Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

testing the power and duty of states to enforce federal laws, it found the solution in the broad principles announced in the Claflin opinion.

The precise question in the Mondou case was whether rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 Stat. 291, could "be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as fixed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion. . . Id. at 46. The Supreme Court of Connecticut had decided that they could not. Except for the penalty feature, the factors it considered and its reasoning were strikingly similar to that on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to enforce the federal law here involved. But this Court held that the Connecticut court could not decline to entertain the action. The contention that enforcement of the congressionally created right was contrary to Connecticut policy was answered as follows:

"The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State." Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra at 57.

So here, the fact that Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be accepted as a "valid excuse." Cf. Douglas v.

386

Opinion of the Court.

New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 388.10 For the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state. Thus, in a case which chiefly relied upon the Claflin and Mondou precedents, this Court stated that a state court cannot "refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers." Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 222.

The Rhode Island court in its Robinson decision, on which it relies, cites cases of this Court which have held that states are not required by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to enforce judgments of the courts of other states based on claims arising out of penal statutes." But those holdings have no relevance here, for this case raises no full faith and credit question. Nor need we consider in this case prior decisions to the effect that federal courts are not required to enforce state penal laws. Compare Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, with Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 20.

10 It has been observed that the historic origin of the concept first expressed in this country by Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . . ." lies in an earlier English case, Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 124 (1789), aff'd., Ogden v. Folliott, 3 T. R. 726 (1790), 4 Bro. P. C. 111. In that case the English courts refused to enforce an American Revolutionary statute confiscating property of loyal British subjects on the ground that English courts must refuse to enforce such penal statutes of a foreign enemy. It has been observed of this case that "of course they could as well have spoken of local public policy, and have reached the same result as surely." Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1932). See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498; cf. Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85.

11 See e. g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U. S. 373; Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411.

Opinion of the Court.

330 U.S.

For whatever consideration they may be entitled to in the field in which they are relevant, those decisions did not bring before us our instant problem of the effect of the supremacy clause on the relation of federal laws to state courts. Our question concerns only the right of a state to deny enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law.

It is conceded that this same type of claim arising under Rhode Island law would be enforced by that State's courts. Its courts have enforced claims for double damages growing out of the Fair Labor Standards Act.12 Thus the Rhode Island courts have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action.13 Under these circumstances the State courts are not free to refuse enforcement of petitioners' claim. See McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230; and compare Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117; 325 U. S. 77. The case is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

12 Newman v. Geo. A. Fuller Co., 72 R. I. 113, 48 A. 2d 345. 13 Gen. Laws R. I. (1938) c. 500, § 28; c. 525, § 7; c. 631, § 4.

Syllabus.

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA v. UNITED STATES.

NO. 6. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.*

Argued March 8, 1945. Reargued April 29, 30, 1946 and October 15, 16, 1946. Decided March 10, 1947.

A group of local manufacturers of and dealers in millwork and patterned lumber and their incorporated trade associations and officials thereof and a group of unincorporated trade unions and their officials or business agents were indicted for conspiracy to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. The indictment charged that they unlawfully combined and conspired together, successfully, to monopolize unduly a part of interstate commerce in the commodities, for the purpose and with the effect of restraining out-of-state manufacturers from shipping and selling the commodities within a certain area and of preventing dealers in that area from freely handling them, and also for the purpose of raising the prices of the commodities; that, to achieve this purpose, a contract was entered into between defendants for a wage scale for members of labor unions working on the articles, combined with a restrictive clause that "no material will be purchased from, and no work will be done on any material or article that has had any operation performed on same by Saw Mills, Mills or Cabinet Shops, or their distributors that do not conform to the rates of wage and working conditions of this agreement"; and that this clause was enforced to the mutual advantage of defendants and to the disadvantage of other manufacturers and of consumers. Held:

1. Conspiracies between employers and employees to restrain interstate commerce violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797. Pp. 400, 411.

2. The indictment charges a conspiracy forbidden by the Sherman Act. P. 401.

*Together with No. 7, Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters et al. v. United States; No. 8, Lumber Products Association, Inc. et al. v. United States; No. 9, Alameda County Building and Construction Trades Council v. United States; and No. 10, Boorman Lumber Co. et al. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court.

3. On that issue, the power of the trial court is limited by § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, which applies to all courts of the United States in all matters growing out of labor disputes covered by the Act which may come before them. P. 401. 4. The purpose and effect of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputations of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member charged with responsibility for the offense actually participated, gave prior authorization or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration. P. 403.

5. The word "organization," as used in the Act, is not restricted to unincorporated entities but covers generically all organizations that take part in labor disputes, including corporations. P. 403, n. 12.

6. While participants in a conspiracy covered by § 6 are not immunized from responsibility for authorized acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy, they are protected against liability for unauthorized illegal acts of other participants in the conspiracy. P. 404.

7. As used in § 6, "authorization" means something different from corporate criminal responsibility for the acts of officers and agents in the course or scope of employment. Its requirement restricts the responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer or employee associations, organizations or their members for unlawful acts of the officers or members of those associations or organizations, although such officers or members are acting within the scope of their general authority as such officers or members, to those associations, organizations or their officers or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from authority granted, by the association or non-participating member sought to be charged or was subsequently ratified by such association, organization or member after actual knowledge of its occurrence. Pp. 406-407.

8. A refusal to instruct the jury to this effect is reversible erroras to both individuals and organizations and as to both employers and employees-no matter how clear the evidence may be of participation in the conspiracy, since the defendants are entitled to have the jury instructed in accordance with the standards which Congress has prescribed. Pp. 407-412.