any one the right of C. L. Hauthaway & Sons, Inc., to register the mark is not affected thereby. Its use of the term "Hauthaway's" had undoubtedly been exclusive for the ten years next preceding the passage of the Trade-Mark Act. There being, therefore, no bar to the registration by C. L. Hauthaway & Sons, Inc., of the term "Hauthaway's" as a trade-mark for burnishing-ink, there is nothing in the statute to prevent the registration of that term in connection with the name of an article of commerce. The decision of the Examiner of Interferences dismissing the application for cancelation is affirmed. ROCKSTROH v. WARNOCK. PATENT INTERFERENCE. Decided December 11, 1907. 132 O. G., 234. 1. INTERFERENCE-MOTION TO DISSOLVE-TIME FOR BRINGING. A party may under Rule 122 wait till the thirtieth day after the approval of the preliminary statements to bring a motion to dissolve; but if he brings it before the thirtieth day he waives his right to the remainder of the period. 2. SAME-SAME-AMENDED MOTION-TRANSMISSION. Where a party acting in good faith files a motion which is held to be indefinite and an amended motion curing the informalities is promptly filed within the limit of appeal set from the previous decision, the amended motion should be transmitted. 3. SAME-SAME-SAME-EXPERIMENTAL PROSECUTION. A party cannot be permitted to prosecute a case experimentally, and where the amended motion does not cure the informalities pointed out in the first decision a third motion is entitled to no consideration. APPEAL ON MOTION. PRINTING-PLATE HOLDER. Mr. Harold Serrell for Rockstroh. Mr. George L. Cragg and Mr. L. S. Bacon for Warnock. BILLINGS, Assistant Commissioner: This is an appeal by Rockstroh from a decision of the Examiner of Interferences refusing to transmit a motion to dissolve. The preliminary statements were approved August 16, 1907, and the time within which to bring motion was set to expire September 17, 1907. On August 31, 1907, Rockstroh brought a motion to dis solve on two grounds—(1) that there is no interference in fact; (2) that the party Warnock has no right to make the claim of the issue. The Examiner of Interferences on September 5, 1907, refused to transmit the motion for the reason that it was not accompanied by a statement of the facts relied upon in support of the same of such a definite and particular character as is required by the present practice, as set forth in several decisions, which were cited. The limit of appeal was set to expire September 20, 1907. Rockstroh did not appeal from this decision; but on September 7, 1907, filed another motion on the same grounds, but enlarging a little as to the facts upon which he relied. On September 11, 1907, the Examiner of Interferences denied this motion, for the reason that, as to the first ground, the particular terms of the counts which were regarded as capable of supporting different meanings were not pointed out, and, as to the second ground, that the particular facts relied on to show that Warnock had no right to make the claims were not set forth with the particularity required by the decisions cited in disposing of the prior motion. The limit of appeal was set to expire September 18, 1907. Rockstroh did not appeal from this decision, but on September 12, 1907, filed a third motion to dissolve on the same grounds as the other two. The Examiner of Interferences on September 20 refused to transmit the motion, for the reason that the failure to present the motion in proper form at the second attempt must have been due to a lack of care in preparing it and that therefore a third motion was entitled to no consideration. He denied transmission also as to the first ground, for the reason that the language of the issue, which was believed by the moving party to be capable of different meanings, was not specifically stated. Rule 122 provides that motions must be brought, if possible, not later than the thirtieth day after the preliminary statements have been opened. A party may therefore wait till the thirtieth day to bring his motion; but if he brings it before the thirtieth day he waives all right to the remainder of the period. It has recently been held in Gold v. Gold (C. D., 1907, 377; 131 O. G., 1442) that when a party acting in good faith files a motion which is held to be indefinite and an amended motion curing the informalities is promptly filed within the limit of appeal set from the prior decision the Examiner of Interferences should transmit the second or amended motion. This does not mean, however, that an applicant can bring motions indefinitely. He cannot be permitted to present his case experimentally. The Examiner of Interferences having denied the first motion because it was not sufficiently definite and having cited de cisions to show what the requirements of the Office are with respect to such motions, it was incumbent upon the moving party to draw his second motion strictly in accordance with the practice prescribed by these decisions. Having failed to do so, the third motion is entitled to no consideration. It is true that this motion was filed within the thirty days specified in the rules; but, as pointed out above, the moving party had waived the time remaining after bringing his first motion. Furthermore, the continued repetition of motions is a hardship not only to the opposing party, but to the Office. It unnecessarily consumes the time of every one concerned, causes them to perform much unnecessary labor, and involves the parties in needless expense. The decision of the Examiner of Interferences is affirmed. Where a party gave notice at the conclusion of the taking of his testimony that he proposed to bring a motion to amend his preliminary statement to conform to his proofs, but failed to bring the motion until after the testimony of the opposing party was taken and filed, although the error to be corrected by such amendment was known to him at least two months before notice of the proposed amendment was given, Held that amendment will not be permitted, as no excuse is offered for the delay and it does not appear that the evidence on which the motion was based was not accessible or would not have been discovered before preparing the original statement had proper care and diligence been exercised. APPEAL ON MOTION. TROUSERS-BOTTOMS. Mr. William H. Finckel for Green. BILLINGS, Assistant Commissioner: This is an appeal by Green from the decision of the Examiner of Interferences denying his motion for leave to amend his preliminary statement. Green's original preliminary statement, filed December 6, 1906, was objected to on the ground that it was not sufficiently definite, and he was given time within which to file an amended statement. In his second statement, filed December 26, 1906, Green alleged reduction to practice on May 10, 1905. By his proposed amended statement Green now desires to set up September 6, 1904, as his date of reduction to practice. Although counsel for Green gave notice on April 8, 1907, at the conclusion of the taking of testimony in behalf of Green, of his intention to file a motion to amend the preliminary statement, the motion to amend was not filed until June 18, 1907, after Farley had taken and filed his testimony. In the notice placed on the record of his intention to move for permission to amend his preliminary statement Green did not state definitely how he proposed to amend it, but merely that he would move to amend the preliminary statement in any particulars in which it may require amendment in order to conform to the allegations of fact supported by the foregoing testimony and that he shall use this foregoing testimony in support of such motion. (Green's record, p. 121.) Farley was ignorant, therefore, until after he had filed his testimony, of the dates upon which Green proposed to stand. The Examiner of Interferences denied the motion on the ground that it was not brought promptly after the discovery of the alleged error and because Green did not exercise proper care and diligence in the preparation of his preliminary statement. The testimony shows that Green discovered the error months before he made his motion to amend and, it is admitted, at least two months before he gave notice of his intention to make said motion. No satisfactory excuse is offered for the delay. It is claimed that the error was discovered when the time for taking testimony was approaching and Green was searching for testimony to support his case. It does not appear that this evidence was not accessible or would not have been discovered by Green at the time of preparing his original statement if he had used proper care and diligence. If a party is permitted to take his testimony and then to amend his statement to conform to said testimony, the purpose of the preliminary statement, dependent upon its being executed in ignorance of the other party's dates, is not fulfilled and the practice of requiring preliminary statements might as well be abandoned. No error is found in the decision of the Examiner of Interferences, and it is accordingly affirmed. PHILLIPS v. SENSENICH. PATENT INTERFERENCE. Decided June 11, 1907. 132 O. G., 677. 1. INTERFERENCE-PROOFS RESTRICTED BY ALLEGATIONS OF PRELIMINARY STATE MENT. Where the preliminary statement of a party alleges reduction to practice in January, 1905, evidence showing the construction of an alleged model in 1895 cannot be accepted as proving an earlier date of reduction to practice. 2. SAME ISSUE-CONSTRUCTION. The terms of an interference issue will not be given a strained or unnatural meaning or be construed to refer to something not disclosed by either party in order to include within the issue an early device made by one of the parties. 3. SAME-SUPPLEMENTAL OATH NECESSARY-EX PARTE MATTER. The question whether or not a supplemental oath should be required has been uniformly held by the Office to be an ex parte matter upon which the proper determination of priority is not dependent, and the absence of such an oath furnishes no ground for holding that the issue is not patentable to the party in whose case the same is required. 4. CLAIMS ALTERNATIVE EXPRESSIONS. Alternative expressions in claims are not generally permitted; but where two terms are employed to designate a particular element, both of which terms describe the element correctly, the claim is not objectionable, as the alternativeness is of language rather than of structure. (Ex parte Holder, C. D., 1903, 442; 107 O. G., 833.) APPEAL from Examiners-in-Chief. SELF-OILING CAR-WHEEL. Messrs. Connolly Brothers for Phillips. Mr. J. M. Nesbit and Mr. H. E. Peck for Sensenich. MOORE, Assistant Commissioner: This is an appeal from the decision of the Examiners-in-Chief affirming the decision of the Examiner of Interferences and awarding priority of invention to Sensenich upon the following issue: 1. A self-oiling wheel provided with an oil-chamber having a filling-opening, a valve-cage extending into the chamber from the filling-opening, the cage being open at its inner end and having slitted or prong-like sides, an inwardly-opening valve operative within the cage for normally closing the filling-opening, and a valve-holding spring. 2. A self-oiling wheel provided with an oil-chamber having a filling-opening in one side thereof, a valve-cage within the oil-chamber and extending from the |