sentence. This process, which includes probation, imprisonment, and parole, is presently divided. Parole and probation supervision are lodged with the courts, prison services are lodged with the executive branch, and research is diffused through both systems.

We believe that this disunity impedes the channeling of resources and efforts in a rational, systematic manner. For example, although probation and parole supervision are two of the key steps in avoiding a return to a criminal activity, the depth and quality of supervision may depend on the caseloads and presentence reporting duties of the approximately 550 probation officers in the 93 judicial districts. This diversity of supervision may affect the planning of an offender's treatment program, since the program must take into account the amount of support which the probation officer can provide a parolee in the community. If this division of responsibility and authority were eliminated and the corrections process worked toward the rehabilitation goal as a single, unified mechanism, it would be greatly strengthened. Directed by one authority, an offender's rehabilitation program would correlate the efforts of the institutional personnel who evaluate his needs and devise and execute his treatment plan, and the community personnel who supervise his release on parole.

The division of the correctional function between the courts and the prison system is at perhaps the most critical point in the correctional process, distinguishing prison operations from community operations. This at one point when, as we can see from our past experience, the great need in corrections is the strong shift toward community operations. For here is the opportunity to rehabilitate.

The value and potential of community based operations is shown by a recent experimental treatment program conducted by the California Youth Authority and discussed in the National Crime Commision Report. Juvenile court commitments, excluding those for whom institutional care was deemed requisite, were divided between community and regular institutional programs.

Youths assigned to the community treatment project were supervised by officers having a caseload of 10 to 12 and employing treatment methods designed to meet each youth offender's individual needs. After 5 years, the community treatment project reports that only 28 percent of its group have had their paroles revoked, as compared with 52 percent of those who were institutionalized. Community supervision employing a variety of individually tailored treatment alternatives could similarly benefit Federal offenders, both youths and adults. This type of treatment program would be feasible under the proposed corrections system.

To date, there has been no major national investment in corrections research. However, since the goals of parole and probation and their supervision techniques are so closely analogous, a division of research could be created within the service to conduct study on subjects of benefit to the entire system. There would be no gaps, no duplication of effort. Most important, results could then be implemented on a uniform basis, throughout the corrections system.

In answer to the need for strengthening the corrections process, the 89th Congress enacted legislation providing three innovative techniques to be used in achieving prisoner rehabilitation. This important legislation authorizes the Attorney General to place prisoners in residential community treatment centers, to permit them to take emergency or rehabilitative leave, and to permit them to work or participate in community training programs. As a result, new techniques involving pre-release and work release programs and halfway houses are being perfected to return useful, rehabilitated individuals to their communities.

Under the work program alone, almost 3 percent of our prison population are being released for employment in the community. If these new techniques are to achieve their maximum rehabilitation potential, adequate supervision is an essential adjunct. To this end, we have appointed a force of work release coordinators in the newly established Division of Community Services. These new techniques may soon apply to probationers and parolees. Efficiency and reason would require that a single authority be used to provide coordinated assistance and supervision for them. Such supervision would extend from the court granting probation or the institution in which sentence is served, to the residential institution center from which the offender is eased back into community life.

That the respective corrections agencies have accomplished as much as they have under the present system is a tribute to their efforts and cooperation. But to be fully effective, the corrections system should have a single administrative

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framework within which the flexible sentencing and treatment alternatives presently available can operate and in which time and money can be budgeted on a coordinated basis. Such a framework would permit a better balanced range of services, since coordinated planning will assure that funds and personnel are allocated in relation to need. Moreover, it would free probation officers to devote more time to the preparation of presentence reports.

The establishment of a unified corrections system within the Department of Justice is predicated on its responsibilities in the field of law enforcement, particularly those of containing and reducing the incidence of criminal activity

A unified corrections system will afford an opportunity to greatly reduce crime by enabling us to return to their communities to lead productive lives many persons who would otherwise continue criminal activity. It is essential to the public safety. It is essential to our humanitarian purposes.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY ACT

As the President declared in his Message to Congress on Crime in America, "We would indeed be indifferent to the command of our heritage if we failed to take effective action to preserve the dignity and privacy of each among us.” We deal here with the right to be let alone, the right that Justice Brandeis eloquently called "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Unrestricted invasions of privacy made possible by sophisticated electronic devices are too great to permit their exploitation even by government agents acting in the name of law enforcement. The legitimate needs of law enforcement can be met without the use of such abhorrent devices. As Justice Brandeis observed nearly 40 years ago: "Even general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared to wiretapping."

Recent proposals have been advanced to authorize limited wiretapping and eavesdropping under judicial supervision. Constitutional challenges to such state legislation are now presented to the Supreme Court in the case of Berger v. New York. Before this session of the Congress expires, the Supreme Court may well decide some of the constitutional issues. But even if the practice withstands this constitutional test, it should be stopped by statute. It is inconsistent with our hopes for America.

Only the most urgent need can justify wiretapping and other electronic surveillance. Proponents of authorization have failed to make a case-much less meet the heavy burden of proof our values require. Where is the evidence that this is an efficient police technique? Might more crime be prevented and detected by alternate use of the same manpower?

If wiretapping is effective, why are jurisdictions which utilize wiretaps sometimes seriously infested with organized crime while areas where they are prohibited are sometimes free of organized crime? Can the public be adequately protected against excessive use if use is permitted? Can innocent people be adequately protected from disclosures of false statements intercepted by wiretaps? How many cases will be lost because rights such as that to counsel are invaded, however unwittingly?

Consistent with the approach taken in connection with other Federal crimes, the Right of Privacy Act is predicated on Congress' ample powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The provisions of the Bill can also be sustained under other powers of the Congress.

Section 2510 (a) is a blanket prohibition against the interception of wire communications. Wire communications involve the interstate communications network, and it has long been clear that Congress has plenary power in this area. Violations of the section will be punished by a penalty of up to five years' imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000, or both. The statutory ban closes a major gap in existing law by making clear that interception alone is a criminal violation-whether or not the information thereby obtained is subsequently disclosed. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 USC 605) prohibits "interception and divulgence" and has long been subject to the interpretation that interception alone is not an offense. In addition to prohibiting interception per se, Section 2510 (a) prohibits the disclosure or the use of any information obtained from wiretapping.

Section 2511 of the Bill deals with eavesdropping. Like wiretapping, eavesdropping involves a serious invasion of the privacy of conversations. Its incidents, however, range far beyond the overhearing of telephone conversations. The sophisticated electronic devices presently available and aggressively promoted on the market are capable of intruding into almost any conversation anywhere.

Such devices, highly portable and easily concealed, can be secreted in the innermost reaches of a person's home. They indiscriminately record his most private conversations. They can be used to overhear conversations even where there has been no physical trespass on private premises to install the devices.

Section 2511(a) adopts several different approaches to achieve a comprehensive ban on the use of electronic, mechanical, or other devices for the purpose of eavesdropping. Section 2511(b) bans the disclosure or use of any information so obtained. As with Section 2510. the maximum criminal penalty for violation of Section 2511 is a $10,000 fine or five years' imprisonment, or both.

The prohibitions against wiretapping and eavesdropping apply only where none of the parties to the conversation has consented to the activity. Entirely different practical and legal considerations come into play when wiretapping or eavesdropping is carried on with the consent of one of the parties. The use of electronic devices in such circumstances has consistently been upheld by the Supreme Court against constitutional attack.

In addition to the broad prohibitions of Sections 2510 and 2511 against the use of wiretapping and eavesdropping devices, the statute will reach the sources of supply. Section 2512 contains specific prohibitions against the manufacture, shipment, or advertisement of devices whose design renders them primarily useful for the purpose of wire interception or eavesdropping. Violations of the section carry a maximum penalty of a $25,000 fine or one year imprisonment, or both. The limited approach taken in the statute to the manufacturing and distribution problem will not prevent persons from obtaining devices that may be easily adapted to eavesdropping and wiretapping. Nevertheless, the section will eliminate many objectionable devices now readily obtained on the market, such as the spike microphone, the cuff-link microphone, the notorious martini olive transmitter, and other devices whose design indicates that their primary purpose is to facilitate the surreptitious overhearing of private conversations. The section will not affect the manufacture or shipment of simple induction coils, tape recorders, or other innocent electronic equipment that may occasionally be adapted to wiretapping or bugging uses. It should be noted, however, that Section 2512 (c) (2) prohibits the advertisement even of legitimate devices, whenever the advertisement promotes the use of the devices for wiretapping or eavesdropping. Section 2514 excepts wiretapping and eavesdropping directly related to and necessary for the protection of the security of the Nation. Even in this narrow area, however, no information obtained as a result of such measures will be admissible in evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings. Other use or disclosure of such information is prohibited except as essential to national security. The national security exception is a necessary provision in the statute and the evidentiary restrictions will serve an important function in confining such activity to the extremely narrow bounds that are appropriate.

To harmonize the proposed statute with Section 605 of the Communications Act, minor amendments are made in Section 605. The principal amendment is the limitation of the "intercept and divulge" requirement to radio communications. Under existing law, as discussed earlier, the requirement also applies to wire communications, which will now be covered by Section 2510 of the proposed statute.

This bill is far-reaching and comprehensive. If enacted, it will go far toward granting major protection to a fundamental right of all Americans. Its specific prohibitions will lay to rest a tragically confused area of the law. Legislation to safeguard the right of privacy is long overdue.

In summary, each of these bills would fill a need in our law enforcement process. I urge their prompt and favorable consideration.

Chairman CELLER. The Chair will rule that each bill will be taken up separately. The U.S. Corrections Service bill first; the firearms bill second; the Federal Judicial Center third; and wiretapping fourth. Interrogation will be limited to each bill in that order.

Mr. ROGERS. What is the first one?

Chairman CELLER. H.R. 5038, the U.S. Corrections Service bill. Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I indicated yesterday that I thought the series of proposals before this subcommittee were some of the most important proposals before the Congress not only in this session but probably in our time. Inasmuch as the Attorney General

is crowded for time, I would like it unmistakably understood that following the presentation of these four matters today, the Attorney General be available for invitation back to the committee for further help in these important fields later on and that other interested witnesses who are experts in this field be afforded time for appearance before this subcommittee.

Chairman CELLER. That sounds very logical. You have no objection to that, do you, Mr. Attorney General?

Mr. CLARK. Certainly not. We want to be of any assistance possible. Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, do I understand we are to ask questions on each bill and the committee will exhaust each bill before we go to the next one?

Chairman CELLER. Do you want to endorse the bills?

Mr. MATHIAS. I said, exhaust them.

Chairman CELLER. We will consider each bill separately. I think that would be the most orderly way of proceeding here rather than going helter-skelter through the four bills.

Mr. Rogers, we will take up the first bill, H.R. 5038, the U.S. Corrections Service.

Mr. ROGERS. Is that the one that deals with parole and probation? Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Chairman CELLER. May I interrupt just to ask one question?

Mr. Attorney General, you are aware, are you not, that the judiciary are at cross-purposes and more or less at loggerheads on this matter as to whether or not the supervision of parole officers shall be in your Department or shall remain where supervision now lies; namely, within the discretion of the individual judges? I take it you are going to touch upon that. We might well do that at this moment. Mr. ROGERS. That was my first question.

Chairman CELLER. Oh, was it?

Mr. CLARK. There has been some concern indicated by the judiciary. This was the subject of hearings before another subcommittee of this committee last year. Since that time, we have made one change in this bill which we believe eliminates the basis for the concern by the judiciary. That change effects this result: As now proposed, the bill would leave in the judicial system the probation officers who are presently engaged there. Their function, however, would be limited to the preparation of presentence reports on which the judges act in sentencing. They would not be involved in direct supervision of persons on probation or parole which, in my judgment, is as purely an executive function as Government has, just as executive as supervision of a felon in jail. There is no difference really.

However, the courts felt that they need to have persons responsible to them preparing data on which they base their sentences, and while we might not entirely share their view as to that, this is a compromise that we are willing to make and have proposed in this bill.

Chairman CELLER. Do not the judges appoint the probation officers now?

Mr. CLARK. That is correct.

Chairman CELLER. I am sort of a devil's advocate here. Wouldn't you say the probation officer in a way espouses the cause of the defendant in the criminal case, seeks to help him in every sense of the word to become rehabilitated and helps him when it comes to bringing

out his good qualities which are made manifest to the judge prior to sentence? If they were on the side of, or were appointed, or were under the control of the Department of Justice, they would be more or less influenced by the prosecution; that is, by the U.S. attorney. In that sense wouldn't there be a militation against the benefits of the prisoner?

Mr. CLARK. No; I think not. If those observations are correct, we would have a very serious problem with the Bureau of Prisons, itself. The function of the probation officer in the supervision of those on probation and parole is not to take their side but to lend his experience and efforts to so control the conduct of the individual that society is protected and the opportunity for rehabiliation most enhanced.

The last figures I saw on probation indicated that Federal courts are granting probation in about 37 percent of the cases. That is a lot of people out to be supervised. Los Angeles County has twice as many probation officers as the entire Federal system. Today they spend so much of their time in preparation of presentence reports and so little in what we call field supervision, seeing what the probationer, the parolee is actually doing, seeing that he is complying with the conditions of probation or parole, that we are losing much of our opportunity to rehabilitate these people and to protect society.

We are trying to do the same thing in prison with the harder cases. Certainly we need to have the opportunity, as the person moves out of prison back into his community, as nearly all of them do, to supervise him with the same continuity of purpose that we have had while he was in prison and we cannot have this effectively as long as parole supervision is under the judicial branch.

Chairman CELLER. It is true, is it not, that over the years there has developed an extreme closeness and harmony between the judge and the parole officer? It is going to be very difficult-if I may use the term-to cut that umbilical cord.

Mr. CLARK. Well, it has in some areas. That may be bad. And it hasn't in other areas. I think if you looked at some of the best probation service districts that we have, actually, the chief probation officer-I think this would be true in the northern district of Illinois-is primarily responsible for the actual selection of the probation service officers and the courts have little direct contact with them.

There is really some desirability that the probation service officer's attitude be independent. He has a function to perform that is different and distinct from that of the court. That is a professional service that he needs to render that should not be dependent upon his relationship, individually or personally, to the judge.

The bailiffs in the courts, who are so important to the judges, they maintain decorum in the courtroom, are most frequently deputy U.S. marshals, employees of the U.S. Department of Justice, and so far as we can tell, they get along fine with judges. So that the source of employment just simply can't be that important in the relationship. Chairman CELLER. Do you know whether the Judicial Conference has expressed any view on this matter?

Mr. CLARK. I am quite sure it hasn't expressed a view upon the bill as submitted this year.

Chairman CELLER. I am informed by Mr. Foley that next week when the Conference meets, they will consider this matter.