Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. issue was not squarely posed in that case we granted certiorari in order to determine it at this time. 328 U.S. 827. The Public Vessels Act provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States . . . Petitioner argues that the Act only provides a remedy for damage to property. "Damages," however, have historically been awarded both for injury to property and injury to the person-a fact too well-known to have been overlooked by the Congress in enacting this statute. Nor is it easy to conceive any reason, absent intent to the contrary, not to have inserted the word "property" in the statute, an obvious method of imposing the limitation for which the petitioner here contends. Petitioner nonetheless argues that the legislative history of the statute conclusively shows that the congressional intent was to limit redress to property damage. The history of the Act may be briefly detailed. Starting in 1920 various bills were introduced which provided for liability of the Government to suit for damages caused by its vessels. We need only consider, however, the bills that were pending in the 68th Congress by which the present Act was passed: H. R. 6989, H. R. 9075 and H. R. 9535. The first provided for suits against the United States "for damages caused by collision by a public vessel." The second, designed as an amendment to the Suits in Ad 543 Stat. 1112, 46 U. S. C. § 781. It might be noted here that there is a distinction between damage and damages. Black's Law Dictionary cautions that the word "damage," meaning "Loss, injury, or deterioration," is "to be distinguished from its plural,-'damages,'-which means a compensation in money for a loss or damage." H. R. 15977, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.; H. R. 6256, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 6989, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 9075, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 9535, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 446 Opinion of the Court. miralty Act, and supported by the Maritime Law Association of the United States, would have amended that act so that it would not be limited to vessels operated by the Government as merchant vessels, and would thus have made the United States unquestionably liable to suit for personal injuries caused by public vessels." This bill never reached the floor of Congress. The third bill, H. R. 9535, was enacted and became the present Public Vessels Act. Although designed as "a substitute for H. R. 6989," 10 it omitted the words "by collision" which would have limited the liability of the United States to damages resulting from collisions by public vessels. The only discussion of any significance to the present inquiry related to the last of these bills. It is true, as petitioner points out, that the proponent of the bill in the House, Mr. Underhill, said, when the bill was introduced: "The bill I have introduced simply allows suits in admiralty to be brought by owners of vessels whose property has been damaged by collision or other fault of Government vessels 8 See Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, on H. R. 9075, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 1924. 946 U. S. C. §§ 741, 742: "No vessel owned by the United States . . . shall, in view of the provision herein made for a libel in personam, be subject to arrest or seizure by judicial process in the United States or its possessions..." "In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel in personam may be brought against the United States or against any corporation mentioned in section 741 of this title, as the case may be, provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tugboat operated by such corporation. . . Johnson v. Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320; Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575. 10 S. Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. Opinion of the Court. 11 330 U.S. and Government agents." " Further, on inquiry as to whether suit could be brought only where blame was charged to the Government, he answered: "Not entirely; where a man's property is damaged, he can bring a suit." 12 These statements were not, however, answers to questions whether the Act would provide a remedy for injury to the person as well as to property, nor does it appear that the speaker was at the time attentive to such possible distinctions. It is also true that the Committee report said that "the chief purpose of this bill is to grant private owners of vessels and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or goods have been damaged as the result of a collision with any Government-owned vessel." 13 However, in the same report a letter from the Attorney General was incorporated, which, while it was addressed to the predecessor bill, H. R. 6989, serves, in the absence of contradiction by the report, as an indication of the Committee's opinion on the intended effect of the Act. That letter explicitly stated that "The proposed bill intends to give the same relief against the Government for damages caused . . . by its public vessels . . . as is now given against the United States in the operation of its merchant vessels, as provided by the suits in admiralty act of March 9, 1920." As the right to sue for personal injuries under the Suits in Admiralty Act was clear, it may be inferred, at least as strongly as the opposite is implied by Mr. Underhill's remarks, that the Committee understood 11 66 Cong. Rec. 2087. 12 66 Cong. Rec. 2088. 13 S. Rep. No. 941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. Of course the chief purpose of the bill was to provide a remedy for those who chiefly urged the bill-the vessel owners. But the committee, in so stating, cannot be taken to have made that purpose the only one. By that token the purpose would be to provide a remedy only for collision damages, a limitation clearly discarded by omitting the words "by collision" from the Act. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, supra, n. 4. 446 Opinion of the Court. that the Act would provide a remedy to persons suffering personal injuries as well as property damage.1 Moreover, when the bill reached the floor of the Senate there was not the least indication that the members of that body believed that the Act limited relief to owners of damaged property.15 The passage of the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Public Vessels Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act 16 attests to the growing feeling of Congress that the United States should put aside its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees have tortiously caused personal injury or property damage. To hold now that the Public Ves 14 See note 9, supra. 15 So the only pertinent comments follow, 66 Cong. Rec. 3560: "MR. ROBINSON. I think the Senator from Delaware should state briefly to the Senate the effect of the bill. It seems to be a measure of considerable importance. “MR. BAYARD. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is quite right; it is a measure of great importance. There are continuous applications being made to the Claims Committee of both Houses for the consideration of bills to reimburse people who have suffered damage from maritime accidents in which United States vessels are concerned, to enable them to present their suits in the various district courts. In this last Congress there were nearly 200 such claim bills introduced in the two Houses. ". . . It would give a person aggrieved because of an accident by reason of the shortcomings of a United States ship the right to go into a district court and prosecute his action. It provides for the appearance of the Attorney General of the United States, and all maritime accidents of any kind resulting from collision, and so on, are taken care of. A great deal of money would be saved to the Government. "Incidentally, the bill would accomplish something which should have been done in this country a long time ago. It would give an opportunity to do justice when Federal employees have committed an offense against an individual. . . . "MR. ROBINSON. If enacted, it would relieve Congress of the consideration of a great many measures in the nature of private claims. "MR. BAYARD. All claims of this nature." 16 60 Stat. 812, §§ 401-424. Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. sels Act does not provide a remedy against the United States for personal injuries would in the future only throw this form of maritime action under the Federal Tort Claims Act; for that Act excepts from its coverage "Any claim for which a remedy is provided by the Act . . of March 3, 1925 [The Public Vessels Act] (U. S. C., title 46, secs. 781-790, inclusive) . "17 We cannot believe that the Public Vessels Act, read in the light of its legislative history evinces a Congressional intent only to provide a remedy to the owners of damaged property. This determination does not dispose of all the issues raised by the Porello case. When impleaded by the United States in the trial court, American, the petitioner here, pleaded as an affirmative defense that Porello, having accepted compensation payments from American, lost whatever right of action he had against the United States as a third-party tortfeasor. The petitioner admits that § 33 (b) of the Longshoremen's Act was amended in 1938 so that mere acceptance of compensation, without an award, does not operate as an assignment to the employer of the injured employee's cause of action against a thirdparty tortfeasor, a conclusion which courts had reached under the former wording of the Act.18 But it contends that the amendment did no more, and that acceptance of compensation still operates as a conclusive election 17 Id., § 421. 18 The statute formerly provided, 44 Stat. 1440: "Acceptance of such compensation shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person, whether or not the person entitled to compensation has notified the deputy commissioner of his election." Under this form of the statute, courts had held that acceptance of compensation precluded the employee from suing a third-party tortfeasor. Sciortino v. Dimon S. S. Corp., 39 F. 2d 210, aff'd 44 F. 2d 1019; Toomey v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 123 F. 2d 718; The |