Internet and Network Economics: First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005, ProceedingsXiaotie Deng, Yinyu Ye Springer, 2005. gada 25. nov. - 1106 lappuses WINE 2005, the First Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005), took place in Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005. The symposium aims to provide a forum for researchers working in Internet and Network Economic algorithms from all over the world. The final count of electronic submissions was 372, of which 108 were accepted. It consists of the main program of 31 papers, of which the submitter email accounts are: 10 from edu (USA) accounts, 3 from hk (Hong Kong), 2 each from il (Isreal), cn (China), ch (Switzerland), de (Germany), jp (Japan), gr (Greece), 1 each from hp. com, sohu. com, pl (Poland), fr (France), ca (Canada), and in (India). In addition, 77 papers from 20 countries or regions and 6 dot. coms were selected for 16 special focus tracks in the areas of Internet and Algorithmic Economics; E-Commerce Protocols; Security; Collaboration, Reputation and Social Networks; Algorithmic Mechanism; Financial Computing; Auction Algorithms; Online Algorithms; Collective Rationality; Pricing Policies; Web Mining Strategies; Network Economics; Coalition Strategies; Internet Protocols; Price Sequence; Equilibrium. We had one best student paper nomination: “Walrasian Equilibrium: Hardness, Approximations and Tracktable Instances” by Ning Chen and Atri Rudra. We would like to thank Andrew Yao for serving the conference as its Chair, with inspiring encouragement and far-sighted leadership. We would like to thank the International Program Committee for spending their valuable time and effort in the review process. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 71.
24. lappuse
... edge is to fix a price which can fetch the maximum money for it and the objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source. In this problem, the edges ...
... edge is to fix a price which can fetch the maximum money for it and the objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source. In this problem, the edges ...
27. lappuse
... edge is to fix a price which can fetch maximum money for it and, at the same time, objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source. In order to map ...
... edge is to fix a price which can fetch maximum money for it and, at the same time, objective of each sink is to buy capacities on edges in such a way that it can facilitate the sink to pull maximum flow from the source. In order to map ...
28. lappuse
... edge prices. We observe that equilibrium prices are essentially unique in the following sense: for each sink ti, the cost of the path from source to the sink is the same in all equilibria. We call the cost of the path from source to the ...
... edge prices. We observe that equilibrium prices are essentially unique in the following sense: for each sink ti, the cost of the path from source to the sink is the same in all equilibria. We call the cost of the path from source to the ...
29. lappuse
... edge would be marked either red or green. If an edge e is marked as green then it means that primal feasibility condition fe≤ ce is being satisfied at that edge. Initially, all the edges are red and the subroutine make-green converts ...
... edge would be marked either red or green. If an edge e is marked as green then it means that primal feasibility condition fe≤ ce is being satisfied at that edge. Initially, all the edges are red and the subroutine make-green converts ...
30. lappuse
... edge (u, v) carries a flow less than or equal to its capacity then turn this edge into green. Otherwise, let Z be the set of vertices reachable from v by following green zero price edges. Z is called a zero component of the edge (u, v) ...
... edge (u, v) carries a flow less than or equal to its capacity then turn this edge into green. Otherwise, let Z be the set of vertices reachable from v by following green zero price edges. Z is called a zero component of the edge (u, v) ...
Saturs
3 | |
24 | |
46 | |
70 | |
92 | |
New Algorithms for Mining the Reputation of Participants of Online | 112 |
Prediction Games | 129 |
On the Structure and Complexity of WorstCase Equilibria | 151 |
Efficient Algorithms for the Electric Power Transaction Problem | 602 |
A Framework on Compound Knowledge Push System Oriented | 622 |
Effective Decision Making by Selfevaluation in the Multiagent | 631 |
An Adaptive GroupBased Reputation System in PeertoPeer Networks | 651 |
Optimal Pricing for Web Search Engines | 670 |
Packing Trees in Communication Networks | 688 |
Incentive Compatible Multiagent Constraint Optimization | 708 |
Capacity | 728 |
SubjectiveCost Policy Routing | 174 |
A Simple GraphTheoretic Model for Selfish Restricted Scheduling | 195 |
A Cost Mechanism for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage | 210 |
A Delay Pricing Scheme for RealTime Delivery in DeadlineBased | 225 |
The Price of Anarchy of Cournot Oligopoly | 246 |
Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation | 268 |
Practical ZeroKnowledge Arguments from ΣProtocols | 288 |
The Bahncard Problem with Interest Rate and Risk | 307 |
Time IntervalBased Prepaid Charging of QoSEnabled IP Services | 325 |
ModelBased Analysis of Money Accountability in Electronic Purses | 346 |
Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation of ECommerce and Process | 366 |
Application of Integrated Web ServicesBased EBusiness and | 375 |
Formal Analysis and Improvement of the State Transition Model | 391 |
Secure FingerprintBased Remote User Authentication Scheme Using | 405 |
Effective Filtering for Collaborative Publishing | 424 |
An Architecture for Evolutionary Adaptive Web Systems | 444 |
A Class of Possibilistic Portfolio Selection Models and Algorithms | 464 |
A New Algorithm Based on Copulas for Financial Risk Calculation | 481 |
An Efficient IdentityBased Key Exchange Protocol with KGS Forward | 500 |
Total Dominating Set Games | 520 |
Computerized Collaborative Support for Enhancing Humans Creativity | 545 |
Online Bin Packing of Fragile Objects with Application in Cellular | 564 |
On Solving Coverage Problems in a Wireless Sensor Network Using | 584 |
Design of P2P Grid Networking Architecture Using kRedundancy | 748 |
Combination of LP and | 758 |
FixedPoint Model and Schedule Reliability of Morning Commuting | 777 |
Majority Equilibrium of Distribution Centers Allocation in Supply | 793 |
An Analysis of Search Engine Switching Behavior Using Click Streams | 806 |
Traffic Models for CommunityBased Ranking and Navigation | 826 |
Semantic Web Recommender System Based Personalization Service | 848 |
Winner Determination in Discount Auctions | 868 |
On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction | 878 |
Why Do Information Gatekeepers Charge Zero Subscription Fees? | 895 |
On Modeling Internet QoS Provisioning from Economic Models | 916 |
An Economic | 936 |
Secure Construction of Virtual Organizations in Grid Computing | 959 |
Nash Equilibria and Dominant Strategies in Routing | 979 |
Heuristic Approaches to Service Level Agreements in Packet | 1003 |
A Fixed Point Approach for the Computation of Market Equilibria | 1013 |
Nash Equilibria in AllOptical Networks | 1033 |
Price of Anarchy Locality Gap and a Network Service Provider Game | 1046 |
Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete | 1066 |
Expectations Asymmetries and Contributions | 1087 |
Author Index | 1103 |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Internet and Network Economics: First International Workshop, WINE 2005 ... Xiaotie Deng Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2005 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agent algorithm allocation analysis approximation approximation algorithm assume auction behavior Berlin Heidelberg 2005 bidder bound buyer communication competitive ratio Computer consider constraints cost defined demand Deng denote distribution economic edge efficient Electronic Commerce evaluation exists fully mixed Nash game theory graph incentive compatible input Internet Lemma linear linear programming LNCS machine maximize mechanism mixed strategy multicast Nash equilibrium node NP-hard optimal packet packing problem paper parameters payment payoff peers players polynomial price of anarchy probability problem Proof proposed protocol pure strategy random reputation resource routing satisfies schedule scheme search engine selection sellers server smartcard solution Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg Steiner tree strategy structure Theorem tion traffic transaction variables vector vertex Walrasian equilibrium web service Ye Eds