SENATOR ANDREWS: How does the proposed legislation differ from past Coast Guard user fee proposals?

ANSWER: Like the 1981 and 1982 proposals, the current one uses a combination of direct and indirect fees. The levels of recovery differ, as do some of the specific costs to be recovered. The fiscal year 1983 proposal, which limited methods of collection to direct fees only and reduced the amount proposed for recovery, did not include as many services for cost recovery. The current proposal provides for the deposit of collections into the general fund of the Treasury as proprietary receipts of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating.

DRUG ACTIVITIES

SENATOR ANDREWS: What is the amount to be spent in FY 1985 and requested for FY 1986 for drug enforcement activities?

ANSWER: The amount to be spent for drug enforcement activities in FY 1985 is approximately $305 million; in FY 1986, the requested amount is slightly more than $325 million.

SENATOR ANDREWS: What is the Coast Guard's overall

assessment of the effectiveness of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS)? What proof is there that NNBIS is stemming the flow of illegal drugs into this country?

ANSWER: The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) has proven to be a useful, positive vehicle in fostering interagency coordination and synergism. Intelligence information gathered by various agencies is used to determine the most effective use of available resources. NNBIS focuses on the macro view of drug interdiction. NNBIS suffered some growing pains, but has experienced many successes, notably the recent execution of Operations Hat Trick and Blue Lightning. These operations required the coordination of many U. S. agencies and the cooperation of several foreign governments. These operations demonstrated the effectiveness of coordinated efforts in stopping the flow of drugs into the country.

SENATOR ANDREWS: What is the proportion of drugs seized to drugs shipped (described as the "only effectiveness measure" by the Commandant last year)? Is the percentage stable at 30 percent, declining or increasing?

ANSWER: The 30 percent figure refers to the total seizures of marijuana by all agencies as estimated by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). The Coast Guard's interdiction rate in calendar year (CY) 1983 was about 14 percent, based in part upon the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) estimates of the amount imported into the U. S. and the amount shipped by sea. These estimates for CY 1984 are not yet available. NNICC did make a prediction of 1984 marijuana shipments; based on that, our interdiction rate for 1984 is estimated to be 15%. However, we believe that our 1984 interdiction rate may actually be significantly higher, because the actual amount of marijuana shipped by sea in 1984 was much less than predicted. This decline in shipments was due to higher than expected eradication in Colombia and maritime route denial during Operation Wagonwheel in November and December, 1984.

SENATOR ANDREWS: When will interdiction efforts be reduced because long term efforts aimed at reducing drug demand through education and source eradication have taken effect?

ANSWER: As long as there is a demand for illegal narcotics and a profit margin sufficient to justify the risk involved in trafficking, interdiction efforts will need to continue. We can't predict when we are going to get to that point, but there were some encouraging signs in 1984. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee's Narcotics Intelligence Estimate for 1983 indicates marijuana use among our young people continues to decline. Also, there were significant strides in source country control, particularly in Colombia where there was considerable crop eradication and stepped up law enforcement.

SENATOR ANDREWS: Provide for the record the amount spent by the Coast Guard in FY 1984 - 1986 for NNBIS support. Provide a comparison of NNBIS support by other Federal Agencies.

ANSWER: We do not have the information on NNBIS support provided by other agencies. The following table, however, shows Coast Guard support for NNBIS in FY 1984 - 1986:

SENATOR ANDREWS: Was the entire FY 1984 Supplemental ($1.8 million) obligated for NNBIS support? Provide a breakdown of costs by NNBIS Regional Coordinator centers and purposes for which funds were used.

ANSWER: The entire $1.8 million supplemental was obligated for NNBIS support in FY 1984. Of the total amount provided by the Supplemental, $120,701 was obligated for travel costs, $100,942 for Standard Level User Charges (SLUC), $522,373 for other operating expenses, and $1,055,984 for direct personnel costs. SLUC and direct personnel costs are paid centrally. The following is a breakdown of non-personnel/ SLUC costs by regional center:

*Includes items such as training, security, leases, equipment, maintenance, and utilities

BLUE LIGHTNING OPERATION

SENATOR ANDREWS:

Please summarize the results of the joint

Coast Guard-Customs interdiction operation in the Bahamas, called "Blue Lightning".

ANSWER: Operation Blue Lightning was a coordinated law

enforcement effort between the Government of the Bahamas and the United States conducted from April 3 to 19, 1985. The operation was coordinated by the Southeast Region of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System and involved 26 Federal, state and local agencies of both governments. The goal of the operation was three-fold: (1) to disrupt the primary maritime smuggling routes through the Bahamas, (2) to destroy cached contraband and facilities on various islands throughout the Bahamas, and (3) to intercept those smugglers approaching the Florida coast who had been "flushed out" by the pressure being applied in the Bahamas. The operation resulted in the seizure of 26 vessels, 18 tons of marijuana, 5500 pounds of cocaine, $1.5 million in assets, and the arrest of 57 people.

SENATOR ANDREWS: Committee sources indicate that the quantity of marijuana moving in the Atlantic supply lines is declining. Does this indicate that marijuana is moving into the country through Mexico? Is that due to deterrent success in the Caribbean, and if so, should more Federal resources be directed to customs activities?

ANSWER: At this point, there are no clear indications that any marijuana normally transported via maritime routes in the Caribbean/Atlantic is being diverted through Mexico enroute the United States. That the volume of marijuana shipped by sea in the Caribbean/Atlantic region appears to have temporarily decreased may be the result of several factors, most notably the present conditions in Colombia. Stepped up law enforcement efforts by both the United States and Colombia during the last two months of 1984 severely disrupted the normal operations of Colombian maritime traffickers. During that time, it appears many maritime traffickers ceased or cut back their operations while diverting some of their product to air shipment in order to avoid the maritime law enforcement pressure. While some Colombian marijuana may have been temporarily diverted from the Caribbean/Atlantic maritime routes, we believe that the other major foreign producers of marijuana destined for the United States are increasing their activity and maritime transportation of marijuana remains highly profitable. Based on this information we would not recommend any shift in current Federal drug interdiction resources.

COLOMBIAN OPERATION

SENATOR ANDREWS: Last year, the Coast Guard participated in a major effort directed at reducing marijuana movement from Colombia. Please summarize the Coast Guard's participation, and the results of that effort. What is the role of Defense personnel in these operations? Do you agree with the five Southern State Governors who called for a more active DOD role in drug interdiction?

ANSWER: Operation Wagonwheel was part of Operation Hat Trick, a larger operation coordinated by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) involving other U. S. law enforcement agencies. Conducted during November and December

1984, Wagonwheel was the largest maritime drug enforcement effort ever, and was designed to disrupt and interdict the fall harvest of South American marijuana.

DOD participation in Operation Wagonwheel represented an unprecedented commitment of dedicated resources to support Coast Guard operations. The U.S. Navy Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, committed extensive surface and air resources to operations under Coast Guard tactical control. Three major surface vessels, three hydrofoil patrol boats and three P-3 aircraft and squadron support personnel representing over a thousand Navy personnel were ultimately involved. Additionally, personnel from the U.S. Army Southern Command provided other support services.

The operation was a major success. Wagonwheel forces seized 37 vessels and 169 tons of marijuana; 3 other vessels were forced into Mexican waters by Coast Guard cutters, where they and their 32 tons of marijuana were seized by Mexican naval units. More importantly, as the Wagonwheel squadron deployed close to the Colombian coast, it effectively sealed off the sea lanes traditionally used by maritime smugglers and accomplished the main objective of the operation: disruption of the smugglers' normal activity during the prime shipping season. Smugglers were forced to stockpile their crop or seek alternate, less efficient and more costly methods of moving their product. Because of stockpiling, Colombian armed forces and police were able to destroy some 300 tons of marijuana in special land operations planned to capitalize on the anticipated impact of Wagonwheel. An increase in air smuggling and a rise in the street price of marijuana in some parts of the U. S. were other indicators of our success. There were reports from Colombia that maritime interdiction, in-country stockpile destruction, and the U. S.-supported Colombian eradication program eliminated as much as 50% of the fall harvest. Maritime trafficking has remained uncharacteristically low thus far in 1985, showing the operation's long term effects on the smuggling organizations. Finally, this operation demonstrated the success that can be gained from international cooperation on a mutual problem.

Department of Defense assistance has increased significantly the last two years and has been valuable in drug interdiction. Additional options are being studied to determine what can be done to further increase DOD assistance.

PROSECUTION

SENATOR ANDREWS: What is the trend for drug violation prosecutions? Last year you indicated that the conviction rate has dropped off. What were 1983 and 1984 results? How can they be improved?

ANSWER: The trend for drug violation prosecutions in the Seventh Coast Guard District (statistics for other districts are not presently available) are illustrated by the following table:

1 - As of February 16, 1985.

2

Approximately 80% of all Coast

Guard drug seizures occur in the Seventh District.

Prosecutions initiated and their outcome are reported in the same calendar year as the arrest, even if the trial/plea/conviction/acquittal took place during a later year.

The conviction rate thus far for prosecutions initiated in calendar year 1984 has dropped off slightly from the two previous years. This may be explained by the increased use of hidden compartments aboard vessels to smuggle illicit drugs. It is more difficult in such cases to prove that the crew members were criminally involved with the hidden drugs.

Some prosecution problems as a result of the wording of certain provisions in Public Law 96-350, codified as 21 USC 955a-d, have come to light. The Coast Guard is presently working on a legislative proposal to deal with those problems. The proposal, if adopted, should improve prosecutions of illicit drug traffickers.

ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES

What

SENATOR ANDREWS: Last year's projections for marijuana confiscated were 2.5 million pounds for both 1984 and 1985. are the actual and estimated figures for those years, as well as FY 1986? Why aren't these figures reflected in the February budget? How were budget estimates made without this data?

ANSWER: Seizure rates, particularly projections, cannot be used as a basis for budget considerations. For example, fiscal year 1984 and 1985 projections were based upon fiscal year 1983