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None of the subsequent changes in the bill are effective to modify this construction of the scope of this judicial review."

Second. Petitioner's chief reliance for its contention that 12 (a) of the Hatch Act is unconstitutional as applied to Oklahoma in this proceeding is that the socalled penalty provisions invade the sovereignty of a state in such a way as to violate the Tenth Amendment 18 by providing for "possible forfeiture of state office or alternative penalties against the state." Oklahoma says § 12 (c) "provides that the commencement of an appeal from an order of the Commission: '. . . shall not operate as a stay of such determination or order unless (1) it is specifically so ordered by the court, and (2) such officer or employee is suspended from his office or employment during the pendency of such proceedings. . . The coercive effect

of the authorization to withhold sums allocated to a state is relied upon as an interference with the reserved powers of the state.

In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, decided this day, ante, p. 75, we have considered the constitutionality of this provision from the viewpoint of interference with a federal employee's freedom of expression in political matters and as to whether acting as an official of a political party violates the provision in § 12 (a) against taking part in political management or in political campaigns. We do not think that the facts in this case require any further discussion of that angle. We think that acting as chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee and acting, ex officio, as a member of the "Victory Dinner" committee for the purpose of raising funds for the Democratic Party and for selling war bonds constitute taking an active

17 See 86 Cong. Rec. 9446, 9495.

18 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

part in political management. While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.

The Tenth Amendment does not forbid the exercise of this power in the way that Congress has proceeded in this case. As pointed out in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124, the Tenth Amendment has been consistently construed "as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public service by requiring those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political partisanship. So even though the action taken by Congress does have effect upon. certain activities within the state, it has never been thought that such effect made the federal act invalid.19 As nothing in this record shows any attempt to suspend Mr. Paris from his duties as a member of the State Highway Commission, we are not called upon to deal with the assertion of Oklahoma that a state officer may be suspended by a federal court if § 12 is valid. There is an adequate separability clause. No penalty was imposed upon the state. A hearing was had, conformably to § 12, and the conclusion was reached that Mr. Paris' active participation in politics justified his removal from membership on the Highway Commission. Oklahoma chose not to remove him. We do not see any violation of the state's sovereignty in the hearing or order. Oklahoma adopted the "simple expedient" of not yielding to what she urges is

19 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 547; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 244; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12; Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218; Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 516; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 338.

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federal coercion. Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482. The offer of benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual.20

In order to give the Civil Service Commission adequate standards to measure active participation in political activities, Congress adopted § 15 of the Hatch Act, quoted above in note 1. By this section Congress made the test of political activity for state employees the same as the test then in effect for employees in the classified civil service. The Commission had at that time determined that "service on or for any political committee or similar organization is prohibited." This could only mean that service on such a committee was active participation in politics. Such determination was made a matter of record by Senator Hatch in charge of the bill during debate on the scope of political prohibition." Obviously the activities of Mr. Paris were covered by the purpose and language of § 12. The words of § 12 (a) requiring Mr. Paris' abstention from "any active part in political management or political campaigns" are derived from Rule I of the Civil Service Commission and have persisted there since 1907.22

Oklahoma also argues that the Civil Service Commission determination that the acts of Mr. Paris constitute such a violation of § 12 (a) as to warrant his removal from his state office is not in accordance with law but arbitrary, unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The facts of Mr.

20 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 593-98; United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 51-54. A review of grants-in-aid will be found in 8 American Law School Review, Corwin: National-State Cooperation, 687, 698.

21 86 Cong. Rec. 2938, § 15 of exhibit.

22 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, ante, pp. 79-81, notes 4, 5 and 6.

Paris' activities and his connection with the Democratic State Central Committee during his tenure of office as a member of the Highway Commission of Oklahoma have been stated. The Circuit Court of Appeals said, 153 F. 2d at 284, "Manifestly, the Commission had solid footing in the Act for the conclusion that removal of Paris from office was warranted." We agree.23

Finally, petitioner says that § 12 (c), note 1, supra, authorizes a review of "every minute detail of the case" to "determine whether sufficient facts exist to support the order of the Commission, decide whether the statute has been reasonably and justly applied, and independently resolve the entire question as though the federal court had been the forum in the first instance." The basis for this argument, in so far as it differs from that referred to in the preceding paragraph, is drawn from the language of § 12 (c) that "The review by the court shall be on the record entire, including all of the evidence taken on the hearing, and shall extend to questions of fact and questions of law. . . . The court shall affirm the Commission's determination or order, or its modified determination or order, if the court determines that the same is in accordance with law." As the facts were stipulated and no objection has been taken to the findings of fact, 61 F. Supp. 355, 357 (5); 153 F. 2d 280, 283, the attack, on this issue, is limited to an examination into whether or not the Commission abused its discretion in the order of removal. As heretofore stated, the provisions for review underwent changes during the passage of the Act. As finally

24

23 See Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608.

24 See 86 Cong. Rec. 2468-2474; S. 3046 in the House of Representatives, Union Calendar No. 924, June 4, 1940, pp. 4 and 17; H. Rep. No. 2376, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 9. The amendment which resulted in the present form of the section appears at 86 Cong. Rec. 9448.

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FRANKFURTER, J., concurring.

adopted, however, the reviewing court is directed to remand when it determines that the action of the Commission "is not in accordance with law." § 12 (c).25 The question of "the removal of an officer or employee," § 12 (b), note 1, supra, we think is a matter of administrative discretion. Since under Rule I of the Civil Service Commission the taking of "any active part in political management or political campaigns" had been determined by the Commission to include service on a political committee, see notes 37 and 38 of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, ante, p. 75, it is clear Mr. Paris' position violated § 15 of the Hatch Act. Note 1, supra. It could hardly be said that the determination of the Commission in ordering his removal was an abuse of its discretion. See 61 F. Supp. at 357 (6) and (7); 153 F. 2d at 283–84.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE dissent.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.

It is of course settled that this Court must consider, whenever the question is raised or even though not raised by counsel, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts as well as the jurisdiction of this Court. Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382. But whether a State has standing to urge a claim of constitutionality under a

25 The following also appears in the section: "The Commission may modify its findings of fact or its determination or order by reason of the additional evidence so taken and shall file with the court such modified findings, determination, or order, and any such modified findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 54 Stat. 767, 769.