THE BATTLESHIP ALABAMA, A TYPE OF THE NEWEST AND MOST POWERFUL AMERICAN WAR VESSELS WA AR is no longer the only school of the soldier and sailor. Principles derived from historical investigation are as applicable in this day of steam and the rapid fire gun as they were in that of sails and the muzzle loading carronade or in that of oars and the sword. Study of these principles in time of peace and their observance under conditions simulating those of war point the way to the most efficient use of modern weapons, either for defense at home or to uphold the honor of the Flag abroad. JOHN C. O'LAUGHLIN Manoeuvers are thus recognized as an essential feature of the education of the military and naval services of all progressive nations. Great Britain has, for years, required her navy to solve strategi cal and tactical problems, which related to the maintenance of her supremacy upon the sea; and the army has annually engaged in comprehensive exercises, which, however, failed to bear good fruit during the South African war. France, also, has compelled the wearers of her uniform to hold not only separate but joint manoeuvers, the main purpose of which has been the protection of her territory in Europe and elsewhere. Germany's army has long been the envy of the services of other nations because of its tactical and strategical efficiency; and the high standard reached has been achieved by hard work, less in the camp than in the field. The German navy is endeavoring to attain the height of effectiveness occupied by its sister service, and her battleships and less formidable craft are constantly at sea executing beneficial evolutions. Evidence of the results of incessant labor is furnished by the German torpedo boat flotilla. So well are these boats handled that, when going at high speed, it is possible to step from the bow of one to the stern of another. Russia directs the training of her land and naval forces in the way calculated to defend her from European attack and to uphold her interests in the Levant and the Far East. A few years ago Japan had no navy. Today she has an efficient fleet, and its manoeuvers have as their object the preservation of the kingdom from much feared Russian aggression, and the realization of the dream of every progressive Japanese-establishment and international recognition of the supremacy of the Tokyo government in the Pacific. No less than other nations, the United States has important interests to defend, and the question of their protection is the subject of thoughtful attention by both the army and navy. In his last annual message, President Roosevelt stated that, ship for ship, the navy of the United States showed her the equal of any service in the world. There are many naval officers who claim that American warships reached this standard before the President prescribed it. Until the past summer little attempt had been made to engage in fleet manœeuvers designed to achieve a strategical object. With the few war ships available, it was hardly possible to do much more than to train officers and men to operate their vessels alone or in squadron. This work was tactical, that is, it related to the manoeuvering of vessels when the enemy was within range. The attainment of this contact constitutes a separate branch of naval science, which is comprehended in the word strategy. Lacking the ships to educate officers in this art by practical exercises, the navy turned to theory to help meet the need. CAPTAIN WILLARD H. BROWNSON, COMMANDING THE BATTLESHIP ALABAMA The war game was introduced as a prominent feature of the course of the naval war college. Officers in attendance upon the course were pitted against each other, one having control of a force supposed to be moving upon the United States and the other acting as commander-in-chief of the defense fleet. The war with Spain gave striking proof of the value of this game. Before the destruction of the Maine, the players were informed that hostilities had broken out between the United States and Spain, and that a hostile fleet had left Cape Verde Islands under instructions to succor Cuba. The enemy was sighted at Martinique, fled to Curacao and was destroyed at Santiago de Cuba. Admiral Cervera pursued an identical course to destruction. The only important difference between the imaginary problem and that which actually developed was this: In the former, the Spanish fleet was destroyed while attempting to enter Santiago de Cuba; Cervera was annihilated as the result of an effort to escape from it. Increase of the commissioned force of the navy has permitted the practical execution of strategical problems. The long coast line of the United States, its possession of outlying dependencies and the proposed construction of the Isthmian canal create many problems in defense, which must be solved before war begins. Because it is geograpically more convenient, New England would probably be selected by a European enemy as the site of a naval and military base from which operations ashore and afloat could be conducted. The Caribbean Sea for four centuries has been a theatre of war. Reading the future by the past, it will continue to be so. Construction of the Panama Canal will materially increase the strategic importance of this region. The acquisition of the Philippines created a new problem for the defenders of the nation to consider; and the interests of the United States in China have made necessary the adoption of measures for the maintenance of our position in that empire The next war of the United States, in all probability, will be with a power of Europe, and control of the Atlantic Ocean will be the deciding factor of the struggle. Recognition of this fact caused the Washington authorities to authorize the North Atlantic squadron to carrry out what is technically known as the "search problem," the army and navy to engage in joint manoeuvers, and to direct the mobilization of the North Atlantic, South Atlantic and European squadrons in the Caribbean Sea in December. The "search problem" assumed that an enemy's squadron was approaching New England for the pur GUNNERS ON THE PRAIRIE TRAINING A RAPID FIRE GUN TO DESTROY THE TORPEDO BOAT THAT SIGHTED THE WHITE SQUADRON plished its mission should it enter a harbor and remain therein six hours without sustaining attack by a superior force. The white squadron, the official designation of the enemy, was under the command of Commander John E. Pillsbury, a thoroughly efficient officer, recog nized by the service as a strategical and tactical expert, and the defense or blue squadron had as its commander-in-chief Rear Admiral Francis J. Higginson, the able head of the North Atlantic station. The white squadron comprised three vessels Prairie, Panther and Supplyall of comparatively low sped, especially the latter; and this disadvantage, together with the restricted limits of the problem, was responsible for its capture. The south shore of New England contains many strategic possibilities. It might well be the objective of an enemy as the scene of a base, from Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound during the War of the Revolution and did not relinqush her hold upon them until the close of that Titanic struggle. The army has sought to protect this region by a series of fortifica tions. These defenses, placed in a comparatively efficient condition, underwent attack by a red fleet, as the North Atlantic squadron was officially known. The lessons of both maneuvers were important and instructive. The "search problem" showed the absolute need of a larger navy. The prime result of the army and navy manoeuvers was the development of defenses, which Major General MacArthur has said would, with the unlimited supply of money available before a declaration of war, be invincible even if attacked by all the navies of the world. |