469 Opinion of the Court. performs the obligation by supplying its own vehicle, hiring the vehicle of an independent contractor, making arrangements with a common carrier, reimbursing employees for the use of their own vehicles, or reimbursing employees for the costs of transportation by any means they desire to use. In other words, where the employer has promised to provide transportation to and from work, the compensability of the injury is in no way dependent upon the method of travel which is employed. From the statutory standpoint, the employer is free to carry out its transportation obligation in any way the parties desire; and the rights of the employees to compensation are unaffected by the choice made. Turning to the factual support for the Deputy Commissioner's inference that Ticer's injury arose out of and in the course of employment, we find ample sustaining evidence. Ticer's employment was governed by the terms of a long-standing agreement between Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (of which Ticer was a member) and the Institute of Electrical Contractors of the District of Columbia, Inc. (of which the employer was a member). Rule 15 (b) of the agreement provided that "Transportation and any necessary expense such as board and lodging shall be furnished for all work outside the District of Columbia." The employer carried out in different ways this obligation to furnish transportation. On certain construction jobs in the past, it actually furnished a station wagon or a 8 See Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431; Breland v. Traylor Engineering & Mfg. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 415, 126 P. 2d 455; Lehigh Nav. Coal Co. v. McGonnell, 120 N. J. L. 428, 199 A. 906; Burchfield v. Department of Labor and Industries, 165 Wash. 106, 4 P. 2d 858; Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn. 87, 101 A. 492; Cary v. State Industrial Commission, 147 Okla. 162, 296 P. 385; Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., (La. App.) 19 So. 2d 586; Turner Day & Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington, 250 Ky. 433, 63 S. W. 2d 490. Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. passenger car of its own to transport the employees. At other times, however, it paid the employees an allowance to cover the cost of transportation in lieu of furnishing an automobile. Where the latter course was followed, the written contract was not amended or changed in any way, the employer simply communicating with the union to ascertain the amount necessary to defray the cost of transportation. The amount agreed upon affected all contractors in the Institute; and the cost of transportation was determined before the contractors made their respective bids. On the Quantico Marine Base project, the sum of $2 per day was agreed upon as the transportation allowance in lieu of furnishing an automobile. This amount was fixed after investigation into the cost of transportation by railroad and was paid to each employee, irrespective of his rate of pay, to cover the cost of transportation to and from the Marine Base. No change was made in the written contract. There was also evidence that the distant location of the Marine Base project, the hours of work and the inadequacy of public transportation facilities all combined to make it essential, as a practical matter, that the employer furnish transportation in some manner if employees were to be obtained for the job. This was not a case of employees traveling in the same city between home and work. Extended cross-country transportation was necessary. And it was transportation of a type that an employer might fairly be expected to furnish. Such evidence illustrates the setting in which the contract was drawn. The Court of Appeals felt, however, that the original contract to furnish transportation was not followed and that a new oral contract to pay transportation expenses was substituted in its place. We need not decide whether that view is justified by the record. It is enough that there is sufficient evidence to support the Deputy Com missioner's view that the payment of transportation costs was merely one way of carrying out the original contract obligation to furnish the transportation itself. We therefore hold that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in concluding that Ticer's injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment. And since the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction over this case, the resulting award of compensation should have been sustained. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result. PACKARD MOTOR CAR CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 658. Argued January 9, 1947.-Decided March 10, 1947. 1. Foremen and other supervisory employees are entitled as a class to the rights of self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities assured to employees generally by the National Labor Relations Act. Pp. 488-490. (a) They are “employees" within the meaning of § 2 (3). P. 488. (b) They are not excluded from the term "employees" by § 2 (2) defining the term "employer." Pp. 488-490. 2. When a union of supervisory employees has been duly certified by the National Labor Relations Board as a bargaining representative, the Act requires the employer to bargain with it. P. 490. 3. Where, as in this case, a determination of the National Labor Relations Board under § 9 (b) that a certain union is an appropriate bargaining representative does not exceed the Board's authority, is supported by substantial evidence, and is not so arbitrary or unreasonable as to be illegal, it cannot be set aside by a court in an enforcement proceeding under § 10 (e). Pp. 491-492. Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. 4. Arguments as to the wisdom of permitting foremen to organize should be addressed to Congress, not to the courts. Pp. 490, 493. 157 F. 2d 80, affirmed. The Circuit Court of Appeals decreed enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board requiring an employer to bargain with a union of foremen. 157 F. 2d 80. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U. S. 707. Affirmed, p. 493. Louis F. Dahling argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Gerhard P. Van Arkel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Morris P. Glushien, A. Norman Somers, Ruth Weyand and Mozart G. Ratner. Briefs were filed as amici curiae by Nathan L. Miller, Roger M. Blough, Borden Burr and Paul R. Conaghan for the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al.; Harry P. Jeffrey for the Foremen's League for Education and Association et al.; and Nicholas Kelley for the Chrysler Corporation, urging reversal. Walter M. Nelson filed a brief for the Foreman's Association of America, urging affirmance. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether foremen are entitled as a class to the rights of self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities as assured to employees generally by the National Labor Relations Act. The case grows out of conditions in the automotive industry, and so far as they are important to the legal issues here the facts are simple. 485 Opinion of the Court. The Packard Motor Car Company employs about 32,000 rank-and-file workmen. Since 1937 they have been represented by the United Automobile Workers of America affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. These employees are supervised by approximately 1,100 employees of foreman rank, consisting of about 125 "general foremen," 643 "foremen," 273 "assistant foremen," and 65 "special assignment men." Each general foreman is in charge of one or more departments, and under him in authority are foremen and their assistant foremen. Special assignment men are described as "troubleshooters." The function of these foremen in general is typical of the duties of foremen in mass-production industry generally. Foremen carry the responsibility for maintaining quantity and quality of production, subject, of course, to the overall control and supervision of the management. Hiring is done by the labor relations department, as is the discharging and laying off of employees. But the foremen are provided with forms and with detailed lists of penalties to be applied in cases of violations of discipline, and initiate recommendations for promotion, demotion and discipline. All such recommendations are subject to the reviewing procedure concerning grievances provided in the collectively-bargained agreement between the Company and the rank-and-file union. The foremen as a group are highly paid and, unlike the workmen, are paid for justifiable absence and for holidays, are not docked in pay when tardy, receive longer paid vacations, and are given severance pay upon release by the Company. These foremen determined to organize as a unit of the Foremen's Association of America, an unaffiliated organization which represents supervisory employees exclusively. Following the usual procedure, after the Board had decided that "all general foremen, foremen, assistant fore 741700 O-47-35 |