thus no possibility of quick reaction. Targets were selected in a misty fashion, and decisions for air strikes were sometimes weeks in coming. Once again it was confirmed that air power without a command and control system is no air power at all. The decision for massive and, hopefully, decisive aid in the Republic of Viet Nam brought the U.S. Air Force into the tactical air picture. Now, less than two years later, the machinery for the control of air power in the Republic of Viet Nam is at a very high standard. This is our second lesson. The control machinery is there and, up to a point, it works very well. It is a good system, the tactical air control system, proved and refined in two wars. In the Republic of Viet Nam it could handle a great many more aircraft than it now has to deal with. In its present structure, it could support the employment of tactical air forces in an expanded war in that area.

A third lesson is pointed up by tactical reconnaissance in Southeast Asia, which two years ago was a primitive operation carried out largely with hand-held K-28 cameras. The RF-101's have clearly established the value of -the absolute necessity for-sophisticated, pro

fessional aerial reconnaissance in any sort of military operation in Southeast Asia. In this part of the world, intelligence is hard to come by. Aerial photographs, interpreted by knowledgeable and usually native photo interpreters, are a prime source of intelligence. It takes good cameras and expert pilots to get these pictures. This is one thing that we have learned or, if you prefer, proved again.

The fourth lesson, one which has been brought home time after time in the past three years, is the essentiality of Clark Air Base in any important military undertakings in this part of the world. It was comforting and quite obviously impressive to our allies in SEATO to see F-100's from Clark landing at Takhli in Thailand only five hours after the order to deploy had been given. The support, the planning, the very construction of our cantonments on the mainland have all depended, to a very great degree, on our base here in the Philippines. Beyond that, it is hard to know, in this volatile area of Southeast Asia, where the next trouble may come from. We cannot afford to disperse our resources too thinly. We are extremely lucky to have, secure from any insurgency problems and with no troublesome

borders with other countries, a close friend in the Philippines. Our base here has made the difference in our ability to react anywhere in Southeast Asia.

There are, unhappily, other less solid theories that are also being certified in the sometimes artificial laboratory of the Republic of Viet Nam. The war in the Republic of Viet Nam remains essentially, of course, a war between the government of that country and the Communist insurgents. But we are deeply committed, and our own people are being killed. Beyond that, equipment and, more significantly, some theories are being put to a test-presumably the ultimate test of actual combat.

THE

HE ACTIONS that we have taken in the Republic of Viet Nam, as I have said earlier, have been both timely and effective. So long as this war can be confined to the borders of that country and remain a counterinsurgency campaign, it would be hard to find fault with anything we have done. The danger lies somewhat deeper.

The Republic of Viet Nam, from the military standpoint, is essentially an artificial situation. The opposition, until now at any rate, has consisted of poorly armed although fiercely determined Communist-led guerrillas. So long as the opposition remains fairly primitive, without a genuine antiaircraft capability, to say nothing of any air capability, we can do pretty much as we please. In fact, it would not be hard to imagine the old observation

balloon as being a likely counterinsurgency weapon.

But we must not get too bemused with a situation where the only hazard to our aircraft comes from small-arms fire. If we are not to suffer the same eventual fate that has overtaken other air forces that learned their lessons in artificial situations-and here I refer for example to the Italians in Ethiopia, the Germans in Spain-then we would be wise not to mistake success in this operation for proof that slow-flying, low-flying aircraft, either fixed or rotary wing, will survive against even moderately advanced opposition.

The borders of Cambodia, Viet Nam, and Laos appear on the maps, and, to an extent, they actually exist. But if one day, in response to our increasing success in the Republic of Viet Nam, we should find ourselves faced with "volunteer" troops of the Pathet Lao, China, or North Viet Nam, we should be prepared to operate once again as a tactical air forcewithout any painful, unlearning period as we transition back to present-day aircraft. Insurgents are not by choice poorly armed. It is entirely within the area of the possible that they, in some future campaign, would include defected elements of well-equipped regular forces.

We should stay flexible, and certainly we should maintain an open mind as to the tactics and techniques needed to defeat the enemy of the moment. But we must not allow these tactics and techniques to take on too much importance in the shaping of our force structure or the design of our new equipment.

Hq Thirteenth Air Force

resulting A-26, aptly called a "hopped-up, tough big brother" of the A-20, proved to be the fastest, most versatile, and deadliest medium bomber developed during World War II.

To meet the Air Force specifications set forth in 1940, Douglas undertook to prototype three experimental models: (1) a light bombardment attack plane, (2) a night-fighter modification, and (3) an aerial destroyer mounting a largecaliber cannon. The A-26 was test-flown 10 July 1942 and went into production in September 1943. It first appeared in combat in 1944. By May 1945 six A-26 groups were committed to overseas theaters, and acceptances of the airplane reached almost 2500 by August 1945.

Early in WW II the usefulness of current attack aircraft, both Allied and enemy, tended to become limited as increasingly effective defense was brought about by improved fighters and ground weapons. As a counterbalance, the Air Forces needed a fast, light bomber with exceptionally heavy firepower and capable of operating

efficiently both at treetop level and at medium altitude.

Specifically desired was a plane to perform a half-dozen or more types of attack missions, all intended to destroy ground installations and immobilize the enemy to the point that a way could be paved for forward surface action. It would attack landing parties, naval craft, mobile or encamped troops, supply and ammo dumps, and moving trains. In order to survive in these varied missions against the deadly defense of which the enemy had proved himself capable, the plane would have to be tough, able to withstand heavy gunfire, and armored for its crew's protection. It had to fly "low and slow"-and then faster than the top fighters of the day. It would have to be armed with heavy offensive and defensive gunfire and carry great bomb loads long distances. Finally it had to be mass producible, and quickly. When the A-26 experienced delays early in 1942, at a time when the AAF was planning to replace all other medium bombers with it, General Arnold insisted he wanted the Invader “for use in this war and not the next."

The Invader was born of these needs and specifications, and the skill, foresight, imagination, and genius of many military and civilian agencies assisted in its birth. Among the many attributes claimed for it were the range of a very heavy bomber, the bomb load of a heavy bomber, the maneuverability of an interceptor, and the speed of a fighter.

An all-metal midwing monoplane powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-2800 engines, the A-26 Invader had a combat weight of 35,000 pounds. and an airspeed of 360 miles per hour-more than 60 miles faster than other medium bombers. Its combat range reached 1000 miles with a two- to four-man crew, depending on whether the bombardier's nose and the rear gun position were installed. It was formidably armed with eighteen .50-caliber machine guns and fourteen 5-inch rockets, and by use of the bomb-bay and wing racks it could carry ordnance loads up to three tons, varying from fragmentation to 1000-pound demolition bombs. Overall length was 51 feet 3 inches, and maximum height 18 feet 6 inches.

The Invader's wings were of two-spar, fullcantilever, laminar-flow construction, with a 70

foot span. The fuselage was shaped and reinforced by aluminum ribs. Each of the two Pratt & Whitney engines developed 2000 horsepower for take-off, and each was equipped with an internal single-stage, two-speed, gear-driven blower. The Hamilton Standard full-feathering, three-bladed propellers were 12 feet 7 inches in diameter. The landing gear was fully retractable and hydraulically operated. A specially designed feature was the dual-slotted, electrically operated flaps which extended outward and downward, creating greater lift and drag than conventional flaps.

The A-26 was designed throughout for quick repairs and engine changes to simplify maintenance and minimize "down" time. For example, the engine cowling was in two halves and could be removed or installed in a few minutes, using only a spark-plug wrench.

A profound respect for the capabilities and demonstrated prowess of this old war-horse grew in World War II and lives on today. The boys who came in low, hit hard, and got the hell out chalked up enviable records for themselves and their "carriers." As noted previously, these Invaders could dish it out, but they also could take terrific punishment and still make it home on their own power.

After July 1944 production of the A-26 mounted steadily. It was truly proving itself in the war in Europe. In their first 17 missions over heavily defended targets in Nazi Germany, the Invader groups were "on target" every time and only one plane was lost. And although in the Pacific the A-26's were mainly assigned to lowlevel bombing and strafing attacks, few failed to return to base.

Pilots of the Invader claim a good deal of its success was due to the plane's easy handling. One veteran of 66 combat missions, Lieutenant Colonel H. G. "Tad" Hankey, stated, "You don't get the sensation of speed until you get close to the ground." To demonstrate his point, he took his A-26 out of the 300-mph straight flight and put it into a dive over a railroad track. He pulled up at the top of the telegraph poles and hurtled down the track at a speed which made the poles one long blur. He then pulled back on the wheel and put the plane into a climb, reporting later that he had been climbing better than 1000 feet

a minute and registering nearly 300 mph in the climb. On reaching an altitude of 7000 feet he resumed straight flight, then feathered the right engine, and continued cruising along at more than 200 mph. While still flying on one engine, he swung the airplane across the sky in long, easy turns and then climbed to altitude with no apparent strain.

Though a latecomer, the Invader compiled distinguished combat record in World War II and won hearty acceptance by the crews who flew it.

first rebirth of the Invader

After World War II the Invader, now redesignated the B-26 after the USAF had abolished the attack classification in 1947, began slipping into oblivion like an old hero laid to rest. It was pickled, preserved, and put in storage. Although it had committed itself valiantly the Invader was being supplanted, supposedly, by the lightning jet aircraft of the future which were writing history in the skies.

Then came the dark days of the summer of 1950 and the advance of the Communist North Korean army into South Korea. Without question air power provided the decisive force which enabled U.S. and U.N. ground forces to retain a foothold on the peninsula. But in the thinly nourished postwar USAF modern aircraft were desperately short. For months to come the war had to be fought with the leftovers of World War II. Fortunately there were thousands of aircraft in pickled storage, among them many hundreds of B-26's. Dozens of others were found on almost every base, where they served for logging flying time or fast administrative flights.

The time was ripe for the resurrection of the old Invader. Off the air bases and out of the boneyards they came, first in a trickle, then in a steady stream as crews could be retrained and the aircraft restored to combat condition. Much praise is due the maintenance and production technicians on the aircraft lines at Ogden Air Materiel Area, Hill Air Force Base, Utah. During the Korean War years they reclaimed and reconditioned more than 1000 B-26's, averaging

delivery of 18 to 20 aircraft a month to the combat lines.

The reconditioning was by no means routine. These B-26's that came off the production lines at Ogden AMA were recognizable as the sturdy, reliable, maneuverable old war-horses of WW II but "beefed up," revamped, and modified to meet the needs of the new "limited" war. The ingenious inventiveness of the work force at Ogden AMA brought many types of Invaders off the lines -reconnaissance, photographic (both day and night), night intruders, fighters, tow-target planes, and light bombers, all specially equipped. One unusual modification was a B-26 equipped with loudspeakers which, from one mile up, blared anti-Red information over the enemy lines.

Although the "MIG Alley" duels between the USAF Sabrejets and the Soviet-built MIG-15's received the attention of the press, it was aircraft like the Invader which applied direct pressure to the enemy on the ground, taking a tremendous toll of enemy manpower and equipment and ultimately making an armistice possible. Tales of the daring and successful night-intruder attacks by the Invader are legion, as are also its successes in interdiction missions and in dropping delayedaction parademolition and parafragmentation bombs on targets not requiring saturation bombing. The Korean communications system was widely scattered and offered few targets worthy of large groups of fighters or bombers. The Invader and other low-flying, slower planes were employed in relatively small numbers in seeking out and destroying Communist bridges, trucks, trains, barracks, and supplies. The "special purpose" paramunitions were parachuted from B-26's with deadly accuracy during daylight hours, and B-29 Superforts often dropped flares for the B-26 night intruder sorties. Their use in this conflict prevented excessive loss of personnel and equipment on the low-level strikes required for the small targets. They lent high morale and confidence to the aircrews.

in storage again

The years after the Korean conflict saw the appearance of the giant long-range jet bomber