AUTREFOIS ACQUIT (continued).
jury resworn. Whereupon the defendant pleaded autrefois acquit
which was overruled on demurrer and the trial proceeded with,
and a verdict of guilty found. On appeal to the General Term it
was held that this discharge of the jury was not equivalent to an
acquittal, and was no defence to the second trial. Id.
BALTIMORE & POTOMAC RAILROAD CO., CHARTER OF.
The charter of the Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Company (act of
Congress of February 5, 1867) authorizes it to take and use for
depot purposes, with the turnouts necessary to reach it, any lots
of ground in the city of Washington contiguous to the line of its
road; that is to say, any lots between the front of which and the
line of the road no other lots intervene, and for this purpose
square 232 is contiguous to the line of the road although, by the
recess caused by the intersection of several streets, it does not
touch Maryland avenue along which the road runs. Railroad
Company v. The Commissioners, 526.
Although the creditor's name be innocently or accidentally (but not
fraudulently) omitted from the schedule of creditors provided for
by the Bankrupt act of March 2, 1867, the discharge and certifi-
cate is conclusive evidence in favor of the bankrupt, and a com-
plete bar to a suit against him by the omitted creditor. Hoffman
v. Haight, 21.
1. A note, consecutively endorsed by three persons, being dishonored,
the holder notified by mail the last endorser, who lived in a dif-
ferent city, enclosing him at the same time two notices for delivery
to the other endorsers, the last of whom resided in the same city
with the holder of the note. These notices the endorser to whom
they had been mailed immediately delivered to his next endorser,
who, in turn, mailed, on the next day, to the first endorser, the
notice intended for him.
Held, Sufficient to fix the liability of the first endorser. Edmonston v.
Gilbert, 351.
2. The rule laid down in Morton vs. Cammack, Mac A & Mackey, 22,
that where the holder and endorser reside in the same city, notice
of protest by mail is not sufficient, does not apply to a case where
there are several endorsers some of whom live in another city.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS. See Pleading and Practice, 11.
1. An exception contained the charge of the court and stated "and
to so much of the said instructions granted by the court, on its
own motion, as are contained in brackets,” plaintiff excepts, &c.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS (continued).
Upwards of two pages of the charge were thus contained in
"brackets;"
Held, that the exception being a wholesale one-pointing out no par-
ticular remark in the charge as incorrect-did not properly present
to this court any question which it was called upon to examine.
Langdon v. Evans, 1.
2. Where a bill of exceptions contains all the evidence offered in the
court below, this court may treat it as a case stated. Maulsby v.
Barker, 165.
BILLS OF PARTICULARS. See Pleading and Practice, 8, 9.
1. The joint resolution of Congress of April 24, 1880, adopting and
legalizing certain ordinances of the Board of Health of the Dis-
trict of Columbia rendered those ordinances the laws of the
District; and the Police Court of the District of Columbia has
jurisdiction to impose and enforce the penalties set forth therein.
The District v. The Gas Light Co., 343.
2. The District of Columbia vs. Bates, 1 Mac A., 493, so far as it refers
to the powers of Congress and of the Board of Health in respect
of nuisances, questioned. Id.
BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS. See Special Assessments.
It was entirely within the discretion of the Board of Public Works to
determine upon the width of pavements to be laid under the acts
authorizing special improvements and assessments therefor.
Johnston v. The District, 97.
By an ordinance of the common council of Washington a special tax
was laid to defray the costs of certain street improvements. The
tax was imposed and levied on all lots and parts of lots bordering
on the line of the improvement. By the provisions of the ordi-
nance the manner of assessment was to be as follows: The asses-
sors were to sum up the aggregate cost of the work, and to state
the amount due from each lot. This assessment roll was then to
be deposited with the register, who was to place it in the hands
of the collector, whose duty it then became to place it upon record
in the tax ledger kept in his office, and notify the parties of the
amount due from each, within thirty days after receiving the
assessment roll. Certain lots bordering upon the line of the im-
provements were omitted from the assessment roll at the time of
making the assessment and of depositing the roll with the regis-
ter, which was in November, 1870. In October, 1871, the owner
of the omitted lots conveyed them to K., a bona fide purchaser,
who purchased without knowledge of any lien and after searching
the assessment rolls and finding no assessment against the lots.
One month after his purchase they were entered on the assess-
BONA FIDE PURCHASER (continued).
ment rolls by a memorandum in red ink stating that they had up
to this time been omitted. After this entry was made K. con-
veyed to L. who conveyed to S., and he to the plaintiff, who took
and recorded his title some time in April, 1881, long after the
entry in red ink had been made.
Held, That K., having exercised all the diligence required of a bona
fide purchaser in searching the assessment rolls at the time of his
purchase, took the property free and clear of the tax, and that
his grantees took the same title although purchasing with knowl-
edge of the later entry. Alley v. Lyon, 457.
1. Where a house is sold "with the lot attached," the question as to
the extent and boundaries of the latter is one of fact for the jury.
May v. Smith, 55.
2. The rule on the subject of boundaries is, that if a deed calls for a
line to run to a fixed boundary or a fixed line, the description of
the distance, inconsistent with that call, must yield to the call.
Mackall v. Richards, 271.
BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS. See Equity, 3.
1. A payment by a stockholder of a building association of his dues
to one of its officers not having authority to receive them, does
not discharge the stockholder if the officer so receiving the money
fails to pay it over; nor can the association charge the loss against
its assets in its account with the stockholders so as to diminish the
value of their shares. Morrow v. James, 27.
2. The terms of a building association contract with its borrower or
advancee, discussed and held not to be usurious. Burns v. Build-
ing Association, 333.
BY-LAWS. See Insurance, 1.
Where an association is chartered by an act of Congress, any by-law
of such association, contrary to the provisions of the charter, is
in effect a by-law in violation of a statute of the United States,
and will, if for no other reason, be void. Raub v. Relief Asso-
ciation, 68.
CASE STATED. See Exceptions, Bills of, 2.
CERTIORARI. See Pleading and Practice, 16.
CHALLENGE OF JURORS.
In the District of Columbia, on the trial of any felony other than
treason or a capital offence, the defence is entitled to ten peremp-
tory challenges and the Government to three. United States v.
Dunn, 151.
1. Where one enters claiming under color of title, and by length of
adverse possession, gains a good title, he will hold according to
COLOR OF TITLE (continued).
the metes and bounds set out in his colorable title, although his
actual possession has extended only to a part of the land claimed,
and that is the only effect of color of title. Keefe v. Bramhall, 551.
2. But, where the entry in the first instance is that of a mere tres-
passer, without colorable title, his adverse possession of twenty
years gives him title only to the land he has actual possession
of. Id.
Congress has power to adopt a law by reference to it, without embody-
ing the law referred to in the act adopting it, provided the refer-
ence be clear, distinct and unmistakable. The District v. The
Gaslight Co, 343.
The bonds of constables given under and in pursuance of the act of
Congress of June 7, 1878, are not affected or controlled by the act of
March 3, 1863, requiring the renewal of constables' bonds every
two years. The bond given under the act of 1878 runs during the
term of the constable, to wit, four years, while under the act of
1863, the bond ran indefinitely until renewed, or until the officer
was removed. The District v. Van Horn, 388.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Police Court, Jurisdiction of, 2.
A government official cannot call in question the constitutionality of a
law directing him to perform a purely ministerial duty. U. S.,
ex rel. Schumacher, v. Marble, 32.
1. Where one has placed himself in a position which will disable him
from performing his part of a contract, he cannot sue the other
party to the contract for a failure to perform his part of it. Sim-
mons v. Pomeroy, 213.
2. P. agreed to convey certain lands to L. in exchange for a certain
house. Afterwards L., for a consideration paid him by S., assigned
the contract to S. and conveyed him the house, the latter assuming
to convey the same to P. on receiving from him the title to the
lands; S., however, finding the title to the house bad, returned it
to L.; P. then refused to convey the lands, and upon suit brought
by S. against him for breach of contract, it was—
Held, That S. was bound to be ready to convey the house as soon as
P. tendered him the land, but that as he had put it out of his power
to convey the house by returning it to L., he had already broken
his part of the agreement, and was not in a condition to sue for
the breach on the part of P. Id.
3. A contract may be illegal and void in part as against public policy,
and yet good as to the residue. Sunderland v. Kilbourn, 506.
4. K. & L., a firm of real estate agents, were employed by S. and H.
to make purchases of real estate. Under the contract, if the prop-
erty was accepted at the price submitted, K. & L. were to be paid
a commission on the purchase price. At the time of, and some
time before, entering into the contract, K. & L. held the refusal
of a piece of property at $40,000. After the contract was entered
into, K. & L. took the money deposited with them by S. and H.,
and purchased it for themselves. and then, without making known
to S. and H. that they were really the owners of the property,
submitted it to them at $65,000. The latter accepted it at that
price, and the conveyance was accordingly made. S. and H. sub-
sequently discovered the real facts, and claimed the benefit of
the purchase at $40,000. But it was held that K. & L. were under
no obligations to give S. and H. the benefit of a contract of refusal
entered into before their contract with them. That the remedy
of the latter was to repudiate their contract if imposition had
been practiced by a concealment of facts; but they could not
retain the property and recover the $25,000 in addition.
5. And where, in another transaction under the contract, a return of
part of the purchase money was claimed on the ground that K. &
L. had defrauded the vendors of it, it was held that even if the
vendors had been defrauded as alleged, this fact did not entitle S.
and H. to receive the benefit of it.
6. But where K and L., acting under the contract, purchased a piece
of property at 40 cents a foot and turned it over to S and H. at
50 cents. at which price the latter agreed to take it, it was held that
K. & L. were accountable to them for the difference.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Autrefois Acquit; Cumulative Sentence.
CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.
1. If distinct offences, although of a similar character, are set forth in
several counts in the same indictment, and a fortiori if set forth in
different indictments or informations, it is in the power of the
court to impose cumulative sentences-that is, periods of confine-
ment, each one of which is independent of the other. In re George
Fry, 135.
2. The prisoner was sentenced upon six separate informations, each
one of which set forth the offence of receiving stolen goods. On
habeas corpus, the petition did not aver more than that the record
would show on inspection that there was only one crime commit-
ted. It was-
Held, That the record did not show anything of that sort, and that the
court had no right to assume that the goods set forth in the several
informations were feloniously received at one time as stolen
goods. Id.
3. A cumulative sentence of imprisonment is sufficiently certain where
|