485 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. Fifth. When we turn to other related legislation, we find that when Congress desired to include managerial officials or supervisory personnel in the category of employees, it did so expressly. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 151, defines "employee" to include "subordinate official." The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., which deals with maritime labor relations as a supplement to the National Labor Relations Act (see 46 U. S. C. § 1252), defines "employee" to include "subordinate official." 46 U. S. C. § 1253 (c). And the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 647, 42 U. S. C. § 1301, includes an officer of a corporation in the term employee. The failure of Congress to do the same when it wrote the National Labor Relations Act has some significance, especially where the legislative history is utterly devoid of any indication that Congress was concerned with the collective bargaining problems of supervisory employees. 10 Sixth. The truth of the matter is, I think, that when Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, it was legislating against the activities of foremen, not on their behalf. Congress was intent on protecting the right of free association-the right to bargain collectively---by the great mass of workers, not by those who were in authority over them and enforcing oppressive industrial policies. Foremen were instrumentalities of those industrial policies. They blocked the wage earners' path to fair collective bargaining. To say twelve years later that foremen were treated as the victims of that anti-labor policy seems to me a distortion of history. 10 Cf. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51, under which the term "any employee of a carrier" has been applied to foremen. Owens v. Union Pac. R. Co., 319 U. S. 715; Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 329 U. S. 649. DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 330 U.S. If we were to decide this case on the basis of policy, much could be said to support the majority view." But I am convinced that Congress never faced those policy issues when it enacted this legislation. I am sure that those problems were not in the consciousness of Congress. A decision on these policy matters cuts deep into our industrial life. It has profound implications throughout our economy. It involves a fundamental change in much of the thinking of the nation on our industrial problems. The question is so important that I cannot believe Congress legislated unwittingly on it. Since what Congress wrote is consistent with a restriction of the Act to workingmen and laborers, I would leave its extension over supervisory employees to Congress. I have used the terms foremen and supervisory employees synonymously. But it is not the label which is important; it is whether the employees in question represent or act for management on labor policy matters. Thus one might be a supervisory employee without representing management in those respects. And those who are called foremen may perform duties not substantially different from those of skilled laborers. What I have said does not mean that foremen have no right to organize for collective bargaining. The general law recognizes their right to do so. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570. And 11 Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, p. 313; Rosenfarb, op. cit. supra, note 6; Gartenhaus, The Foreman Goes Union, 113 New Republic 563; Comment, 55 Yale L. J. 754; Hearings, House Comm. on Military Affairs on Bills relating to the Full Utilization of Manpower, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 299; Northrup, The Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv. Bus. Rev. 187; cf. American Management Association, Relations Between Management and Foremen in American Industry (1944); Id. The Foreman in Labor Relations (1944); Id. Should Management be Unionized? (1945). some States have placed administrative machinery and sanctions behind that right.12 But as I read the Federal Act, Congress has not yet done so. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER agrees with this opinion except the part marked "First" as to which he expresses no view. GULF OIL CORP. v. GILBERT, DOING BUSINESS AS GILBERT STORAGE & TRANSFER CO. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 93. Argued December 18, 19, 1946.-Decided March 10, 1947. 1. A federal district court has power to dismiss an action at law pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens-at least where its jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and the state courts have such power. Pp. 502-509, 512. 2. A resident of Virginia brought an action in a federal district court in New York City against a Pennsylvania corporation qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York (where it had designated agents to receive service of process), to recover damages for destruction of plaintiff's public warehouse and its contents in Virginia by fire resulting from defendant's negligence. The court had jurisdiction (based solely on diversity of citizenship) and the venue was correct; but all events in litigation had taken place in Virginia, most of the witnesses resided there, and both state and federal courts in Virginia were available to plaintiff and were able to obtain jurisdiction of defendant. Applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court dismissed the suit. Held: It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Pp. 509-512. 3. Important considerations in the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, from the standpoint of litigants, are relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance 12 The state laws are discussed in Northrup, The Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv. Bus. Rev. 187, 199–200. Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises if that be appropriate, and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. P. 508. 4. Considerations of public interest in applying the doctrine include the undesirability of piling up litigation in congested centers, the burden of jury duty on people of a community having no relation to the litigation, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home and the unnecessary injection of problems in conflict of laws. Pp. 508-509. 153 F.2d 883, reversed. Applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court dismissed a tort action in New York arising out of events occurring in Virginia. 62 F. Supp. 291. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 153 F. 2d 883. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U. S. 830. Reversed, p. 512. Archie D. Gray and Bernard A. Golding argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were John E. Green, Jr. and Matthew S. Gibson. Max J. Gwertzman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions are whether the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, if so, whether that power was abused in this case. The respondent-plaintiff brought this action in the Southern District of New York, but resides at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he operated a public warehouse. He alleges that the petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Lynchburg, so carelessly handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause 501 Opinion of the Court. an explosion and fire which consumed the warehouse building to his damage of $41,889.10, destroyed merchandise and fixtures to his damage of $3,602.40, caused injury to his business and profits of $20,038.27, and burned the property of customers in his custody under warehousing agreements to the extent of $300,000. He asks judgment of $365,529.77 with costs and disbursements, and interest from the date of the fire. The action clearly is one in tort. The petitioner-defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to receive service of process. When sued in New York, the defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia, where the plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. The case, on its merits, involves no federal question and was brought in the United States District Court solely because of diversity in citizenship of the parties. Because of the character of its jurisdiction and the holdings of and under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, the District Court considered that the law of New York as to forum non conveniens applied and that it required the case to be left to Virginia courts.1 It therefore dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed as to the applicability of New York law, took a restrictive view of the application of the entire doctrine in federal courts and, one judge dissenting, reversed. The case is here on certiorari. 328 U. S. 830. 1 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291. 2 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883. 741700 O-47-36 |