Internet and Network Economics: First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005, ProceedingsXiaotie Deng, Yinyu Ye Springer, 2005. gada 25. nov. - 1106 lappuses WINE 2005, the First Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005), took place in Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005. The symposium aims to provide a forum for researchers working in Internet and Network Economic algorithms from all over the world. The final count of electronic submissions was 372, of which 108 were accepted. It consists of the main program of 31 papers, of which the submitter email accounts are: 10 from edu (USA) accounts, 3 from hk (Hong Kong), 2 each from il (Isreal), cn (China), ch (Switzerland), de (Germany), jp (Japan), gr (Greece), 1 each from hp. com, sohu. com, pl (Poland), fr (France), ca (Canada), and in (India). In addition, 77 papers from 20 countries or regions and 6 dot. coms were selected for 16 special focus tracks in the areas of Internet and Algorithmic Economics; E-Commerce Protocols; Security; Collaboration, Reputation and Social Networks; Algorithmic Mechanism; Financial Computing; Auction Algorithms; Online Algorithms; Collective Rationality; Pricing Policies; Web Mining Strategies; Network Economics; Coalition Strategies; Internet Protocols; Price Sequence; Equilibrium. We had one best student paper nomination: “Walrasian Equilibrium: Hardness, Approximations and Tracktable Instances” by Ning Chen and Atri Rudra. We would like to thank Andrew Yao for serving the conference as its Chair, with inspiring encouragement and far-sighted leadership. We would like to thank the International Program Committee for spending their valuable time and effort in the review process. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 77.
56. lappuse
... agents who have chosen s. Consider, for example, the selfish scheduling game in which there are n jobs owned by independent agents, m machines, and a processing time pij for job i on machine j. Each agent selects a machine on which to ...
... agents who have chosen s. Consider, for example, the selfish scheduling game in which there are n jobs owned by independent agents, m machines, and a processing time pij for job i on machine j. Each agent selects a machine on which to ...
57. lappuse
... agent whose goal is to minimize the completion time of his own job. To induce these selfish agents to take globally ... agent's strategy set is the set of possible machines {1, ..., m}. Given a strategy profile, the disutility of agent i ...
... agent whose goal is to minimize the completion time of his own job. To induce these selfish agents to take globally ... agent's strategy set is the set of possible machines {1, ..., m}. Given a strategy profile, the disutility of agent i ...
61. lappuse
... agent's disutility is the expected completion time of his job. We begin by computing the condition under which an agent has an incentive to change strategies. Consider a job i on machine j and let Jj be the set of jobs assigned to ...
... agent's disutility is the expected completion time of his job. We begin by computing the condition under which an agent has an incentive to change strategies. Consider a job i on machine j and let Jj be the set of jobs assigned to ...
70. lappuse
... agents control and provide access to different resources - edges and/or nodes, of the network for a price. In addition, one other agent, hereafter called the buying agent, associates a certain level of utility, in traversing the network ...
... agents control and provide access to different resources - edges and/or nodes, of the network for a price. In addition, one other agent, hereafter called the buying agent, associates a certain level of utility, in traversing the network ...
71. lappuse
... agent indicates his budget limitation (which may be a proxy for the utility he obtains) in going from node s to node t. The N agents owning the edges/nodes in the network then agree to cooperate among themselves to identify a shortest ...
... agent indicates his budget limitation (which may be a proxy for the utility he obtains) in going from node s to node t. The N agents owning the edges/nodes in the network then agree to cooperate among themselves to identify a shortest ...
Saturs
3 | |
24 | |
46 | |
70 | |
92 | |
New Algorithms for Mining the Reputation of Participants of Online | 112 |
Prediction Games | 129 |
On the Structure and Complexity of WorstCase Equilibria | 151 |
Efficient Algorithms for the Electric Power Transaction Problem | 602 |
A Framework on Compound Knowledge Push System Oriented | 622 |
Effective Decision Making by Selfevaluation in the Multiagent | 631 |
An Adaptive GroupBased Reputation System in PeertoPeer Networks | 651 |
Optimal Pricing for Web Search Engines | 670 |
Packing Trees in Communication Networks | 688 |
Incentive Compatible Multiagent Constraint Optimization | 708 |
Capacity | 728 |
SubjectiveCost Policy Routing | 174 |
A Simple GraphTheoretic Model for Selfish Restricted Scheduling | 195 |
A Cost Mechanism for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage | 210 |
A Delay Pricing Scheme for RealTime Delivery in DeadlineBased | 225 |
The Price of Anarchy of Cournot Oligopoly | 246 |
Enforcing Truthful Strategies in Incentive Compatible Reputation | 268 |
Practical ZeroKnowledge Arguments from ΣProtocols | 288 |
The Bahncard Problem with Interest Rate and Risk | 307 |
Time IntervalBased Prepaid Charging of QoSEnabled IP Services | 325 |
ModelBased Analysis of Money Accountability in Electronic Purses | 346 |
Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation of ECommerce and Process | 366 |
Application of Integrated Web ServicesBased EBusiness and | 375 |
Formal Analysis and Improvement of the State Transition Model | 391 |
Secure FingerprintBased Remote User Authentication Scheme Using | 405 |
Effective Filtering for Collaborative Publishing | 424 |
An Architecture for Evolutionary Adaptive Web Systems | 444 |
A Class of Possibilistic Portfolio Selection Models and Algorithms | 464 |
A New Algorithm Based on Copulas for Financial Risk Calculation | 481 |
An Efficient IdentityBased Key Exchange Protocol with KGS Forward | 500 |
Total Dominating Set Games | 520 |
Computerized Collaborative Support for Enhancing Humans Creativity | 545 |
Online Bin Packing of Fragile Objects with Application in Cellular | 564 |
On Solving Coverage Problems in a Wireless Sensor Network Using | 584 |
Design of P2P Grid Networking Architecture Using kRedundancy | 748 |
Combination of LP and | 758 |
FixedPoint Model and Schedule Reliability of Morning Commuting | 777 |
Majority Equilibrium of Distribution Centers Allocation in Supply | 793 |
An Analysis of Search Engine Switching Behavior Using Click Streams | 806 |
Traffic Models for CommunityBased Ranking and Navigation | 826 |
Semantic Web Recommender System Based Personalization Service | 848 |
Winner Determination in Discount Auctions | 868 |
On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction | 878 |
Why Do Information Gatekeepers Charge Zero Subscription Fees? | 895 |
On Modeling Internet QoS Provisioning from Economic Models | 916 |
An Economic | 936 |
Secure Construction of Virtual Organizations in Grid Computing | 959 |
Nash Equilibria and Dominant Strategies in Routing | 979 |
Heuristic Approaches to Service Level Agreements in Packet | 1003 |
A Fixed Point Approach for the Computation of Market Equilibria | 1013 |
Nash Equilibria in AllOptical Networks | 1033 |
Price of Anarchy Locality Gap and a Network Service Provider Game | 1046 |
Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete | 1066 |
Expectations Asymmetries and Contributions | 1087 |
Author Index | 1103 |
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Internet and Network Economics: First International Workshop, WINE 2005 ... Xiaotie Deng Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2005 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agent algorithm allocation analysis approximation approximation algorithm assume auction behavior Berlin Heidelberg 2005 bidder bound buyer communication competitive ratio Computer consider constraints cost defined demand Deng denote distribution economic edge efficient Electronic Commerce evaluation exists fully mixed Nash game theory graph incentive compatible input Internet Lemma linear linear programming LNCS machine maximize mechanism mixed strategy multicast Nash equilibrium node NP-hard optimal packet packing problem paper parameters payment payoff peers players polynomial price of anarchy probability problem Proof proposed protocol pure strategy random reputation resource routing satisfies schedule scheme search engine selection sellers server smartcard solution Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg Steiner tree strategy structure Theorem tion traffic transaction variables vector vertex Walrasian equilibrium web service Ye Eds