end will have in mind the same possibilities and objectives. In military matters, especially those of the magnitude of the operations of the present war, where mistakes and inconsistencies cost thousands of lives and millions of man-hours, it is all the more important that there be clearly expressed guiding principles which are clearly understood by all planners, as well as by all who are charged with the handling of forces in the field."6

A study conducted by an Air War College seminar in 1951 concluded that the United States Air Force had a vital requirement for a codification of its doctrine. The very size of the USAF demanded a codification of doctrine. Prior to World War II virtually all senior Air Corps officers would pass through the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, exchange views with the several division heads, and draw from these conversations "the essence of air doctrine." By 1951 the USAF had grown into a larger and more complicated organization. If an officer in the field was to point his efforts along constructive lines he had to know "the over-all policies and objectives of the Air Force. . . . Without a well established doctrine the efforts of all but a few key personnel, who can remain sensitive to the changes as they occur, are to a very considerable extent negated.”7

Five years later Professor Henry A. Kissinger pointed out that "strategic doctrine" enables society "to act purposefully as a unit by reducing most problems to a standard of average performance which enables the other members of the group to take certain patterns of behavior for granted and to plan their actions accordingly. . . . By explaining the significance of events in advance of their occurrence," Kissinger concludes, "[doctrine] enables society to deal with most problems as a matter of routine and reserves creative thought for unusual or unexpected situations."8

The reasons why the Air Force has been hesitant to record its fundamental beliefs have interested a number of students. “Air activities have most often attracted men of active rather than literary leanings. . . . The Air Force has

never boasted a high percentage of scholars,” Col. Noel F. Parrish pointed out in 1947.9 So far as writing was concerned, Professor W. Barton Leach, Brigadier General, USAFR, called the Air Force “The Silent Service.”10 General Barker further stated in regard to the provocative article on air power's need for a Mahan: "As you know, the scholarly life is not particularly respected in the profession of arms.

I don't believe, however, that we can ever detail an officer to do a work of this sort. Mahan, as with all great thinkers, was inspired. Of course he had to spring from an environment which allowed him to study long and deeply the problems of sea power. His many years on shipboard were devoted to these exhaustive studies-but he would have been playing poker . . . and reading fiction if he hadn't been inspired to learn all he could of naval history and to give it pattern and meaning."11

Other factors also have hampered the expression of fundamental Air Force beliefs. Prior to 1947 the subordinate position of the Air Force to the Army and Navy is said to have hampered air publications, as did the fact that the Army's manuals system was unsuited to the needs of the Air Force. An Air University study in 1948 stated that the "outstanding obstacle to writing air force doctrine in the past was the rapidity of the development of air power . . . from a limited supporting role to its present position of preeminence in warfare."12 In some cases senior Air Force officers are said to have discouraged the preparation of air doctrine because they felt that air doctrines were too short-lived to warrant publication. Word of mouth generally sufficed to keep senior air commanders well abreast of Air Force policy, and it was much easier "to scrap the worn-out doctrine that remains unpublished than it is to drop a doctrine that has been published."13 The basic shortcoming of "verbal doctrine" was that it remained vague. "It is this reluctance to pub lish as official anything imperfect," stated an Air War College study, "that restrains our commanders from the dissemination of current doctrine. Until we accept the fact that

all doctrine is imperfect . . . and that it is highly changeable we cannot hope for the issuance of doctrine."14 This same study noted that in 1951 "the air leaders of today are not so old that they can easily forget the punishment meted out to the doctrinaires of the past." A statement of Air Force policy in 1950 to the effect that "all Air Force military personnel will refrain from preparing proposed articles or public addresses of a controversial or provocative nature" caused Air University to contemplate suspension of publication of the Air University Quarterly Review.15 Eleven years later the same publication found that Department of Defense blue pencils left a number of holes in its pages at printing time.16

Air Force thinkers not only have found it difficult to codify the Air Force's fundamental beliefs but, as the foregoing quotations reveal, have employed a diversity of discourse to categorize these fundamental beliefs. "There appears to be a fine line of demarcation between concepts and doctrines on the one hand, and doctrines and principles on the other hand," concluded an Air War College study in 1951. “It is difficult to differentiate between concepts which existed in the minds of some far-sighted individuals in the Air Force and the doctrine which was accepted as official by the War Department. Also doctrine is easily confused with strategy."17 Adding additional complexity to any attempt to analyze basic Air Force thought patterns is the fact that the terms used to categorize fundamental Air Force beliefs apparently varied with the persons using them and certainly varied with the time period in which the terms were employed.

It is not too hard to imagine why early Air Force thinkers began to refer to their fundamental ideas as "doctrines." In his first book, published in 1921, Brigadier General William Mitchell referred to "our doctrine of aviation.”18 In 1928 the Commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School submitted a paper entitled "The Doctrine of the Air Forces" to the Office of Chief of Air Corps. 19 The term "doctrine" had an old meaning in military establishments as a teaching, or, in a collective

sense, a body of teachings. Although the Air Service and Air Corps were virtually unable to change the War Department's Field Service Regulations and Training Regulations, the chief of the Army's air arm, in common with the other chiefs of Army arms and services, was entitled to issue the doctrinal literature for the Air Service and its successor, the Air Corps. The War Department General Staff emphasized, however, that doctrine should be formulated only by the chief of an Army arm or service.20 "Doctrinal literature originates with the highest authority," said an Army Air Forces staff officer in 1944, "and states in general the over-all policy to be followed.”21

Given agreement on the proposition that doctrine derived from the highest authority in the Air Force, there was less agreement as to its precise nature. In 1938 the Air Corps Board stated: "Principles change not at all, or but slightly, over considerable periods. Doctrines generally change slowly, but will change as different applications of principles bring forth different beliefs and teachings. Methods are influenced both by doctrine and technical improvement and will change more rapidly than doctrines. The most satisfactory Field Service Regulation would be one dealing only would never change. However, air warfare is with principles and expressed in terms that relatively new and there is much difference of opinion as regards principles of employment."22

In 1943, however, an AAF staff officer defined doctrine as "a body of fundamental principles expressing the logical possibilities and objectives of air warfare, as well as its general limitations. Like any other doctrine, especially one for a weapon so new as the air arm still is, it is only natural that the AAF doctrine should include speculative as well as proved truths, but they are all necessary to provide a basis for initial decisions in the design of airplanes and in the training of personnel to accomplish the desired end." This same officer defined "policies" as "derivatives of doctrine and the expressions of decisions based upon doctrine."23

By 1948 the growth to maturity of the Air Force during World War II and the achievement of separate status as the United States Air Force led Air University thinkers to suggest that the time was opportune to undertake that part of their mission which charged them to prepare, review, and revise all USAF publications pertaining to "basic doctrine."24

As this work progressed, Air University accepted the definition of doctrine stated by the Joints Chiefs of Staff: "A compilation of principles and policies, applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Its purpose is to provide that understanding within a force which generates mutual confidence between the commander and his subordinates in order that timely and effective action will be taken by all concerned in the absence of instruction."25 Looking backward at Air Force experience, Air University students of doctrine noted that there had been an implication that doctrine represented an official view and that, once it had been stated, some general efforts had been made to follow it. These students recognized, however, that the Air Corps and Army Air Forces had not always been guided by "prevailing existing doctrines," which were influenced by the ground-oriented War Department. They accordingly sought to find Air Force doctrine through a "logical analysis of historical fact" rather than through official statements, organizational designs, or other apparent factors that might appear to contradict the actual doctrine which was practiced.26

The vigorous efforts of Air University to define USAF doctrine in the early 1950's did much to clarify the semantic thought patterns of the Air Force. "In this attempt to strike out on our own," said Colonel William W. Momyer, Deputy Commandant for Evaluation, Air War College, "we have encountered many obstacles that were certainly anticipated, and others that could not be foreseen. Of course, we have encountered . . . prejudice in respect

to what constitutes doctrine."27 To accomplish their task, Air University students had to relate Air Force doctrine to the hoary principles of war, to the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces, to tactics and strategy, and to "concepts," a relatively new Air Force term.

As a part of its Army heritage, the United States Air Force had received the age-old principles of war which derived from the writings of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini and which had been best recorded in modern times by Great Britain's Major General J. F. C. Fuller. The American version of the principles of war first appeared in War Department Training Regulation 10-5 of 1921. They were discussed in the Air Corps Tactical School text on air warfare dated 1 March 1936. In September 1943 Colonel Ralph F. Stearley wrote a paper on the applicability of the principles of war to air power, which was published as AAF Memorandum 200-7, October 1943. Colonel Stearley stated that the nine fundamental principles of war (which, like common sense, applied to all forms of military power) were the principles of cooperation, objective, offensive, mass, movement, economy of force, surprise, security, and simplicity. He also stated that the application of principles of war to the preparation for war and the direction of war constituted "strategy," whereas their application to specific operations was called "tactics."28

In an article on "Air Power and Principles of War" in 1948, Colonel Frederick E. Calhoun of Air University suggested that air power had strengthened the validity of the first eight principles, but he argued that air warfare could not be simple and that the ninth principle should be replaced by "capacity," or constant combat readiness. 29

Within the U.S. armed forces the principles of war were accepted by the Army and were taught by the Air Force at Air University. The Navy's attitude was that they were permissible as maxims, precepts, factors, guides, or even basic considerations, but the Navy questioned whether they could be accepted as principles. The Navy did not list the principles in its U.S. fleet publications, but

the basic thoughts of the principles were taken cognizance of in these doctrinal publications.30 The Royal Air Force distinguished between principles of war, which it considered to be not principles but guides or aidesmemoir, and doctrines which were devised from them. 31

Possibly in line with these same trends of thought, Air University did not include a specific discussion of the principles of war in its proposed manual on USAF basic doctrine published in October 1951.32 A USAF committee which revised this manual and published the result as Air Force Manual 1-2, USAF Basic Doctrine, nevertheless inserted a section entitled "Air Forces and the Principles of War."33 Although an Air War College officer suggested that this consideration of the principles of war was a "dissertation" which was "hardly doctrinal," General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, Far East Air Forces, stated that this section of the manual was too brief and ought to be developed and elaborated.34 Later editions of AFM 1-2 prepared at Air University did not include specific discussions of the principles of war, but there was a continuing recognition that these principles applied to air power as well as to the other military services.35

In drawing up its statement of USAF basic doctrine, Air University preferred to relate the role of the Air Force to the national objectives and national policies of the United States rather than to the current statement of armed forces organization and roles and missions which emanated from the National Security Act of 1947. It was the opinion of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards, Commanding General, Air University, that "current decisions on matters of organization and roles and missions . . . are not basic doctrine."36 Air Staff officers questioned the fairly precise Air University statements of what it believed the U.S. national objectives and policies to be,37 but the USAF-approved manual on basic air doctrine issued on 1 April 1953 accepted the broad proposition that the USAF supported the nation's objectives and policies, without telling what they were.38 In a speech before the

Scientific Advisory Board on 4 December 1957, General Thomas D. White, USAF Chief of Staff, strongly asserted that "Air Force doctrine is not a thing apart nor a code sufficient unto itself. The Air Force is a national instrument and evolves no doctrine, makes no plans, and makes no preparations other than those clearly and unmistakably called for or anticipated by the national policy."39 The requirement that USAF doctrine must support national objectives and policies necessarily marked it as distinct from pure air power doctrine, which would enunciate through theory and logic the immutable principles that characterize air power as differentiated from land power and sea power.40

An Air War College study in 1951 noted that doctrine was easily confused with strategy on the one hand and with tactics and techniques on the other hand. Air University found little difficulty in distinguishing doctrine from tactics and techniques, for the latter depended quite manifestly upon specific equipment and special situations and were designed to implement specific actions within the broad framework of doctrine. Strategy was also concerned with specific situations, although on a tremendously broader scale than tactics. Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell, an Air Force author on the subject, stated that the tools of strategy were a sound plan, adequate forces, appropriate execution, and guidance by proper principles. "Therefore strategy," wrote General Maxwell, "is the art of infusing into a plan and/or applying a central idea, design, or timing which will give the greatest possible advantage in a campaign or situation. The strategy is the specific design used."41

Prior to World War II the teachings of the Air Corps Tactical School had frequently gone beyond the somewhat narrow confines of officially approved doctrine,42 but, probably because it held that the principal characteristics of doctrine were that it be "reasonable” and "progressive,"43 the Air Corps Tactical School did not differentiate between the doctrinal and the nondoctrinal in its teachings. As early as March 1943, however, AAF officers were referring to ideas that did not have the proved

"

validity of doctrine as "concepts." "No concept, particularly one pertaining to a new weapon," wrote Colonel Charles G. Williamson of the AAF Directorate of Bombardment on 3 March 1943, "can reasonably be stated as a fixed and permanently inviolable rule, but must be accepted as a guide until actualities justify, in the mind of the proper authority, a change in concept."44

In 1948, writing of the need for vision in the new United States Air Force, Major General Robert W. Harper, Commander, Air University, described General Billy Mitchell as being among the "visionaries and missionaries" of the Air Force. "For atomic warfare," wrote Harper, "new concepts of Air Power will have to be formulated."45 Early in the 1950's USAF regulations charged Air University with the responsibility for developing doctrine.46 But Air University specified that the mission of the Air War College included "the conduct of special studies and evaluation which will provide sound air power concepts" and "the preparation... of doctrinal manuals." The first objective of Air War College evaluation was: "To develop doctrines and concepts for the employment of air power."47 In September 1951 General Edwards stated that the Air War College had the mission of "promoting sound concepts on the broad aspects of air power in order to assure the most effective development and employment of the air arm."48

By the autumn of 1951 Air Force usage suggested that "concept" was more visionary, more dynamic, and more comprehensive than "doctrine," but an Air War College study of Air Force ideas proposed to establish "concept" at an orderly position in Air Force thought. According to this study: “In the field of ideas there is evidently a degree of general acceptance ranging from the first nebulous ideas of an individual, up successively through concepts, doctrines, and principles. The point at which an idea becomes a concept, a concept a doctrine, and a doctrine a principle is not always clear. Thus at any one time our Air Force doctrine may be said to be partly concept, partly doctrine, and partly principle."49 In his pioneer book, U.S. Military Doc

trine, Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, who had worked with the Air War College students in the preparation of their study, accepted the proposition that Air Force ideas progressed first from concepts to doctrines, the latter having gained enough official support to be taught at service schools or to be accepted at the highest staff levels. General Smith further proposed that a service doctrine which was accepted by the President, the Congress, or the people of the United States become an executive, legislative, or a national "policy."50

Although recent usage accents the proposition that a concept is a hypothesis which has not yet received the acceptance required by doctrine,51 there is less agreement as to whether doctrine is confined to the service level of the armed forces. In 1957, for example, Colonel Wendell E. Carter contemplated a "national doctrine" which grows out of the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dictates how wars will be fought.52 That same year Professor Kissinger referred to "strategic doctrine" which would desirably issue from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.53 In 1958 an Air War College study identified a need for a U.S. military doctrine which would represent "some substantial concensus of the whole body politic, and particularly among all military personnel, as to objects of military enterprise.”5+

Early in the 1950's studies at Air University successfully identified a pragmatic hierarchy of Air Force thought patterns, and Air University maintained the proposition that "USAF doctrine, developed within the parameters of the more valid concepts of air power, is intended for practical purposes to be used as a guide for organization, development, equipment, and employment of the United States Air Force."55

Other USAF officers, however, were more skeptical of the role of doctrine in Air Force development. Even as the pioneer draft of a USAF basic doctrine statement was under review in Headquarters USAF, General Nathan F. Twining, Acting Chief of Staff, stated to Congress: "The Air Force is not bound to any fixed doctrine or concept. It grew out of sci