that is to say, I take it there must have been tens of thousands of pieces of mail. Presumably, not all were opened. Do you know on what basis a selection was made? Dr. CRAIN. In those days I don't know that there were tens of thousands of pieces. I think there was relatively little correspondence, relatively little physical access to the U.S.S.R. Lots of people we talked to for intelligence purposes had relatives behind the Iron Curtain and didn't know where they were, how to get a hold of them. Many simply were afraid to even correspond, afraid that they would be the target of the KVD, or whatever the agency was that was charged with internal security in the U.S.S.R. Whether or not that was true, they believed it and it had a hampering effect on the correspondence. I believe we got it all. Mr. KASTENMEIER. As a corollary, the telephone company conducted certain random recordings but they were entirely random. In this case, the question is the invasion of the privacy of the sender or receivers of first-class mail. Was this randomly done or was it done selectively, was there a list of people who might have been of special interest to those agents who were rummaging through the mail? In other words, was it a selective investigation or was it random? Dr. CRAIN. It was total. We were told that all the mail going to the U.S.S.R., particularly-that was what we were particularly interested in-was opened. Now, again, I didn't see that take place but we were told that. We had hundreds and hundreds of them, I know that. Mr. KASTENMEIER. Presumably not all of them were copied such as the one you made available to this committee? Dr. CRAIN. Yes; all of them were copied and the originals sent on. They were momentarily delayed or opened and reproduced. We only got the machine copies, as it were. Mr. KASTENMEIER. My last question is, you have recommended to this committee that a ombudsman procedure be instituted, presumably the Congress might create it itself, or perhaps the executive branch might establish it. Do you have any other potential legislative recommendations for us on the basis of your experience and your views on this matter? Dr. CRAIN. At this point I think I might very well recommend legislation that would limit intelligence activities of the U.S. Government for the collection and evaluation and research functions, as far as a means of intelligence collection goes, aside from utilizing the open sources which I mentioned which are available, although some are a bit hard to get. I recommend that we also use the technology which has been developed for intelligence gathering. The satellites that are in orbit, for instance, have highly sophisticated photographic and electronic capability. The U-2 was kind of a Model-T of that type of technology. You have the monitoring of electronic emissions, radio, radar, dilatometry, and so forth. This is really in the category of open information. It is out in the air, why not pick it up and computerize it and so on. It is a tremendous source of information. My experience was, even in those days, that covert intelligence gathering got precious little of value, got almost nothing for the millions of dollars spent and the countless hours and the amount of energy that was spent on it. Mr. PATTISON. I have one other question, very quickly. Mr. KASTENMEIER. I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Pattison. Mr. PATTISON. As a former CIA agent, would you tell me if any selfrespecting spy ever mailed something from the country he was spying on to the country he was spying for in the reliance that it wasn't going to be seen in some way; is it likely that a spy would put it into writing and send it through the ordinary mail? Dr. CRAIN. Not if he didn't want it detected; he might do it for that purpose. Mr. PATTISON. To throw you off the track that he was sending some information to some other country? Dr. CRAIN. Particularly because it wouldn't be opened in England or the United States and some other countries that are not behind the Iron Curtain. If he sent it to an Iron Curtain country probably, you would assume it would be opened somehow. Mr. KASTENMEIER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Danielson. Mr. DANIELSON. I note that when you went to work for the CIA in August of 1951, you were employed in research supervision in the Operational Intelligence Research Branch of the CIA. Dr. CRANE. Yes. Mr. DANIELSON. When you resigned 8 years later you were Deputy Chief of the Operational Intelligence Research Branch; the same branch? Dr. CRAIN. Yes. Mr. DANIELSON. Did you ever work in any other branch? Dr. CRAIN. No; I did not. Mr. DANIELSON. Am I correct in my belief that since you spent your entire 8 years within one branch, the Operational Intelligence Research Branch, that you may have not known everything that went on in the CIA during those years? Dr. CRAIN. You can certainly assume that, assuming that everyone in the CIA didn't know. Mr. DANIELSON. Am I also correct, safe in assuming, you don't know all of the information that the CIA gathered from whatever source during those 8 years? Dr. CRAIN. I am sure. Mr. DANIELSON. Was it not the policy, and I am speaking of the total picture, to compartmentalize activities so the dissemination of knowledge within the organization was on a need-to-know basis? Dr. CRAIN. Yes. Mr. DANIELSON. Then on what basis is the basis for your statement that you were satisfied, based on your experience, that nothing of value was obtained with covert operations? Dr. CRAIN. Well, because I was in the covert area. As far as the information from covert operations against the U.S.S.R., I was qualified as to the U.S.S.R. I remember that was the only, practically the only denied area. China was coming up, as it were, but it didn't pose the most immediate threat. We didn't need to know as much as we needed to know about the U.S.S.R. at the time. I believe I was aware of the covertly obtained information or almost all of it. I was in a particularly advantageous position in that regard because the function of our branch was to participate in the planning and the support of these clandestine or cover operations. We were necessarily quite close to them, including knowing what happened to them. What information that was gotten, if any, from them was precious little. Mr. DANIELSON. You show an ambivalence in answering my two questions. A moment ago you said most certainly I was correct, you didn't know everything going on and you didn't know all the information that was gathered. To the other, you said you were aware of almost all of it. Dr. CRAIN. I didn't know a lot of things within the Agency but I indicated that I did know virtually of what was going on in the covert area against the U.S.S.R. Now, I might not have, but that is my belief. For example, there were other areas of operation which I was not privy to, lots of details of the U-2 operation I wasn't privy to, and so on. But a good deal of the Agency is quite open. Mr. DANIELSON. What you are saying, isn't it really the truth that you are very familiar with the information that came to your attention, but you are not familiar with the information that didn't come to your attention? Dr. CRAIN. Yes. Mr. DANIELSON. I think you understand, and I trust you understand me. Thank you very much. Mr. KASTENMEIER. I don't know that other people do. Accordingly, the subcommittee stands adjourned until 10 a.m. on Tuesday next. [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m. on Thursday, May 22, 1975.] SURVEILLANCE THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Kastenmeier, Drinan, Badillo, Pattison, and Railsback. Also present: Bruce A. Lehman, counsel; Timothy A. Boggs, professional staff member; and Thomas E. Mooney, associate counsel. Mr. KASTENMEIER. The subcommittee will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today for another in its ongoing series on wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and other forms of privacy invasion. In this series of hearings, we have explored the monitoring activities of the Bell System and the use of mail covers and mail openings by the U.S. Postal Service and the Central Intelligence Agency. We have heard testimony on the range of surveillance techniques utilized by the FBI, the Secret Service, and other Federal investigative agencies and on the purposes and effects of political surveillance. This morning, we will focus on the illegal use of wiretapping by a major metropolitan police department and the response of Federal investigative agencies to that illegal activity. The question of the adequacy of FBI and Justice Department enforcement of the criminal provisions of title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is especially relevant to the oversight jurisdiction of our subcommittee. We are the body within the House of Representatives directly charged with monitoring Justice Department enforcement of this statute. In an effort to explore the extent and scope of illegal wiretapping in Houston, the subcommittee's staff traveled to Texas and interviewed a number of individuals with knowledge of illegal wiretapping. The picture which emerged was one of widespread, systematic use of electronic eavesdropping by local police with little serious effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate and enforce the law. I should note that enforcement in Texas is a purely Federal function since Texas has no State wiretap law. In fact, the only effective investigative activity to date appears to have been carried out by the Internal Revenue Service incidental to a tax investigation. In addition to these interviews, the staff obtained transcripts of a series of recorded conversations between Chief Lynn, our first witness today, and local police officers, which indicated a high degree of cooperation on the part of Bell Telephone Co. employees in illegal wiretapping operations. Although the witnesses who will appear today have first-hand knowledge only of the use of illegal wiretapping and Federal enforcement efforts in Texas, I believe their experience will be helpful in understanding the scope of the problem, which unfortunatly is national. I am pleased to call as our first witness this morning a gentleman that we have mandated to be present for this purpose. Our first witness is Carrol M. Lynn, chief of police of the city of Houston, Tex., the Nation's fifth largest city. Chief Lynn, if you will please raise your right hand. Do you swear that what you are about to tell the subcommittee is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Mr. LYNN. I do. Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Thank you. You may sit down. Chief Lynn, I understand you have a prepared statement. The committee would appreciate your proceeding from your prepared statement, sir. TESTIMONY OF CARROL M. LYNN, CHIEF OF POLICE, HOUSTON, TEX. Mr. LYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Carrol M. Lynn, I have been the chief of police of Houston, Tex., since January 9, 1974. Prior to that time, I served as director of the Houston Police Training Academy. The Houston Police Department is one of the largest in the country with over 2,500 officers. During the summer of 1973, two Houston narcotics division officers were indicted and convicted in State court for violations of narcotics laws. The allegations arising out of the investigation of these two officers included charges of illegal wiretapping. These officers' convictions were the first public sign that all was not well in the Houston Police Department. In late 1973, Houston elected a new mayor, Fred Hofheinz, who selected me to serve as his chief of police. Soon after taking office, I became concerned that my own home and office telephones might be tapped. My suspicions were aroused when certain information discussed over my private telephone was disclosed publicly. A check by a private consultant confirmed that my telephones may have been tapped. Following the consultant's inspection, I notified the FBI Special Agent in Charge in Houston and requested that he initiate an investigation of what I considered a very serious violation of my privacy and of Federal law. If I might describe that meeting? Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Yes, Chief Lynn. Mr. LYNN. I went to him and asked if my lines might be checked. I told him of my suspicions, that things had been leaked over my telephone. I spent several hours with this gentleman. |