directed from Freetown. There were few Allied ships in that part of the South Atlantic because warships and merchantmen were being assembled for the invasion of North Africa and because shipping had been routed farther west to avoid the greater submarine menace along the African coast. A merchant ship, the Empire Haven, was nearby, however, and H.M.S. Corinthian was at Takoradi. They were being sent to aid the survivors from the Laconia, and Freetown wanted Richardson's squadron to provide air cover for the operation.25

The spot where the Laconia had gone down was so far from Ascension that a B-25 from Wideawake would be able to remain in the area for less than half an hour. A plane with longer range was needed, and as it happened there was one at Wideawake on the night of 15 September. It was a B-24D Liberator of the 343d Bombardment Squadron, which recently had moved across the South Atlantic en route to the Middle East for service in the battle against Rommel's Afrika Korps. On the way over this four-engine bomber had been separated from other planes of the squadron when it was delayed by mechanical trouble. Now it was at Wideawake, and it was pressed into service.26

Loaded with depth charges and bombs, the B-24 took off at 0700 on Wednesday, 16 September, and headed northeast. The pilot was Lieutenant James D. Harden, and his crew included Lieutenant Edgar W. Keller, bombardier, and Lieutenant Jerome Perlman, navigator. These men, all of whom were flying their first combat mission, were members of the 343d Squadron, but the copilot, Lieutenant Raymond J. Ford, belonged to Richardson's 1st Composite Squadron.27

At 0930 Harden spotted a submarineU-156-towing two lifeboats and approaching two more at 05° South, 11° 40′ West. While the B-24 circled overhead, its crew saw the U-boat pick up the other two lifeboats and continue on its course. They also saw that the submarine had a white flag with a red cross. Using a signal lamp, the crew challenged the U-boat to show its national flag, but none was displayed. The submarine, however, blinked light signals

which could not be read clearly but which were thought to be "German Sir." After 40 minutes, Harden gave up the effort to communicate and headed southward.28

The radio operator on the B-24 soon established contact with wyuc at Wideawake Field, reported the sighting of a submarine towing four lifeboats, and asked what to do next. As Colonel Ronin says, “It was a good question." It could be answered in only one of two ways: return to base, or attack. There were no friendly submarines in that part of the Atlantic, and the Americans, who as yet had no word of the rescue work being conducted by German U-boats, had received no instructions against interference with such operations in that area. Richardson carefully weighed the alternatives. He had a responsibility for providing the protection that Freetown had requested for British ships going to the rescue of the survivors. If he ordered Harden to come in, he not only would jeopardize the safety of British ships but would leave the submarine free to continue its destruction of Allied shipping. Further, such an order would mean abandoning an important and legitimate military mission that had a chance of successful accomplishment. On the other hand, an order to attack would place in jeopardy the lives of some of the survivors. Harden had to have an answer soon. He could not remain in the area much longer and still have enough fuel to get back to Ascension. After conferring with Ronin, Richardson issued the order: "Sink sub."29

In a letter to the authors on 13 November 1962, General Richardson said, "I made the decision, as I recall, in consultation with Colonel Art Ronin." Later, on 1 February 1963, General Richardson wrote, "I think that I made it [the decision] after consultation with Colonel Ronin. Ronin or Wilson may have made it-we were all three working together." Kemmet's article in the Express on 4 August 1963 quoted General Richardson as saying, "I gave the order to bomb the Laconia survivors." Commenting on the article, General Richardson said, "They [the Express] took it upon themselves to emphasize the 'I' factor, although I took pains [in the interview] to point out that although it was my organization, and partly my decision, others were involved. I don't mind assuming full responsibility." Colonel Wilson, the operations officer, does "not recall our ordering an attack although it is possible we did issue such an order.” In a letter of 15 November 1962 Colonel Ronin wrote, "I told the B-24 commander to attack," but in reviewing a draft of this note on 12 October 1963 he said that his previous statement gave "the impression that I was in direct contact with the B-24 commander, which I was not. I believe that Richardson was in contact with him from the Command Post and actually passed the order as he says. However, at that time I could have out-voted him if I had not concurred in the bombing." Looking back over twenty years, both General Richardson and Colonel Ronin believe that, in the light of the information they then possessed and of the conditions as they understood them, the decision to attack was the right one.

Upon receiving the signal, Harden turned back northward and soon found the U-boat. Following is the account of the attack as reported by the pilot of the B-24:30

Upon returning to position, life boats had moved away from sub. One pass dropping three depth charges was made, one hit ten feet astern, and two were about 100 and 200 yards. Made three more runs and bombs failed to fall. This was fixed and a final run was made at 400 feet. Two bombs were dropped one on either side, not more than 15 or 20 feet away. The sub rolled over and was last seen bottom up. Crew had abandoned sub and taken to surrounding lifeboats.

The log of U-156 describes the attack as witnessed from the submarine: 31

Aircraft of similar type approached. Flew over, slightly ahead of submarine, at altitude of 80 meters [about 250 feet]. Dropped two bombs about three seconds apart. While four life boats in tow were being cast off, the aircraft dropped one bomb in their midst. One boat capsized.

Aircraft cruised around for a short time and then dropped a fourth bomb 2-3,000 meters away. Realized that his bomb racks were empty. Another run. Two bombs. One exploded, with a few seconds delayed action, directly under the control room. Conning tower vanished in a tower of black water. Control room and bow compartment reported taking water. All hands ordered to don life jackets. Ordered all British off the boat. Batteries began giving off gas. Italians also ordered off (had no escape gear to give them).

The people in the lifeboats saw the attack from still a different view. One of the boats reached the Liberian coast on 10 October, four weeks after the Laconia was sunk. During that time 52 of the 68 persons in the boat had died. The 16 who reached land safely (15 British and 1 Pole) had suffered terribly. It is no wonder that they were confused as to the chronology of events. Here is their story as reported by the American chargé d'affaires in Monrovia: 32

About four o'clock on that afternoon [Sunday, 13 September, according to the report] an American Liberator bomber appeared and, although the submarine displayed a Red Cross flag, the bomber launched seven depth charges

one of which fell near a lifeboat, completely destroying it and drowning all passengers, who were Italian prisoners. Two others fell about three yards on either beam of the submarine, the explosion lifting it from the water and obviously caused damage.. The submarine continued on the surface for about a mile and then submerged, throwing all of the survivors from the deck into the water. Many of these were drowned by suction, but the remaining life boats were able to pick up a few.

U-156 had not been sunk, as Harden and his crew believed, but it had sustained considerable damage. Shortly after 1100, Hartenstein returned to the lifeboats and transferred to them the remaining passengers he had aboard. He then submerged and headed westward. So far as he was concerned, the rescue operation was ended. That night, when Doenitz was informed of the attack on U-156, he directed U-506 and U-507 to continue rescue work and hand over the survivors to the French

ships that would arrive the next day. Meantime the U-boat captains could retain Italians aboard, but all other survivors were to be transferred to lifeboats. Warning the captains to beware of attack, Doenitz instructed them not to seek protection under the Red Cross flag but to keep their boats ready to submerge instantly.33

While the B-24 was on its way back to Ascension, Lieutenant Richard T. Akins, pilot of a B-25 of the 1st Composite Squadron, reported at 1025 that he had sighted lifeboats and rafts at 05° 10′ South, 11° 10′ West, just a few miles south and east of where Harden and his crew had bombed U-156. That afternoon Richardson flew out to the area and found some lifeboats. He also saw the Empire Haven, which he directed toward the boats. An hour later Captain Virgil D. Holdsworth in another B-25 reported that he had spotted lifeboats at 4° South, 12° West.

That night a message from Freetown indicated that French warships from Dakar were headed south, but there was nothing in the signal to indicate that their mission was to assist in rescuing survivors from the Laconia. The men on Ascension were sure that if the enemy had not previously discovered the pres

ence of American forces on the island, he knew it now as a result of the bombing of the submarine. Assuming that the Vichy warships were on their way to Ascension, the men prepared to defend the island. As the historian of the 1st Composite Squadron wrote, "arrangements were made for an American Reception -the powder was dry." The tension that night was heightened when the radar picked up a surface target 40 miles to the northeast. For an hour and a half the radar followed the track as the target moved to a position 14 miles southeast of the island. Then contact was lost. Major Buethe believed that the radar had picked up a submarine engaged in a reconnaissance of the island and that contact had been broken when it submerged.34

At 0720 on Thursday, 17 September, Harden and his crew were off again in the B-24. They reached the search area at 0905 and began flying a square pattern. At 1030 they

sighted a submarine two miles ahead and to the left at 04° 51′ South, 12° 22′ West. Increasing his speed to 200 miles per hour, Harden went in for the attack. The boat crash-dived, and its conning tower and deck were awash when the B-24 passed over. The bombs failed to release, so Harden went around and made a second pass 45 seconds later. This time two 500-pound demolition bombs and two 350-pound depth bombs fell in train, two landing astern of the submarine and two hitting directly on top. When Harden came back over the spot, the crew saw an oil slick. For 40 minutes the plane circled the area, but no further results were observed. Harden then headed back to base, the crew believing that they had sunk the submarine or at least badly damaged it. But they were wrong. U-506, which then had more than a hundred survivors aboard, escaped without damage.35

In nine other sorties flown by the 1st Com

posite Squadron on 17 September only Akins had anything significant to report-at 1500 he saw eight people on a raft at 03° 25' South, 13° 10' West. When he went back to the same area the next morning he found four empty lifeboats, all in good condition. There were oars in the boats, and Akins thought that there also was food. At the time he had no idea that the people might have been removed by the warships from Dakar. One of the French ships, a small vessel which was making 22 knots on a zigzag course northward, was sighted later that morning by Lieutenant J. A. McClellan at 03° 45' South, 13° 15′ West.

That afternoon at 02° 56′ South, 13° 35' West, Lieutenant Philip Main sighted two French ships headed northwest at 17 knots. Reporting by radio from his B-25, Main received instructions to identify the vessels if possible but not to attack unless fired upon. At 1500, Wideawake queried Freetown concerning the status of the French vessels. The British reply, received at 1700, was to shadow but not to interfere with them, for, the message said, "it appears that they are searching for Italians from Laconia." This evidently was the first time that the Americans on Ascension had received any information concerning the rescue operations which had been undertaken by the German U-boats and the Vichy warships.36 The cruiser Gloire and the sloop Annamite had arrived in the area the previous day. Now Gloire was on her way back to Dakar with more than a thousand survivors taken from U-506 and U-507 and from lifeboats and rafts the French had found. The following day another French sloop, the Dumont d'Urville, met the Cappellini and took on 42 survivors, who subsequently were transferred to the Annamite and taken to Dakar. The British apparently had broken off their rescue efforts after realizing that the French had sent ships to pick up the survivors.37

Meantime, on the 17th, Doenitz had issued the directive that was to become known as the "Laconia Order." Addressed to all commanding officers, it read in part as follows:38

No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and

crews.

The "Laconia Order" had a prominent place in the Nuremberg proceedings which resulted in Doenitz' being sentenced to prison for ten years. In the trial, however, the order lost most of its value to the prosecution when Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz testified that in the war with Japan the U.S. Navy had followed the same general policy as was set forth in the German admiral's directive.39

The B-24 which attacked U-156 and U-506 never flew another combat mission. The plane crashed in Palestine on 18 October 1942 while Harden and his crew were on their way to rejoin their squadron in the Middle East. None of the men were injured, and when Harden returned to duty he turned in a report of his operations from Ascension Island. On the basis of that report, the American commander in the Middle East awarded Air Medals to Harden and the other members of the crew for the destruction of an enemy submarine on 16 September and for the probable destruction of another on 17 September 1942.+

Hartenstein, having survived the attack by the B-24, continued operations and sank two more ships before returning to base on 16 November 1942. The U-boat captain perished on another voyage, when U-156 was sunk by U.S. naval aircraft east of Barbados on 8 March 1943.+1

Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes

1. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: USGPO, 1946), II, 57; VIII, 657-662. Adm. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1959), 255-264. Lt. Comdr. Alex A. Kerr, "International Law and the Future of Submarine Warfare,'

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXI, No. 10 (Oct. 1955), 1105-1110.

2. Doenitz, Memoirs, 255-264. Nazi Conspiracy, II, 829830; VII, 57; VIII, 657-662; Supp. B, 577-579. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nurem berg, 1947-1949), XI, 24-39. Also see, for example, Capt. S.