Lofft. 55, before Lord Mansfield, down to Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, ubi sup., in which the privilege of the advocate is treated as similar to that of the judge and the witness, and is referred to the same principle, namely, that it is indispensable, in the interests of suitors, that those who take part in a suit should be free and independent in the discharge of their duty, and that to that end their conduct should not be subject to be brought in question before a jury upon a subsequent trial. As against this view it was argued by Mr. Waddy that the privilege of counsel is less than that of a judge or a witness. He contended that the duty of counsel was to state to the court with critical accuracy what was contained in his instructions, and to comment fairly and reasonably upon the evidence given in the case, and for any departure from the line of his duty, of which it was said a jury are the proper judges, the counsel, he insisted, ought to be liable in an action. In support of this view Mr. Waddy mainly relied upon the cases of Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473, and Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & A. 232, and on a passage in the judgment of Lord Coleridge in the recent case of Seaman v. Netherclift, 34 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 878; 1 C. P. Div. 540. But it seems to me that there is no authority for Mr. Waddy's position. Mr. Waddy pointed out (what is greatly to the credit of the bar of England) that in no case in which the conduct of a barrister had been called in question in an action had there been any difficulty in showing that the language of the advocate had been relevant to the matter in hand in the strictest sense. But he failed to satisfy me that in a case in which this strict relevancy could not be proved the advocate would not be protected. The privilege is not needed when the advocate is in the right. It may be inconvenient to individuals that advocates should be at liberty-subject only to animadversion or punishment from the presiding judge — to abuse the privilege of free speech. But it would be a far greater inconvenience to suitors if advocates were embarrassed and enfeebled in their endeavors to perform their duty by the fear of subsequent litigation. This consequence would follow: That no advocates would be so independent as those whose circumstances rendered it useless to sue them in actions. The passage in Seaman v. Netherclift, ubi sup., upon which Mr. Waddy relied, was not, as it seems to me, intended to qualify the statement of the law contained in the earlier judgments relied upon for the defendant. All that was intended to be laid down was this; that for defamatory statements made by an advocate outside bis office as advocate, and with no reference to the subject before the court, and which therefore must necessarily be irrelevant and made in bad faith, counsel might be proceeded against in an action. In this case the expressions complained of seem to me to have been within the line indicated by the authorities as the boundaries of the advocate's privilege; and I think therefore that the ruling of the learned judge was right, and that this application must be dismissed. Smith, J., concurred. Rule discharged. The plaintiff appealed. The appeal was heard by Brett, M. R., and Fry, L. J. BRETT, M. R. Mr. Waddy has assisted the court as much as possible, because he has gone through all the cases which have any bearing on the question for our decision. I think we are now in a position to give judgment; if we had had the least doubt we should have heard counsel on behalf of the defendant, and should perhaps have taken time to consider, but this is not the first time that the doctrine now in question has come before a court; it has frequently been considered. In this case an action was brought against a solicitor, who had been acting as advocate for a person who was charged with a criminal offense, for things said in court while he was so acting as advocate. What he said I shall assume, for the purpose of this judg ment, to have been malicious, in the same sense that it was not said for the purpose of doing any thing for the defense of his client. I shall assume that there was no justification or ground for saying what he said, and I shall assume that he acted from an indirect motive; that is, from anger against the prosecutor. If I thought the action would lie at all, I should wish to send back the case for a new trial, in order that these facts might be found by the jury; but I am of opinion, that even though the defendant may have acted from an indirect motive, desiring to injure the plaintiff in consequence of personal anger, and not act ing for the benefit of his client, and even if what he said was irrelevant to any issue or fact in the case then before the magistrates, nevertheless inasmuch as it was said with reference to, and in the course of, the inquiry which was taking place, no civil action will lie, however improper the conduct of the defendant may have been. It has been said on behalf of the plaintiff that every person whose character is defamed prima facie has a cause of action, and that the other party must show a defense in order to avoid liability, and that nothing which has ever been held to be a defense has been shown here. I cannot agree with that view. The common law does not consist only of particular cases, but of principles which are stated as having existed from the beginning of the law. The judges do not make new law; they only declare what the law has always been. New circumstances and new combinations of facts are constantly arising, and the judges are obliged to apply what they consider the common law to be. It sometimes seems as if they were making new law, but they are not really doing so, but only applying the law which already exists. We therefore have to find out what the principle is, which now by decision is to be applied for the first time, for I cannot see that there has been any decision on the same state of facts, though there have been analogous cases. If we can find out what the principle is, the next thing to be done is to apply that principle to the present state of facts. Cases of libel and slander are always subject to one principle, namely, that if what is said or written is said or written on some privileged occasion, it is not actionable slander or libel. The rule is not that what is said or written on such an occasion is a slander or libel subject to a defense, but that if it is said or written on a privileged occasion, it is not, from the moment it is said or written, slander or libel at all. There are many privileged occasions which the common law has recognized, for different reasons, but in all cases for good and practi cal reasons. In the class of cases which we have now to consider, the thing said or written in an inquiry which takes place in the administration of the law; that it is said on a privileged occasion with regard to some persons is undoubted. It was admitted by Mr. Waddy that for some purposes counsel are privileged; but he said that the privilege exists only as long as the counsel is acting bona fide, and is saying what is rele vant to the proceedings in which he is engaged. But he goes on to contend that counsel who do not act bona fide are not protected, and that if what is said is | irrelevant, the counsel is not a person to whom the privilege applies. That is the question which we have to decide. The result of the decisions is that we have got so far as this, that what is said in an inquiry held for the purpose of the administration of the law is as to some persons privileged. What persons are to be included? There may be mentioned (though I do not say it is an exhaustive list) judges, counsel, parties and witnesses. As to judges, parties and witnesses, there have been decisions, and it has been held that whatever is said by them with reference to the matter which is the subject of inquiry is privileged, and they are not liable. It has been suggested that this is so only in some cases, that is, that judges who are acting without malice and saying what is relevant are not liable; that parties acting without malice and saying what is relevant are not liable; and that witnesses acting without malice, and saying what is relevant are not liable; but is is said, as to all three classes, that if they speak without relevancy and with malice, they are not privileged. I am inclined to think, that as to some of these classes of persons, there is not the same statement of law to be found in the judgments of the different judges; some judges will not carry the doctrine further than they can help, while others are inclined to carry it to the full extent. As to witnesses we have the cases of Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126, and Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 H. & N. 569. These are the chief cases as to witnesses. The general result of the decisions is that all witnesses, speaking with reference to the matter which forms the subject of inquiry, whether their statements are relevant or not, or whether they are actuated by malice or not, are not liable to any action in respect to such statements, whether made by words spoken or by affidavit. Different reasons are given for the exemption in the different cases, but though different, the reasons are not necessarily inconsistent. What we have to do is to get at a rule which is wide enough to cover all the classes of cases, if we can. It has been suggested that although a counsel may not be liable to an action for slander, he might be liable to another action on the case, namely, an action analogous to the action for malicious prosecution, in which the plaintiff must go further than to show that the defendant made a false statement, and one which was false to his own knowledge, and must allege and prove a want of reasonable and probable cause. This has been said by great judges, and therefore I feel some hesitation in dealing with the proposition, but it seems to me to be wholly untenable. How can a man maintain an action, which he could not otherwise maintain, by altering the form? It seems to me that every objection which applies to the action for slander would apply to the other suggested action. I will deal with it by using the words of one of the most consummate pleaders, Crompton, J. In Henderson v. Broomhead he said: "The attempts to obtain redress for defamation having failed, an effort was made in Revis v. Smith to sustain an action analogous to an action for malicious prosecution. That seems to have been done in despair." 4 H. & N. 579. This is a strong and picturesque state'ment showing an absolute denial on the part of that learned judge that the new cause of action which had been suggested could exist. In answer to the action for defamation for words spoken by counsel in the conduct of a case, it is said that from the time of Queen Elizabeth downward such an action has never been successfully maintained, and within the last thirty years there have been decisions and dicta which are inconsistent with the right to maintain such an action. In the case of the other suggested action, the same answer may also be given, and every objection equally applies. No lawyer has ever heard of such an action having been successfully brought, and it is impossible to suppose that if it could be maintained, the occasion for bringing it has never arisen. In Henderson v. Broomhead, in the part of his judgment immediately proceeding the passage which I have just read, Crompton, J., made the following observatious: "My brother Martin held that even if the slanderous matter was proved to be malicious and false to the knowledge of the defendant, the action would not lie. No action will lie for words spoken or written in the course of any judicial proceeding. In spite of all that can be said against it, we find the rule acted upon from the earliest times. The mischief would be immense if the person aggrieved, instead of preferring an indictment for perjury, could turn his complaint into a civil action. By universal assent it appears that in this country no such action lies. Cresswell, J., pointed out in Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126, that the inconvenience is much less than it would be if the rule were otherwise. The origin of the rule was the great mischief that would result if witnesses in courts of justice were not at liberty to speak freely, subject only to the animadversion of the court. 4 H. & N. 579. It is true that this reasoning in that particular case was only applied to the case of a witness; but the reason of the rule with regard to witnesses is given, and that reason is not peculiar to the case of a witness or a party, for the reason for the privilege is that the words written or spoken are written or spoken in the course of administration of the law. The reason is founded on public policy. Scott v. Stansfield, ubi sup., was the case of a judge. Kelly, C. B., in giving judgment for defendant, said, at page 222: "The question raised upon this record is whether an action is maintainable against the judge of a county court, which is a court of record, for words spoken by him in his judicial character, and in the exercise of his functions as judge in the court over which he presides, where such words would, as against an ordinary individual, constitute a cause of action; and where they are alleged to have been spoken maliciously and without probable cause, and to have been irrelevant to the matter before him." The chief baron then proceeds to lay down that the privilege applies to all judges, whether of superior or inferior courts, and then continues as follows (at page 223): "This provision of the law is not for the protec tion or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. How could a judge so exercise his office if he were in daily and hourly fear of an action being brought against him, and of having the question submitted to a jury whether a matter on which he had commented judicially was or was not relevant to the case before him?" The reason of the privilege is there stated to be public policy. Martin, B., adds (at page 224): "If words spoken under such circumstances were the subject of an action of slander, the most mischievous consequences would ensue; no judge, as my lord has pointed out, would then be able freely to administer justice, for if it were alleged, as is the case here, that he spoke falsely and maliciously, and not bona fide in the discharge of his duty, and what he said was irrelevant to the matter in hand, a jury would have to determine the question whether what he said in the course of a case which he had jurisdiction to try was or was not said under the circumstances so alleged. What judge could try a case with any degree of independence if he were to be afterward subject to have his conduct in the administration of justice commented upon to a jury, and the propriety of it determined by them?" It seems to me that he means not only the question of relevancy, but the whole question, and holds that for the sake of the public benefit, and looking to the balance of conveniences, it is better that a judge should not be subject to any fear in consequence of what he may say in the course of a case which he has to try. It follows therefore that both witnesses and judges are within the rule, and are privileged, although they may be acting from an indirect motive and with malice. The law says if in some particular case this happens, still it is better on the whole to state distinctly that no action will lie. There is a later case as to a witness: Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, ubi sup. The decision proceeded on the assumption that the statements made were false and malicious, and yet it was held that no action would lie. Nothing could be more strong or decisive than that case. What is the ground of the rule thus laid down? The rule was not made in order to protect the witness who makes false and malicious statements, and it does not look to the benefit of the person injured by such statements, but proceeds on the ground of public policy, in order that the administration of law may be free, and that a witness may give evidence with no fear of ever being charged in an action for any thing that he may have said in the course of his evidence. The same point was decided in the Common Pleas Division, and in the Court of Appeal in Seaman v. Netherclif, ubi sup., a case which proceeded on the same ground. We find also that the same rule applies to the case of parties to an action. If it is right for the reasons which have been given, that the privilege should attach to judges though they act with malice and speak falsely, and have no reasonable ground for what they say, how can it be suggested that it is not for the public benefit that counsel should be within the rule? Of all the three class, judges, witnesses and counsel, the person who most wants to have his mind clear from fear of the consequences of what he may say is a counsel who is engaged in the conduct of a case. A counsel is in a position of extreme difficulty, for he has not to speak of the things which he knows; he does not know whether the facts which he is instructed to bring forward are true or false, but he has to argue in favor of the proposition which will best advance the case of his client. If in the midst of these difficulties he is to be called on to consider whether what he desires to say in support of his client's case is relevant to the question at issue, subject to the risk of being liable to an action, if by an error of judgment, or in consequence of incorrect instructions, he makes a statement which turns out not to be relevant, the difficulty of doing his duty will be greatly increased. He wants protection more than the judge or the witness, and he wants it more for the public benefit. In my opinion the reason of the rule covers him, not merely as much as the other classes of persons, but more in order that he may be able to keep his mind free for the performance of his duty. It is illogical to my mind to say that counsel do not want protection. The protection is given not for the benefit of a man who may wish to act with malice; but the reason is that if the rule were otherwise, an innocent counsel would be in danger, and would be put to trouble. It is better that the rule should be made large, even though it may be large enough to cover the case of a man who acts with malice and is guilty of misconduct. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby the judgment of the court of exchequer chamber, which was delivered after the case had been elaborately argued, was a written judgment, and therefore must have been in terms laid before each of the judges who took part in the decision, and each judge must have written on the back of the judgment his assent to the terms which it contains. That judgment lays down the proposition that no action lies for words spoken in legal proceedings against different classes of persons, including counsel. In Rex v. Skinner, Lofft. 55, Lord Mansfield, a master of legal knowledge, and who took pride in laying down principles, states the rule in similar terms. That of itself is a very strong authority; and moreover, Lord Mansfield's rule was brought before the court of exchequer chamber in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L. Rep., 8 Q. B. 264, and was adopted by the court. The reasons for the rule are, I think, more applicable to counsel than to any other persons, and this remark seems to apply to the rule as stated in Kennedy v. Hilliard in the elaborate and learned judgment of Pigot, C. B., a judge of immense learning. He says: “Upon a review of the authorities, it appears to me that the law is correctly laid down in the following proposition, with which Mr. Starkie in his Treatise on Libel and Slander, closes his description of this part of the subject, viz. That an action of slander cannot be main tained for any thing said or otherwise published by either a judge, a party, or a witness in due course of a judicial proceeding, whether criminal or civil.' I take this to be a rule of law, not founded as is the protection in other cases of privileged statements, on the absence of malice in the party sued, but founded on public policy, which requires that a judge in dealing with the matter before him, a party in preferring or resisting a legal proceeding, or a witness in giving evidence oral or written, in a court of justice, shall do so with his mind uninfluenced by the fear of an action for defamation or a prosecution for libel." It seems to me that we may introduce counsel into this statement, and then the rule so stated is the rule of the common law, for the rule requires that a counsel speaking in the conduct of a case in which he is instructed shall do so with his mind uninfluenced by the fear of an action for defamation. If we take that to be the rule, the question of malice, of bona fides, or of relevancy cannot be raised. The only question is whether what is complained of was said in the course of the administration of the law, and if this is so the case must be stopped, for no action can be maintained from the moment the fact is established that what the plaintiff is suing for was said by the defendant acting as counsel in a judicial inquiry in any court of justice. If this rule is applied to the facts of the present case, it becomes clear that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and therefore the judgment must be affirmed. FRY, L. J. I concur with the judgment of the master of the rolls, and will add a very few words. For the purposes of the present argument the facts must be taken to be these: An advocate made a statemeut which was defamatory and false, and was made by reason of malice, but was made when he was speaking as an advocate, and with reference to the case which was being tried, and the question is, is it actionable? It is a remarkable fact, and creditable to the profession, that there is no direct decision to be found upon the point; but although there is not a decision, there are dicta bearing on the question. We have the opinion of Lord Mansfield more than one hundred years ago. In Rex v. Skinner, Lofft. 55, he observed: "What Mr. Lucas (counsel for the defendant) has said is very just; neither party, witness, counsel, jury or judge can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office. If the words spoken are opprobrious or irrelevant to the case the court will take notice of them as a contempt, and examine on information. If any thing of mala mens is found on such inquiry, it will be punished suitably." I read this passage in order to show that in stating the rule as to privilege Lord Mansfield was dealing with cases where the person whose words were complained of was actuated by malice, or mala mens. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby the rule is thus stated in the judgment of the court of exchequer chamber, L. Rep., 8 Q. B. 263: "The authorities are clear, uniform, and conclusive that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against judges, counsel, witnesses or parties, for words written or spoken in the ordinary course of any proceeding before any court or tribunal recognized by law." And in the same judgment the following passage occurs (at p. 268): "But another ground on which this action must fail, and which embraces the great variety of cases in which statements made. whether orally or in writing, are privileged and protected, is that by reason of the occasion on which they are made, the making of them is not such a publication as will support an action for libel or slander. On this ground, whatever is said, however false or in jurious to the character or interests of a complainant, by judges upon the bench, whether in the Superior Courts of law or equity, or in the County Courts, or Sessions of the Peace, by counsel at the bar in pleading causes, or by witnesses in giving evidence, or by not exceeding two thousand dollars." Held, that where a sheriff has failed to renew his bond within the limited time, all his acts prior to proceedings by the act directed to be taken to declare the office vacant, are valid as to the public and third persons. members of the Legislature in either House of Parlia-MO ment, or by ministers of the Crown in advising the Sovereign is absolutely privileged, and cannot be inquired into in an action at law for defamation." Although these statements were not necessary for the decision of the particular cases, still they are of the highest importance and value, and in my opinion they declare the common law. The analogous cases are those of witnesses, of judges, and of parties. As to judges the cases establish this proposition, that a defamatory statement made by a judge, which is false and malicious, and for which there is no reasonable or probable cause, is not actionable, and a similar rule prevails with regard to a witness. Why should a judge who degrades his office by his misconduct, and is guilty of conduct of the worst description, be protected, and why should a witness, who is guilty of perjury, and actuated by malice, makes a false statement affecting the character or interests of some other person, be protected? The reason is not because the conduct of those persons ought not to be actionable, but because actions would be brought where there was no malice and no improper conduct. We must bear in mind that the rule was not made in order to protect those who are actuated by malice and speak falsely, but because others would be liable to be vexed by actions. Both analogy and convenience apply the rule to the case of counsel. The court has control over the proceedings before it, and has stringent powers for the purpose of preventing abuses, and if such an action could be maintained no person acting as counsel would be free from the apprehension of being harassed for what he might feel himself called upon to say in the performance of his duty. On every ground I am of opinion that such an action ought not to be maintained. At the same time the decision we have arrived at shows how strong the duty is in foro conscientiæ not to abuse the privilege of counsel. Brett, M. R. I wish to add, as to what was said by Lord Denman in Kendillon v. Maltby, Car. & Marsh, 402, that as is obvious from judgment, we do not agree with it. Judgment affirmed. FORFEITURE OF OFFICE BY FAILURE TO NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1883. CLARK V. ENNIS.* When a statute declares that if a sheriff shall not renew his OTION to quash the service and return of writ of summons, on the ground that the sheriff serving the same was not authorized to serve. The facts appear in the opinion. R. V. Lindabury, for plaintiff. F. Bergen, for defendant. VAN SYCKEL, J. In this case summons was issued on the 27th of December, 1882, returnable on the 30th day of the same month. It was on the same day served by Thomas Forsyth, as sheriff of the county of Union, on the defendant, and duly returned. Motion is made to quash the service and return on the ground that Forsyth had no authority to act as sheriff. For the purposes of the motion it is admitted that Forsyth was elected sheriff of the county of Union at the annual election of members of the general assembly in the year 1881; that he gave bond, took the oath of office, and was regularly commissioned within the time prescribed by law, and that he thereupon entered upon the office of sheriff of said county, and has discharged the duties and received the emoluments of the same ever since. Subject to exception on the part of the plaintiff as to its competency, it is further admitted that Forsyth did not renew his bond in November, 1882, but that he did renew it on December 27, 1882, before the service of said summons, and that said renewal in all respects complied with the requirements of the statute, save as to time only; and further, that said new bond bears date on November 13, 1882, and was filed on the day of its execution and before the service of said summons. The Constitution of this State provides that "sheriffs and coroners shall be elected by the people of their respective counties at the elections for members of the general assembly, and they shall hold their offices for three years, after which three years must elapse before they can be again capable of serving. Sheriffs shall annually renew their bonds." The motion to quash is based on the provisions of the second and tenth sections of our sheriff's act. The second section provides, "that the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas in the several counties of this State, shall meet at the office of the clerk of the said court, in their respective counties, on the first Tuesday after the close of the annual election of members of the general assembly, on the penalty of fifty dollars for each defaulter, to be sued for and recovered by the collector of the said county, and applied to the use of the same, and which time and place the sheriff for the time being, or sheriff elect, as the case may be, of the same county, is hereby required and enjoined to attend, with the certificate of his election, and not less than five sufficient sureties, being freeholders and residents in the same county, to be approved of by the judges then met, or the major part of them, and then and there, before the said judges, with such approved sureties, shall enter into bond for the faithful execution of his office, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, or in such greater sum, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, as the said judges, or the major part of them may order." It is also provided in the same section that the bond shall be approved by the judges and filed in the office of the county clerk. The tenth section provides, "that if any sheriff for the time being of any county shall neglect, refuse, or be unable to give bond with sureties as aforesaid, agreeably to the directions of this act, at the time or times herein limited, the office of such sheriff shall immediately expire, and be deemed and taken to be vacant, and if such sheriff shall thereafter presume to execute the office of sheriff, then all such his acts and proceedings done under color of office shall be absolutely void, and he shall for such offense be liable to be indicted for a misdemeanor, and on conviction, fined in any sum not exceeding two thousand dollars." This section unquestionably applies to the failure to give the renewal bond required to be executed annually. The defendant insists that by the mere operation and effect of the statute, the office of Forsyth expired on his omission to renew his bond on the 14th day of November, 1882, and that all his official acts since that time, under color of said office, are absolutely void, not only as to the sheriff himself, but also as to the public and third persons. It is important to be observed that by the second section the judges of the Court of Common Pleas are required, under a penalty for default, to meet at the clerk's office, in their respective counties, on the first Tuesday after the close of the annual election for members of the general assembly, at which time and place the sheriff is enjoined to attend, with the certificate of his election and not less than five sufficient sureties, to be approved by said judges, and then and there enter into bond for the faithful execution of his office. No record is required to be made of this proceeding other than the approval of the judges indorsed on the bond and the filing of said bond in the clerk's office. The sheriff complies with the requirements of the law by appearing with five sufficient sureties ready to execute his bond, and if the judges of the court fail to attend, there will be no entry, record, or writing to show whether or not the sheriff has performed his duty. No inference therefore that the sheriff is in default can properly be drawn from the fact that a renewal bond is not filed in the clerk's office as required by the statute. Forsyth was in office under a commission for three years, the tenure fixed by the Constitution. The renewal of his bond was not a condition precedent to the taking of his office. His failure to renew operated as a defeasance. It is clear, I think, both upon reason and authority, that a statute declaring an office vacant for some act or omission of the incumbent, after he enters upon his duties, does not execute itself. Whether the cause of forfeiture has arisen, whether the default in this case is the default of the court or the sheriff, is a question to be determined upon the application of legal rules to facts to be ascertained and settled in the due course of proceeding, in the presence of the officer to be affected. The law of Alabama provides that the sheriff's bond must be filed in fifteen days after election, and that if he fails to give bond within the limited time, he vacates his office. In Ex parte Candee, 48 Ala. 386, it was held that the failure to file the bond within fifteen days after election did not vacate the office. That such failure might be a cause of forfeiture and vacancy, which could be taken advantage of and inforced by the State in a proper judicial inquiry instituted for that purpose. In State v. Cooper, 53 Miss. 615, it is said: "Although the statute declares that if the oath be not taken, and bond executed within a time named, the office shall be vacant, yet if the person elected or appointed has entered upon the office, and the proper authorities have taken no steps to remove him, the statute does not work that effect." In Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674, the statute being as hereinbefore mentioned, it was said: "A failure of the sheriff to renew his bond within the time prescribed by law only renders him liable to a proceeding for forfeiture, but does no, per se, operate, etc., his instantaneous removal from office." In Kentucky the law declares that if a sheriff shall fail to take the oath of office and give bonds within thirty days after notice of election, his office shall be considered vacant. In Stokes v. Kirkpatrick, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 138, a motion was made to set aside the return of a summons, on the ground that the sheriff had not filed his bond. The court said: "The provisions of the act cannot be construed as abrogating the ancient and well-established rules and principles applicable to the vacation or forfeiture of offices, according to which such vacancy or forfeiture can be declared only by a direct proceeding." In State v. Toomer, 7 Rich. 216, it is said that the laws of South Carolina provide that the sheriff shall, within three weeks after his election, tender his bond to the proper officers for approval, and immediately thereafter deposit the same with the treasurer, and sue out his commission, "and upon his neglect or failure to do so within the said time, his office shall be deemed absolutely vacant, and shall be filled by election or appointment, as heretofore provided." And it is further provided that the sheriff shall, within ten days after receipt of his commission, take certain prescribed oaths, "and unless the said oaths be so taken, indorsed and subscribed within ten days from the issuing of said commission, the said commission shall be utterly null and void, and the said office deemed absolutely vacant." The sheriff did not take out his commission or give bond, or make oath until some time after the limited period. The suit was on the bond. The court said. "To hold the office forfeited for failure to file the bond, etc., absolutely, and in a collateral proceeding, would be to come in conflict with every respectable judicial adjudication on this branch of the law; for in all these we find the doctrine broadly affirmed that the only efficacy that is imparted to the official title by a strict compliance with the provisions of the act, such as the execution of the bond, etc., is merely to protect it against forfeiture at the instance of the State. But if instead of enforcing the forfeiture the State sees fit to excuse the delinquency of the officer, the defects in his title, whatever they may be, are completely cured. *** The only acts he omitted to do in order to complete his de jure title were the filing of the bond and suing out of the commission. These were matters however which alone concerned the State, and with which the public had nothing to do. * * * He had a de facto titlethe only one in which the public had any interest." In Crawford v. Howard, 9 Ga. 314, a sheriff was elected, entered upon the duties of his office, but did not give bond until after thirty days. The law declared that if he did not give bond within thirty days "his office shall be vacant." The court said: "The judgment of the law 18 that if he fails to qualify, he forfeits the rights to the office under his election, but the proper officers of the law must pronounce the judgment of forfeiture, then he would be an usurper, and after that his acts would be void. Upon quo warranto we do not doubt that it would be competent for him to show that the irregularity in giving the bond was without fault on his part." In State v. Carneall, 10 Ark. 156, the court held that an officer installed into office cannot, within the cou stitutional period of his term, be deposed from office |