Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

by the B. N. A. Act, are assigned their bailiff for that purpose, who specially to those bodies, is inherent had the property appraised, and sold in them aside from the 92nd section it to the plaintiff, a creditor of B., of the Act. Ib. by private sale, for $900; and executed a bill of sale thereof. The

3. The word "imprisonment" used in that section does not necessarily exclude the imposition of hard labour as part of the punishment. Therefore:

Held, [reversing the judgment of the Court below,] that the Legislature of this Province has power to impose hard labour in addition to imprisonment. Ib.

to make laws in relation to "Muni

plaintiff, in his evidence, swore that B. owed him about $1,000, and he thought there was ample security for the $900 and also additional security for B.'s indebtedness to himself, and that the goods seemed to be worth about $5,000; and the plaintiff, without disturbing in any way the possession of B., rented the property to him, and he remained, as he had theretofore been, in possession.

4. By clause 8 of the 92nd section of the B. N. A. Act, exclusive power the proposed arrangement with B., In order effectually to carry out is given to the Provincial Legislatures the bank by special power appointed their local manager agent to accept cipal Institutions in the Province," the chattel mortgage, and as such and clause 9 gives similar power in relation to "Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other licenses, in order to the raising of a revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal purposes."

Per SPRAGGE, C. J. O., that clause 9 is cumulative to clause 8, and was intended to authorize provincial legislation in relation to licenses, for the purpose of raising a revenue as well as for the regulation of matters of police. Ib.

[blocks in formation]

agent to make the affidavits required to be made by mortgagees.

Held, (1) [reversing the judgment below] that it need not appear on the affidavit, or the mortgage, or the papers filed therewith, that the agent

was aware of the circumstances con

nected with such mortgage.

Held, (2) [PATTERSON, J. A., dissenting] that as under the circumstances stated the chattel mortgage was satisfied quoad the goods, the mortgage could not properly be refiled; and notwithstanding the continued possession of the mortgagor (B.) it was not necessary for the plaintiff to file a bill of sale from the bank to himself in order to preserve his rights as against execution creditors of, or bond fide purchasers from B. (the mortgagor). Carlisle v. Tait, 10.

[blocks in formation]

on the 12th of July, and filed on the 18th, the 17th having been Sunday:

Held [affirming the judgment of the County Court], that such registration was too late, the Act, R. S. O. ch. 119, requiring the same to be effected within five days from the execution of the instrument; that Sunday counted as one of such five days, and that Rule 457, O. J. A., did not apply. McLean v. Pinkerton,

490.

[ocr errors]

5. Chattel mortgage Notice Religious society-R. S. O. ch. 95, sec. 13.]-The trustees of a church had been sued by the defendant, and pending the action they passed a resolution authorizing the raising by loan of $400 to pay off urgent claims, which recited that it was necessary to give security to the party making the advance. The plaintiff, being one of the trustees, thereupon advanced the money, obtaining from the trustees a chattel mortgage on all the movables contained in the

3. The mortgage, besides being a church, which was prepared by a security for $1,400 actually advanced, partner of the general solicitor of the provided that it should also be a trustees, who was defending the security for further advances, if action against them, but neither necessary, of goods and merchandize partner was called as a witness on to enable the mortgagor "to carry the trial. In an interpleader issue on business," not "to enter into the learned Judge found for the and carry on as in the statute,— defendant. which should "be re-paid on demand at any time within one year from the date hereof, or such other time as the parties may agree thereto."

[ocr errors]

Held, that the omission of the words "to enter into" could not render it unnecessary to register the mortgage, as regarded the $1,400.

Quare, per WILSON, C. J., whether the clause for future advances was not void as enabling payment to be delayed beyond the year. Ib.

4. Chattel mortgage-Description - After acquired property.] M., owning parts of lot 13 and 14 in the 2nd concession of Murray, gave a chattel mortgage of certain crops, grain, hay, &c.. c'escribed as "now being on the premises, situate on the north-east half of lot 14 in the 2nd concession, and north half of lot 14 in the said concession of Murray." Held, that crops and hay upon lot 13 could not pass. Grass et al. v. Austin, 511.

100 VOL. VII. A.R.

Held, [BURTON, J., dubitante] affirming the decision of the Common Pleas Division, that the mortgage was not invalid under R. S. O. ch. 95, sec. 13, and the fact that all the movable property of the mortgagors was included in the security was not of itself sufficient to satisfy the Court of any fraudulent intent in making

it.

Held, also, that the mere fact of the mortgage having been prepared by the partner of the solicitor for the trustees, was not of itself sufficient to impute to the plaintiff knowledge of the pending action against the trustees.

Held, also, that the fact of the plaintiff being himself one of the trustees, to which position he had been appointed about three or four months before the advance had been made, was not sufficient to fix him with knowledge of the pendency of the action in face of his sworn statement that he was ignorant thereof.

[ocr errors]

Held, also, that the trustees had-Where the plaintiff was engaged power to borrow the money and by the defendants for “the season,' secure it by the chattel mortgage. i. e., from early in May till some Brown v. Sweet, 725. time in November, as master to manage the steamer Idyl-Wyld, for $1,000, and he continued So

[blocks in formation]

APPEAR-employed until September, when the

See INTERPLEADER SUIT.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT.

CONTRACT.

steamer was burnt:

Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to more than a proportionate share of the salary agreed upon, for the contract was subject to the continued existence of the vessel, and performance was excused by its destruction without the default of the defendants. Ellis v. The Midland Railway Company, 464.

Semble, that such a contract made verbally with the president of the defendant company might be binding; and that a nonsuit for want of the corporate seal was properly set

1. Contract-Time.]-The plaintiffs and defendants entered into an agreement in the following terms: "I, the undersigned, agree to deliver aside. Ib. S. S. Mutton & Co., 40 M. ft. blk. ash, with mill-culls out, f. o. b. vessel on Cornwall canal, at $10 per M. ft.

Also 10 M. ft. soft elm at $10 per M. CONTRACT OF TRUSTEES.

ft. f. o. b. vessel on Cornwall canal, to be delivered in the month of June, 1881, the lumber now on stick and part seasoned," and the plaintiff's signed a corresponding memorandum, agreeing to accept such lumber at the time specified.

Held, that the words "with mill culls out," applied to the ash only, not to the elm.

Held, also, that the plaintiff, not having had a vessel ready to receive the lumber in June, could not

[blocks in formation]

See PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI

GENCE.

Collision at crossing-Contributory negligence.]-The servant of the plaintiff was in charge of an omnibus running to and from the station of the defendants' railway, and on the evening in question was attending at Georgetown station, at about ten feet from the track, but was unable to see along the railway in either direction by reason of houses intervening. By leaving the omnibus, however, and going to the track he could have seen an approaching

2. Contract-Excuse for non-per- train; but omitting to take this formance-Corporate seal Costs.] precaution, although aware that a

freight train was then on the track | tary; and as the transaction had been near the crossing, he started off to found to have been bonâ fide, and cross it, and did not hear or see without intent to defraud creditors, anything of the approaching train it could not be impeached under 13 until within about four feet of him, Eliz. ch. 5. Beavis v. Maguire, 704. when he was unable to avoid it, and the 'bus and harness were considerably damaged. It was not shewn

that the driver of the train had CONVEYANCE OF LAND TO

given any warning of its approach by sounding the whistle or bell on

RAILWAY COMPANY.

The deed to the defendant com

its nearing the part of the track pany described it by its original where it crossed the road to the sta-name of P. H. L. & B. R Co., tion. At the trial the plaintiff was when in fact its name had then nonsuited on the ground of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's

[blocks in formation]

been changed.

Held, a sufficient descriptio persona, to enable the company to take, though it might not be sufficient to sue in. Grand Junction Railway Co. v. Midland Railway Co., 681.

CORPORATE POWERS.

See BRIDGE COMPANY.

CORPORATE SEAL.
See CONTRACT 3.

COSTS.

When an appeal was allowed on a ground raised for the first time on the argument no costs were given. Ellis v. The Midland Railway Com

Conveyance for value-Hindering creditors-13 Eliz., ch. 5.]-The male defendant mortgaged his property several times, and finally sold the equity of redemption. His wife barred her dower in each mortgage, under an agreement with her husband, made on the first occasion, that he would convey other prop-pany, 464. erty to her. Upon this claim being reiterated on the sale of the equity of redemption, the husband conveyed the other land to a trustee for her. The effect was that the plaintiff, a creditor of the husband, was delayed and hindered in recovering his debt.

Held, [affirming the decision of the Court below,] that the conveyance to

COUNSEL.

See JUNIOR COUNSEL.

COUNTY COURT APPEAL.

County Court appeal-Remission

the wife's trustees was not volun- to Court below for amendment-Dis

See CONVEYANCE OF LAND TO RAIL-
WAY CO.

DESCRIPTION.

cretion of Court below as to amending.]| DESCRIPTIO PERSONÆ.
-This case had been remitted to
the Court below, this Court being of
opinion that the record should be
there amended and a verdict entered
for the plaintiff against the defendant
B. alone (6 App. R. 411). The
learned Judge of the County Court,
instead of entering such a verdict,
directed a new trial, the parties to
apply to amend their pleadings as
they might be advised, so that B.
might raise any defence which he
was not obliged to raise in the action
on the joint liability.

Held, that the direction of the
learned Judge of the County Court
as to the way in which he thought
it most just to the defendant B. that
the application to amend should be
made, was an exercise of his discre-
tion with which this Court would
not interfere. Wilson v. Brown &
Wells, 181.

COVENANTS, NOT STA-

TUTORY.

See LEASE, SHort form of.

CREDITOR, PAYMENT TO.
[TO INDUCE HIM TO EXECUTE DEED
OF COMPOSITION AND DISCHARGE.]
See INSOLVENT ACT, 9.

CREDITORS, RIGHTS OF.
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

DELEGATION OF POWERS
OF LEGISLATURE TO LI-
CENSE COMMISSIONERS.
See BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT 1.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 4.

DEVISE TO GOVERNMENT

OF FOREIGN STATE.

Devise to government of Foreign
State-Supervision of Trusts.]-A
testator directed his executors to pay
and deliver the residue of his estate
to the Government and Legislature of
the State of Vermont, to be disposed
of as to them should seem best, hav-
ing regard to certain recommenda-

tions set forth in the will.

Held, [affirming the decree, 27 Gr.
361,] that the State was sufficiently
designated as the legatee to entitle it
to take the bequest; and the fact
that the bequest was for the benefit
of, and to take effect in a foreign
country, could not be urged as an
objection to its validity; neither
could the objection that the State
could not be made amenable to the
Courts of the State, and thus there
would not be any supervision of the
trusts, as it must be assumed that a
sovereign State would not do any-
thing to violate a trust; besides
which it appeared that the Legislature
was not, in reality, to assume the
trust, their duty being to appoint
trustees who would be amenable to
the Courts.

Held, also, that the direction for
accumulation did not render the be-
quest invalid, it being for the Courts
in Vermont to say whether the direc-
tion should be carried out. Park-
hurst v. Roy, 614.

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »