C

OMMAND AND CONTROL: what is it and why all the emphasis? It has been vaguely thought of as everything from command systems in support areas, such as research and development, logistics, and supply, to the guidance systems in drones and surface-to-air missiles. There is really nothing new about command and control or command and control systems. Military commanders have always devised organizations and methods to secure knowledge needed to make intelligent decisions and issue intelligent commands. However, the time compression brought about by new weapon systems has established requirements for decisions to be made within minutes on matters of national security. The problem is to mechanize the flow of information required in the decision-making process in order to keep pace with modern weapons. This, of course, requires an understanding of (1) the basic decision-making process, (2) the assistance that can be provided to the decision-maker by technology, and (3) the military commander's requirements.

In order to clear up any misunderstanding, the standard military definition for command and control is: an arrangement of personnel, facilities, and the means for informa

tion acquisition, processing, and dissemination. employed by a commander in planning, directing, and controlling operations.

A command and control system is a composite of equipment, skills, and techniques which is capable of performing the clearly defined function of enabling a commander to exercise continuous control of his forces and weapons in all situations by providing him with (a) the information needed to make operational decisions and (b) the means for disseminating these decisions. A complete system includes all subsystems, related facilities, equipment, services, and personnel required for operation of the system so that it can be considered a self-sufficient unit in its intended operational environment.

From these definitions it is evident that a command and control system can exist at any level of command where decision-making authority resides regarding the control of forces. This system, at a lower command level, can also be a subsystem of a higher-echelon command and control system. All these systems then become subsystems of a national system responsive to the President as commander in chief of the armed forces. The total system, if properly designed, should provide each level of command with the information

needed to make appropriate decisions. These decisions and execution orders should follow established command channels to ensure proper delegation of authority and responsibility, which has proved to be the most important key to successful military manage

ment.

the decision-making process

An understanding of the fundamentals of the decision-making process is necessary prior to the design of an automated command and control system. Many erroneous images of the decision-maker exist. Some see him as a commander who suddenly rouses himself from thought and issues an order. Others see him as a happy-go-lucky fellow with a coin poised ready to risk his action on a toss. Still others see him as a commander at a staff meeting in the process of saying "yes" or "no." All these images ignore the whole lengthy, complex process of alerting, exploring, and analyzing that precedes the final decision.

Decision-making comprises three principal phases: determining the necessity to make a decision, finding possible courses of action, and choosing among courses of action. The amount of time spent on each phase depends upon the level at which the decision is to be made. Only a small fraction of the time involved is spent in making the final decision or choice, while the majority of effort is spent on the other two phases.

Decisions are generally of two types: programed decisions and nonprogramed decisions. Decisions are programed to the extent that they are repetitive or routine. They are nonprogramed if they are novel, if there is no cut-and-dried method for handling the problem since it has not arisen before. Such was General Eisenhower's D-Day decision in Europe.

Traditional techniques for programed decisions have usually been understood and applied. Habit is the most general of all techniques. The collective memories of organizational members are vast encyclopedias of factual knowledge, habitual skills, and operat

ing procedures. Closely related to habits are standing operating procedures. While habits are recorded in the central nervous system, standing operating procedures are formal, written programs. These recorded programs provide a means for bringing habitual patterns into the open where they can be examined, modified, and improved. An organizational structure is itself a partial specification of decision-making programs. It establishes a common set of presuppositions and expectations as to organizational responsibilities for decisions; it establishes subgoals to serve as criteria of choice in various parts of the organization; and it establishes operational datacollecting and reporting responsibilities in particular organizations so that they can communicate events requiring attention to appropriate decision points.

Traditional techniques for nonprogramed decisions are not easily described. When executives or military commanders are asked how they make unprogramed decisions they generally describe the use of "judgment," which depends upon experience, insight, intuition, and possibly creativity. This does not really explain the process and leads to further examination. One thing that is known is that training in orderly thinking helps in nonprogramed decision-making. The military "estimate of the situation" is an excellent example of such a procedure. It is well known that some men have developed the decision-making skill much better than others. This skill is developed through professional training in basic principles and through experience and job rotation that the organization itself provides. The detailed process of acquiring decision-making skills is as mysterious as the basic learning process. The only known technique for improving nonprogramed decision-making is to select men who have demonstrated a capacity for it and continue their training and planned experience.

electronic data processing

The introduction of the computer and electronic data-processing techniques in the

area of programed decision-making has extended the range of accuracy of programable decisions in many areas. While computers were initially conceived as devices for solving mathematical problems, it gradually became clear that there were other ways of using them. If a model or simulation of a situation can be programed for a computer, the behavior of the model can be ascertained over a whole range of conditions. The computer then becomes a powerful tool to assist the decision-maker in all decision areas. The computer, of course, cannot have insight or be creative and can only do what it is programed to do.

In general, problem solving proceeds by establishing goals, detecting differences between present situation and goal, finding in memory or by search the tools or processes that are relevant to reducing the differences, and applying these tools or processes. Each problem is normally broken down into subproblems. Each subproblem is then broken down into others until a subproblem is found that can be solved. By successive solution of such subproblems the overall goal is eventually achieved-or given up. This general technique of problem solving can be programed in a computer, e.g., chess and checkers playing programs that are capable of beating proficient players. It is this type of program that suggests future innovations in the use of computers to assist in the decision-making process.

desired concept

In the desired concept, the information base required for automating command operations is the primary concern and the direct task of the commander's staff. This staff must also maintain the information base, develop plans, lay out programs, establish planning factors, specify operating procedures, etc. Thus it is from the daily work of the staff, from the dynamic perspective of the command context, that the specifics of the informational requirements of a command center must be generated.

Extreme care must be taken in establishing the data base in a command center. Consider all the questions a commander could ask. The number is virtually infinite. For example, there are several thousands of the form "Where is the ?" or "Who is commander of the ?" Let us say, for

the sake of argument, that on any given day. he could ask any of one billion questions. However, the chance that he may ask a given question is not random. There are certain questions which he is almost certain to ask; others he is almost certain not to ask. The important thing to recognize is that the estimate of that probability is a very nonlinear function of the efficiency of staff work. A poor staff will have only a hazy idea as to what the commander is thinking, and therefore it may be forced to prepare for a wider range of possible questions than necessary. Indeed, it is the feeling of inadequacy in keeping in close touch with what is really relevant that prompts the desire to have more and more facts around "just in case." The first-rate staff anticipates what information the commander will require. In fact, by anticipation of the problems and considerations that are going to arise, by being acutely aware of his traits and habit of mind, the staff leads his thoughts and conditions his interests.

Unless the information base is established by the staff as a result of real and present needs, the volume of data can climb astronomically while relevance plummets and the system becomes glutted by "information" that does not inform. This problem is greatly aggravated by industry's encouragement of the designing of such systems around elaborate electronic equipments and the conducting of "systems analyses" by civilian engineers whose training has been predominantly in hardware or computer programing and not in the concrete problems of military leadership or the rigors of the military staff.

The essence of the concept of operational control systems can be stated concisely:

(1) The information base of the command center will be maintained by the center staff

in the memory of the center's computer sys

tem.

(2) The computer itself will act merely as a highly sophisticated communications device. serving the staff by linking its members directly with the information base.

(3) Each command staff office will have direct access to the information base on a nearly instantaneous basis through its own console or display units.

(4) The system will allow multiparallel access to the computer system for all staff offices.

Thus the information base in the computer system becomes a dynamic tool for the command staff. The information base in the computer system is solely the product and responsibility of the staff. Each staff office maintains that part of the base for which it is responsible. The information base becomes in fact the context of command, as current as the staff maintains it, as responsive as the staff molds it to staff needs, and as sophisticated in its calculations as the staff is sophisticated in carrying out its functions.

This concept of automating command operations is the only one that has the potential of greatly enhancing command capability in the time-tested patterns of military command doctrine. It augments the capability of a commander and his staff to exercise command prerogatives, rather than putting him in the position of a spectator overwhelmed by facts about events that are already history.

FROM THE initial definitions it is seen that command and control is an organized decision-making process which, within the concept discussed, is particularly amenable to automation through the use of computers and data-processing equipment. This includes both the operational and "business" areas

within the military. Under this concept, each staff functional area or agency supporting the recently approved National Military Command Center must analyze its own activities to determine the desired information base to be put into a computer in conjunction with the desired programs and operating procedures. The information requirements established at the national level prescribe the inputs desired from the next lower level of command. This principle then continues down through normal channels of command to the lowest level. It is obvious that each subelepatible with higher-echelon systems in terms ment of the national system must be comof data elements, codes, and operational language. Therefore the design of command and control systems will tend to be a relatively centralized function, with representation from each functional area working intimately with the appropriate technical personnel.

The recent emphasis on military command and control has resulted from the realization that electronic data-processing equipment can greatly assist commanders at all levels to make accurate and timely decisions

that otherwise could not be made without

considerable human effort. Such automation presently in progress will most surely result in proposals for major changes in organizations and level of authority and responsibility. One thing, however, must not be forgotten concerning military command and control automation: that is, a peacetime system must not be devised that cannot operate under wartime conditions. The appropriate delegation of authority and responsibility will be as valid in any future war as it has been in past wars. Individuals properly trained and experienced in the decision-making process remain the most valuable asset in any command and control system.

Hq United States Air Force

AIRCRAFT TIRE

MANAGEMENT

COLONEL ELMER G. PROHASKA

S

ATISFYING Air Force customers' needs for aircraft tires is one of the most important responsibilities of the Air Force Logistics Command and, more specifically, of the Ogden Air Materiel Area.

Contrary to popular belief, aircraft tires and ground vehicle tires are alike only in that they are both round and mounted on wheels. The essential need for aircraft tires that can safely withstand the stresses of high-speed take-offs and landings and the great weights of modern aircraft is obvious. The difficulties faced by the tire inventory manager at Ogden Air Materiel Area stem primarily from a multitude of intangibles which are both difficult

to predict and control. He has the dual task of reducing these uncertainties to known planning factors and at the same time finding ways and means to perform his job at reduced costs. Some of the tire manager's support problems, their solutions, and the management techniques employed to minimize support costs merit closer consideration.

inventory

To support 52 aircraft types, ranging from the L-20 to the B-58, 248 different tires are procured, stored, and distributed to approximately 400 bases worldwide. The present 248