In support of the above statement, counsel for appellant cited the following authorities: "Materia Medica and Therapeutics-fourth edition-Shoemaker-published by the F. A. Davidson Company, Dictionary of Applied Chemistry-Thorpe-vols. 1 and 3, and General and Industrial Chemistry-Molinari." The petition for rehearing was denied by the Board of Appeals. It is contended by counsel for appellant that the involved product is new; that it results from the application of a novel method of manufacture, whereby "certain chemical reactions are caused to take place forming calcium sucrate, calcium phospho sucrate, calcium lacto phosphate and magnesium phospho sucrate, all of which are compounds not even suggested by the references and compounds not possible to form by combining any or all of the ingredients of any or all of the references "; and that appellant has produced a bacteria proof product possessing both medical and food value heretofore unknown. [1] Counsel for appellant attached to his brief copies of affidavits. In view of the fact that they were not presented to, and were not considered by, the tribunals of the Patent Office, this court will not consider them. In re Fisher, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 864, 37 F. (2d) 628,395 O. G. 710. In his petition for rehearing, filed with the Board of Appeals, counsel for appellant said: The chemistry involved in this application is complicated and beyond the grasp of those not skilled in the art as set fourth in the specification and claims. [2] In cases involving intricate and highly technical questions, especially in the absence of the evidence of those expert in the art, concurring decisions of the Patent Office Tribunals will not be disturbed, unless it appear that they are manifestly wrong. Stern et al. v. Schroeder et al., 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 670, 36 F. (2d) 515,393 O. G. 3; Stern et al. v. Schroeder et al., 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 690, 36 F. (2d) 518, 393 O. G. 4; Beidler v. Caps, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 703, 36 F. (2d) 122, 392 O. G. 241; Clancy v. De Jahn, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 714, 36 F. (2d) 131, 392 O. G. 244; In re Moulton, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 891, 38 F. (2d) 359, 396 O. G. 7; In re Demarest, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 940, 38 F. (2d) 895, 396 O. G. 4; In re Wietzel, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1079, 39 F. (2d) 669, 400 O. G. 463; Pengilly v. Copeland, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1143, 40 F. (2d) 995, 399 O. G. 3. [3] It is true that the references cited by the tribunals of the Patent Office do not show the use of calcium and magnesium sulphates in combination with other substances for producing food products, nevertheless, the authorities cited by counsel for appellant disclose that the use of calcium and magnesium sulphates in combination with other substances for the precise purposes claimed by appellant is old in the art. We are in accord with the conclusion reached by the tribunals of the Patent Office and, for the reasons stated, the decision of the Board of Appeals is affirmed. Affirmed. [U. S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] IN RE RUSSEL No. 2,673. Decided April 15, 1931 410 O. G. 820; 48 F. (2d) 668 1. PATENTABILITY-PRINTED MATTER. "The mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,' or 'any new and useful improvements thereof,' as provided in section 4886 of the Revised Statutes, 35 U. S. C. A. Sec. 31." 2. SAME CLAIMS FOR A DIRECTORY. Claims for a directory having a part in which surnames are arranged in a particular manner Held unpatentable since the subject matter does not come within the provisions of the statute. Mr. Robt. E. Barry, Mr. D. P. Wolhaupter, and Messrs. Seymour & Bright for Russel. Mr. T. A. Hostetler and Mr. Howard S. Miller for the Commissioner of Patents. HATFIELD, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the decision of the Primary Examiner denying all of the claims, Nos. 6 and 7, in appellant's application for a patent for an alleged invention relating to improvements in indexes, particularly to the indexing of names in directories, and is claimed to be applicable to dictionaries, etc. The method of arranging and grouping the names is sufficiently set out in the involved claims. They read: 6. A directory comprising a part in which surnames are arranged phonetically with the given names of the respective surnames arranged otherwise than phonetically, and another part in which the surnames are arranged otherwise than phonetically with reference to the section in the first-mentioned part where surnames are arranged phonetically. 7. A directory comprising a part in which surnames are arranged in groups phonetically with the given names of the respective surnames arranged alphabetically and a second part in which surnames are arranged in columns alphabetically with references to the pages in the first-mentioned part where surnames are arranged phonetically, the several columns of the second part having at their heads designations of the range of surnames in the respective columns. It is claimed by appellant that his alleged invention facilitates the finding of names in directories and the like; and that it comprises “finished tangible subject matter bearing specifically arranged data or means, combined to produce a novel result." It may be observed, however, that the only matter claimed to be new is the alleged novel arrangement of names. [1] The mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," or "any new and useful improvements thereof," as provided in section 4886, of the Revised Statutes, 35 U. S. C. A. Sec. 31. Guthrie v. Curlett et al., 10 F. (2d) 725; Flint et al. v. Leonard & Co., 27 F. (2d) 215; In re Dixon, 18 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 711, 44 F. (2d) 881, 402 O. G. 3, and cases therein cited. It is contended by counsel for appellant that the decision in the case of Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 Fed. 443, supports his contention that the involved claims present patentable subject matter. In that case, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, held that so-called transfer tickets for use by street railway traction companies, etc., involved patentable subject matter, and, in its decision, referred to the case of Rand-McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scripp Book Co., 187 Fed. 984, also relied upon by counsel for appellant in this case. The court, however, did not hold that the mere arrangement of the printed text constituted patentable subject matter, but, on the contrary, based its decision upon the patentable novelty of the physical structure of the tickets, and, in this connection, said: The specifications describe a distinctive physical structure, viz., a given combination and general arrangement of body and coupon (with the suggestion that the two parts may be printed in different colors), accompanied by "conventional indications" and instructions for the use and interpretation of the ticket. But the alleged patentable novelty does not reside in the arrangement of the printed text, nor does such text constitute merely a printed agreement. (Italics ours.) [2] It is not claimed in the case at bar that appellant has invented a new physical structure, or a method of producing it. It is contended, however, that his alleged novel arrangement of names in directories and dictionaries is patentable subject matter. The issues at bar are clearly distinguishable from those involved in the Cincinnati Traction Co. case, supra, and other cases relied upon by counsel for appellant. The decision is affirmed. Affirmed. [U. S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] DORER v. MOODY No. 2,665. Decided April 15, 1931 410 O. G. 821; 48 F. (2d) 388 1. INTERFERENCE-APPEAL-WHAT MAY BE CONSIDERED. The question whether claims are unpatentable to an applicant involved in interference because of the issue of a prior patent to him will not be considered on appeal from award of priority. 2. SAME RIGHT TO MAKE THE CLAIMS-PRIORITY. The invention in issue Held to be disclosed in the application of M. involved in interference and in a prior application of his antedating the patent to D, and priority Held properly awarded to M. APPEAL from the Patent Office. Affirmed. Mr. Cleon J. Sawyer for Dorer. Mr. Frank Bower and Mr. Edward A. Hathaway for Moody. GARRETT, J.: An interference was declared by the Acting Examiner between Patent No. 1,586,978, granted to Dorer, June 1, 1926, upon an application filed February 3, 1921, and the application (which appears to be a divisional application of a patent case, the latter of which ripened into Patent No. 1,502,865, July 29, 1924), filed June 15, 1923, but relating back to the parent application filed August 21, 1920. By virtue of this latter date Moody became the senior party. The counts of this interference are two in number as follows: 1. In combination with a casing having suction and discharge means, a rotary impeller delivering fluid to the discharge, and means in the suction imparting rotational and axial velocity to the fluid before entering the impeller and separated therefrom by a conversion chamber. 2. In combination with a casing having suction and discharge means, a double impeller connected at each side with said suction, and means in the suction at each side of said impeller and separated therefrom by conversion chambers for imparting rotational axial velocity to the fluid before entering the impeller. Dorer moved to dissolve the interference on the ground that Moody was not entitled to make the counts. Moody moved to amend by adding certain additional claims from the Dorer patent as new counts. The Law Examiner denied both motions. Upon the hearing before the Examiner of Interferences, Dorer raised certain points, to wit: (a) Moody's lack of right to make the counts; (b) that Moody could take no benefit from his application of August 21, 1920; (c) that Moody was estopped by his long delay in presenting claims corresponding to the counts in issue; and (d) that there should be a recommendation of dissolution under Patent Office rule 126, because Moody was precluded by his prior Patents 1,321,538 and 1,460,428, from obtaining patent on the counts at issue. The Examiner of Interferences declined to entertain the matter embraced in contention (d), holding that the points thereof might have been presented as fully" before the Law Examiner as they are presented here," but stating that it was not intended to give any intimation that his views upon the matter differed from the views of the Law Examiner. Also the Examiner of Interferences held that rule 130 prohibited him from entertaining points (a) and (b). He therefore considered and passed only upon the question of estoppel holding that Moody was not estopped, and awarding him priority. Upon appeal to the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office the several points above mentioned were presented to that tribunal and there adjudicated, the decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority to Moody being affirmed. The case was then appealed to this court and errors embracing appellant's foregoing contention assigned. We shall deal with these assignments of error somewhat in inverse order. [1] As for the subject matter embraced in (d), supra, the Board said: These are matters for ex parte consideration. They furnish no ground for awarding priority in favor of Dorer and under the well-established practice appellant is not entitled to a consideration thereof on an appeal from a decision on priority. We find no error in this. While appellant's fourth assignment of error, apparently, relates to the question of estoppel embraced in point (c), supra, it does not use the word "estopped" and is not very specific in respect thereto. The subject is not discussed in the brief, nor do we recall any emphasis of it in the oral argument. The authorities cited in the decisions of the Examiner of Interferences and of the Board of Appeals, Harbridge v. Perrin, 54 App. D. C. 106, 295 Fed. 927, 321 O. G. 705, 1924 C. D. 237, and Leonard v. Everett, 52 App. D. C. 90, 281 Fed. 594, 304 O. G. 142, sustain their holdings upon this issue. This leaves to be considered only the question of whether Moody is entitled to make the claims embraced in the two counts. This question having been decided in the affirmative by both tribunals of the Patent Office as a result of the examinations there had by the experts it must be clearly shown that their decision was wrong in order to justify this court in reversing their actions. Appellant's brief argues this issue under two heads: (1) That Moody's application does not disclose a conversion chamber within the meaning of the Dorer patent, and (2) that Moody is not entitled to the date of his 1920 application, now Patent 1,502,865, because, as we understand it, appellant insists that it does not disclose helically inclined stay vanes. The invention at issue relates to rotary hydraulic pumps, the general object being to control the flow or force of the water in such a manner as that it will have a rotational and axial velocity before entering the impeller which will cause the machinery operated by it to function at high speed. Both parties rely upon their filing dates, and appellant insists that, since the counts were claimed of the Dorer patent, they must be given the meaning to which the Dorer patent is limited, and that they must have been disclosed with this meaning in Moody's parent application of August 21, 1920, and not alone in his later divisional application, in order to give Moody priority, because the divisional date was later than appellant's filing date. [2] Both parties show certain chambers which separate the impellers from the "means in the suction imparting rotational and axial velocity to the fluid before entering the impeller." Dorer refers to these as "conversion chambers," and in his specifications describes them as being "for transforming the energy of the fluid into rotational velocity in the same direction of rotation as the impeller," and insists this meaning must be given to the "conversion chambers" of the counts. Moody does not refer to his chambers as "conversion " chambers, but says of them in the specification that the water "passing through the vane free chambers 21 and 22 is delivered to the impellers 13 and 14 in the form of solid whirling streams." The contention of appellant is that by reason of the shape of Moody's chambers, as disclosed by his drawings, the outlet points being somewhat expanded and not contracted, as is claimed for Dorer's chambers, the impeller of Moody does not receive the liquid at an increased velocity as does the impeller of Dorer. It will be observed that the counts do not in themselves call for increased velocity. They speak only of "imparting rotational and |