That

amounts to only one sentence, no matter how numerous the charges. That is, if a man steals one pair of shoes one day, and the next day another, and a dozen different offences are committed, he cannot be punished by more than one term of imprisonment for the whole, any more than in one case. doctrine in the Tweed case is repudiated both in England and in this country, by the weight of authority, and we are satisfied that if distinct offences, although of a similar character, are set forth in several counts in the same indictment, and, a fortiori, if set forth in different indictments or informations, it is in the power of the court to impose cumulative sentences, that is, periods of confinement, each one of which is independent of the other.

Another question made is, whether the record in these cases discloses more than one crime, and it is claimed that although there were six different informations, yet only one crime has been committed. The petition is a little ambiguous. We do not understand whether it means to allege that only one larceny was committed, or one offence of receiving stolen goods was committed. These are six separate informations. Each one of them sets forth a positive offence of receiving stolen goods. They describe the goods, the different values, and, as far as we can gather from the record, those were distinct offences. We have no right to suspect, much less to assume, that all these goods were feloniously received at one time as stolen goods. The record does not disclose that only one offence was committed, and the petition does not even aver it. It avers simply that the records would show, on inspection, that there was only one crime. But we think the record does not show anything of

that sort.

The matter troubling me the most has been the point made as to the uncertainty of the sentence. It is claimed that the sentence is so vague and uncertain, as to the commencement and termination of the confinement of the prisoner, as to be void. For instance, one of the sentences, number 23,939, I think, is for receiving stolen property, and the record shows the sentence to be, that the prisoner should

be imprisoned one hundred and eighty days in jail, the sentence to take effect upon the expiration of an imprisonment under sentence in case nuniber 22,937 of the same date-that is, of January 3d, 1884. The proposition maintained is, that the sentence on its face ought to show the exact length of imprisonment without compelling the prisoner, or anyone else, to resort to other records to find out when the imprisonment commences and terminates, and that if it does not, it is void. Two cases have been cited upon this question; one in 18 Ohio State Reports, and the other in 22 Ohio State Reports. In the first case, however, the sentence was to take effect at the expiration of the sentence in case number so and so aforesaid, and inasmuch as there had been no allusion to any other case in the previous part of the sentence, it was irretrievably vague and uncertain, and held to be void. That would not apply to this case, however, because it refers to a distinct case, giving the title and date of it. In volume 22 of the same reports, there was a case in which the reference was to another case, without indicating the date of it or the court in which it had taken place. The date here is clearly given, and the indication is sufficiently clear that the conviction was in the same court. So that neither of these cases has application to the present one. On the other hand, we have examined the precedents, and we find that sentences like this, and sentences even much more vague than this, have been sustained both in England and in this country. One is the case of the Queen vs. Cutbush, 2 Queen's Bench, page 379, where the imprisonment was adjudged by a justice "to commence at the expiration of the first term of three calendar months, an imprisonment to which he has this day been adjudged by us the said justices." That is even more vague than the present case, because it does not give the number of the case. Another case was Kile vs. Corum, 11 Metc., where the sentence was to be executed from and after the expiration of four former sentences, without indicating where they took place, or what the date was. That was held not to be erroneous, although the judgment was reversed on other grounds. Still another

case is that of Mills vs. Cowen, 13 Penn., 631, where a man was indicted for attempting to procure an abortion of a certain female, and the sentence was for an imprisonment, "to be computed from the expiration of the sentence on the indictment for attempting to procure abortion of another Nothing could be more vague than that, for it female. does not state where it took place, the date or the number of the case. case. The case of the People vs. Forbes, in 22 Cal.

Reports, 135, is very much like this. There were five separate sentences passed on the defendant on the 6th of Septemher, 1862, by the Recorder's Court of San Francisco, the first for a period of confinement of ninety days, and each of the others was for ninety days: "Said term to commence at the expiration of previous sentences." Now, each one of the sentences under consideration is to commence at the expiration of the previous sentence, the number and date of which is given. It is more definite than in the case just cited. So that we think the requirement of the law as to certainty is sufficiently gratified by the references contained in We cannot think, therefore, that they are

the sentences.

void.

One or two of these objections, perhaps, would be more appropriately considered on appeal, and not as justifying the court in discharging the party on habeas corpus. But it is sufficient to say that we do not consider that the record has disclosed any errors, and therefore the prayer of the petition. must be refused, and the prisoner must be remanded to the custody where the habeas corpus found him.

UNITED STATES, EX REL. JOHN M. HENDERSON, Trustee,

vs.

JAMES B. EDMUNDS ET AL., Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

LAW. No. 24,988.

Decided March 3, 1884.

{The CHIEF JUSTICE and Justices Cox and JAMES sitting.

1. On a petition for mandamus against the Commissioners of the District, this court can only direct the Commissioners to go on and execute their office, when it appears on the petition that they have refused to do so. But where it becomes their duty to examine alleged errors in an assessment it is immaterial whether in that examination they decide well or ill, if it appears that they have examined and determined; the writ of mandamus cannot do the work of a writ of error.

2. Though the court might decline to interfere by mandamus, it may, nevertheless, with a clear opinion on the subject, inform the Commissioners of their duty in the premises.

3. The words in the act of Congress of February 21, 1871, which imposed upon the Board of Public Works the duty of assessing a proportion of the cost of street improvements "upon the property adjoining and to be specially benefited by the improvement," were used merely as a designation of the property, and not as a condition on which a charge was to be made upon it. To hold these words to mean that an assessment could only be made upon the property adjoining, provided it be benefitted by the improvement, would be equivalent to inserting in the statute a limitation which would have been distinctly stated if intended.

4. Hence, the Board of Public Works, in making an assessment upon adjoining property under the act of February 21, 1871, was not charged with the duty of inquiring whether the property was benefited, but only to determine the cost of the improvement, and to distribute this cost between the owners of the adjoining property and the District, to do which it had only to ascertain the frontage by measurement and whether the property was specially exempted from assessments. There was no provision that the board was to act as a jury to determine whether the property was benefited; the assessment did not depend upon that condition.

5. It follows, therefore, that it is not in the power of the Commissioners, when they come to act under the statutes (Acts of Congress of June 19, 1878, and June 27, 1879,) authorizing them to correct erroneous or excessive assessments, to consider anything but the elements that go to make up the charge. They cannot consider or attempt to adjudicate whether the property was benefited.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This was a petition for the writ of mandamus against the

Commissioners of the District of Columbia, based upon the following facts:

Lot R, square 25, fronting 231 feet on M street, N. W., between 24th and 25th streets, in the city of Washington, the property of Mrs. Mary C. Henderson, was assessed according to frontage for special improvements made on M in the year 1872, $1,452.92; and the same lot for special improvements made on 24th street in 1876, was assessed in like manner, $1,085.90. These assessments, with accrued interest, amounting in all to $2,631.85, were paid respect

stree t

ively

January 22, 1874, and February 24, 1877. After

wards, in compliance with the act of June 27, 1879, there was duly filed with the Commissioners of the District, and within sixty days after the passage of the act, a written complaint alleging error in the said assessments and praying a revision of the same, on the ground that no special benefit had accrued to the said lot by reason of said improvements. The relator alleged that the Commissioners refused to make this revision, and a mandamus was prayed accordingly. A demurrer was filed to the petition upon the following grounds:

1. That the construction of the 37th section of the act of February 21, 1871, and the 1st section of act the of August 10, 1871, contended for by the relator, is entirely erroneous. 2. By presumption of law, property adjoining on a street specially improved is thereby benefited, the statute referred to left it to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Works to appraise the amount of the benefit; which said board having done, its judgment is conclusive in the premises.

3. Congress, by its act of June 19, 1878, affirmed the validity of the assessments complained of; which said act in its full legal effect was recognized and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mattingly and others against the District of Columbia.

The relator joined issue upon the demurrer, thereby dissenting from the propositions of laws above formulated. The statutes relating to the questions raised are as fol

lows: