The plaintiff by his bill, sets out his right to a ferry between the city of Belleville and the township of Ameliasburg, and charges the defendants with running a ferry boat between the township of Ameliasburg and a place in the township of Sidney which adjoins the city of Belleville, about two miles from the Belleville terminus of the plaintiff's ferry, and with having, for hire and reward, carried persons from Ameliasburg whose immediate destination was Belleville, and with having carried the same to Ameliasburg from Belleville, all of whom would, but for defendants' ferry, have used and travelled by the plaintiff's ferry; and he further charges that thereby the defendants intended to and did divert the said persons from the plaintiff's ferry to his detriment and loss: that the only object of the defendants in establishing their ferry was, to draw off passengers from the plaintiff's ferry and that there is no occasion or reason for a ferry at the place where the defendants have it.

The defendants do not by their answer deny any of these charges. They put the plaintiff to proof of the right he claims, and deny that they are infringing any right he has; and they allege that they run their ferry boat under the sanction and with the consent of the municipal councils of Ameliasburg and Sidney, and that they believe that a license had been granted under an Order in Council to the township of Ameliasburg to establish a ferry between the two townships.

The decree declares that the defendants' ferry is an infringement of the rights of the plaintiff as lessee of the ferry between Ameliasburg and Belleville, and awards an injunction to restrain the defendants from maintaining and using their ferry between the township of Ameliasburg and the township of Sidney; and from running any ferry boat for the conveyance of people, &c.; and generally from carrying on a ferrying business across the Bay of Quinté between the said townships to the prejudice of the plaintiff, or so as in any way to interfere with his said ferry.

The objections urged against the decree cannot be stated

much more concisely than by reference to the formal reasons of appeal, which are thus expressed:

1. The alleged grant of ferry was void for uncertainty in not describing the limits of the ferry.

2. The grant, if valid, was of a right to a ferry one way only.

3. The grant, if valid, was only of a ferry to a point in Ameliasburg, and that point having been selected, the ferry, if valid both ways, to and from that point, has not been interfered with by the appellants.

4. The grant, if valid, did not extend more than a mile and a half on each side of the point in Ameliasburg which was selected by Belleville as one of the termini, and the appellant has not ferried to or from Ameliasburg within that limit.

5. The appellant has not ferried to and from the Belleville. terminus within a mile and a half of the city of Belleville. 6. The respondent had no right to complain, as in this case, the right, if any, was in the city of Belleville.

7. The Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to grant. the relief given by the decree.

8. The appellant did not interfere with the respondent's rights, as he did the ferry between the two termini of the respondent's ferry.

9. The grant to the city of Belleville was subject to revocation by the Order of the Governor in Council; and, even if valid, it was revoked by the Order in Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario granting a right to Ameliasburg to a ferry, and after such revocation the respondent had no right to complain against the appellant in respect of the acts done by him.

Occasion has been given for some of the objections urged against the plaintiff's title by a series of instances of singular want of care in the wording of written instruments.

On 26th April, 1858, letters patent were issued, which recited that the municipality of the town of Belleville had petitioned for a license of "one ferry from Belleville to Ameliasburg," and then granted full license and authority to the municipality to establish a ferry "between the town of Belleville to Ameliasburg."

On 17th June, 1867, the Corporation of the town of

Belleville, by deed, after reciting, amongst other things, that, by the letters patent, a lease of the ferry "from the said town of Belleville to the township of Ameliasburg had been granted, proceeded to demise and lease to A. L. Bogart, for fifteen years, "the said ferry, and the right to ferry to and from the town of Belleville aforesaid to the township of Ameliasburg aforesaid, as fully and to the same extent as the party of the first part might or could claim under the said lease or letters patent from the Crown."

In these four references to the ferry we have it described in three different ways-from Belleville to Ameliasburg, between Belleville to Ameliasburg, to and from Belleville to Ameliasburg-and not one of the four follows the language of the Statute 20 Vict. c. 7, under which the license was given.

One question naturally suggested by this very inaccurate language, the answer to which does not quite lie on the surface, is, whether Bogart, under whom the plaintiff holds, took the right to ferry both ways, or only from Belleville to Ameliasburg.

I agree with the opinion expressed in the Court below, that, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, he must succeed even though the license reaches only the trip in one direction; but if the defendant has to account, the question will be of practical importance as regulating the amount of compensation.

I think the learned Chancellor took the correct view of the construction of the instruments, and I form my opinion upon the same reasoning adopted by him.

The much litigated monopoly which was the subject of Newton v. Cubitt, 12 C. B. N. S. 33, and several of the other cases cited, is an instance of a right acquired to ferry in one direction only. Whether such a right could now be granted by the Crown in this Province, may be at least doubtful, having regard to the legislation on the subject of ferries, as e. g. 8 Vict. c. 50; 9 Vict. c. 9; 20 Vict. c. 7., and the Acts respecting municipal institutions. But assuming the power to exist, I should be surprised to see a grant of

the kind, because the motive and consideration being the promotion of the interest and convenience of the public, it is not easy to imagine circumstances in which greater efficiency would not be attained by the same craft being employed returning as well as going.

I do not read any of the statutes on the subject as having such a grant in contemplation, although the language may be general enough to permit it in case the municipality, or the Governor in Council as the case may be, found a case so exceptional as, in the public interest, to make it advisable.

Looking at the statute more immediately before us, we find it providing that when a ferry is required over any stream or other water in Upper Canada, and the two shores are in different municipalities not in the same county, the Governor in Council is authorized to grant a license under the great seal of the Province to either municipality exclusively, or to both conjointly, as may be most conducive to the public interest, such license to confer a right in such municipality or municipalities to establish a ferry from shore to shore on such stream or other water, and with such limit and extent as shall appear advisable to the Governor in Council, upon condition that the craft to be used for the purpose of such ferry shall be propelled by steam, &c. When one shore is within the limits of a city, town, or incorporated village, and the other shore in a township or other rural municipality, the license shall in all cases be issued to the city, town, or incorporated village; but where the rural municipality opposite such city, town, or incorporated village is an island, then the license is to be granted to the island municipality.

Under this Act the license is always to be granted either to one body, or to two whose action under it must be in unison and not in conflict.

It is not unimportant to note that the object of this statute, as declared in the preamble, is to afford inducements for establishing steam ferries, which necessitate a considerable investment of capital, and involve expense in 44-VOL. VII A.R.

their maintenance and working. The inducements intended plainly are the securing a remunerative return for the expenditure, while the paramount object is the providing for the public convenience, not the creation of a profitable monopoly irrespective of that convenience. No argument is required to shew that the object will be better attained by giving to the person or corporation providing the steamboat the gains from a paying trip each way, than by requiring the boat which takes over a load always to return empty. If, at a certain rate of fare, the traffic one way alone were found remunerative, the public interest would obviously require a reduction of the charge rather than the employment of two boats to do the work of one.

A grant of a ferry from one shore only would be made in the interest of the grantee and not of the public, and would be a monopoly of the odious sort, which, although, as the books shew, it was sometimes created in olden times, would scarcely be looked for under the legislation of people who make their own laws, and who look to the public good in regulations of this character, and not to the creation of advantages for individuals at the expense of the public.

I read the statutes in question and the instruments made under their authority in this spirit; and I think when we find a petition, preferred under the provisions of the statute, for a license for "one ferry from Belleville to Ameliasburg," and the consequent grant of authority to establish a ferry "between Belleville to Ameliasburg," we may, without unjustifiable violence to the language, construe it as intended to describe the privilege which the statute gives power to confer, namely, a ferry from shore to shore. I do not see in it any intention to narrow the grant authorized by the statute; and having regard to the declared object of the law, which, if it would not be defeated, would be, to say the least, less certain of attainment by limiting the privilege to the trip one way, I think we should give the fuller force to the language of the grant, unless clearly restrained by the necessary import of the language itself. In so treating it we do not, in my judgment, derogate from the rights of