strong this word is commonly used in connection with the decoction. or infusion made therefrom, and the word "Strength" would be understood as indicating that the coffee-berries to which it was applied had a desirable quality-namely, that strong coffee could be made therefrom. The word "America's" is clearly geographical, being evidently the equivalent of the adjective "American."

Neither of these words could be registered alone, and a registrable trade-mark cannot be made by combining two non-registrable words. Such was the holding in ex parte J. W. Lewis & Co., (66 MS. Dec., 219,) where the words "Toledo Premium " were held to be not registrable as a trade-mark for dry goods. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia made a similar ruling in Kentucky's Distilleries and Warehouse Company v. Old Lexington Club Distillery Company, (post, 417, 135 O. G., 220; at the present term of the court and not yet published,) in which they held that the word "Club" was descriptive as applied to whisky, that "Lexington " was geographical, and that the combination of the two was not registrable.

Applicant contends that the manner in which he uses the mark shows that it is fanciful, the specimens accompanying the application showing the words "America's Strength" associated with a picture of" Uncle Sam " and with the representation of a battleship.

The answer to this contention is that applicant is not seeking to register the entire device appearing on the specimens, but merely the words "America's Strength." The obvious meaning of the words standing alone must be considered and not what meaning they might suggest if associated with certain pictures.

It must be held, therefore, that the action of the Examiner in refusing to register the mark was right.

The decision is affirmed.

WELLCOME v. BAUM.

Decided July 2, 1908.

135 O. G., 894.

TRADE-MARKS-OPPOSITION-VERIFICATION.

Section 6 of the Trade-Mark Act as amended March 2, 1907, construed and held not to require that a notice of opposition filed by an attorney shall be verified by him.

APPEAL from Examiner of Interferences.

TRADE-MARK FOR SUPPOSITORIES FOR THE NASAL PASSAGES.

Messrs. Hervey & Barber for Wellcome.

Messrs. Mann & Co. for Baum.

BILLINGS, Assistant Commissioner:

This is an appeal by Henry Solomon Wellcome from the decision of the Examiner of Interferences dismissing a notice of opposition

filed in his behalf by Hervey & Barber, his duly authorized attorneys, to the registration of trade-mark application No. 30,307.

The notice of opposition signed by the attorneys of Wellcome was filed within thirty days following the publication of the mark, but was not verified. The Examiner of Interferences of his own motion dismissed the notice of opposition upon the ground that verification is an essential element of a notice of opposition under the statute and that no verified notice was filed within the thirty days, citing the Commissioner's decision in the case of W. H. Baker v. Baker, (C. D., 1906, 337; 124 O. G., 909.)

After the above action of the Examiner of Interferences, but within what is believed to be a reasonable time in view of the showing that Wellcome was traveling abroad, the notice of opposition was duly verified by the opposer, Wellcome, the verification being made at Biarritz, France, before the American consular agent, one of the officers mentioned in the Trade-Mark Act.

Section 6 of the Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, contained the following provision:

Any person who believes he would be damaged by the registration of a mark may oppose the same by filing notice of opposition, stating the grounds therefor, in the Patent Office within thirty days after the publication of the mark sought to be registered, which said notice of opposition shall be verified by the person filing the same before one of the officers mentioned in section two of this act.

The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the case of Martin v. Martin and Bowne Company, C. D., 1906, 642; 122 O. G., 734; 27 App. D. C., 59,) concerning the above statutory provision, said:

We agree with the Commissioner of Patents that where a statute requires an oath to be made by a party, as in this instance the one who may believe himself damaged, it is not satisfied by the affidavit of his attorney or agent. The intent of the lawmakers is to be found in the plain language of their enactment. Consideration of inconvenience and hardship growing out of the brief period allowed for the opposition, or the absence of the damaged party, as was the case here, may well operate upon the makers of the law, but cannot justify a judicial addition to the letter of the statute.

In order to provide a remedy for the inconvenience and the hardship amounting to an impossibility of filing an opposition in some cases, due to the brief period allowed for filing the opposition, as noted in the above court decision, Congress amended section 6 of the Trade-Mark Act by adding at the end of the above provision the proviso that

An opposition may be filed by a duly-authorized attorney, but such opposition shall be null and void unless verified by the opposer within a reasonable time after such filing.

Said amendment was approved March 2, 1907. Otherwise said section remains unchanged.

This case presents for consideration the single question whether an opposition filed within thirty days by the duly-authorized attorney and subsequently verified by the opposer within a reasonable time, as provided by the amendment, is null and void because not verified by the attorney at the time it was filed. The amendment to the statute does not require that an opposition filed by an attorney shall be verified by him, but said amendment does expressly state that

such opposition shall be null and void unless verified by the opposer within a reasonable time after such filing.

This provision clearly applies whether or not the notice of opposition was verified by the attorney at the time he filed it.

The preceding provision of the section heretofore quoted provides merely for the filing of a notice of opposition by "the person who believes he would be damaged" and states further:

the same.

which said notice of opposition shall be verified by the person filing

The court, as noted above, held that this provision requires the verification of the person damaged and not that of his attorney or agent. It is not apparent, therefore, how this provision affords any warrant for holding that the notice of opposition filed by the attorney under the provision added by the amendment must be verified by him.

Moreover, in the absence of a statutory requirement for a verification by the attorney no good reason is found for requiring it. Verification by both the attorney and his principal would appear to be useless. Under the statute the verification by the attorney cannot take the place of the verification by the party damaged, and unless the opposition is verified by the party damaged it is held null and void and cannot form the basis for any proceeding, whether or not it is verified by the attorney. In the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice (vol. 22, pp. 1016 and 1017) it is stated:

11. OBJECT OF VERIFICATION.-Under Modern Codes and Statutes the object of requiring a verification of pleadings would seem to be to insure good faith in the averments of the party and to avoid sham and frivolous pleas.

111. IN EQUITY-1. VERIFICATION OF BILL-a. NECESSITY FOR VERIFICATION— (1) IN GENERAL.-As a general rule, in the absence of a statute or rule requiring verification, bills in equity need not be verified except when preliminary relief is sought or where it is sought to transfer into equity matters usually cognizable at law.

Concerning the necessity of requiring a verification by the attorney as an assurance that he files the notice of opposition in good faith, it is noted that section 14 of the Trade-Mark Act requires that a fee of ten dollars must accompany the filing of the notice of opposition. This requirement, together with the provisions that the notice filed

by the attorney shall be null and void unless verified by the party damaged within a reasonable time, is believed to afford ample guarantee that the notice of opposition is filed in good faith.

The Commissioner's decision in W. H. Baker v. Baker, supra, that a notice of opposition unaccompanied by a verification is ineffectual, cited as controlling by the Examiner of Interferences, was rendered prior to the amendment of the Trade-Mark Act. It relates only to notices of opposition filed by the party damaged and not by his attorney. It is likewise true that under the amendment to the section an unverified opposition is null and void; but the very purpose of the amendment appears to be to permit the notice to be verified within a reasonable time after the filing thereof by the party damaged, who of all persons is the one best qualified to make the verification.

For the reason stated the decision of the Examiner of Interferences must be reversed.

BROWN V. INWOOD AND Lavenberg.

Decided July 15, 1908.

135 O. G., 895.

INTERFERENCE-SUSPENSION OF PROCEEDINGS-DISCRETION OF THE EXAMINER OF INTERFERENCES.

The Commissioner will exercise his supervisory authority to review the decision of the Examiner of Interferences refusing to suspend an interference proceeding only where it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion operating to the injury of one of the parties.

ON PETITION.

MEANS FOR MAKING BOX-BLANKS.

Messrs. Bulkley & Durand and Messrs. Davis and Davis for Brown.

Messrs. Dyrenforth, Dyrenforth & Lee for Inwood and Lavenberg. MOORE, Commissioner:

This is a petition by Healey, the assignee of Brown, the junior party to the above-entitled interference, that proceedings be suspended for six months.

A motion requesting said suspension was denied by the Examiner of Interferences, as was also a second motion for the same purpose. Petitioner contends that said decisions were harsh and inequitable, and he brings this petition asking that the suspension be granted under the exercise of the supervisory authority of the Commissioner. It is the settled practice that this authority will not be exercised

except when it appears that there has been a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the lower tribunal operating to the injury of one of the parties.

It appears that a suit is pending in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Indiana which involves the question of the title to the invention of the issue and that the master in chancery has formulated a tentative report finding that Healy is entitled to ownership of the invention and to a conveyance of the Inwood and Lavenberg applications.

The Examiner of Interferences in his decisions points out that a diffierent question is involved in the interference proceeding; that the decision in the court case will not settle the question of priority of invention; that in any event it will probably be years before a final decision is rendered by the courts, and that it would be a hardship upon petitioner's opponents and contrary to the settled practice of the Office to grant such a suspension under the circumstances here presented.

The affidavits filed in support of the petition have been carefully examined; but no error is found in the decisions of the Examiner of Interferences and no occasion is here presented calling for the exercise of the supervisory authority of the Commissioner.

The petition is denied.

GEORGE WOSTENHOLM & SON, LIMITED, v. CROWLEY.

OPPOSITION.

Decided June 8, 1908.

135 O. G., 1121.

TRADE-MARKS-APPEAL-REFUSAL TO DISMISS OPPOSITION-NON-APPEALABLE. No appeal lies from a decision of the Examiner of Interferences refusing to dismiss a notice of opposition on the ground that the notice was not signed in conformity with the law.

APPEAL ON MOTION.

TRADE-MARK FOR HAND SEWING-NEEDLES.

Mr. Charles C. Gill and Mr. Wm. G. Henderson for George Wostenholm & Son, Limited.

Messrs. Munn & Co. for Crowley.

BILLINGS, Assistant Commissioner:

This is an appeal by Crowley from a decision of the Examiner of Interferences denying a motion to dismiss the opposition filed by appellee.