either resist all the demand for salvage, on the ground that no services were performed which entitled the party to salvage, or, admitting the service, they go to trial to determine whether any salvage, and, if so, how much, shall be paid. On this question, evidence and argument are heard, and the court then issues such decree as the case seems to require.

Although services were rendered to the ship or cargo, or both, it does not follow that they were salvage services in the legal sense of the word. For certainly every person who helps another at sea does not thereby acquire a right to take possession of the property in reference to which his assistance was given, and carry it into port. To give this right, the property, whether ship or cargo, must have been in the proper and rational sense of the term saved; that is, there must have been actual disaster and impending danger of destruction; and from this danger the property must have been rescued by the exertions of the salvors, either alone, or working together with the original crew.

It is to be noticed, however, that neither the master nor officers nor sailors of the ship that is saved can be salvors, or entitled to salvage. The policy of the law-merchant forbids the holding out such a reward for merely doing their duty. It considers that sailors might be induced to let the vessel get into danger, if they could expect a special reward for getting her out of it. They are already bound by law to do all they possibly can do to save the ship and cargo under all circumstances. But courts of admiralty have sometimes allowed gratuities to seamen for extraordinary exertions and very meritorious conduct. A passenger may be a salvor of the ship he sails in, because he has no especial duty in regard to it.

If the Court of Admiralty find it to be a case for salvage, there are no positive and certain rules which determine how much shall be given, or in what proportions, to the different salvors. In every case the court are governed by the circumstances of that case; and even if a ship or cargo be entirely abandoned at sea, or, in maritime phrase, derelict, those who find it and take possession of it, and bring it in, take according to their merits, and not one-half, as used to be the rule. More

than one-half is very seldom given; but this has been done in a few extraordinary cases.

If the property is not entirely derelict or deserted, and all hope of recovering it by the original crew given up, then less than half is usually given by way of salvage. How much less depends on the circumstances. It may be very little, or nearly half. The court will inquire how much time was lost by the salvors, how much labor the saving of the property required, and, most of all, how much exposure the salvors underwent, or how much danger they incurred. For it is an established rule, that in addition to a fair compensation for time, labor, and loss of insurance (for which see the chapter on Insurance), the court will give a further sum by way of reward, and for the purpose of encouraging others to make similar exertions and incur similar perils to save valuable property. And, in this point of view, all necessary exposure and danger are considered as entitled to liberal reward.

If the court have not restored the property to its owners on their giving bonds with sureties to pay the salvage and costs, they order the property sold; and they may do either of these things at any period of the proceedings. At the close, they decree the whole amount of salvage, and also direct particularly its distribution.

A large part, usually about one-fourth, of the whole salvage, is allowed to the owners of the saving ship or ships; another large part to her master, less parts to the officers, in proportion to their rank, and the residue is divided among the crew, with such discrimination between one and another as greater or less exertions or merit require.

The trial is had, and the whole decree and this distribution of the salvage made, by the court alone, without a jury. But the statute of the United States, which gives our courts o Admiralty (which are exclusively United States courts, no State court having any Admiralty power) jurisdiction in Admi. ralty over our inland lakes and rivers, provides that disputed facts shall be tried by a jury, in most cases, at the request of either party.

SECTION X.

THE NAVIGATION OF THE SHIP.

1. OF THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE MASTER.-The mas ter has the whole care and the supreme command of his vessel, and his duties are co-equal with his authority. He must see te everything that respects her condition; including her repair supply, loading, navigation, and unloading. He is principally the agent of the owner; but is, to a certain extent, the agent of the shipper, and of the insurer, and of all who are interested in the property under his charge.

Much of his authority as agent of the owner springs from necessity. He may even sell the ship in a case of extreme necessity; so he may make a bottomry bond which shall pledge her for a debt; so he may charter her for a voyage or a term of time; so he may raise money for repairs, or incur a debt therefor, and make his owners liable. All these, however, he can do only from necessity. If the owner be present, in person or by his agent, or is within easy access, or can be con. sulted, by telegraph or otherwise, without a loss of time which would be seriously injurious, the master has no power to do any of these things unless specially authorized.

If he does them in the home port, the owner is liable only where, by some act or words, he ratifies or adopts the act of his master. If in a foreign port, even if the owner were there, he may be liable, on his master's contracts of this kind, to those who neither knew nor had the means of knowing that the master's power was superseded or qualified by the presence of the owner. The master being by the law-merchant the general agent of the owner of the ship, no one dealing with him can be prejudiced by any private or secret limitations to his authority by the owner.

Beyond the ordinary extent of his power, which is limited to the care and navigation of the ship, he can go, as we have said, only from necessity. But this necessity must be greater to justify some acts than for others. Thus, he can sell the ship only in a case of extreme and urgent necessity; that is, only when it seems in all reason impossible to save her, and a sale

is the only way of preserving for the owners or insurers any part of her value. We say "seems;"" for if such is the appearance at the time, when all existing circumstances are carefully considered and weighed, the sale is not void, if some accident, or cause which could not be anticipated, as a sudden change in the wind or sea, enables the purchaser to save her easily. Several such cases have occurred.

So, to justify him in pledging her by bottomry, there must be a stringent and sufficient necessity; but it may be far less than is required to authorize a sale. It is enough if the money is really needed for the safety of the ship, and cannot otherwise be raised, or not without great waste.

So, to charter the ship, there must be a sufficient necessity, unless the master has express power to do this. But the necessity for this act may be only a mercantile necessity; or, in other words, a certain and considerable mercantile expediency. So, to bind the owners to expense for repairs or supplies, there must also be a necessity for them. But here it is suffi cient if the repairs or supplies are such as the condition of the vessel, and the safe and comfortable prosecution of the voyage, render proper.

So the master-unlike other agents, who have generally no power of delegation-may substitute another for himself, to discharge all his duties, and possess all his authority, if he is unable to discharge his own duties, because, in that case, the safety of the ship and property calls for this substitution.

Generally, the master has nothing to do with the cargo between the lading and the delivery. But, if the necessity arises, he may sell the cargo, or a part of it, at an intermediate port, if he cannot carry it on or transmit it, and it must perish before he can receive specific orders. So, he may sell it, or a part, or pledge (or hypothecate) it, by means of a respondentia bond, in order to raise money for the common benefit. A bond of respondentia is much the same thing as to the cargo that a bottomry bond is as to the ship. Money is borrowed by it, at maritime interest, on maritime risk, the debt to be discharged by a loss of the goods. But it can be made by the master only on even a stronger necessity than that required for bottomry;

only when he can raise no money by bills on the owner, nor by a bottomry of the ship, nor by any other use of the property or credit of the owner. Indeed, it seems that, when goods are sold by the master to repair the vessel, it is to be considered as in the nature of a forced loan, for which the owner of the vessel is liable to the shipper, whether the vessel arrive or not.

The general remark may be made, that a master has no ordinary power, and can hardly derive any extraordinary power even from any necessity, except for those things which are fairly within the scope of his business as master, and during his employment as master. Beyond this he has no agency or authority that is not expressly given him.

The owner is liable also for the wrong-doings of the master; but with the limitation which belongs generally to the liability of a principal for the torts of his agent, or of a master for the torts of his servant. That is, he is liable for any injury done by the master while acting as the master of his ship, but not for the wrongful acts which he may do personally when he is not acting in his capacity of master, although he holds the office at the time. Thus if, through want of skill or care while navigating the ship, he runs another down, the owner is liable for the collision. But the owner is not liable if the master embezzles goods which he takes on board to fill his own privilege, to have himself all the freight and profit.

2. OF COLLISION.-The general rules in this country in respect to collision are that the party in fault suffers his own loss and compensates the other party for the loss he may sustain. If neither is in fault, the loss rests where it falls. If both parties are in fault, the loss rests, where it falls, by the rules of the common law, but is equally divided in Admiralty. There are certain rules in regard to sailing, founded on the principle that the ship which can change its course to avoid collision with least inconvenience must do so; and therefore that the ship that has a fair or leading wind shall give way to one on a wind, or go under her stern; and if vessels are approaching each other, both having the wind on the beam, or so far free that either may change its course in either direction, the vessel on the larboard tack must give way, and each pass to the right.