Despite the similarities between the recent business cycle The ability of the GSE's to purchase record amounts of mortgages during the past several years is a principal reason why the housing market remained strong in an otherwise weak economy. Privatization advocates have yet to demonstrate who other than the GSE's would be able to provide such high amounts of liquidity regardless of economic or market conditions. Third, privatization advocates raise concerns about size and systemic risk. Residential mortgage debt outstanding grew at an annualized rate of 8.6 percent over the past decade. Not surprisingly, the GSE's also have experienced significant growth. But GSE size is not an accurate proxy for risk. For every mortgage Freddie Mac guarantees, whether it is securitized or held in the retained portfolio, there is approximately 40 percent collateral behind the loan in the form of homeowner equity. We actively manage interest-rate risk and other related market risks and take a disciplined approach to risk management. Freddie Mac strives to substantially match the duration of our assets and liabilities. Throughout 2003, for example, a period of extreme turbulence in financial markets, Freddie Mac's duration gap remained low. Moreover, mortgage debt and the risks of investing in it would not disappear by downsizing the GSE's or making other changes to the GSE charter. Rather, the burden of managing mortgage credit risk would shift from these institutions to those with explicit Government support (such as Federally insured depositories), while interest-rate risk would shift onto individual households. Another likely outcome is that higher costs of conventional mortgage financing could cause borrowers to shift into the FHA market, thereby actually increasing Government subsidization of housing. In other words, we believe that those who call for privatization have not begun to demonstrate how this would be better for homeowners, the housing finance system, or the economy. Q.6. It is my understanding that Freddie's compliance with the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is being delayed due to its ongoing revisions of its financial statements. Freddie is expected to release its revised earnings sometime soon. Have you communicated with the SEC regarding when you expect to come into compliance with the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934? of 1934? When specifically do you believe that you will be able to do so? A.6. Our most pressing priority is to bring Freddie Mac's financial statements current. On November 21, 2003, the Freddie Mac Board of Directors and management team announced the release of the company's restated and revised financial results for the years 2000 through 2002. The restatement was a significant step in Freddie Mac's progress toward achieving accurate and timely reporting. In addition, we issued our annual report for 2002 on February 27, 2004 and will hold the related annual stockholders' meeting on March 31, 2004. We intend to return to timely financial reporting as soon as possible. However, we currently are not able to predict when we will do so. Significant revisions to our accounting systems are necessary to implement the revised accounting policies adopted in connection with the restatement, as well as new accounting guidance applicable for 2003, so that those accounting systems can fully support the preparation of consolidated financial statements in accordance with GAAP. As a result, the public release of our 2003 financial results has been delayed. Our objective is to release combined quarterly and full-year 2003 results by June 30, 2004 and to provide our 2003 annual report and hold our related stockholders' meeting as soon as practicable thereafter. However, there can be no assurance that we will meet this objective. We have been in ongoing discussions with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on various issues since our initial announcement that we would register our common stock with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SEC rules require us to bring our financial statements "current" before we can finish the process of becoming an SEC registrant. We will complete our voluntary registration with the SEC after we return to timely financial reporting. Q.7. Some witnesses before the Banking Committee have recommended placing your new regulator in the Department of the Treasury and letting it have oversight over the GSES' housing mission, as well as their safety and soundness. However, are you aware that in an October 1, 2003 letter, Treasury gave notice to the National Cooperative Bank, a private nonprofit corporation originally created by Congress that has been and still is extensively involved in financing affordable housing that it was intending to increase the interest rates of its long-term loan by 700 basis points? If enacted, that interest rate would have been devastating to the affordable housing mission of the National Cooperative Bank. Doesn't this letter, at a minimum, demonstrate a desire by Treasury to promote safety and soundness to the determent of the National Cooperative Bank's housing mission? Why or why not? A.7. We have not seen the letter you cite and are not familiar with the issue involving the National Cooperative Bank, so we cannot knowledgeably comment on it. However, to address the general concern you are raising, we would like to reiterate points we made in our testimony on establishing an effective regulatory oversight structure for the GSE's. World-class regulatory oversight is critical to the achievement of Freddie Mac's mission and to maintaining the confidence of the Congress, the public, and financial markets. Freddie Mac strongly supports the enactment of legislation that provides strong, credible regulatory oversight. Accordingly, the new GSE regulatory structure must: • Engender public confidence through world-class supervision and independence; Ensure the continued safety and soundness of the GSE's; • Respond flexibly to mortgage market innovation; and • Strengthen GSE market discipline through robust and timely disclosure. We believe these principles will be realized most completely under an independent regulatory board modeled on independent Federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. We believe such a board should not include representatives of HUD, Treasury, or other executive branch departments. The purpose of establishing an independent board is just that, independence. Inclusion of executive branch representatives on the GSE regulatory board could compromise this important component of world-class regulation. Freddie Mac would have similar concerns should the Congress decide to locate the new regulatory office within the Department of the Treasury. To ensure independence, we would support applying the same operational controls as apply to the relationships between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Adequate firewalls are needed to avoid the politicization of the GSE mission and the critical role we play in the Nation's economy and global financial markets. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR REED FROM NORMAN B. RICE Q.1. Your question_raises the issue of whether Congress needs to "level the playing field" among the GSE's. Given the fundamental differences in the nature and composition of the Federal Home Loan Bank System and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I doubt that it is desirable or even possible to establish a truly level playing field without a wholesale restructuring of the present GSE's. A.1. Although the FHLBanks are exempt from all Federal, State, and local taxation except for real property taxes, they are obligated to make payments to the Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP) in the amount of 20 percent of net earnings after operating expenses and Affordable Housing Program (AHP) expense. In addition, annually the FHLBanks must set aside for the AHP the greater of an aggregate of $100 million or 10 percent of their current year's net income before charges for AHP (but after expenses for REFCORP). Assessments for REFCORP and AHP are the equivalent of a 26.5 percent effective income tax rate for the FHLBanks. In addition, all FHLBank cash dividends received by members are taxable; dividends received by members do not benefit from the corporate dividends received exclusion. Q.2. Congress has established two very different housing obligations for the housing GSE's-the Affordable Housing Program (AHP) for the Federal Home Loan Banks, and Affordable Housing Goals (AHG's) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These differences make it difficult to attempt a direct comparison of the performance of the three GSE's in serving specific affordable housing needs. At the present time, the Federal Housing Finance Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development are conducting a joint study to determine how the Chicago FHLBank's Mortgage Partnership Finance program would score under the AHG's for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Once this study is complete, it should provide a better understanding of the potential application of AHG's to the FHLBanks. A.2. Although the AHP and AHG's are intended to achieve similar objectives, they operate in very different ways. For Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress has imposed certain requirements on their purchases of mortgages to target their efforts to specified affordable housing goals. In the case of the FHLBanks, Congress has required them to set aside 10 percent of their net profits for distribution as grants or below-cost loans in support of affordable housing. The AHP program also targets incomes lower than those established by the AHG's. AHP subsidies must be used to fund the purchase, construction, or rehabilitation of owner-occupied housing for very lowincome, or low- or moderate-income (no greater than 80 percent of area median income) households; or rental housing in which at least 20 percent of the units will be occupied by and affordable for very low-income (no greater than 50 percent of area median income) households. |