of abode, or place of business, at least or latest, on the day after dishonor of said note; and notice by mail is not sufficient to charge such endorser. Cabot Bank vs. Warner, 10 Allen, 522; Green vs. Darling, 3 Shepley, 143; Morton vs. Ward, 7 Wash. L. R., and authorities there cited; Bailey vs. Bank of Mo., 7 Mo., 467; Kramer vs. McDarell, 8 Watts & Serg., 138; Stephenson vs. Primrose, 8 Porter, 155; Curtis. vs. Bank, 6 Blackf., 302; Pierce vs. Pindar, 5 Metc., 352; Power vs. Mitchell, 7 Wis., 161; Norris vs. Bank, 10 Mich., 547; Bell vs. Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Walters vs. Brown, 15 Md., 285; Miranda vs. Bank, 6 La., 740. The note was born in Washington-its maker and payee (the endorser Gilbert) lived and did business in Washington-it was made payable at a bank in Washington, and at its maturity, and for some weeks before, the note was held in Washington. The Citizens' Bank and its notary partially construed the law applicable to the case, and interpreted their duties under it. The notice given, itself, advises the endorser, Gilbert, that he is accountable to the "Citizens' National Bank" for the said note, and the notary certifies that the demand and protest was made by him at the request of the "Citizens' National Bank." But should a note like the one in this suit be taken by an endorsee to a distant place, for instance, San Francisco, California, or London, England, and there discounted or deposited for collection, would it be, or can it be, held that the payee and first endorser would or could be charged upon a notice from the bank here transmitted to such distant place, but directed to such endorser, and then re-transmitted to the endorser at the same place? It is obvious that the instructions prayed for embodied and stated the law of the case, and of this court, and should have been granted and given to the jury, and that the court below erred in refusing to give said instructions. It is equally obvious that the instructions given by the court below wrongly stated the law of the case, and, therefore, that as to the defendant Gilbert, who is sued in this action jointly with the makers of the note, the judgment should be vacated and set aside. Mr. Justice MAC ARTHUR delivered the opinion of the court. In this case the declaration is upon a promissory note. The first endorser is the payee. It is dated July 16, 1881, payable in 12 months at the Bank of the Republic in this city. Gilbert endorsed the note to Edmonston & Sons, a copartnership doing business in Baltimore. They placed it, as the period of maturity was approaching, in the National Farmers and Planters' Bank of the city of Baltimore. That bank endorsed it to the Citizens' National Bank of this city for collection. We have, then, three endorsers: Gilbert, the payee; Edmonston & Sons, and then the National Farmers and Planters' Bank. The note was presented at the Bank of the Republic, and payment refused. It was protested, and notices were enclosed in a communication to the National Farmers and Planters' Bank of Baltimore. The notices of protest appear to have been sufficient to fix the liability of all the endorsers, provided they were properly delivered. The bank in Baltimore delivered the notices to their immediate endorsers, Edmonston & Sons, who, in their turn, transmitted the notice to Gilbert, at his residence in Washington. So that we have the three endorsers notified, each giving his immediate endorser notice the same day or the day after receiving it. There can be no fault found with this method of notifying the endorsers, for it appears to be well established as law that the holder may give notice of the dishonor of commercial paper to his immediate endorser, and that one can then give notice to the previous one, and so on through the series of endorsers up to the first, and they, then, all become liable to the holder of the note. If, however, the holder sees fit to give notice only to his immediate endorser he takes that responsibility. If they communicate the notice in time to the antecedent endorsers, it fixes the liability of each and all of them to the holder, although he may have communicated the notice only to his immediate endorser. Now, we think that that was done in this case, and consequently that the liability of the first endorser is established. It is said that the notices ought to have been served by the Citizens' National Bank upon Gilbert directly. This bank has its habitat in Washington, where Gilbert also resides; the general rule is that where the holder and the endorser of a dishonored note live in the same city, service by mail is not sufficient-that it must be made either at his residence or place of business. This rule has been recognized by a decision of this court in a case where there was but a single endorser, Morton vs. Cammack, Mac A. & Mackey, 22. But the law approves the method pursued in this case where there are several endorsers, so that the application of the decision of this court in a case where there was but one endorser can scarcely be applied to a case of this description. It is said that the notice which was received by the first endorser, who is the defendant, apprised him that he was accountable to the Citizens' National Bank of Washington, and it is claimed upon this ground that the notice ought to have been served upon him directly by the bank in this city. But the notice was transmitted properly by the bank here to the bank in Baltimore; the bank in Baltimore delivered the notice which had been enclosed for the second endorser, the plaintiffs in this action, and they, in turn, immediately communicated the notice that was designed for Gilbert, the first endorser, by mail, apprising him of the fact that the note had been returned to them dishonored, and that they wanted him to pay it, or language to that effect. We do not know that they could have done anything more to fasten the liability of the defendant Gilbert. We are of opinion that the motion for a new trial upon the bill of exceptions should be denied. OLIVIA BELMONT vs. THE WASHINGTON AND GEORGETOWN RAILROAD COMPANY. { Decided January 19, 1885. The CHIEF JUSTICE and Justices MAC ARTHUR and JAMES Sitting. An agreement of the parties by their attorneys to refer a pending cause to a special referee, "whose award, when approved by the court, is to be its judgment," is not within the Maryland act, and if the court disapprove the award, and make an order setting it aside, such order is not appealable. MOTION to dismiss an appeal. THE CASE is stated in the opinion. S. S. HENKLE and C. MAURICE SMITH for plaintiff. Mr. Justice MAC ARTHUR delivered the opinion of the court. In the case of Olivia Belmont vs. the Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company, I am authorized to announce the conclusion of the court. The following minute is taken from the journal of the court; "By agreement of parties, by their respective attorneys, the case is referred to James G. Payne, esq., whose award, when approved by the court, is to be its judgment." No order of reference was prepared by the attorneys, and we suppose they made their oral application, and the clerk caught the decision of the court as well as he could and made this minute of it; but we cannot find that any formal order was signed by the court. Mr. Payne, it appears, acted upon the order, took testimony and made an award, in which the facts that he found established by the testimony are stated at large with his conclusions of law. A motion was made to enter judgment upon this award. Exceptions were then filed by the plaintiff, against whom the award was rendered, in which the finding of facts as well as conclusions of law are disputed. The judge holding the circuit denied the motion to enter judgment, sustained the exceptions to the award and set it aside. From that order an appeal is taken to this court, and it is now before us on motion to dismiss that appeal, on the ground that the order was not appealable. It is to be observed in the construction of this minute, that the award is to be subject to the approval of the court before it becomes its judgment. The limitation, therefore, imposed by the order itself is that the judgment, in the discretion of the court, is to be expressed by way of approval before it can become the final determination of the case. If it had been a reference to arbitration under the rules of the court, or under the Maryland act which authorized reference to arbitration, the effect of the award would have been entirely different from the one contemplated by this order. We can only consider this order as authorizing the referee to report the case to the court for its judgment, and as in the nature of a special verdict or an agreed statement of facts. This appears also to have been the construction put upon it by the referee himself, for he reports at large and in great minuteness the facts established by the testimony and the conclusions of law which he thinks ought to be applied to them, so that the court might see the whole case and approve or disapprove of his award. The court has exercised that discretion, and held that it must be set aside. The Now it may be that the attorneys intended to make a reference to arbitration. We know very well what the effect of an award of arbitrators is; that it is final and conclusive upon all the facts in the case, and the controversy cannot be inquired into either by the parties or by the court. duty of the court is a merely formal act then, or nearly so, to enter judgment upon the award. And that makes an award of an arbitrator a practical determination of a controversy. The only way in which the award of arbitrators can be impeached, according to the act of Maryland, is on the ground of fraud, malpractice, or where notice has not been served upon the parties, etc., and if a party desires to file exceptions it must be done with proof of this description in order to impeach it, otherwise the order |