examiner should criticize the compensation system and other objectionable factors in the setting and circumstance of the sale.

Bank supervisory employees who review and approve individual sales, accept new accounts, and review established customer accounts should not receive incentive compensation based on the profitability of individual trades or accounts that are subject to their review. Similarly, department auditors or compliance personnel should not participate in incentive compensation programs that are based directly on the success of sales efforts nor should they report to a manager who receives this type of incentive compensation. In addition,

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bank management should not rely on third party audit and control systems if that vendor's control personnel receive transaction-based incentive compensation.

Bank employees, including tellers, may receive a one-time nominal fee of a fixed dollar amount for each customer referred for nondeposit investment products. The payment of this referral fee should not depend on whether the referral results in a transaction.

Fiduciary Accounts

Pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11(d), examiners will review the investments held by national banks as fiduciary to determine whether such investments are in accordance with law, 12 CFR 9, and sound fiduciary principles. In so doing, they will ensure that the bank has complied with all applicable state and federal restrictions on investment transactions involving the bank's fiduciary accounts.

Under 12 CFR 9.12, national bank fiduciaries may not invest funds held as fiduciary in the stock of organizations with which there exists such a connection as may affect the exercise of the best judgment of the bank in acquiring the stock, unless there exists specific authority for such an investment in the governing instrument, local law, a court order or through consents from all beneficiaries. As to accounts subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, such investments must be within the authority of that Act. These principles govern purchases of a bank's proprietary products, such as bank-advised mutual funds and private label mutual funds for fiduciary accounts.

In addition, pursuant to 12 CFR 9.11(d), examiners will determine that fiduciary purchases and retention of bank proprietary products for fiduciary accounts are in accord with sound fiduciary principles. This requires that even if specific authority exists for fiduciary accounts to purchase or retain bank-advised or bank private label mutual funds, the assets must be appropri

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ate for each account. The investment must be consistent with the purpose for which each account was created, and suitable for the beneficial interest holders of each account. This requirement exists as to purchases for individual accounts, and for conversions of collective investment funds to bank-advised mutual funds.

Twelve CFR 9.7 requires banks to conduct initial and annual reviews of each fiduciary account as well as a separate review of all securities by issuer to ensure compliance with these requirements. These reviews include:

⚫A documented review of each ac

count to determine that the assets of that account, including any proprietary products, meet the investment objectives of the account. In structuring the account portfolio, the fiduciary must consider the provisions of the document establishing the account. The review must also take into account the needs of the beneficial interest holders. This review should address the issues set forth in the Comptroller's Handbook for Fiduciary Activities, "Portfolio Management."

A documented annual review of all assets by issuer, including proprietary products. This review should consider the quality of fund management, fee structure, risk diversification and anticipated rates of return. It should also address the considerations set forth in the Comptroller's Handbook for Fiduciary Activities, "Investments."

Compliance Program

Banks must maintain compliance programs capable of verifying compliance with the guidelines specified in the Interagency Statement and with any other applicable requirements. Banks should perform nondeposit investment compliance programs independently of investment product sales and management. At a minimum, the compliance function should include a sys

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tem to monitor customer complaints and to review customer accounts periodically to detect and prevent abusive practices.

Examiners reviewing the compliance operations of a bank offering a variety of retail investment products should ensure that the bank has comprehensive self-regulatory policies and that it is conducting an ongoing comparison of the bank's investment sales practices with its stated investment policy. In banks with a less elaborate investment sales program, where an internal auditing group may perform all of the bank's compliance functions, the examiner should ensure that these auditors are periodically comparing sales practices with policy.

Individuals performing the audit or compliance of the bank's investment program should be qualified and should have the necessary experience to perform the assigned tasks. Compliance personnel should also engage in ongoing training to keep abreast of emerging developments in banking and securities laws and regulations.

Banks can establish independence of audit or compliance personnel if such personnel determine the scope, frequency, and depth of their own reviews; report their findings directly to the board of directors or an appropriate committee of the board; have their performance evaluated by persons independent of the investment product sales function; and receive compensation that is not connected to the success of investment product sales.

Bank compliance programs should be modeled after those in the securities business where it is customary for compliance personnel to conduct regular and frequent customer account reviews in order to detect and prevent abuses. The extent and frequency of customer account supervision should be dictated by the aggressiveness of the sales program and the riskiness of products being offered.

Examiners should expect the bank to assign individuals independent of the sales

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force to review periodically customer responses to suitability inquiries and to compare these responses to the type and volume of account activity to determine whether the activity in an account is appropriate. If account activity is unusual relative to the customer's stated objectives and risk tolerance, or if account activity is brisk relative to the size of a customer's investment or past practices, management should make follow-up inquiries to determine if the activity serves the best interests of the customer.

If examinations or routine oversight by bank management indicates that suitability problems may exist, bank management is expected to conduct its own review of all affected accounts and to institute corrective actions. If it is determined that customers may have been disadvantaged, corrective actions should be designed on a case-by-case basis and may include full explanations to customers and, where appropriate, offers to rescind trades.

Customer complaints are an indication of potential problems that warrant a prompt account review. Examiners should expect the bank to assign a bank officer who is independent of the sales force the responsibility for approving the resolution of complaints or reviewing the resolution of complaints by a third party vendor. The examiner should evaluate the system for assuring that all complaints (written and oral) receive management's attention by reviewing the bank's audit of the complaint resolution system.

Managers of high-volume investment sales programs also often use automated exception reporting systems to flag potential problems before customers complain. Such systems monitor product sales and the performance of salespersons. If the bank has such systems in place, and if the reports show significant volumes of mutual fund redemptions after short holding periods, examiners should review the steps management has taken to investigate whether the product is being sold properly.

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If early redemptions are restricted to one salesperson or one branch, management can reasonably conclude that the problem is localized. However, early redemptions occurring throughout the sales network may indicate that something is wrong with the product itself or with the training provided to salespeople. Similarly, if reports indicate that a salesperson is selling one type of product almost exclusively, management may need to review that individual's performance or training.

Ultimately, the way for bank management to assure itself that the securities salespersons are providing the required disclosures and making suitable recommendations to customers is to "test" the sales program. Effective "tests" can be conducted in several ways. Larger banks sometimes employ "testers" who pose as prospective customers and test the sales presentations for a variety of issues including adherence to customer protection standards. Many other well-managed banks (of all sizes) have instituted follow-up programs to verify that their customers understood their investment transactions. A bank manager, who is independent of the sales force, may telephone customers a few days after an investment account is opened or an unusual transaction has taken place. The manager will determine if the customer understands what he or she has purchased; understands the risks, including the uninsured nature of the product; understands the bank's role in the transaction; and can generally confirm responses to a suitability inquiry previously provided.

A bank officer usually can determine if a customer understands an investment by asking the customer to describe its general features. The customer should be able to describe how the product works and its risks rather than simply recite what he or she hopes to gain from the particular investment. Managers usually also determine if the customer is satisfied with the product and service or has any problems or suggestions for improving service. If a bank institutes a telephone follow-up program, it should maintain a record of con

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