court to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court, although the case
may nevertheless be carried to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but if so,
and final judgment is there rendered, the jurisdiction of this court can-
not thereafter be invoked directly on another writ of error to the Cir-
cuit Court. Ib.
3. When the plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court on the
sole ground that the suit arises under the Constitution or laws or some
treaty of the United States, as appears on the record from his own state-
ment of his cause of action, in legal and logical form, and a dispute or
controversy as to a right which depends on the construction of the
Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States, is determined,
then the appellate jurisdiction of this court is exclusive. Ib.
4. The property and franchises, which are the subject-matter of this suit,
were not in the possession of the state court, when the Federal court
appointed its receiver; and jurisdiction having attached there under the
allegations of the original bill, that jurisdiction did not fail by reason
of anything that appeared in ex parte affidavits, denying the truth of
the allegations contained in the original bill in respect to the amount
in dispute. Put-in-Bay Waterworks &c. Company v. Ryan, 409.
C. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Under the Bankrupt Act of 1898, the District Court of the United States in
which proceedings in bankruptcy are pending has no jurisdiction, un-
less by consent of the defendants, of a bill in equity by the trustee in
bankruptcy against persons to whom the bankrupt, before the proceed-
ings in bankruptcy, made a sale and conveyance of property which the
plaintiff seeks to set aside as fraudulent as against creditors, but which
the defendants assert to have been made in good faith and to have
vested title in them. Wall v. Cox, 244.
LIFE INSURANCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
1. Where a married woman had resided in Arkansas for many years, and,
just as she was leaving the State to join her husband, who had taken
up his residence in Louisiana, was injured through the alleged negli-
gence of the defendant railway company, and brought an action to re-
cover damages in a state court in Arkansas, which, on the application
of the company, was removed into the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Western District of Arkansas, the rule of decision was
the law of Arkansas, the place of the wrong, and of the forum, and not
the law of Louisiana. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Humble, 57.
2. By the law of Arkansas, plaintiff was entitled to bring the action in her
own name and without joining her husband. And if her husband
should subsequently bring suit in Louisiana on the same cause of ac-
tion, it is not to be assumed that the courts of that State would not
recognize the binding force of the judgment in Arkansas. Ib.
3. By the legislation of Arkansas the earnings of a married woman arising
from labor or services done and performed on her sole account are her
separate property, and although the statutes may not have deprived the
husband of the services of the wife in the household, in the care of the
family, or in and about his business, they have bestowed on her, inde-
pendently of him, her earnings on her own account, and given her au-
thority to acquire them. Ib.
4. The evidence in this case tending to show that plaintiff for some years
had been carrying on business on her own account, which had been
suspended by reason of temporary illness for a short time just previous
to the accident, the Circuit Court did not commit reversible error in
instructing the jury that, if they found for the plaintiff, they might take
into consideration in assessing her damages, among other things, her
age and earning capacity before and after the injury was received, as
shown by the proofs. Ib.
5. On this record the earning capacity referred to presumably had relation
to earnings on plaintiff's own account, and if defendant wished this
made more explicit, it should have so requested. Ib.
6. By the provision in act 68 of the Laws of the Territory of Arizona that
the common law of England, so far as it is consistent with and adapted
to the natural and physical condition of this Territory and the neces-
sities of the people thereof, and not repugnant to or inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States, or bill of rights, or laws of this
Territory, or established customs of the people of this Territory, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of
this Territory, the common law was not made unqualifiedly the rule of
decision, but that law, as modified by the conditions of the Territory,
and changes in the common-law relation between husband and wife
had been expressed in statutes prior to the passage of the act of 1885.
Luhrs v. Hancock, 567.
7. By a conveyance from a husband to his wife, property does not lose its
homestead character.
8. The deed of a person alleged to be insane is not absolutely void; it is
only voidable, and may be confirmed or set aside.
Ib.
9. The inquiry as to the insanity of Mrs. Hancock was not open to the ap-
pellant. Ib.
1. As against the purchaser of interests in mining claims after the location
certificates were recorded, the original locators were held by the state
court estopped to deny the validity of the locations. The question of
estoppel is not a Federal question. Speed v. McCarthy, 269.
2. The state court further held that where the annual assessment work had
not been done on certain mining claims, a co-tenant could not, on the
general principles applicable to co-tenancy, obtain title against his co-
tenants by relocating the claims. Ib.
3. This was also not a Federal question in itself, and the contention that
the state court necessarily decided the original mining claims to be in
existence at the time of the relocation, in contravention of provisions
of the Revised Statutes properly interpreted, could not be availed of
VOL. CLXXXI-41
under section 709, as no right or title given or secured by the act of
Congress in this regard was specially set up or claimed. Ib.
1. The power of the State of Illinois to levy a special assessment in propor-
tion to benefits, for the execution of a local work, and the authority to
confer on a municipality the attribute of providing for such an assess-
ment, is not denied. Lombard v. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 33.
2. Where a special municipal assessment to pay for a particular work has
been held to be illegal, no violation of the Constitution of the United
States arises from a subsequent authority given to make a new special
assessment to pay for the complete work. Ib.
1. Section 5142 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing for
the increase of the capital stock of a national bank, and declaring that
no increase of capital stock shall be valid until the whole amount of
the increase is paid in, and until the Comptroller of the Currency shall
certify that the amount of the proposed increase has been duly paid in
as part of the capital of such association, does not make void a sub-
scription or certificate of stock based upon capital stock actually paid
in, simply because the whole amount of any proposed or authorized
increase has not in fact been paid into the bank; certainly, the statute
should not be so applied in behalf of a person sought to be made liable
as shareholder, when, as in the present case, he held, at the time the
bank suspended and was put into the hands of a receiver, a certificate
of the shares subscribed for by him; enjoyed, by receiving and retain-
ing dividends, the rights of a shareholder; and appeared as a share-
holder upon the books of the bank, which were open to inspection, as
of right, by creditors. Scott v. Deweese, 202.
2. As between the bank and the defendant, the latter having paid the
amount of his subscription for shares in the proposed increase of capi-
tal was entitled to all the rights of a shareholder, and therefore, as
between himself and the creditors of the bank, became a shareholder
to the extent of the stock subscribed and paid for by him. Ib.
3. That the bank, after obtaining authority to increase its capital, issued
certificates of stock without the knowledge or approval of the Comp-
troller and proceeded to do business upon the basis of such increase
before the whole amount of the proposed increase of capital has been
paid in, was a matter between it and the Government under whose laws
it was organized, and did not render void subscriptions or certificates
of stock based upon capital actually paid in, nor have the effect to re-
lieve a shareholder, who became such by paying into the bank the
amount subscribed by him, from the individual liability imposed by
section 5151. Ib.
4. Upon the failure of a national bank the rights of creditors attach under
section 5151, and a shareholder who was such when the failure occurred
cannot escape the individual liability prescribed by that section upon
the ground that the bank issued a certificate of stock before, strictly
speaking, it had authority to do so. Ib.
5. If a subscriber to the stock of a national bank becomes a shareholder in
consequence of frauds practiced upon him by others, whether they be
officers of the bank or officers of the Government, he must look to them
for such redress as the law authorizes, and is estopped, as against
creditors, to deny that he is a shareholder, within the meaning of sec-
tion 5151, if at the time the rights of creditors accrued he occupied and
was accorded the rights appertaining to that position. Ib.
1. In reviewing questions arising out of Mexican laws relating to land titles,
it is difficult to determine with anything like certainty what laws were
in force in Mexico at any particular time prior to the occupation of the
country in 1846-1848. Whitney v. United States, 104.
2. Looking through the provisions to which its attention has been called the
court finds nothing in them providing in terms, or by inference for a
general delegation of power by the supreme executive to the various
governors to make a grant like the one set up in this case; and it holds
that the appellants have not borne the burden of showing the validity
of the grant which they set up, either directly, or by facts from which
its validity could be properly inferred within the cases already decided
by this Court. Ib.
3. When Congress, under the act of March 2, 1827, granted to the State of
Illinois alternate sections of land throughout the whole length of the
public domain, in aid of the construction of a canal to connect the
waters of the Illinois River with those of Lake Michigan, it also granted
by implication the right of way through reserved sections; but this
implication would not extend to ninety feet on each side. Werling v.
Ingersoll, 131.
4. The State of Illinois never took title to a strip of land ninety feet wide
on each side of the route of that canal through the public lands, so far
as related to the sections reserved to the United States by the act of
March 2, 1827.
5. The State, in constructing the canal, proceeded under that act, filed its
map thereunder, and constructed the canal with reference thereto. Ib.
6. The facts in these two cases are so nearly alike that the court thinks it
sufficient to consider only the first. The land there in question is within
the limits of the territory ceded to the United States by the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. The plaintiffs claim title by virtue of a patent
issued in confirmation of two grants made by the Mexican government.
The defendants, without claiming the fee, claim a right of permanent
occupancy, as Mission Indians, who had been in occupation of the
premises long before the Mexican grants. Held: (1) That the United
States were bound to respect the rights of private property in the ceded
territory, but that it had the right to require reasonable means for
determining the validity of all titles within the ceded territory, to re-
quire all persons having claims to lands to present them for recogni-
tion, and to decree that all claims which are not thus presented, shall
be considered abandoned; (2) That so far as the Indians are concerned,
the land was rightfully to be regarded as part of the public domain,
and subject to sale and disposition by the government; (3) That if the
Indians had any claims founded on the action of the Mexican govern-
ment, they abandoned them by not presenting them to the commission
for consideration; (4) That lands which were burdened with a right of
permanent occupancy were not a part of the public domain, subject to
the full disposal by the United States. Barker v. Harvey; Quevas v.
Harvey, 481.
7. Some discussion appears in the briefs as to the meaning of the word
"servidumbres," (translated "usages"). The court declines to define
its meaning when standing by itself, but holds that in these grants it
does not mean that the general occupation and control of the property
was limited by them, but only that such full control should not be
taken as allowing any interference with established roads or crossroads,
or other things of like nature. Ib.
8. Public lands belonging to the United States, for whose sale or other
disposition Congress has made provision by general laws, are to be
regarded as legally open for entry and sale under such laws, unless
some particular lands have been withdrawn from sale by Congressional
authority, or by an executive withdrawal under such authority, either
express or implied. Lockhart v. Johnson, 516.
9. Under the act establishing the Court of Private Land Claims, public
lands belonging to the United States, though within the claimed limits
of a Mexican grant, became open to entry and sale. Ib.
10. If the provisions of the laws of New Mexico in force when this location
was made were not complied with, and another location is made be-
fore such work was done, the new location is a valid location. Ib.
11. In the courts of the United States in action of ejectment the strict legal
title must prevail; and if the plaintiff have only equities, they must be
presented on the equity side of the court. Ib.
12. Although the plaintiff has no right to maintain this action, he ought
not to be embarrassed by a judgment here from pursuing any other
remedy against the defendants, or either of them that he may be ad-
vised. Ib.
1. Article 5043c of the Revised Statutes of Texas, 1895, provides: "It shall
be the duty of the commission provided for in article 5043a to protect
the domestic animals of this State from all contagious or infectious
diseases of a malignant character, whether said diseases exist in Texas
or elsewhere; and for this purpose they are hereby authorized and
empowered to establish, maintain and enforce such quarantine lines
and sanitary rules and regulations as they may deem necessary. It
shall also be the duty of said commission to coöperate with live stock
quarantine commissioners and officers of other States and Territories,
and with the United States Secretary of Agriculture, in establishing
such interstate quarantine lines, rules and regulations as shall best
protect the live stock industry of this State against Texas or splenetic
fever. It shall be the duty of said commission, upon receipt by them
of reliable information of the existence among the domestic animals
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