SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTO
It is now here ordered by the Court that the Territory of Hawaii be, and it is hereby, assigned to the Ninth Judicial Circuit under Section fifteen of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891.
1. The Harter act, so-called, does not relieve the ship owner from liability
for damages caused by the unseaworthy condition of his ship at the
commencement of her voyage. International Navigation Co. v. Farr &
Bailey Manufacturing Co., 218.
2. Nor is the ship owner exempted from liability under that act, “for dam-
age or loss resulting from faults or errors of navigation, or in the man-
agement of said vessel," unless it appears that she was actually sea-
worthy when she started or that the owner had exercised due diligence
to make her so in all respects. Ib.
3. The mere fact that the owner provides a vessel properly constructed
and equipped is not conclusive that the owner has exercised due dili-
gence within the meaning of the act, for the diligence required is dili-
gence on the part of all the owner's servants in the use of the equip-
ment before the commencement of the voyage and until it has actually
commenced; and the law recognizes no distinction founded on the
character of the servants employed to accomplish that result. Ib.
4. Whether a ship is reasonably fit to carry her cargo is a question to be
determined on all the facts and circumstances, and the difference in
the facts of this case from those in The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, was such
that the Court of Appeals was at liberty to reach a different result. Ib.
5. In a suit for a collision against a vessel navigated by charterers, it is
competent for the court to entertain a petition by the general owners
that the charterers be required to appear and show cause why they
should not be held primarily liable for the damages occasioned by the
collision. The Barnstable, 464.
6. A ship is liable in rem for damages occasioned by a collision through
the negligence of the charterers having her in possession and navigat-
ing her. Ib.
7. If a stipulation in the charter party that "the owners shall pay for the in-
surance on the vessel" imposes any other duty on the owner than that
of paying the premiums, it goes no farther than to render them liable
for losses covered by an ordinary policy of insurance against perils of
the sea; and as such policy would not cover damage done to another
vessel by a collision with the vessel insured, the primary liability for
such damage rests upon the charterers, who undertook to navigate the
vessel with their own officers and crew, and not upon the owners. Ib.
1. A decree of the highest court of a State, giving full faith and credit to a
decree in another State for alimony, cannot be reviewed by this court
on writ of error sued out by the defendant. Lynde v. Lynde, 183.
2. The refusal of the highest court of a State to give effect to so much of a
decree in another State, as awards alimony in the future, and requires
a bond, sequestration, a receiver and injunction, to secure payment of
past and future alimony, presents no Federal question for the review
of this court. Ib.
3. Alimony, whether in arrear at the time of an adjudication in bankruptcy,
or accruing afterwards, is not provable in bankruptcy, or barred by the
discharge. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 575.
Under the law of Oregon which was in force in Alaska when the seizure
and levy of the plaintiff's goods were made by the defendant as mar-
shal of Alaska under a writ of attachment, that officer could not, by
virtue of his writ, lawfully take the property from the possession of a
third person, in whose possession he found it. Marks v. Shoup, 562.
A bankrupt, nine days before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
him, made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors which
was an act of bankruptcy. After the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, the assignee sold the property. After the adjudication in bank-
ruptcy, and before the appointment of a trustee, the petitioning credi-
tors applied to the District Court for an order to the marshal to take
possession of the property, alleging that this was necessary for the in-
terest of the bankrupt's creditors. The court ordered that the marshal
take possession, and that notice be given to the purchaser to appear in
ten days and propound his claim to the property, or, failing to do so,
be decreed to have no right in it. The purchaser came in, and pro-
pounded a claim, stating that he bought the property for cash in good
faith of the assignee, submitted his claim to the court, asked for such
orders as might be necessary for his protection, and prayed that the
creditors be remitted to their claim against the assignee for the price,
or the price be ordered to be paid by the assignee into court and
paid over to the purchaser, who thereupon offered to rescind the pur-
chase and waive all further claim to the property. Held, that the
purchaser had no title in the property superior to the bankrupt's es-
tate, and that the equities between him and the creditors should be
determined by the District Court, bringing in the assignee if necessary.
Bryan v. Bernheimer, 188.
JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
1. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway Company v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, followed. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion v. Clyde Steamship Company, 29.
2. Brown v. Marion National Bank, 169 U. S. 416, followed on the point that
"if an obligee actually pays usurious interest as such, the usurious
transaction must be held to have occurred then, and not before, and
he must sue within two years thereafter." Dangerfield National Bank
v. Ragland, 45.
3. Orient Insurance Company v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Waters-Pierce Com-
pany v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28; New York Life Insurance Company v.
Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, approved and affirmed. Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Warren, 73.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19 to 23;
COURT AND JURY, 1.
This case distinguished from Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. Ras-
mussen v. Idaho, 198.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
One who pays to government officers, entitled to receive money for public
lands, more than the law required him to pay for it cannot recover that
excess in an action against the Government in the Court of Claims.
United States v. Edmondston, 500.
1. There is no body of Federal common law, separate and distinct from the
common law existing in the several States, in the sense that there is a
body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and distinct from the
body of statutes enacted by the several States. Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Call Publishing Co., 92.
2. The principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate com-
mercial transactions, except so far as they are modified by Congres-
sional enactment. Ib.
1. After the Supreme Court of South Carolina had construed the mortgage
contract in accord with the claim of the plaintiffs, and gave judgment
accordingly, in an application for a rehearing it was set up for the first
time that this was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
Held, that this came too late. Eastern Building Association v. Welling,
2. The assertion that, although no Federal question was raised below, and
although the mind of the state court was not directed to the fact that
a right protected by the Constitution of the United States was relied
on, nevertheless it is the duty of this court to look into the record and
determine whether the existence of such a claim was not necessarily in-
volved, was unsound, as shown by authority. Ib.
3. Section 3625 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio dealing with the subject of
|