Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. tors, some of whom were not members of the Senate in 1932, and none of whom was on the Senate Judiciary Committee which reported the bill. They were expressed eleven years after the Act was passed and cannot be accorded even the same weight as if made by the same individuals in the course of the Norris-LaGuardia debates." Moreover, these opinions were given by individuals striving to write legislation from the floor of the Senate and working without the benefit.of hearings and committee reports on the issues crucial to us here. We fail to see how the remarks of these Senators in 1943 can serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932, and we accordingly adhere to our conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to issue injunctions when sought by the United States in a labor dispute with its own employees. It has been suggested, however, that Congress, in passing the War Labor Disputes Act, effectively restricted the theretofore existing authority of the courts to issue injunctions in connection with labor disputes in plants seized by the United States. Chief reliance is placed upon the rejection by the Senate of § 5 of the Connally substitute bill." But it is clear that no com 41 See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 493 (1931); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 474 (1921). 42 89 Cong. Rec. 3889, 3890, 3904–5. 43 Section 5, as we have noted before, would have permitted issuing injunctions to restrain violations of the Act. It is not at all clear that the rejection of a proposal in this form should, in any event, be of determinative significance in the case at bar. Here the United States resorted to the District Court for vindication of its right under a formal contract, said to be operative "for the period of Government possession" and mutually adopted by the parties concerned as a satisfactory solution to a grave situation. The District Court, to 258 Opinion of the Court. 45 44 parable action transpired in the House. Indeed, proposals in the House and the House substitute for S. 796 authorized the use of injunctions in connection with private plants not yet seized by the United States. These admitted inroads on the Norris-LaGuardia Act drew much comment 5 on the floor of the House, but nevertheless prevailed. Seizure was also contemplated, and criminal sanctions were made available in this situation, without specifically authorizing the use of injunctions by the United States. The latter issue was not raised, not debated and not commented upon in the House. But the fact that the House version did not provide for the issuance of injunctions to aid in the operation of seized plants is not the issue here. Rather, it is whether the House expressed any intent to restrict the existing authority of the courts. We find not the slightest suggestion to that effect in either the House substitute bill or the debates concerning it. Nor can the action of the conference committee be construed as a Congressional proscription of issuing injunctions to aid the United States in dealing with employees in seized plants. Neither the House nor Senate version, as these bills went to conference, in any way placed this issue before the conferees. The conference committee simply struck the broader provisions of the House bill allowing injunctions to issue in private labor disputes and preserve existing conditions, issued a restraining order and a preliminary injunction, effective until contractual rights could be ascertained. True, the action of the defendant Lewis in calling a strike, in addition to terminating the contract, suggests a violation of § 6 of the War Labor Disputes Act. But Senate disapproval of using injunctions to avert the latter event does not necessarily imply a desire to diminish the contractual rights and remedies of the United States. 44 89 Cong. Rec. 5382. 45 See, for example, 89 Cong. Rec. 5241, 5243, 5299, 5305, 5321, Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. had no occasion to consider the narrower question we have before us now. The conferees, in producing the Act in its final form, did nothing which suggests that the Congress intended to bar injunctions sought by the Government to aid in the operation of seized plants. We thus find nothing in the legislative background of the War Labor Disputes Act which constitutes an authoritative expression of Congress directing the courts to withhold from the United States injunctive relief in connection with an Act designed to strengthen the hand of the Government in serious labor disputes. The defendants contend, however, that workers in mines seized by the Government are not employees of the Federal Government; that in operating the mines thus seized, the Government is not engaged in a sovereign function; and that, consequently, the situation in this case does not fall within the area which we have indicated as lying outside the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is clear, however, that workers in the mines seized by the Government under the authority of the War Labor Disputes Act stand in an entirely different relationship to the Federal Government with respect to their employment from that which existed before the seizure was effected. That Congress intended such to be the case is apparent both from the terms of the statute and from the legislative deliberations preceding its enactment. Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act calls for the seizure of any plant, mine, or facility when the President finds that the operation thereof is threatened by strike or other labor disturbance and that an interruption in production will unduly impede the war effort. Congress intended that by virtue of Government seizure, a mine should become, for purposes of production and operation, a Government facility in as complete a sense as if the Government held full 258 Opinion of the Court. 46 title and ownership. Consistently with that view, criminal penalties were provided for interference with the operation of such facilities." Also included were procedures for adjusting wages and conditions of employment of the workers in such a manner as to avoid interruptions in production. The question with which we are confronted is not whether the workers in mines under Government seizure are "employees" of the Federal Government for every purpose which might be conceived, but whether, 48 49 46 Thus in the legislative debates Senator Connally stated: ". . . but it does seem to me that the power and authority and sovereignty of the Government of the United States are so comprehensive that when we are engaged in war and a plant is not producing, we can take it over, and that when we do take it over, it is a Government plant, just as much as if we had a fee simple title to it, . . ." 89 Cong. Rec. 3811-3812. See also id. at 3809, 3884-3885, 5722. 47 War Labor Disputes Act, § 6, provided: "(a) Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any person (1) to coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person, to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility, or (2) to aid any such lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption interfering with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of such interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or direction thereof or for the payment of strike, unemployment, or other benefits to those participating therein. No individual shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason only of his having ceased work or having refused to continue to work or to accept employment. "(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both." 48 Id., § 5. 49 Thus according to § 23 of the Revised Regulations for the Operation of the Coal Mines Under Government Control, issued by the Coal Mines Administrator on July 8, 1946: ". . . nothing in these regulations shall be construed as recognizing such personnel as officers and employees of the Federal Government within the meaning of the Opinion of the Court. 330 U.S. for the purposes of this case, the incidents of the relationship existing between the Government and the workers are those of governmental employer and employee. Executive Order 9728, in pursuance of which the Government seized possession of the mines, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with the representatives of the miners, and thereafter to apply to the National Wage Stabilization Board for appropriate changes in terms and conditions of employment for the period of governmental operation.50 Such negotiations were undertaken and resulted in the Krug-Lewis agreement. That agreement contains many basic departures from the earlier contract entered into between the mine workers and the private operators on April 11, 1945, which, except as amended and supplemented by the Krug-Lewis agreement, was continued in effect for the period of Government possession. Among the terms of the Krug-Lewis agreement were provisions for a new mine safety code. Operating managers were directed to provide the mine employees with the protection and benefits of Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws. Provision was made for a Welfare and Retirement Fund and a Medical and Hospital Fund. The agreement granted substantial wage increases and contained terms relating to vacations and vacation pay. Included were provisions calling for changes in equitable grievance procedures. It should be observed that the Krug-Lewis agreement was one solely between the Government and the union. statutes relating to Federal employment." And see § 16. Section 23 also provides, however: "All personnel of the mines, both officers and employees, shall be considered as called upon by Executive Order No. 9728, to serve the Government of the United States . . . . 50 After the negotiation of the Krug-Lewis agreement, the changes agreed upon therein were approved by the National Wage Stabilization Act and thereafter by the President. This procedure is provided for in § 5 of the War Labor Disputes Act. |