appellee cannot be said to have assented to the appellant's act. So far as appears, the only copies that have been brought over are the one above mentioned and another, purchased for use but not for sale, by the president and manager of the appellant. The question is whether the omission of notice of the American copyright from the English publication, with the assent of the appellee, destroyed its rights, or, in other words, whether the requirement of the act of June. 18, 1874, chapter 301, section 1, 18 Stat., 78, (Rev. Stat., sec. 4962,) that notice shall be inserted "in the several copies of every edition published" extends to publications abroad. The circuit court sustained the defendant's contention and dismissed the bill. Rep. 768.) The circuit court of appeals reversed this decision, (146 Fed. Rep., 354; 76 C. C. A., 470,) and the case is brought to this Court by appeal. (140 Fed. Notwithstanding the elaborateness of the arguments addressed to us and the difference of opinion in the courts below, there is not a great deal to be said, and the answer seems to us plain. Of course, Congress could attach what conditions it saw fit to its grant, but it is unlikely that it would make requirements of personal action beyond the sphere of its control. Especially is it unlikely that it would require a warning to the public against the infraction of a law beyond the jurisdiction where that law was in force. The reasons for doing so have not grown less, yet in the late statute giving copyright for foreign publications the notice is necessary only in "all copies of such books sold or distributed in the United States." (Act of March 3, 1905, c. 1432, 33 Stat., 1000, amending Rev. Stat., sec. 4952.) So it is decided that the section punishing a false notice, which naturally would be coextensive with the requirement of notice, did not extend to false statements affixed abroad. (McLoughlin v. Raphael Tuck Co., 191 U. S., 267.) The same conclusion would follow from the form prescribed for the notice, which would be inapt in foreign lands. It is said that the act of 1905 cannot affect the construction of the law under which the parties' rights were fixed, and it cannot, beyond illustrating a policy that has not changed. But the age of the condition affords another reason for confining it as the later condition is confined. When it first was attached, in 1802, there was little ground to anticipate the publication of American works abroad. As late as 1820 Sydney Smith, in the Edinburgh Review, made his famous exclamation," In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book?" If, however, there was a publication abroad, importation without the consent of the owner was forbidden in general terms, a fact giving another reason for the narrower construction of section 4962. If that was the true construction once, it is the construction still. Again, when the present act was passed, there was no foreign copyright for an American author, and Congress knew and he knew, as he knows now, if he contents himself with home protection, that his work might be reprinted without notice of any sort. Such reprints rather inconsistently are called piracies in argument. But whatever the moral aspects may be, the piracy is a legal right, and as such its exercise must be contemplated by the author. It does not matter whether he does so with regret at the loss of money or with joy at the prospect of fame, and it is difficult to see any greater difference between giving consent to the foreign publication and intentionally creating the opportunity, the inducement, and the right. But it hardly would be argued that because no copyright had been taken out in England and therefore the reprint there was lawful, an American copyright could be defeated by importing the English book and reprinting from that. (Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S., 123, 150.) It would be even bolder to say that the American author stood worse if in the days before he could get a copyright in England he had made an arrangement with English publishers to secure some payment from them. Yet that is the logic of the appellant's case. If a publication without notice of an American copyright did not affect the copyright before the days when it was possible to get an English copyright also, it is not to be supposed that Congress, by arranging with England for that possibility, gave a new meaning to the old section 4962, increasing the burden of American authors, and attempting to intrude its requirements into any notice that might be provided by the English law. The words of the section remained unchanged, notwithstanding the grant of a limited liberty of importation, while other sections were amended where there was reason for a change. It may be that in most cases the importation of a pirated English copy of an American book would be unlawful, whereas it is argued that the importation was lawful in the case at bar. The appellee makes a strong argument that the appellant's importation was wrong. But it is hard to see how the right to copy a book, whether lawfully or unlawfully imported, can be affected by the mode in which it got here. The analogies of the law are the other way. A person is subject to the jurisdiction, even if he was brought there by wrong. (Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S., 192.) A document is admissible in evidence, although it was improperly obtained. (Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass., 457, 470; 3 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2183.) The argument for the appellant dwells somewhat fancifully on the possibilities of innocence being led astray. All those possibilities might exist if a pirated volume should be smuggled into the United States. Moreover the appellant argues, with the support of the opinion of an Attorney General and a Solicitor General, that under section 4956 and its amendments two copies of an unauthorized edition lawfully might be imported for use. (21 Op. Att. Gen., 159, 162.) The statutes cannot be expected to do more than to secure the author and the public so far as is reasonably practicable. The obvious plan is not to be distorted by the chance that ingenuity may find some way to slip through the law uncaught. As we are satisfied that the statute does not require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and sold only for use there, we agree with the parties that it is unnecessary to discuss nice questions as to when a foreign reprint may or may not be imported into the United States under the present provisions of our law. Decree affirmed. [Supreme Court of the United States.] WHITE-SMITH MUSIC PUBLISHING COMPANY v. APOLLO COMPANY. COPYRIGHT Decided February 24, 1908. 133 O. G., 762. INFRINGEMENT-MUSICAL COMPOSITION. The copyright of a musical composition which is published in the form of sheet-music is not infringed by a perforated roll of paper designed to be used in connection with an automatic piano-player in reproducing the music recorded in the copyrighted sheets, since such perforated roll is not a "copy" within the meaning of the copyright statutes. Mr. Livingston Gifford for the appellant. Mr. Charles S. Burton, Mr. John J. O'Connell, Mr. John W. Munday, and Mr. Charles A. Brodek for the appellee. Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases may be considered together. They are appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit (147 Fed., 226,) affirming the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, rendered August 4, 1905 (139 Fed., 427,) dismissing bills of the complainant (now appellant) for want of equity. Motions have been made to dismiss the appeals, and a petition for writ of certiorari has been filed by appellant. In view of the nature of the cases the writ of certiorari is granted, the record on the appeals to stand as a return to the writs. (Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 204 U. S., 204.) The actions were brought to restrain infringement of the copyrights of two certain musical compositions, published in the form of sheet-music, entitled, respectively, "Little Cotton Dolly " and " Kentucky Babe." The appellee, defendant below, is engaged in the sale of piano-players and player-pianos, known as the "Apollo," and of perforated rolls of music used in connection therewith. The appellant, as assignee of Adam Geibel, the composer, alleged compliance with the Copyright Act, and that a copyright was duly obtained by it on or about March 17, 1897. The answer was general in its nature, and upon the testimony adduced a decree was rendered, as stated, in favor of the Apollo Company, defendant below, appellee here. The action was brought under the provisions of the Copyright Act, section 4952 (3 U. S. Comp. Stat., Sup. 1907, p. 1021,) giving to the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book, map, chart, dramatic, or musical composition the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same. The circuit courts of the United States are given jurisdiction under section 4970 (3 U. S. Comp. Stat., 3416) to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of courts of equity in copyright cases. The appellee is the manufacturer of certain musical instruments adapted to be used with perforated rolls. The testimony discloses that certain of these rolls, used in connection with such instruments, and being connected with the mechanism to which they apply, reproduce in sound the melody recorded in the two pieces of music copyrighted by the appellant. The manufacture of such instruments and the use of such musical rolls has developed rapidly in recent years in this country and abroad. The record discloses that in the year 1902 from seventy to seventyfive thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and that from one million to one million and a half of such perforated musical rolls, to be more fully described hereafter, were made in this country in that year. It is evident that the question involved in the use of such rolls is one of very considerable importance, involving large property interests, and closely touching the rights of composers and music publishers. The case was argued with force and ability, orally and upon. elaborate briefs. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the mechanical construction of such instruments and rolls, it is enough to say that they are what has become familiar to the public in the form of mechanical attachments to pianos, such as the pianola, and the musical rolls consist of perforated sheets, which are passed over ducts connected with the operating parts of the mechanism in such manner that the same are kept sealed until, by means of perforations in the rolls, air-pressure is admitted to the ducts which operate the pneumatic devices to sound the notes. This is done with the aid of an operator, upon whose skill and experience the success of the rendition largely depends. As the roll is drawn over the trackerboard the notes are sounded as the perforations admit the atmospheric pressure, the perforations having been so arranged that the effect is to produce the melody or tune for which the roll has been cut. Speaking in a general way, it may be said that these rolls are made in three ways. First. With the score or staff notation before him the arranger, with the aid of a rule or guide and a graduated schedule, marks the position and size of the perforations on a sheet of paper to correspond to the order of notes in the composition. The marked sheet is then passed into the hands of an operator who cuts the apertures, by hand, in the paper. This perforated sheet is inspected and corrected, and when corrected is called "the original." This original is used as a stencil and by passing ink-rollers over it a pattern is prepared. The stenciled perforations are then cut, producing the master or templet. The master is placed in the perforating-machine and reproductions thereof obtained, which are the perforated rolls in question. Expression-marks are separately copied on the perforated music-sheets by means of rubber stamps. Second. A perforated music-roll made by another manufacturer may be used from which to make a new record. Third. By playing upon a piano to which is attached an automatic recording device producing a perforated matrix from which a perforated music-roll may be produced. It is evident, therefore, that persons skilled in the art can take such pieces of sheet-music in staff notation, and by means of the proper instruments make drawings indicating the perforations, which are afterwards outlined and cut upon the rolls in such wise as to reproduce, with the aid of the other mechanism, the music which is recorded in the copyrighted sheets. The learned counsel for the parties to this action advance opposing theories as to the nature and extent of the copyright given by statutory laws enacted by Congress for the protection of copyright, and a determination of which is the true one will go far to decide the rights of the parties in this case. On behalf of the appellant it is insisted that it is the intention of the Copyright Act to protect the intellectual conception which has resulted in the compilation of notes which, when properly played, produces the melody which is the real invention of the composer. It is insisted that this is the thing which Congress intended to protect, and that the protection covers all means of expression of the order of notes which produce the air or melody which the composer has invented. Music, it is argued, is intended for the ear as writing is for the eye, and that it is the intention of the Copyright Act to prevent the multiplication of every means of reproducing the music of the composer to the ear. On the other hand, it is contended that while it is true that copyright statutes are intended to reward mental creations or conceptions, |