NITED STATES OF AMERICA

F

OR MORE than a year now, strategists and policy makers have carried on a cross-Atlantic dialogue over the merits of the American proposal for a combined NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Protagonists on both sides of the ocean continue to hold divided opinions as to what is at stake. Is the mixed-manned MLF a vital necessity to smooth relations with our European colleagues, or is it, as some have maintained, more apt to divide than unite the alliance? In either case, if the MLF should have to be scuttled because of lack of allied enthusiasm, what are the alternatives?

The area of maneuver for the strategic nuclear strike force issue is hemmed in on three sides by hard, seemingly immovable restrictions. First, France is by now bound and determined to have her own independent force de frappe. In retrospect, one can now guess that de Gaulle was almost certain to refuse the Nassau offer. Even without de Gaulle, France could, and probably would, press its nuclear program to completion.

Incidentally, some Americans still argue incorrectly that the French "turned down our offer of nuclear weapons." As far as is known, the Nassau proposal represented no change in the United States position regarding nuclear weapons sharing. According to the Nassau communiqué, the proposal involved "Polaris missiles (without warheads)." In the French view, this was like refusing to throw a life line to a tired swimmer but telling him you would have a scotch and soda ready if he made it ashore. The French needed warheads, not missiles, as de Gaulle emphasized in his reply.

Second, a European community deterrent would have little purpose if its use were subject to a United States veto. Confidence in the American ability to provide active strategic deterrence is now waning because Europeans doubt that the United States would, in many cases, take action that might risk the devastation of America. This is no reflection on our bravery-or our integrity. Rather, Europeans regard their own suspicion as an acknowledgment of our propensity for making rational decisions in such matters. In any event, if Europeans think we may hesitate to come to their aid, their concern would not seem to be allayed by an arrangement that includes an American finger on the "safety catch."

But a third factor-fear of possible ungoverned German resurgence-generates demands for some type of control mechanism which would prevent unilateral national use of the component parts. Not only the Soviet and satellite nations would strenuously object to an independent, nuclear-armed West Germany; even neutrals and most of our allies would oppose such a course. The Nassau formula of a

Most objectors are less emphatic in their opposition than the heir apparent to the role of British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, Britain's Labour Party leader. He is reported to have said: "We are completely, utterly, and unequivocally opposed, now and in all circumstances, to any suggestion that Germany, West Germany or East Germany, directly or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger. Laurence W. Martin, "Honest Brokers' in the Nuclear Muddle," The Reporter, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2 January 1964), p. 21.

NATO Conference, Ottawa, 22-24 May 1963