Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

as appropriate involved with the Federal Home Loan Banks versus Fannie Mae versus Freddie Mac.

So there are certain elements that would apply. There are other elements that would not. But from the regulator's standpoint when you are dealing with mission, safety, and soundness, it seems to me there are a lot of common denominators, and there are synergies. Senator BENNETT. I agree with that, and my time is up, but it just occurs to me that it may well be that if you put the Federal Home Loan Bank boards into this pot, you have to eliminate the joint and several liability arrangement that they currently have and thereby change the structure of them so they become more like the other entities that are in the pot.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Senator Bennett.

Mr. Walker, I have a couple of questions following up on Senator Bennett's questions for the record. One has to do with the organizational structure of the new GSE regulator, keeping in mind the differences among Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and as he has pointed out, the Federal Home Loan Banks and so forth.

The other question would relate to corporate governance and the Finance Board. We would like that answered for the record, and we will get this to you in a few minutes.

We have been talking about risk here and mission, safety and soundness. What we are trying to do as I understand it and I have been on this Committee for 18 years; Senator Sarbanes dates me here but we both sat through the debacle of the thrifts. Senator Bennett came in the middle of it, I believe, on the Committee. Senator SARBANES. And helped us to straighten it out. Chairman SHELBY. Absolutely.

But at the same time, what we are trying to do is balance the mission of the GSE's, which we mostly agree is sound-that is, the housing policy for the United States of America and the people, and homeownership-and the safety and soundness of the GSE's as financial institutions.

Is that what we are trying to do?

Mr. WALKER. I agree, to balance those interests.

Chairman SHELBY. Absolutely.

And we have been talking a lot about failures here, but what we are really trying to get at if we create a powerful regulator is to preclude failure, to stay away from failure, in other words, to make sure that these institutions are going to be there for the future. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. WALKER. That is correct, Senator. We want to prevent a failure, and we want to learn from the lessons of the past.

Chairman SHELBY. How important, Mr. Walker, is it for the regulator, whoever the regulator would be in the future, to know what the models are at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Federal Home Loan Bank board-in other words, wouldn't they have to know what is going on there? It is a very complicated situation. They would have to have the personnel to know, and they would have to be hands-on, to know what was going on, so to speak.

One of the problems that I have gathered here is that it was PricewaterhouseCoopers, inside accountants, that brought the Freddie Mac situation to a head and not OFHEO. I agree with Sen

ator Sarbanes that the leadership at OFHEO since the revelations at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have been very diligent.

Go ahead.

Mr. WALKER. OFHEO has not historically had many people with expertise in accounting and reporting issues. They recognize the need to beef up in this area. They are taking steps to do that, and I think that that is appropriate that they do. In addition, in fairness to OFHEO, I will also note that one of the things I mentioned was about the need to have model corporate governance practices. OFHEO has taken steps to try to make sure that at least in the case of Freddie Mac, the CEO is separated from chairman of the board, which is a best practice in that regard, and they are trying to become more active there.

Senator SARBANES. May I

Chairman SHELBY. If I can finish up, Senator Sarbanes, of the securities that Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, create and this is the securitization of the whole organization-who owns or buys most of those securities? Isn't it the banks? Don't a lot of the banks, as investors, invest in the GSE securities?

Mr. WALKER. That is my understanding, Senator.
Chairman SHELBY. Is that correct?

Mr. MCCOOL. Yes. They are purchased by mutual funds, they are purchased by banks, but a lot of other entities purchase them. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to follow up on the other point.

An independent, assured source of funding for the regulator is a very important aspect of this, is it not? You were mentioning OFHEO's difficulties, but is not that one of them and something that needs to be addressed in any effort to strengthen the regulatory structure?

Mr. WALKER. It is important to assure that they have an adequate amount of resources in order to effectively do their job, and that is one consideration that I think you are going to have to give as to how should they be funded and the means by which they should be funded.

Senator SARBANES. Now, in your report, you point out that the FHFB just had 10 examiners as of about 18 months ago to examine the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, and they have initiated a program to increase it up to 30. Of course, I think the Comptroller has 20 or 30 people at one or another of the major institutions that they are involved in as I understand it.

So it is really falling way short of what is needed, is it not? Mr. WALKER. They are clearly going to have to take a look at what they need to get the job done versus the current resources they have, and they are likely to need additional resources.

Senator SARBANES. Do you have any perception that the Federal Housing Finance Board has actually been acting more as an advocate for increasing the powers of the bank system rather than its safety and soundness regulator?

Mr. WALKER. I do not.

Tom.

Mr. MCCOOL. We have not taken a position on that, Senator. Senator SARBANES. Some have argued and actually, it has come up here today-that you cannot put the Federal Home Loan Banks into the same regulatory structure as Freddie and Fannie because there are important differences. I take it your position is that the similarities more than outweigh the differences, and therefore it is sensible to put them all under the same regulatory structure. Is that correct?

Mr. WALKER. That is correct, Senator. There would be some differences, but there are more commonalities than differences, and with regard to mission, safety, security, soundness, there are more similarities than differences.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sununu, anymore questions?

Senator SUNUNU. No, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. No questions.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. No questions.

Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Walker, we thank you, and we look forward to your answers to those last questions and any others for the record. We appreciate your appearance before the Committee and your insights into what we are trying to do.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I note that the GAO has built up quite a body of expertise on this issue, and I would hope we could be able to draw on the Comptroller General for his counsel and advice as we move forward.

Mr. WALKER. We have great staff, and we are happy to help.
Thank you.

Senator SARBANES. You have a good head of a great staff, too.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you.

Chairman SHELBY. Our next panel will be Mr. Alan Beller, Director, Division of Corporate Finance and Senior Counselor to the Commission on Securities and Exchange; Mr. Richard Carnell, Professor of Law, Fordham University Law School; and Mr. James R. Rayburn, President, National Association of Home Builders.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your patience dealing with the first panel. Your written statements, we have for the record, and we have reviewed them. We would appreciate it if you would sum up as soon as your can your top points here today. We will start with Mr. Beller.

STATEMENT OF ALAN L. BELLER

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Mr. BELLER. Thank you, Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Sarbanes, and Members of the Committee.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before you on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the application of disclosure and reporting requirements of the Federal securities laws to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. These Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSE's,

issue marketable debt to the public. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have publicly held common stock and also issue guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. All of these entities and their securities are exempt from the registration and disclosure provisions of the Federal securities laws. None of the debt securities issued by any of these GSE's is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.

As to the Commission's historical views on GSE disclosure, since at least 1992, the Commission has expressed the view that because the GSE's sell securities to the public, including debt securities, and have public investors and do not have the full faith and credit backing of Government securities, their disclosure should comply with the disclosure requirements of the Federal securities laws. Mandatory compliance by the GSE's is the objective. Further, the disclosure quality that we seek for the GSE's can only result from becoming subject to the SEC's reporting system. The disclosure quality results not only from the Commission's rules, but also the Commission's and the staff's administration of these rules, including our review and comment processes and our enforcement program.

A 1992 joint report of the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Commission on the Government securities market addressed attaining that objective through registration. However the means, mandatory registration or voluntary registration, for example, would appear to be less significant than the objective-mandatory compliance with SEC disclosure and other requirements.

I would like to turn to a preliminary discussion of our registration requirements. For purposes of today's subject, two of the Federal securities laws are relevant-the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Registration under the Exchange Act results in reporting companies providing for disclosure of detailed information relating principally to the company itself. Registration under the Exchange Act also subjects companies to the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to issuers.

The Securities Act, by contrast, requires registration by issuers of transactions, namely public offerings of their securities. One result of registration under the Securities Act is required disclosure of essentially the same information regarding corporations as is required for reporting companies under the Exchange Act. Another result of registration under the Securities Act is disclosure regarding the securities being offered. Finally, because Securities Act registration statements are subject to review by the Commission staff, registration can affect the timing of offering transactions.

With that summary, let me turn to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On July 12, 2002, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced that each would voluntarily register its common stock under the Exchange Act and thus become mandatorily subject to Commission reporting requirements. Fannie Mae's registration statement under the Exchange Act was declared effective on March 31, 2003. Freddie Mac has stated that it intends to conclude the Exchange Act registration process after it completes its restatement and audit of the financial statements. I think Freddie Mac's latest in

formation is that they intend to become subject to registration in 2005.

The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight has also adopted rules requiring the officers and directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to file with the Commission the insider transaction reports required by the Exchange Act and requires the companies to file with the Commission all proxy documents that are also required pursuant to the Exchange Act.

It has been our focus to date that investors who purchase and sell stock or debt of the GSE's are entitled to the corporate information required under the Exchange Act. Registration under the Securities Act would not result in disclosure of additional corporate information.

Registration of securities transactions by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the Securities Act, especially offerings of their mortgage-backed and other mortgage-related securities, does require consideration of factors not implicated by registration under the Exchange Act. The Commission did not recommend in 1992 removing the exemption from the Federal securities laws for the offer and sale of mortgage-backed and mortgage-related securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We seek the achievement of the benefits for investors of registration under the securities laws, but we also recognize that these other factors need to be examined in connection with considering registration.

First, as noted earlier, the review process of the Division of Corporation Finance of registration statements under the Securities Act means that the timing of offerings can be affected.

Second, Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's mortgage-backed and other mortgage-related securities are backed by their respective guarantees. Exchange Act filings already would contain important corporate information necessary to analyze those securities as a credit matter.

And finally, registration of offerings of the GSEs' mortgagebacked and related securities under the Securities Act may raise another significant and complex factor-the impact on the U.S. mortgage market-that we believe should be considered. In particular, a substantial portion, and recently a majority of the GSES' mortgage-backed securities have been sold into the so-called "To Be Announced" or TBA, market. These transactions involve forward sales of mortgage-backed securities made up of pools of mortgages not yet identified and in many cases not yet even in existence. Therefore, in a TBA transaction, actual mortgage pool characteristics cannot be disclosed at the time of registration or offering. The TBA standards that those mortgage pools must meet, which have been established by market participants, are already available to the market independent of registration.

In addition, we understand that the TBA market is used to set or "lock in” mortgage rates in the U.S. housing market. A decision to require registration under the Securities Act of offers and sales of mortgage-backed securities should therefore take into account whether and if so, how such registration might impact the mortgage market and especially the operation of the TBA market.

I would now like to turn to the Federal Home Loan Banks. The Federal Home Loan Bank System was created in 1932 and is com

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »