Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic AntitrustPhilip Marsden Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. gada 1. janv. - 800 lappuses The book is handsomely produced by Edward Elgar. . . The notes contain more than citations and are well worth reading. A welcome feature is that after each set of notes there is a list of the most important writings on the topic followed by a list of the |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 91.
3. lappuse
... competitors such that none has an incentive to alter its action in light of the actions being taken by its rivals. The Bertrand model posits that the actions of competitors are the prices they charge, so the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is ...
... competitors such that none has an incentive to alter its action in light of the actions being taken by its rivals. The Bertrand model posits that the actions of competitors are the prices they charge, so the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium is ...
9. lappuse
... competitors in the relevant markets were not limited to Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP.57 Nevertheless the most interesting aspect of his decision may be its stress on the limitations of the structural approach and its suggestion of an ...
... competitors in the relevant markets were not limited to Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP.57 Nevertheless the most interesting aspect of his decision may be its stress on the limitations of the structural approach and its suggestion of an ...
18. lappuse
... competitor has proposed for the final deal , although customers may or may not tell them what the competing vendor's best deal was ( or what the cus- tomers contend it was ) in order to play the final round competitors off against each ...
... competitor has proposed for the final deal , although customers may or may not tell them what the competing vendor's best deal was ( or what the cus- tomers contend it was ) in order to play the final round competitors off against each ...
23. lappuse
... competitors for a substantial number of customers , with other competitors unable to counter the competitive harm.20 Both the DOJ and the Commission based their objections on the view that the relevant market was for high function EAS ...
... competitors for a substantial number of customers , with other competitors unable to counter the competitive harm.20 Both the DOJ and the Commission based their objections on the view that the relevant market was for high function EAS ...
32. lappuse
... competitors , as well as data supplied by PeopleSoft . It also conducted a discount regres- sion analysis and applied a merger simulation model . As noted above , as part of its information requests , it collected ( an ultimately very ...
... competitors , as well as data supplied by PeopleSoft . It also conducted a discount regres- sion analysis and applied a merger simulation model . As noted above , as part of its information requests , it collected ( an ultimately very ...
Saturs
1 | |
16 | |
41 | |
72 | |
5 A transatlantic assessment of the evolving use of behavioural merger remedies | 108 |
Tetra Laval GEHoneywell and the convergence toward US standards | 153 |
a transAtlantic comparison | 195 |
EC and US antitrust law compared | 236 |
16 Issues relating to the enforcement and application of criminal laws in respect of competition | 466 |
a North Atlantic treaty alliance against cartels? | 493 |
18 Lessons learned from the US experience in private enforcement of competition laws | 515 |
advocacy reports and studies as instruments of competition policy | 541 |
opening antitrust to the public why more European Union Court and Commission documents and hearings should no longer be secret | 552 |
thoughts on consumer welfare in the US | 566 |
22 Competition enforcement and consumers | 594 |
23 The distributional consequences of antitrust | 605 |
a transatlantic perspective | 287 |
10 Abuse of dominance enforcement under Latin American competition laws | 319 |
the US influence on the development of the regulatory framework for IP licensing in the EC | 335 |
a Federal Trade Commission perspective | 356 |
when why and how is it applied in EU and US law? | 398 |
retrospect and prospects | 414 |
towards a transatlantic open aviation area | 444 |
a pragmatic view on cooperation convergence and what is in between | 622 |
25 Bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements | 641 |
26 An antitrust analysis of the World Trade Organizations decision in the USMexico arbitration on telecommunications services | 679 |
North American origins European practice | 718 |
28 Competition policies in Latin America postWashington Consensus | 732 |
Index | 759 |
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abuse agreements analysis Antitrust Law applied approach Article 82 assessment behavioural remedies bilateral Canada Canadian cartel CMLR Commission’s companies competition agencies competition authorities Competition Bureau competition law competition policy competitors concerns conduct cooperation costs criminal customers decision discounts divestiture dominant firm EC Merger economic efficiency European Commission European Competition European Union evidence exclusionary extradition Federal Trade Commission goal Guidelines Ibid infringement intellectual property issues judicial jurisdiction Justice licensing litigation market power market share ment merger control Merger Regulation merging Mexico Microsoft monopoly monopsony negotiations offence Oracle parties patent PeopleSoft plaintiff potential practice refusal regime regulatory relevant restrictions rule of reason sector settlement Sherman Act standard suppliers Supreme Court telecommunications Telmex Tetra Laval Tetra Pak tion transaction Treaty tying unilateral effects United Washington Consensus
Populāri fragmenti
302. lappuse - ... making the conclusion of. contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
454. lappuse - Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
246. lappuse - In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.
73. lappuse - ... where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition...
265. lappuse - Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
190. lappuse - The reviewing court shall: (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be — (a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law...
267. lappuse - United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 571, 576 (1966).* Mr. Justice DOUGLAS: The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.
249. lappuse - Articles 85 and 86, it follows that an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within the meaning of Article 86.
178. lappuse - ... it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.
254. lappuse - Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller...