V

THE tremendous educational opportunities within Marshall's reach during his war service in France have been noted in a detail that is justified only by the general failure of our literature to reflect the magnitude and advanced organization of the air operations in the Great War." These air operations were in process all around Marshall during the summer and fall of 1918, and an appreciation of their extent and influence underscores Pogue's silence about any related enlargement of Marshall's professional understanding, then or later. With, I hope, this apology accepted, we have next to see what, according to Pogue, Marshall learned about air power in the two postwar decades, considered as a third and mature phase of his professional development. The result of this inquiry is briefly told.

Marshall left France for Washington in September 1919, having become Pershing's aide, in which assignment he was to serve five years. It was paper-work duty aside from the command channels of the peacetime army's operation for the 39-year-old Marshall, who was to revert to his permanent rank of captain upon expiration of the temporary war ranks. The reduction in rank was soon ameliorated by promotion to major, but in military advancement he lagged behind a number of his contemporaries, a circumstance that increasingly concerned him.

There was difficulty over what to do with Pershing. The only suitable position for him was that of Chief of Staff, but General Peyton March, one of Pershing's former subordinates, held that office with two more years to go. It was thought ill-fitting that the General of the Armies should serve in a secondary billet. Moreover, although

While the pioneering strategic bombardment forces of the Germans, British, and Italians have been suitably recognized in American studies, the important Division Aérienne of the French has disappeared from view, practically without knowledgeable mention. The standard general history of the U.S. Air Force, which was written in the USAF Historical Division for the USAF Office of Information Services (A History of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957, ed. Alfred Goldberg [Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Company, 1957], is mainly devoted to the post-World War II years. In its brief treatment of World War I operations, it refers to "a French aerial division" as being placed under Mitchell's control (p. 26). This division was of course the Air Division.

March also wore four stars, he was due to lose two on return to his permanent rank.

The solution continued Pershing as Commanding General, A.E.F., with his own staff and with station in Washington. His immediate chore was to prepare his report on the expeditionary forces, which was published in 1920, and a separate report on First Army. Marshall had begun some work on the latter in France, and it too was thought finished in December 1919. Pershing was then occupied in giving testimony, as the most expert of witnesses, on the legislation that became the National Defense Act of 1920, which took form essentially in accord with his views about the desirable size of the standing army. The Secretary of War also asked him to survey the army camps and war plants of the United States and report on those that should be retained in peacetime commission. Marshall of course went along on one of the two special railroad cars made available for what became a triumphal tour by the national hero. At last, in July 1921, Pershing assumed the office of Chief of Staff. He retained his aide through the threeyear tour, regarding him apparently as a paragon at handling the deluge of papers and correspondence that readily bored the old warrior.

These were the times when Billy Mitchell joyously sank the German battleship Ostfriesland to cap a violent public controversy that riled the War and Navy Departments. Amid calls in Congress for a separate Air Force, the National Defense Act of 1920 had confirmed the status of the Air Service as a combatant arm of the U.S. Army. Perhaps some clue to Marshall's apparent indifference to these events at the dawn of the air power controversies lies in his work on Pershing's First Army report, which after Pershing recalled the first issue for revision he continued over the years until its publication in 1924. Pogue regards Marshall as the actual writer of this report, which he claims "provided its author with a thorough review of the war experience and . . . helped establish the accepted story of American operations." The thoroughness of that review as to air operations, and perhaps Marshall's regard for revolutionary weapons as well, is clouded by the absence of all men

tion of the Air Service except for the barest orderof-battle data and reference in a lone paragraph to the "valuable service" rendered by "our 821 airplanes" at the opening of the Meuse-Argonne drive.98

The years rolled faster now over George Marshall while he swam doggedly in the back stretches of the Army stream, seemingly unable despite wide acquaintance and Pershing's important friendship to catch the main current and stroke ahead to the preferment he watched others achieve. After Pershing left office Marshall served a tour in China as lieutenant colonel and executive officer of an infantry regiment. He returned to Washington to be instructor in the Army War College. In another year he was posted to Fort Benning as Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School. In 1933, five years having been spent in the instruction of the young officers at Fort Benning, he at last got a command of his own, an infantry battalion at Fort Screven, Georgia. A year later he became colonel and took over the parent regiment, the 8th Infantry, at Fort Moultrie near Charleston. The principal business of the regiment and its commander was a part in administering the Civilian Conservation Corps of the Great Depression. This command Marshall enjoyed only briefly before the order came to report to the headquarters of the Illinois National Guard as senior instructor, with offices in Chicago's Loop.

Colonel at 53 was not undistinguished status in the between-wars Army. Neither was it the salient distinction of military genius, although a brigadier's star came along to Marshall after three years in Chicago, where he was his usual severe self as a taskmaster for the guardsmen. The highlights of the part-time training he helped to guide were the annual exercises or maneuvers. In the contemporary world of 1936 Hitler marched into the demilitarized Rhineland behind the threat of the new Luftwaffe. Because of confrontation of the Mediterranean Fleet by the Italian Air Force, Britain and France had stood down from vital oil sanctions that might have been imposed against Mussolini's rape of Ethiopia. Bombardment air forces on both sides of the earth were being tuned up for wars breaking in China and Spain. But Marshall's experiences in the 1936 maneuvers that included the Illinois Guard belonged by contrast to another world, as his biographer notes. The Red

Force in which Marshall commanded a "brigade" flew one reconnaissance airplane piloted by a reserve officer who could not read maps. The Maneuver Director, Major General Kilbourne, gave little attention in his report to the lack of air forces, although he was impressed, at this late date, when the few available aircraft operated in bad weather and when three planes came from as far away as Langley Field, Virginia, to simulate bombardment of a Michigan airfield.99

The Marshall who emerges again from these years through the pages of his biography also seems provincially withdrawn from the sweep of the larger circumstances that were investing his military world. If admirably concerned with the duty at hand, for a presumed genius he turned curiously inward to daily chores, to the most petty details of regimental instruction in the lost land of China, of daily lessons at the Infantry School, of refurbishing a run-down infantry post, all unrelieved by the visions and challenges on the grand scale that mark the Carlylean hero for hero worship. While the wish and hope for high office seem never to have left him long, his biographer gives no hint that he ever dreamed, as his contemporary Mitchell dreamed, of a military world remade. One who reads these melancholic chapters about his middle age can feel, reluctantly, that this man who strove so earnestly for preferment wanted preferment most of all for its own sake, as a symbol of personal achievement, rather than for what he might do with power.

Of the new warfare dominated by air forces that Mitchell foresaw in the immediate future Marshall apparently had not the least conception. Having been given his star, ironically only one month before he would have earned it by seniority in spite of all the influence and pressures exerted behind scenes in his favor, he departed Chicago in September 1936 for Vancouver Barracks, Washington, where he took command of an infantry brigade. It was here that he uttered his only allusion to the airplane, to air forces, to air operations, or to air power that Pogue reports in his entire exposition of Marshall's long "education."

The occasion came in the following June. Three Russian aviators who had left Moscow two days earlier in a single-engine airplane bound for California over a polar route were forced to land on the small airfield near his headquarters. During

After another year at Vancouver Barracks barren of interest for our topical investigation, Marshall's preliminary term of education was all but over. In July 1938 he was called to Washington to become Chief of the War Plans Division, a post he held only three months before he succeeded General Embick as Deputy Chief of Staff.

While Dr. Pogue is not a professional soldier, he could hardly misconceive the importance of air forces during Marshall's oncoming tenure as Chief of Staff. It becomes next to unbelievable that he would overlook or fail to introduce in his record any interests, studies, experiences, associations, or reflections that could give his subject anything like a working understanding of a major arm of his own service. If Marshall did have such understanding, then we can only conclude that Pogue has failed in expounding his own chosen subject of Marshall's education as a general by omitting consideration of a major specialty in Marshall's schooling. Certainly he does not report any evidence of that understanding, if any exists in the mass of sources to which he had access, including interviews with Marshall himself when he had full opportunity to query him directly on the point.

Pogue's exposition is thin for a definitive biography. His detail is frequently skimpy where professional interest is greatest, as in Marshall's exploits and opportunities during the campaigns of the Great War. The desire to interest the general reader is apparent, as is the usual effort nowadays to "humanize" the subject. For this reader the proportion of homely incident at the expense of the announced subject of the volume is surprising. The result is a rather light narrative about George Marshall rather than the serious examination of his professional qualifications to become Chief of Staff at the outbreak of a world war that one may be led to expect by the sponsorship of the work and the title of its first volume. But no treatment of any length or depth could rightly ignore any evidence that existed as to Marshall's progress in professional understanding of air power.

Perhaps we should recall for our own reader that we are examining Pogue's Marshall, the gen

eral whose development is set forth in this authoritatively sponsored biography. We are attempting to assess, through the medium of a biographer who had entree to all the likely sources for his work, whether or not that general was equipped in one major aspect as Chief of Staff to monitor the planning and assembly of forces for modern warfare. If we accept Pogue's report, as indicated by negative evidence since he does not discuss the subject, then we must infer that Marshall was not well equipped in regard to understanding of air power and air forces and that he was not potentially sympathetic to their development. Throughout Pogue's pages the impression grows of a prosaic, conventional, although intellectually gifted man who debouched into no forward-reaching vistas like those that invited the airmen busy at founding the Army Air Forces of World War II.

This inference is borne out by the external evidence of General Arnold, whose comment in his own treatment of the period was that Marshall "needed plenty of indoctrination about the air facts of life" when he took over as Chief of Staff.10 Pogue, too, states that after arrival in Washington in 1938 Marshall was "embarking. . . on a concentrated education in air corps matters," a part of which consisted of a few days spent in visiting "air bases and aircraft plants" in the company of General Andrews, the commander of the GHQ Air Force.102 This tour could hardly have amounted to more than the quick walk-through and generalized briefings the Air Corps found all too necessary for influential persons with bearing on its destiny. What else formed the concentrated education is not revealed.

The general lack of an "education in Air Corps matters” thus admitted at this late date in Marshall's life and career also goes undiscussed in Pogue's work. In view of the rapidly accruing military importance of air forces, Pogue's failure to explain, comment on, take notice of, or even mention Marshall's seemingly near-total isolation from the subject over thirty years is in itself worth critical notice. One comes up short indeed when then he reads, on the book's next to last page, the raw conclusion about Marshall that "to a considerable degree he was aware of the important changes the truck, the tank, and the airplane were bringing to modern warfare. . . ."103 If Marshall was as aware of these changes as this last-moment nod to the

subject affirms, then Pogue has neglected throughout all his previous pages to show him so or how he became so.

The lone, tenuous example of attention to the airplane as a weapon reported of Marshall does not support this penultimate conclusion. Pogue is commenting in that example upon Marshall's sharpening of the instruction in small-unit infantry tactics during his tour at the Infantry School:

Marshall's emphasis on training for warfare of movement recalled Pershing's insistence in 1917-18 on preparing the AEF to move out of the trenches into "open warfare." Pershing had argued both that open warfare was better suited to the temper of the American soldier and that it was the one hope of forcing a decision in battle. Marshall was certainly imbued with that point of view. It is not necessary to suppose, however, that he had a fully developed concept of the war of movement that would come on battlefields dominated by the tank and the airplane, and there is no evidence that he had any such vision. He remained essentially an infantryman, though one who wel

comed and readily recognized the significance of technological changes. He had a special tank company established at Benning. He tried to get an air detachment. Balked in that, he arranged for annual demonstrations of air support techniques by a squadron from Maxwell Field.104

We may inquire of our author where he advances the evidence for Marshall's ready recognition of the significance of technological changes beyond this singular instance of introducing a few tanks into the tactical exercises. In any event an annual demonstration of close air support techniques hardly suggests the insight of a student of Billy Mitchell. One can adopt better, and without strain, Pogue's judgment that throughout Marshall's time of education "he remained an infantryman." His selection for the office of Chief of Staff as one cut to the pattern of prevailing War Department views was not mistaken. How or if he changed essentially must await the second and third volumes of Pogue's study for clarification.

Air University Review

Notes

1. The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, USAF Historical Studies No. 89 (Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, 1955), pp. 97-99, 101. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, unnumbered volume of U.S. Army in World War II, gen. ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 36.

2. The Army Air Forces in World War II, ed. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, Vol. VI: Men and Forces (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 7. General of the Air Force H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 176-177. General Ira Eaker was in Andrew's office when Craig's phone call came in, Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, p. 91.

3. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, unnumbered volume of U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 3. 4. AAF in World War II, VI, 8-9.

5. Watson, pp. 136-143. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 320-323. Global Mission, pp. 177-179. Arnold apparently misrecalled the date of the Presidential conference as 28 September. But on this date see AAF in World War II, VI, 9.

...

24. Global Mission, p. 40.

25. I. B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States during World War I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 37, 41-45. "American Punch Through Aeroplanes," Aerial Age Weekly (N.Y.), 5 (25 June 1917), 489. Laurence La Tourette, "America's Air Fleet," The Outlook, 116 (27 June 1917), 322.

26. Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 19141918 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), pp. 435436, 459.

27. Général Armengaud, "Le Renseignement de l'Aviation de la défense et les offensives allemandes pour la percée en 1918," Revue des Forces Aériennes, 3 (July 1931), 792-793. 28. Ibid., pp. 793-794.

29. Col. Girard Lindsley McEntee, U.S. Army (Ret), Military History of the World War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 473.

30. Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (6 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922-1937). IV, 264-270.

31. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, by direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1918, The German March Offensive and its Preliminaries, Vol.

1, comp. Brig. General Sir James Edmonds (London: Macmillan and Co., 1935), pp. 92-94.

32. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Ministère de la Guerre, Etat-Major de l'Armée, Service Historique (11 tomes; Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1922-1937), Tome VI, L'Hiver 1917-1918-L'Offensive Allemande, Vol. 1, pp. 250251. McEntee, p. 472. Armengaud, pp. 797-800.

33. Cf. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Douglas Haig's Dispatches (December 1915-April 1919), ed. J. H. Boraston, O.B.E. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1919), pp. 182-184. 34. Ludendorff, p. 463.

35. Général Voisin and Capt. Koechlin Schwartz, "Monoplaces ou biplaces de chasse?" Revue des Forces Aériennes, 4 (January 1922), 61. Raleigh and Jones, IV, 274-275. General der Kavallerie von Hoeppner, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft (Leipzig: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1921), p. 148.

36. Hans Ritter, Hauptmann in Generalstab a. D., Der Luftkrieg (Berlin: Verlag von K. F. Koehler, 1926), pp. 140142. Von Hoeppner, pp. 155-156.

37. Raleigh and Jones, IV, 315-316.

38. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 1, Annexes, Vol. 2, Annex No. 541, Ordre No. 25087, G.Q.G., 23 mars 1918; Annex No. 558, Télégramme Nos. 4871/M-4872/M, G.Q.G., Aéronautique, 23 mars 1918, 1715 hrs; Annex No. 616, Télégramme No. 4949M, G.Q.G., Aéronautique, 24 mars 1918, 0925 hrs.

39. Ibid., Tome VI, Vol. 1, pp. 250-251.

40. Ibid., Annexes, Vol. 2, Annex No. 774, Ordre No. 27162/OP, G.Q.G., 26 mars 1918.

41. Général Voisin, "Le doctrine de l'aviation française de combat en 1918: L'aviation de combat indépendante," Revue des Forces Aériennes, 3 (October 1931), 1154-1155.

42. Colonel Breveté Guillemeney, "Vieux principes Méthodes nouvelles," Revue des Forces Aériennes, 3 (October 1931), 1213. Raleigh and Jones, IV, 257-258.

43. Ludendorff, p. 495.

44. Von Hoeppner, pp. 85, 115, 138-145.

45. Raleigh and Jones, II, 79-80, 147-148; IV, 271-272.
46. Ibid., IV, 319-331. Ludendorff, p. 481.
47. Raleigh and Jones, II, 165-168, 181-182.

48. Général M. Duval, "Pourquoi fut créée la Division Aérienne," Revue de l'Armée de l'Air, 7 (November 1935), 1270-1274.

49. The program of 2 March 1917 (as modified in September) to place 2850 airplanes on the French front had been substantially realized by 1 April 1918. In April French production reached 2150 planes and 3882 engines. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, pp. 55-56.

50. Ibid., p. 56; Annexes, Vol. 1, Annex No. 186, Ordre Général No. 17900, Grand Quartier Général, Service Aéronautique, 14 mai 1918.

51. Capitaine de Réserve Pierre Étienne, "Réserve générale et Division aérienne," Revue de l'Armée de l'Air, 7 (November 1935), 1262.

52. Compte rendu, M. Duval, État-Major, Division Aérienne, 27 mai 1918, 0900 hrs, Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, Annexes, Vol. 1, Annex No. 330.

53. Étienne, p. 1263.

54. Peter Supf, Das Buch der deutschen Fluggeschichte (2 vols.; Berlin-Grunewald: Verlagsanstalt Hermann Klemm AG, 1935), II, 367.

55. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, p. 148. Von Hoeppner, pp. 160-161.

56. Note pour le chef d'état-major de la division aérienne, G.Q.G., Aéronautique, No. 37808, 30 mai 1918, Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, Annexes, Vol. 1, Annex No. 763.

57. Ordre d'opérations pour la journée du 31 mai et la nuit du 31 mai au 1er juin 1918, M. Duval, G.Q.G., Division Aérienne, État-Major, No. 339, le 30 mai 1918, ibid., Annex

No. 764.

58. Ibid., Tome VI, Vol. 2, pp. 250-252. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 401-404. The components of the IX Brigade had recently been altered to substitute the 51st Day Bombardment Wing for the 54th Night Bombardment Wing.

59. Pogue, pp. 162-165, 168-169.

60. Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Out of My Life, trans. F. A. Holt (2 vols.; New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1921), II, 189-191. Ludendorff, pp. 515, 533. Crown Prince William of Germany, My War Experiences (New York: Robert W. McBride & Co., 1923), pp. 326-330. Von Hoeppner, p. 162. Reichsarchiv, Schlachten des Weltkrieges (36 vols.; Oldenburg i.D./Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1924-1930), Vol. 34, Der letzte deutsche Angriff, Reims 1918, pp. 12-17.

61. Ludendorff, p. 533. Crown Prince William, pp. 327, 331. Der letzte deutsche Angriff, p. 35.

62. For example, Hq Seventh Army, Chief of Artillery, No. 415-418, "Artillery Orders No. 1," 20 June 1918, von Boehn, Colonel-General, The Commander in Chief, editorial translation in The General Service Schools, The German Offensive of July 15, 1918, Marne Source Book (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The General Service Schools Press, 1923), Document No. 65, pp. 100-102.

63. Hq First Army, No. 2532, "Army Orders," subject: Secrecy, 18 June 1918, v. Mudra, General of Infantry, The Commander in Chief, editorial translation, ibid., Document No. 38, pp. 50-53. 64. Crown Prince William, p. 331.

65. Armengaud, p. 806.

66. "Note sur l'exploration aérienne," Le Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, État-Major, le 7 mai 1918 [written by the Officer supérieur chargé de l'Aéronautique], quoted in extenso by Armengaud, pp. 806-810.

67. Personal letter Foch to Pétain and Haig, G.Q.G. Armées Alliées, Etat-Major, No. 1437, le 13 juin 1918, Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, Annexes, Vol. 2, Annex No. 1515.

68. "Compte rendu du chef du 2 bureau du Groupe d'Armées du Nord," No. 3901, le 28 juin 1918, ibid., Annexes, Vol. 3, Annex No. 1715. "Compte rendu de renseignements du chef du 2 bureau du Groupe d'Armées du Centre," No. 4606, le 7 juillet 1918, ibid., Annex 1827. "Compte rendu du 13 juillet 1918, du chef du 2e bureau du G.A.C.," No. 5264, ibid., Annex No. 1962. Armengaud, p. 814.

69. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VII, La Campagne Offensive de 1918 et la Marche au Rhin, 18 juillet 1918-20 juin 1919, Vol. 1, pp. 18, 27, 30-32. The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918, "Sections of the officially authorized report of the Commission of the German Constituent Assembly and of the German Reichstag, 1919-1928 selected by Ralph Haswell Lutz, trans. W. L. Campbell (Hoover War Library Publications, No. 4; Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 81-86.

70. The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Col. T. Bentley Mott (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1931), p. 353. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, pp. 445-484; Tome VII, Vol. 1, pp. 22-23, 55, 59-60. Raleigh and Jones, VI, 412.

71. Based on map overlay and order of battle information in Commandant H. Langevin, 'Action de masse' dans une bataille défensive," Revue des Forces Aériennes, 2 (January 1930), 26-33, supplemented by Raleigh and Jones, VI, 412; by map overlay: "Champagne-Marne Operation, Combined Order of Battle, 14 July 1918," U.S. Army, Historical Division, United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces (Vols. 5-9 of 17; Washington: Department of the Army, 1948), Vol. 5, Champagne-Marne, Aisne-Marne, p. 9; and by "History of 1st Pursuit Group," unpublished compilation from unit documents, USAF Historical Division Archives, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

72. "History of 1st Pursuit Group." "Chronology of Air Service, A.E.F.," unpublished compilation in E. L. Jones collection, USAF Historical Division Archives. Memorandum, Col. Wm. Mitchell, commanding 1st Brigade, Air Service, to Chief of Air Service, First Army (Brig. General Benjamin Foulois], 9 July 1918, quoted in full in Brigadier General William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 215-218.

73. Ludendorff, pp. 535-536. "War Diary, Army Group German Crown Prince, 17 July," German Offensive of July 15, 1918, Document No. 386, pp. 539-541.

74. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, pp. 493-500.

75. "Résumé des opérations aériennes du 15 julliet 1918," G.Q.G., Aéronautique, le 16 juillet 1918, ibid., Annexes, Vol. 3, Annex No. 2218. Voisin, p. 1291. "Operations Report, July 14 to August 1, 1918," Command Post, 3d Division, 5 August 1918, Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces, V, 103-104.

76. Langevin, pp. 50-51. Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, pp. 495-500.

77. "Compte rendu sommaire d'opérations," G.Q.G., Division Aérienne, Etat-Major, No. 2175, le 15 juillet 1918, ibid., Annexes, Vol. 3, Annex No. 2045. Order No. 69, Division Aérienne, 15 July 1918, quoted by Langevin, pp. 52-54.

78. Army Group German Crown Prince, telephone message to Hq First, Seventh, and Third Armies, 1945 hours, 16 July 1918, German Offensive of July 15, 1918, Document No. 403, p. 564.

79. "Ordres pour la nuit du 15 au 16 juillet 1918," Q.G., G.A.C. Aéronautique, No. 5408, le 15 juillet 1918, Les Armées Françaises dans La Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2, Annexes, Vol. 3, Annex No. 2075. "Ordre pour la journée du 16 juillet