until after appellee made application for Letters Patent on his invention. What the evidence shows to have been done by appellant and his assignee, the United Shoe Machinery Company, was more in the nature of an experiment, than of any well-defined intention to apply within a reasonable time for a patent, or to put the machine into general commercial use. As to appellee's machine, there is no dispute as to his dates. The record clearly discloses that he put his machine into immediate and general use. A large number of the machines were sold and used in the vicinity of Cincinnati, Ohio. He promptly applied for a patent. He is here with no laches to account for, the prior applicant, and, we think, entitled to priority over appellant for the invention in controversy. With this state of facts before us, we fully agree with the conclusion of the Commissioner of Patents, in which he stated: It is rather remarkable that the utility of the Gordon machine was demonstrated after half a day's use, while to show the utility of a similar device it required the building of several machines and their trial for more than a year. Moreover, it seems improbable that a machine whose successful operation had been satisfactorily demonstrated should be thrown aside for about three years in order to experiment with a machine designed to accomplish substantially the same results, when all the time a machine of that character was urgently in demand. The explanation given for the delay in placing appellant's device on the market or if filing an application is regarded as of no substantial merit. The conduct of the inventor and his assignee is alone sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Gordon machine was only an abandoned experiment. But aside from this consideration it is believed that the testimony fails to overcome the burden imposed upon appellant of proving that the Gordon machine constituted in law a reduction to practice. Assuming, however, that the tests made by appellant constituted a legal reduction of the invention to practice, the mere fact alone that the invention was concealed and suppressed for a period of more than two years, during which time appellee invented his machine and put it upon the market, is sufficient, in our opinion, to defeat the right of appellant to priority over appellee. The Court, in Matthes v. Burt, (C. D., 1905, 574; 114 O. G., 764; 24 App. D. C., 265,) a case similar to the one before us, said: Having, then, completed the invention and satisfied himself of its utility, as claimed, Matthes deliberately concealed it, suppressing its use and withholding it from the public. How long he might have pursued this policy with no rival in the field is of course conjectural; but it is certain that he showed no substantial intention of change of policy until he had obtained definite knowledge of Burt's exploitation of the same invention. On the other hand, Burt, having no knowledge of Matthes's discovery, and encouraged and induced by the apparently unoccupied field, went diligently to work to perfect his invention and to put its product upon the market. He not only sold this product to the trade in large quantities, but promptly applied for a patent. On this state of facts, the Commissioner held that Matthes's right had become subordinate to that of Burt who was the first to invent in accordance with " the true policy and ends of the patent laws" as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kendall v. Winsor, (21 How., 322, 327, 328.) Viewing this case from any standpoint, we are of the opinion that the conclusions reached by the tribunals of the Patent Office are correct, and the decision of the Commissioner of Patents should be affirmed. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed, and the clerk is directed to certify these proceedings, as required by law. Affirmed. [Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.] Decided April 20, 1908. 135 O. G., 1126; 31 App. D. C., 269. PATENTABILITY-INVENTION-DOUBLE SPOTS FOR BOWLING-ALLEYS. Where it was old to provide spots in a bowling-alley to insure the accurate setting of the pins, claims covering two series of spots, one within the other, thereby to insure the correct setting of different kinds of pins having different-sized bases, not limited to any mechanical construction, set forth nothing which involves the exercise of the inventive faculty. Mr. L. S. Bacon, Mr. J. H. Milans, and Mr. C. T. Milans for the appellant. Mr. F. A. Tennant for the Commissioner of Patents. ROBB, J.: This appeal is from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents refusing to allow the following claims: 1. A double spot for bowling-alleys, one spot being arranged within another and having striking visually appreciable differentiating characteristics. 2. A double spot for bowling-alleys, one spot being arranged within the other and of striking contrasting colors. 3. In combination with pins of different base diameters, a bowling-alley having a double spot adapted to receive either of said pins consisting of one spot within another, the diameters of said spots corresponding to the diameters of said pins. 4. In combination with pins of different base diameters, a bowling-alley having a double spot adapted to receive either of said pins consisting of one spot within another, the diameters of said spots corresponding to the diameters of said pins and said spots being strikingly contrasting in appearance. 5. In combination with pins of different base diameters, a bowling-alley having spots whereby to accommodate either of said pins, the diameters of said spots corresponding to the diameters of said pins and said spots being strikingly contrasting in appearance. 6. In combination with pins of different base diameters, a bowling-alley having spots whereby to accommodate either of said pins, the diameters of said spots corresponding to the diameters of said pins, 14. As an article of manufacture, a double spot adapted for insertion in a bowling-alley, one spot being arranged within another and having striking visually appreciable differentiating characteristics. The object of the applicant, as stated in his specifications, is to provide a device comprising a spot within a spot, the larger adapted to center and support pins of a larger type such as tenpins, and the smaller to support pins of relatively smaller size such as candle or duck pins, and thereby to overcome objections to the single spots now employed and upon which various sizes of pins are alternately set at the will of the player. The Commissioner allowed claims Nos. 7 to 13, inclusive, covering the mechanical construction of the double spot of the rejected claims. We agree that applicant is not entitled to the broad claims of the issue, which as drawn cover much more than an article of manufacture. We fail to perceive invention in providing smaller spots within the single spots hitherto used. These single spots correspond to the base diameters of the ordinary tenpins and manifestly exact accuracy in placing the smaller pins can be attained only by providing spots of corresponding size which, if concentrically arranged, will necessarily fall within the larger spots and to be distinguishable must be of a different color. It is the policy of the patent law to deal liberally with inventors; nevertheless courts will not grant a monopoly unless convinced that invention is involved. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed, and the clerk of the court will certify this opinion and the proceedings in this court to the Commissioner of Patents as required by law. Affirmed. [Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.] ROSE v. CLIFFord and NewELL. ROSE v. NEWELL. CLIFFORD V. ROSE AND NEWELL. CLIFFORD . NEWELL. Decided April 7, 1908. 135 O. G., 1361; 31 App. D. C., 195. INTERFERENCE-PRIORITY-DELAY AFTER REDUCTION TO PRACTICE. After reduction to practice of an invention a mere delay of the inventor in applying for a patent, in the absence of concealment, abandonment, or suppression, will not prevent the inventor from getting a patent based upon priority of invention. Mr. J. D. Sullivan, Mr. W. Fowler, and Mr. C. Neave for the appellant Rose. Mr. J. H. Griffin and Mr. H. E. Davis for the appellant Clifford. Mr. A. S. Pattison and Mr. Philip Mauro for the appellee Newell. VAN ORSDEL, J.: These appeals come here from decisions rendered by the Commissioner of Patents in three separate interferences. Interference No. 23,780 involves all three of the parties. Both Rose and Clifford have appealed from the decision in this interference. Interference No. 23,781 involves only Clifford and Newell, from which decision Clifford has appealed. Interference No. 23,782 involves Rose and Newell. From this decision, Rose has appealed. The Commissioner of Patents awarded to Newell priority of invention on the following issue: 1. In a device of the class described, a cooling-chamber provided with an opening in its upper part, a liquid-receptacle provided with an opening, a container placed with its open mouth extending through said openings in the coolingchamber and said receptacle and adapted to be sealed by liquid in said receptacle, and means for drawing off liquid from said receptacle. 2. In a device of the class described, a cooling-chamber, a liquid-receptacle exposed to the action of said cooling-chamber, and provided with an opening in its upper part, a container placed with its open mouth projecting downwardly into said opening in the liquid-receptacle and adapted to be sealed by liquid therein, and means for drawing off liquid from said receptacle. The invention here in issue relates to an improvement on watercoolers, having a receptacle for water within a chamber for ice, so arranged that the receptacle containing the water is surrounded with ice. The water is drawn from the receptacle by means of a pipe, to which a faucet is attached.. The receptacle is supplied with water from a bottle, filled with water, and inverted so that the mouth of the bottle extends through a funnel, in which the inverted bottle rests, into the receptacle. The water passes from the bottle into the receptacle, until it rises to a level with the mouth of the bottle, when the liquid seals the mouth of the bottle. When water is drawn from the faucet, the water is lowered in the receptacle, until the air is permitted to enter the mouth of the bottle, when the water again flows into the receptacle and so continues until it rises to the mouth of the bottle and seals it. Rose alleges conception of the invention in August or September, 1901, and reduction to practice in February, 1902. His application was filed March 26, 1902. Clifford alleges conception in November, 1901, and reduction to practice in February, 1902. His application was filed April 14, 1902. Newell alleges conception and disclosure in the spring of 1899, and reduction to practice in the early summer of 1899. His application was filed July 22, 1902. It will be observed that Rose is the senior party in point of filing, and Newell is the junior party. Originality of invention is the issue involved between Clifford and Rose. Newell is an independent inventor, and claims to have conceived the invention and reduced it to practice prior to the date of conception alleged by either Rose or Clifford. The Examiner of Interferences found that Newell had not completed his invention at the date Rose filed his application, and that, as between Rose and Clifford, Clifford was the original inventor. He accordingly awarded priority to Clifford. The Board of Examiners-in-Chief reversed the Examiner, and awarded priority to Newell. The Commissioner of Patents affirmed the decision of the Board. Inasmuch as the same invention is involved in all three applications, it is important to consider, first, whether Newell established his conception of the invention and its reduction to practice prior to the dates alleged by Rose and Clifford. If he did, and is not estopped by concealment, suppression, or abandonment, it will be unnecessary to enter into the controversy between Rose and Clifford. Newell fixes the date of conception of his invention from the fact that in 1899 he was engaged in the business of making shoe-heels in a small shop on Wingate street, Haverhill, Mass. About this time he went into the distilled-water business. In looking about for a device by which the distilled water could be cooled, without the ice coming in direct contact with the water, he conceived the invention here in issue. He states that he purchased a still in the summer of 1899, and began selling distilled water the same fall. He also testified that he moved his place of business from Wingate street to Washington street, Haverhill, along about September 1, 1900. This date is verified by the introduction of his ledger showing an account with his Washington street landlord, in which it appears that he paid his first month's rent in October, 1900. No objection was made to the introduction of this ledger in evidence. A number of coolers were introduced in evidence by Newell. Exhibit No. 1 consisted of a coil of pipe extended through the icereceptacle, with a funnel at its upper end to receive the neck of the inverted bottle. Exhibits 2 and 3 contained different forms of receptacles for the water. Exhibit No. 4 contained a glass receptacle. Newell testified that he made these four exhibits and used them in his shop on Wingate street. He afterward corrected his evidence as to Exhibit No. 4, and stated that it was Exhibit No. 4 that was used on Wingate street, and, from reference to certain bills he found, that Exhibit No. 4 was not made until June, 1903. Newell is corroborated as to the construction and operation of these particular exhibits by two witnesses. All of these witnesses fix dates when Newell successfully operated Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, prior to any date claimed by either Rose or Clifford. These exhibits embrace the invention in controversy, which is neither complicated, nor difficult to comprehend. Without entering into an extended consideration of the evidence of the various witnesses, we can see no escape from the conclusion reached by the Commissioner of Patents. His logical and complete |