585 Opinion of the Court. fendant guilty of contempt and imposed an unconditional fine. On appeal by the Commission, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, set aside the fine and directed that the defendant be imprisoned until he produced the documents. 157 F. 2d 65. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U. S. 706. Affirmed, p. 595. Morris Lavine argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Roger S. Foster argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Philip Elman, Robert S. Rubin and W. Victor Rodin. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting pursuant to its authority under § 20 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 86, 15 U. S. C. § 77t, issued orders directing an investigation to determine whether Penfield Company had violated the Act in the sale of stock or other securities. In the course of that investigation it directed a subpoena duces tecum to Young, as an officer of Penfield, requiring him to produce certain books of the corporation covering a four year period ending in April, 1943. See § 19 (b) of the Act. Upon Young's refusal to appear and produce the books and records, the Commission filed an application with the District Court for an order enforcing the subpoena.1 After a hearing, the court ordered 1 SEC. 22 (b) provides: "In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person, any of the said United States courts, within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides, upon application by the Commission may issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. Young, as an officer of Penfield, to produce them.2 Young persisted in his non-compliance. The Commission then applied to the District Court for a rule to show cause why Young should not be adjudged in contempt-a proceeding which, as we shall see, was one for civil contempt. The District Court delayed action on the motion until after disposition of a criminal case involving Young, Penfield, and others. When that case was concluded, the court, after hearing, adjudged Young to be in contempt. It refused, however, to grant any coercive relief designed to force Young to produce the documents but instead imposed on him a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00 which he paid.3 before the Commission, or one of its examiners designated by it, there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof." 2 That order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 143 F.2d 746. 3 The request of the Commission and the ruling of the court are made clear by the following colloquy: "MR. CUTHBERTSON: So far as the punishment which the Court might see fit to impose, that is up to the Court. We are still anxious to get a look at these books and records, so I suggest to the Court, if he be so disposed, whatever punishment the Court might see fit to impose would be in connection with or so long as he refused to produce his books and records for our inspection. "THE COURT: I don't think that I am going to be disposed to do anything like that. I sat here for six weeks and listened to books and records. The Government produced people from all over the United States in connection with the Penfield matter. "MR. CUTHBERTSON: I might say, your Honor, that we have in mind that these books and records may disclose certain acts other than those charged in the indictment. We don't propose to go over the same matter that the Court went over in connection with the criminal case. "THE COURT: The Court can take judicial notice of its own books and records, and in that trial the evidence was clear and 585 Opinion of the Court. That was on July 2, 1945. On September 24, 1945, the Commission filed a notice of appeal in the District Court and subsequently a statement of points challenging as error the action of the District Court in imposing the $50.00 fine instead of a remedial penalty calculated to make Young produce the documents. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court erred in imposing the fine and directing that Young be ordered imprisoned until he produced the documents. 157 F. 2d 65. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Penfield Co. and Young. Neither the District Court nor the Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgment against Penfield. Nor is any relief sought by or against it here. Accordingly the writ is dismissed as to Penfield. First. It is argued that since no application for an allowance of an appeal was made, the Circuit Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain it. If the appeal was in a suit of a civil nature, the filing of the notice of appeal with the District Court was adequate under the Rules of Civil Procedure." definite and positive from all of the Government's witnesses, that during one period of time this defendant had nothing whatsoever to do with the Penfield Company. Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don't know. "The judgment and sentence of the Court is that the defendant pay a fine of $50, and stand committed until paid." 4 Section 8 (c) of the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 940, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 230, provides: "No appeal intended to bring any judgment or decree before a circuit court of appeals for review shall be allowed unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree." See Alaska Packers Assn. v. Pillsbury, 301 U. S. 174; Georgia Lumber Co. v. Compania, 323 U. S. 334. 5 Rule 73 (a) provides in part: "When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of appeals and within the time prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with Opinion of the Court. 330 U. S. It is the nature of the relief asked that is determinative of the nature of the proceeding. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217, 220. This was not a proceeding in which the United States was a party and in which it was seeking to vindicate the public interest. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 445. The contempt proceedings were instituted as a part of the proceedings in which the Commission sought enforcement of a subpoena. The relief which the Commission sought was production of the documents; and the only sanction asked was a penalty designed to compel their production. Where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is "intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do," Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, p. 442, the remedy is one for civil contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. pp. 258, 303. Then "the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public." McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 64. One who is fined, unless by a day certain he produces the books, has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And those who are imprisoned until they obey the order, "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461. Fine and imprisonment are then employed not to vindicate the public interest but as coercive sanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his duty to do. See Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U. S. 599; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358; Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U. S. 105; McCrone v. United States, supra. The Act gives the Commission authority to require the production of books and records in the course of its investi the district court a notice of appeal." Where a Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts with a prior statute, the Rule prevails. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U.S. C. § 723b. 585 Opinion of the Court. gations. And in absence of a basis for saying that its demand exceeds lawful limits (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186), it is entitled to the aid of the court in obtaining them. A refusal of the court to enforce its prior order for the production of the documents denies the Commission that statutory relief. The issue thus raised poses a problem in civil, not criminal, contempt.' Where a judgment of contempt is embodied in a single order which contains an admixture of criminal and civil elements, the criminal aspect of the order fixes its character for purposes of procedure on review. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107. But there was no such admixture here. The District Court refused to grant any remedial relief to the Commission. The denial of that relief was the ground of the Commission's appeal. The order of denial being final, was appealable, Lamb v. Cramer, supra, pp. 220-221, and the right to appeal from it was in no way dependent on an appeal from the imposition of the fine. Second. The question on the merits is two-fold: (1) whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in granting the Commission remedial relief by directing that Young be required to produce the documents; and (2) whether that court exceeded its authority in reversing the judgment which imposed the fine and in substituting a term of imprisonment conditioned on continuance of the contempt. As we have already noted, the Act requires the production of documents demanded pursuant to lawful orders of the Commission and lends judicial aid to obtain them. There is no basis in the record before us for saying that 6 See § 22 (b), supra, note 1. 7 This thus disposes of the further contention that the appeal was not timely under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. Supp. II § 682. United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531. |