exercise the size of Swift Strike III, the number of umpires and controllers employed was quite small, only 322 officers and enlisted men. The concept behind so small an organization was that control would be accomplished through the use of normal command channels, with minimum use of umpires. This new approach was designed to give commanders maximum opportunities to exercise command, with particular emphasis on battle leadership, decisions, and initiative. Through this procedure substantial savings were made in umpire and controller personnel and in communications requirements.

Exercise Phases

Phase I of the exercise was conducted from 21 July to 3 August. It consisted primarily of the air battle, but during the same time period Red Army forces moved into the maneuver area and were readied for the ground battle that was to ensue.

Air operations began on 21 July with the authorization from the Director Controller Headquarters for Commander Joint Task Force Blue to conduct unarmed reconnaissance operations over the Territory of Columbia. At the same time CJTF Blue was authorized to employ escorted aerial reconnaissance if the Red Air Force reacted to a degree which made unarmed and unescorted aerial reconnaissance missions infeasible. Concurrently, CJTF Red was instructed by the Director Controller to defend the Territory of Columbia from aggression by Blue forces, but he was not authorized to penetrate Blue Homeland airspace. By noon of 21 July, CJTF Blue found it necessary to escort his reconnaissance aircraft.

The reconnaissance phase lasted four days. During this period there was an intensive shakedown of air traffic control facilities to ensure the required reliability. Reliability was essential not only to the subsequent exercise play but also to flying safety. A total of 596 Air Force aircraft and some 370 Army aircraft participated in the exercise. This number of aircraft provided a density of traffic in the exer

cise area that dictated a requirement for the highest standards of air traffic control, coordination, and regulation.

By 24 July the air traffic control facilities, which were from USAFSTRIKE and the Air National Guard, were well established within both joint task forces. The Director Controller then directed CJTF Blue to conduct a one-time strike on the Red Hawk missile units that had been inflicting appreciable losses on Blue aircraft. This was done with the idea that subsequent exercise play in the air battle would depend on Red reaction to an attack on its force.

Following the aggressive Blue strike, CJTF Red was directed to conduct offensive air operations over the Blue Homeland. As soon as the Red Air Force initiated these operations, the Blue Air Force was instructed to extend offensive air operations into the Territory of Columbia. Thus on 25 July full-scale conventional air operations were initiated by both forces.

Concurrently with the air battle, Red Army forces moved into the maneuver area and prepared for ground battle. The 2d Infantry Division was deployed from its home station at Fort Benning, Georgia, by organic and commercial means. The 5th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado, was deployed from McConnell AFB, Kansas, to Donaldson Field, South Carolina, by MATS aircraft, a total of 7918 personnel and 8722 short tons of equipment flown into the exercise area. Severe weather in the Midwest disrupted the scheduled arrival of the 5th Division, but MATS responded with additional sorties and completed the deployment within the time allotted for this operation.

Phase II of the exercise was initiated on 4 August with JTF Blue's conduct of an airborne assault by the 82d Airborne Division into the Territory of Columbia. The 82d Division was followed on 5 August by the 101st Airborne Division. Both these divisions staged from the airfields in the vicinity of their home stations of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, respectively. Associated with the airborne assault of the 82d and 101st Air

borne Divisions was the construction of assault landing strips in the immediate vicinity of the drop zones to support the air line of communications (ALOC), which was to be sole means of resupply for the XVIII Airborne Corps. The emphasis on air operations by both JTF's changed during this phase from counter-air operations to isolation of the battlefield and close-air-support missions.

The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions had not worked together as a team since their participation in airborne operations in Holland in 1944. In Swift Strike III they again teamed together to demonstrate an efficiently integrated fighting force.

The airborne operations and resupply activities of JTF Blue were the largest ever accomplished in an exercise by U.S. forces. In a two-day period at the outset of the ground battle, over 14,000 troops were deployed into the assault airhead. Over 5000 tons of equipment and supplies were also dropped, airlanded, or delivered by the newly developed ground proximity extraction system during the first two days. Also illustrative of the scope of operations of the Blue forces is the fact that over 34,000 personnel and almost 27,000 short tons of equipment were delivered by the Blue Air Force during the period 4-16 August.

The construction of assault landing strips began immediately after the heavy drop of the required construction equipment on 4 August. Within 36 hours after the airborne assault began, the first strip was ready for limited use. Sustained operations from this assault strip were begun 72 hours after the airborne assault. Construction of a second strip was begun 56 hours after the airborne assault, and it was ready within 24 hours for the first C-130 landing. Both these assault strips were used throughout the exercise to support the ALOC, which was the lifeblood of JTF Blue's forces.

To support this operation, General Holloway had the following aircraft at his disposal:

16 C-97 (ANG)

2 C-121 (ANG)

Supplementing these resources, MATS C-124's flew 250 sorties in support of the aerial resupply operations.

In Phases III and IV the JTF Blue airhead was consolidated. The Blue forces were initially subjected to intensive air and ground attacks by the Red forces. The Blue forces launched a coordinated attack to destroy the Red forces. JTF Red conducted retrograde operations and regrouped to launch a counterattack.

Phase V of the exercise had as its major activity the withdrawal of an airborne division from the exercise. The purpose of this operation was to test USSTRICOM's ability to withdraw a large force from the exercise for commitment in a strategic contingency mission. The 101st Airborne Division was the unit selected for this action, and it was moved from the exercise area to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, by all available USAFSTRIKE, CONAC, and MATS troop-carrier aircraft. The major elements of JTF Blue were required to protect the withdrawal, thereby creating an opportunity for JTF Red to initiate successful offensive operations against the dwindling Blue ground forces. Upon completion of the withdrawal of the 101st Division, the exercise was terminated.

that they were capable of responding to the heavy requirements placed upon them. For obvious reasons of safety and control, the rules of engagement and umpire rules prevented or nullified any detailed tactics of aerial warfare that would normally have been applied. As a result, each side was reduced to a common level of combat skills and, to some extent, of tactical planning.

The air battle phase was conducted for too long a period, a fact that was acknowledged at all levels of command. USSTRICOM had learned from previous exercises that realistic air play cannot always be achieved coincidental with the air/ground play, particularly the fight for air superiority, interdiction operations, and reconnaissance. Therefore in Exercise Swift Strike III the air battle took place for two weeks prior to initiation of ground operations. It was generally agreed that a period of seven to nine days would have been an ample duration for this phase.

The magnitude of the airlift operations conducted by JTF Blue deserves special mention. These operations were conducted under conditions which constituted major advantages and assets: first, almost ideal weather conditions existed throughout the exercise; and second, the air line of communications from the staging bases to the objective area was less than two hours' flying time. These advantages were partially offset by other factors: six different types of aircraft were used, each possessing varying degrees of capability; it was necessary to oversaturate and tax to the maximum the D-Day launch bases in order to meet the initial launch objectives. Additionally, the late scheduled arrival of Air Force Reserve units precluded the detailed preparations considered necessary to prepare these units for the D-Day airborne and airlanded operations.

A total of 266 troop-carrier and transport aircraft were available to JTF Blue. The total capability represented by this number of aircraft was 5536 sorties. As many as 4659 sorties were actually scheduled against the capability, and 4060 sorties were flown. When the number of noneffective sorties over which the Airlift Task Force had no control was deducted from

the total, an overall effectiveness of 91.8 per cent resulted.

The airlift operations of this exercise were an undertaking never before attempted in peacetime. The results proved that an air line of communications can be established and maintained under conditions of air superiority. The necessary concentration of aircraft for operations of this type dictates the absolute requirement for complete protection of operating bases. Whether or not this standard could be achieved in a future war is open to debate.

Although new developments have been made in troop-carrier operations-e.g., assault strip operations, ground proximity extraction delivery, and the pop-up method of troop or cargo delivery-there is still a pressing requirement for an all-weather delivery capability. In Swift Strike III, weather did not hamper the airborne operations and subsequent resupply operations to any appreciable degree. This was extremely fortunate, for the JTF Blue ground operations could easily have been seriously jeopardized by significant breaks in the flow of aircraft engaged in aerial resupply.

The possibility of requirements for U.S. Strike Command forces to conduct air operations in many undeveloped and isolated areas of the world makes it essential that the capabilities and limiting factors associated with bare base operations be fully understood. To gain experience in this important field, operations were conducted throughout the exercise from three bare bases.

MATS operated under the bare base concept from Donaldson Field, which had been closed as an active base in June 1963. None of the available buildings were used, and MATS personnel operated from mobile facilities which they flew into Donaldson. The only exceptions to a true bare base operation that were allowed during the exercise were use of the installed runway lights and use of the base control tower in lieu of a mobile tower. This action was taken in the interest of safety because of the exceedingly heavy traffic using Donaldson during the

exercise.

The mobility package to support bare base operations at Donaldson included a